



On the Publication of Defense of Japan 2014

Minister of Defense

Itsunori Onodera

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The National Security Council was launched at the end of last year. Also, Japan's first ever National Security Strategy (NSS) and, in accordance with the NSS, new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) were approved. Moreover, basic orientation for the development of seamless security legislation to ensure Japan's survival and protect its people was approved as a Cabinet decision this July, in order to resolutely secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people, and contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community. On this milestone year of the 60th anniversary, the Ministry will take the first step to realizing a new form of defense forces.

The 60-year history of the Ministry and the SDF is precisely a chronicle of the path Japan has taken as a peace-loving nation. Japan will maintain its own security, peace and stability in the region, and the international community, adhering to the course it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation under the policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation.

The activities of the SDF for securing the lives and property of the Japanese people and the sovereignty of Japan's territorial land, waters, and airspace are becoming ever more critical amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan. Since taking office as Minister of Defense, I have made a point of visiting as many SDF camps and bases as possible from as far north as Hokkaido to as far south as Okinawa. Furthermore, I visited the Philippines in December 2013 and made the first visit

by a Japanese Defense Minister to Djibouti and South Sudan in May 2014. I offered words of encouragement to our personnel engaged in international disaster relief operations, anti-piracy operations, and peace-keeping operations. Our SDF personnel are carrying out their duties sincerely in an orderly manner and with high morale even in harsh environment.



The domestic and international environment surrounding the Ministry and the SDF has changed dramatically over the last 60 years. However, some things still have not changed, one of them being that the understanding of the people remains essential for national defense. Indeed, it was based on this belief that in 1970 then-Director General of the Japan Defense Agency Yasuhiro Nakasone published the inaugural issue of the Defense of Japan. The Defense of Japan has been published annually since 1976, and this year's marks the milestone 40th issue. Very few other countries explain their defense policies through the annual publication of whitepapers. Due to Japan's publication of the Defense of Japan over many years, the transparency of Japan's defense is praised internationally. Not content with the status quo, we will continue to produce high quality defense whitepapers to further deepen the understanding about Japan's defense policy by the Japanese people and other countries.

This year's edition of Defense of Japan includes a feature article at the beginning, which takes a look back at the history of the whitepaper as well as of the Ministry and SDF. The "Dynamic Joint Defense Force" to be developed as set out in the new NDPG is also explained in a clear manner. In addition, this year's publication includes new topics, such as the review of Japan's security legislation. Furthermore, efforts are made to further familiarize readers with the SDF. I hope that this issue will be read by as many people as possible.



On the Publication of the 40th Issue of the Defense of Japan

Former Director General of the Defense Agency
Former Prime Minister of Japan

Yasuhiro Nakasone

I was the 26th Director General of the Defense Agency from January 1970 to July of the following year. One of the projects I devoted much effort to during my tenure was the publication of the Defense of Japan.

Although the possibility of publishing a whitepaper was considered at the Defense Agency even before I became the Director General, it had not been realized. The Japanese people at that time were wary about war and associated the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) with the former military. It was a time when the antipathy towards the SDF was still very much strong. At the Agency, many people had deep-rooted hesitations about publishing a whitepaper from fears that it would become a target of questioning from opposition parties at the Diet and invite unnecessary suspicions from the public. For the Directors General of the Defense Agency who preceded me, the whitepaper was in a sense almost a taboo subject matter.

What drove me to push for the publication of the whitepaper was my conviction that the understanding, proactive support, and cooperation of the public are, above all, essential for the defense of Japan. For this reason, I aspired to bring the Defense Agency and the SDF to the “public sphere” and encourage discussions about defense issues in people’s living rooms. Therefore, I spurred the officials in charge to publish a whitepaper, and I myself took up a pen and made revisions to the manuscript. On October 20, 1970, the first issue of Defense of Japan was finally distributed at the Cabinet meeting.

A series of Defense of Japan has been published, and now we are at the 40th issue. In the course of the many years, the public perception of the SDF has also changed considerably. While it may be hard to believe now, when the inaugural issue was published, people still had minimal understanding and awareness about defense, to the point that SDF personnel were turned away from taking university entrance exams and enrolling into universities. However, the people today see for themselves that the SDF are at the front line of national security and working hard for national defense and disaster relief work. Today, the SDF is an organization that has earned the deep trust of the people. Nothing can make me happier than this as one of the members that started the Defense of Japan to promote understanding of the SDF.

The 20th century was a century of war. The 21st century must not repeat this tragedy. At present, the global situation is at a major turning point, and the security situation is in a state of chaos. Under such circumstances, the need to discuss defense issues in the “public sphere” through the Defense of Japan is perhaps even greater now than when the whitepaper was launched. What defense policies should Japan adopt to protect peace and prosperity in Japan and throughout the world? I hope that many people will read the Defense of Japan, also in the sense of aspiring to secure and safeguard the people’s livelihood and pursue the further development and prosperity of Japan and the rest of the world.


Overview

Overview p. 2

- ◆ The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, being encompassed by various challenges and destabilizing factors, which are becoming more tangible and acute.
- ◆ Opaque and uncertain factors such as issues of territorial rights and reunification remain in the vicinity of Japan. There is also an increase in the number of so-called “gray-

zone” situations, that is, neither purely peacetime nor contingencies, over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests, etc. In addition, there are clearer trends for neighboring states to modernize and reinforce their military capabilities and to intensify their military activities. As such, security issues and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region including the area surrounding Japan are becoming more serious.

Recent Security Related Issues around Japan



A bomber of the Chinese Armed Forces that flew through the airspace between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advanced to the Pacific Ocean

The United States


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- ◆ Despite its changing influence in relative terms, the United States remains the world's most powerful nation, and it is believed to consistently play a significant role in ensuring peace and stability throughout the world.
- ◆ In the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released in 2014, the United States expressed its intention to continue to uphold the policy of placing the Asia-Pacific region at the focus of U.S. strategy, including the National Security Strategy (rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region), as articulated in the Defense Strategic Guidance, as well as to strengthen its relations with allies in the region and expand its collaboration with partners.
- ◆ The 2014 QDR states that the centerpiece of the Department of Defense's commitment to the rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region is to modernize and enhance security alliances with

countries including Japan. Furthermore, it states that 60% of U.S. Navy assets will be stationed in the Pacific by 2020 including enhancements to its critical naval presence in Japan, and the Air Force will move forces such as ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) assets to the region.

- ◆ Meanwhile, the government budget sequestration, including defense spending, which was initiated in 2013, has had various impacts on the U.S. Forces. The QDR also emphasizes the considerable risks that mandatory sequestration would have on U.S. Forces, and much attention will be paid to how the mandatory sequestration cuts in defense spending will impact U.S. defense strategies and security strategies.

U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region





North Korea


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General Situation

- ◆ On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two—north and south—for more than half a century. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.6 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ).
- ◆ North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities, and repeatedly uses militarily provocative words and actions. Such military trend in North Korea is heightening tension in the Korean Peninsula, and constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but of the entire region and the international community. Therefore, Japan needs to pay utmost attention to such activities.

Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles

- ◆ North Korea is deemed to be developing nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for maintaining the existing regime.
- ◆ It is believed that North Korea is working to develop a nuclear weapon to mount on a ballistic missile as part of its nuclear weapons program. In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile requires a considerably high degree of technological capacity. However, considering the fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s and that North Korea conducted a nuclear test in February 2013, it is difficult to eliminate the possibility that North Korea has achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquired nuclear warheads.
- ◆ North Korea's nuclear weapons development, considered in conjunction with the enhancement of its ballistic missile capabilities, poses a grave threat to Japan's security and significantly impairs peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the international community. Therefore, they can never be tolerated.
- ◆ North Korea appears to give high priority to the development of ballistic missiles out of political and diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of earning foreign currency, in addition to enhancing its military capabilities.
- ◆ The details of the new missile KN08 which was showcased at the military parade in April 2012 and July 2013 are unknown. However, the missile is believed to be an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
- ◆ In March, June, and July 2014, North Korea launched multiple ballistic missiles towards the Sea of Japan and conducted military provocations.
- ◆ The development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and missiles by North Korea constitutes, coupled with provocative words and actions, including missile attacks against Japan, a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan. Additionally, such development poses a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to the non-proliferation of weapons, including WMDs.



Domestic Affairs

- ◆ The years following the transition to the Kim Jong-un regime have seen many changes in personnel, especially at high levels of the military and the cabinet, reportedly aimed at strengthening the power base of First Chairman Kim Jong-un.
- ◆ Following on from 2012, many personnel reshuffles were carried out from 2013 to June 2014 with the three key military posts, namely, the Director of General Political Department being replaced once, the Chief of the General Staff being replaced twice, and the Minister of the People's Armed Forces being replaced twice. As a result of such reshuffles, all of the three key military posts have come to be held by individuals selected by First Chairman Kim Jong-un.
- ◆ In December 2013, Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission and First Chairman Kim Jong-un's uncle, was executed. It is believed that by executing Vice-Chairman Jang Song-thaek who was considered to be the guardian of First Chairman Kim Jong-un, the First Chairman endeavored to strengthen and consolidate his regime as its sole leader.
- ◆ North Korea faces chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages.
- ◆ North Korea announced the establishment of economic development zones. In addition, according to reports, a new economic policy is under way to enlarge the discretion of plants and other entities over production and sales plans. These all suggest North Korea is placing importance on the rebuilding of the economy.



China


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- ◆ China is strongly expected to recognize its responsibility in the international community, accept and comply with international norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative manner on regional and global issues.
- ◆ During the third plenary session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2013, the session adopted “The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms” regarding reforms in a wide range of areas. Through the Decision, the Central Committee decided to establish a central leading team for comprehensively deepening reform, which is deemed responsible for the overall design of the reform. The team held its first meeting in January 2014. How these reforms will take shape, including how China will deal with corruption problems within the party, will be a point to watch out for going forward.
- ◆ It is believed that China is enhancing its asymmetric military capabilities to deter military forces of other countries from approaching and advancing to China’s surrounding region, and to inhibit their military activities in the region (so-called “Anti-Access/Area Denial” [“A2/AD”] capabilities).
- ◆ China has been strengthening its military forces broadly and rapidly. Furthermore, China has been rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities in the seas and airspace, including the


East China Sea and South China Sea. China has adopted so-called assertive measures, including attempts to alter the status quo by coercive measures, especially for issues involving conflicting maritime interests. Japan has great concerns over such Chinese military activities, etc., together with the lack of transparency in its military affairs and security issues, and needs to pay utmost attention to them. These activities also raise security concerns for the region and the international community.

- ◆ China has not disclosed specific information on possession of weapons, procurement goals and past procurements, organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, and a detailed breakdown of the national defense budget. It is hoped that China will increase transparency concerning its military affairs by such efforts as disclosing specific information pertaining to its defense policies and military capabilities.
- ◆ The Chinese national defense budget continues to increase at a rapid pace. Its nominal size has grown approximately 40-fold over the past 26 years and almost quadrupled in size over the past ten years.

Change in China's Announced Defense Budget



Recent Chinese Activities in Airspace near Japan (The flight paths shown are an illustration)



- ◆ Even after China put into commission the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" in September 2012, China seems to be continuing training of carrier-based aircraft pilots and research and development of necessary technologies including the development of a domestic carrier based fighter, J-15, such as its takeoff and landing tests on the "Liaoning." In November 2013, the carrier sailed in the South China Sea for the first time and conducted sea trials in this sea area. Some analysts point out that China may also be constructing its first domestic aircraft carrier.
- ◆ China is developing the J-20 and J-31, which are pointed out to become next-generation fighters.
- ◆ The Chinese government announced that it established "the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)" including the Senkaku Islands which China described as if they were a part of China's "territory," that it obligated aircraft flying in the said zone to abide by the rules set forth by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, and that the Chinese Armed Forces would take "defensive emergency measures" in the case where such aircraft does not follow the instructed procedures. Japan is deeply concerned about such measures, which are profoundly dangerous acts that unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea, escalating the situation, and that may cause unintended consequences in the East China Sea. Furthermore, the measures unduly infringe the freedom of overflight over the high seas, which is the general principle of international law.

Japan is demanding China to revoke any measures that could infringe upon the freedom of overflight over the high seas. The United States, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and the European Union have expressed concern about China's establishment of such zone.

- ◆ One of the objectives of China's maritime activities is thought to be to weaken the control of other countries over the islands to which China claims territorial sovereignty, while strengthening the claim of its territorial sovereignty, through various surveillance activities and use of force in the seas and airspace surrounding the islands.



Russia

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- ◆ How President Putin will gain broader support in the country and handle issues concerning the modernization including structural reform of the economy while maintaining his power base will be the focus of attention.
- ◆ In March 2014, after Russia took effective control of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, a referendum was held, asking Crimean citizens if they wanted Crimea to be annexed by Russia. Following the referendum, Russia “annexed” Crimea. The United States, European countries, and Japan condemned the referendum as it violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and is in violation of international laws, and have refused to recognize the “annexation” of Crimea. Said countries have expressed the view that Russia’s changing of the status quo by force or coercion is a global issue that also impacts Asia and elsewhere.
- ◆ Activities by Russian Armed Forces in the vicinity of Japan are on the rise, including exercises and drills that are believed to have objectives such as verification of the results of military reform.

Southeast Asia

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- ◆ In the South China Sea, there are territorial disputes between ASEAN member states and China, and in recent years, Chinese naval vessels and government vessels have been operating in this sea area. There were reports that in May 2014, China’s unilateral commencement of oil drilling triggered confrontations between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels, and many vessels sustained damages due to collisions.
- ◆ In recent years, against the backdrop of economic development, etc., Southeast Asian countries have been increasing their defense spending and modernizing their militaries focusing on introducing major equipment for their naval and air forces, such as submarines and fighters including a fourth-generation modern fighter.

Disputes in the Middle East and Africa and the Response from the International Community

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
- ◆ In recent years, there are greater risks in terms of security issues that occur in one country or region turn into security issues and instability factors impacting the overall international community.
- ◆ In particular, the Middle East and Africa have seen outbreaks of disputes triggered by various factors including ethnicity religion, territory, and resources.
- ◆ It has become increasingly important for the international community to discern the character of such complex and diverse conflicts, to consider international frameworks and involvements in accordance with their particular circumstances, and then to seek out appropriate responses.

Outer Space and Security

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- ◆ Major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing their C⁴ISR functions, among others. Such satellites include image reconnaissance satellites reconnoitering military facilities and targets, signals intelligence satellites for military communications and radio wave gathering, communication satellites for military communication, and positioning satellites for navigating naval vessels and aircraft and enhancing the precision of weapons systems.
- ◆ The risk towards the stable use of outer space has become one of the critical security challenges facing countries.

*C⁴ISR: Stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.



Debris created by a Chinese anti-satellite test (in one month)
White line indicates the orbit of the International Space Station (NASA)

Trends Concerning Cyberspace

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- ◆ For armed forces, information and communications form the foundation for command and control which extends all the way from central command to ground-level forces, and the information and communications technology (ICT) advancement is further enhancing the dependence of units on information and communication networks.
- ◆ Cyber attacks are being regarded as an asymmetrical strategy capable of mitigating the strengths of enemies by exploiting weak points in enemy armed forces, and it is said that many foreign militaries are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace.
- ◆ Under such circumstances, cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against the information and communications networks of governmental organizations and armed forces of various countries. It has been pointed out that governmental agencies and other organizations of China, Russia, and North Korea have been involved.

Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology as well as Defense Production and Technological Base

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- ◆ Countries supporting high-tech troops work on improving the destructive capabilities of their weapons, precision guidance technology, information-related technology including C⁴ISR, and unmanned technology (e.g. drones) to be able to carry out more precise and effective attacks. They also work on research and development activities on improved stealth capacity to increase opportunities for preemptive attacks, stealth technology for reducing risks for attrition of combat capabilities through improved survivability, and nanotechnology used for parts and materials related to these technologies.
- ◆ In order to maintain and enhance their defense production and technological bases, the United States and European countries are realigning their defense industries, as well as jointly developing and producing and promoting technological collaboration related to defense equipment. Furthermore, many countries take measures for promoting the overseas exports of defense equipment.

Basic Policies for the Development of New Security Legislation

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- ◆ In May 2014, the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security submitted its report, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe presented a basic orientation regarding the way forward for the examination of this issue.
- ◆ Discussions have been repeatedly held in the ruling parties, and examination has also been conducted by the government. On July 1, 2014, the government approved the Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People.



Prime Minister Abe holding a press conference following the approval of the Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People (Cabinet Public Relations Office)

Establishment of National Security Council

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A National Security Council meeting (Cabinet Public Relations Office)

- ◆ In December 2013, the National Security Council was created. The Council functions as the control tower of Japan's foreign and defense policies.

National Security Strategy

Chapter 3 p. 132

- ◆ In December 2013, Japan's first National Security Strategy was decided. The Strategy sets out Japan's basic policy on national security.
- ◆ Japan will work to realize its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region

from Japan's stance as a Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of international cooperation. Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community.

New National Defense Program Guidelines

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◆ The “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond” (new NDPG) were established in December 2013 following examinations at the MOD, the National Security Council, and other fora.

Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

- ◆ Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the SDF needs to respond to various situations which require SDF commitments. The frequency of such situations and the duration of responses are both increasing.
- ◆ Japan needs to enhance its deterrence and response capability by conducting tailored activities swiftly and sustainably based on joint operations, as well as by developing defense capabilities adequate both in quality and quantity that underpin various activities to realize a more robust defense force.
- ◆ From a comprehensive perspective, the defense force should prioritize particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation as a whole. The defense force also must be an effective one which enables conducting a diverse range of activities to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they demand.
- ◆ Japan will build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for C3I, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF's operation.

Japan's Basic Defense Policy

- ◆ Along the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, the following three approaches will be promoted: (1) Japan's own efforts; (2) Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and (3) Active promotion of security cooperation.

The Role of the Defense Force

- ◆ Effective deterrence of and response to various situations
- ◆ Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific region and improvement of global security environments
- ◆ In order to effectively fulfill these roles, the defense force will be built up by prioritizing those functions and capabilities that should be prioritized from the perspective of joint operations. The SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities.



International emergency relief activities in the Philippines

Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

- ◆ Approximately half of the SDF's divisions and brigades will be reorganized into rapid deployment divisions and rapid deployment brigades comprised of units, including rapidly rapid deployment regiments, furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities to increase their rapid deployment capabilities.
- ◆ The GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable units sustaining specialized functions to effectively perform amphibious operations.

Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)



New destroyer (image)

- ◆ The number of destroyers will be increased. New destroyers (with additional multifunctional capability and compact-type hull) will be introduced. Two Aegis-equipped destroyers will be added, giving the fleet eight destroyers.
- ◆ The MSDF will continue to increase the number of submarine units.
- ◆ The MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1/P-3C) units by continuing to acquire the P-1 aircraft.

Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

- ◆ By consolidating warning and control operations at air defense command centers, the ASDF will gradually change warning groups into warning squadrons. The ASDF will establish one new squadron in the air warning unit.
- ◆ The 13th squadron will be newly established, and one squadron of the Air Reconnaissance Unit will be abolished. Two squadrons will be added to the fighter aircraft units at Naha Air Base.
- ◆ One squadron will be added to the aerial refueling and transport units, increasing their number of squadrons to two.



F-35A fighter

Basic Foundation for the SDF



Capping ceremony of nurses

- ◆ A broad range of areas that constitute the basic foundation for the SDF will be strengthened, including training and exercises, operational infrastructure, personnel and education, medical, defense production and technological bases, efficient acquisition of equipment, research and development, collaboration with local communities, boosting communication capabilities, enhancing the intellectual base, and promoting reform of the MOD.


New Medium Term Defense Program

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- ◆ Taking into account the new NDPG, a new Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) was established for the FY2014-FY2018 period.
- ◆ The MTDP stipulates among other items: the reorganization of the major SDF units; major programs regarding SDF's capabilities,

including the strengthening of the defense posture in the southwest region; measures for strengthening the Japan-U.S. security arrangements; quantities of major procurement; and expenditures.

Example of Rapid Deployment to the Southwest Area



Dynamic Joint Defense Force Committee

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
- ◆ The Dynamic Joint Defense Force Committee, at the instruction of the Minister of Defense, carries out essential initiatives for proactively building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, while assessing and verifying the progress of various measures laid out in the new NDPG and new MTDP.



Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2014

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- ◆ Japan is steadily building up its defense capability in FY2014, which serves as the first fiscal year under the new NDPG and new MTDP, to establish a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, based on these programs.
- ◆ The defense capability will be built up so that Japan's defense forces will seamlessly and dynamically fulfill their responsibilities including: (1) providing an effective deterrence and response to a variety of security situations; and (2) supporting stability in the Asia-Pacific, and improving the global security environment.




Rescue ship for responding to various missions including disaster relief (conceptual image)

Defense-Related Expenditures

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- ◆ In FY2014, in light of the increasingly severe security environment, defense-related expenditures were increased following-on from FY2013, in order to strengthen the posture for protecting the lives and property of the Japanese people and Japan's territorial land, waters, and airspace.

Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years



Efficient Deterrence and Response


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Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan


- ◆ The SDF routinely and continuously engages in surveillance activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan in peacetime to respond to various emergencies promptly and seamlessly.
- ◆ The MSDF patrols the waters in peacetime, using P-3C patrol aircraft to monitor the vessels that sail through the waters. The ASDF uses radar sites, early warning aircraft, and other equipment to carry out warning and surveillance over Japan and its surrounding airspace. In major channels, GSDF coastal surveillance units, MSDF guard posts, among other units, conduct surveillance.
- ◆ In 2013, there were eight incidents of activity by Chinese Navy vessels involving the passage through the southwestern region, and four incidents of such activity were also confirmed in waters south



P-3C patrol aircraft conducting a warning and surveillance flight



Destroyer crew engaged in warning and surveillance




ASDF personnel getting aboard F-15 Fighter for scramble

of Okinawa. Moreover, Chinese government vessels have intermittently intruded into territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. In recent years, activities by Chinese Navy vessels and government vessels have expanded and intensified rapidly. In response to this situation, the MOD and SDF are working more closely with relevant ministries and agencies, including sharing information with the Japan Coast Guard.

- ◆ If any aircraft suspected of violating Japan's territorial airspace is detected, the ASDF scrambles fighters and other aircraft to verify the situation and take other responses.
- ◆ In August 2013, a TU-95 bomber of the Russian Air Force intruded into Japanese airspace. In September of that year, an unmanned aircraft (presumed) of unknown nationality flew over the East China Sea. The ASDF scrambled fighters to respond to these incidents.
- ◆ Even after China's establishment of the "East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone" in November of the same year, the MOD and SDF have been implementing warning and surveillance activities as before, and will continue to take rigorous airspace anti-intrusion measures.




Russian TU-95 bomber that intruded into Japanese airspace




Unmanned aircraft (presumed) of unknown nationality that flew over the East China Sea

Number of Scrambles since the Period of the Cold War and Its Breakdown




Chapter 1 Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People and Secure the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) for Japan and Neighboring Countries



Example Flight Patterns of Russian and Chinese Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded



Defense of Japan's Offshore Islands

- ◆ In order to respond to attacks on offshore islands, the MOD deploys units, and detects signs at an early stage through activities conducted in peacetime including intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance activities. Through joint operations that integrate GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, units are swiftly deployed and concentrated to intercept and defeat enemy invasion. Should islands be captured without any signs detected in advance, the enemy will be brought under control by ground fire from aircraft and vessels. Tactical operations will then be implemented to recapture the islands by landing GSDF, etc.
- ◆ Initiatives are taken to strengthen the defense foundation from peacetime, including the establishment of a coast observation unit, area security units in the southwest region, and addition of a squadron to the fighter units at Naha Air Base.
- ◆ In order to intercept and defeat invasion, the SDF will newly introduce rapid deployment brigade possessing mobile combat vehicles transportable by the C-2 transport aircraft, and thereby strengthen its air operation capacity. Furthermore, in order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, transport vessels will be improved and tilt-rotor aircraft will be introduced.
- ◆ In order to land, recapture and secure any remote islands that might be invaded, amphibious rapid deployment brigade (provisional name) with sufficient amphibious operational capabilities will be established .



U.S. Forces' Osprey landing on destroyer Hyuga

Efficient Deterrence and Response

Chapter 1 p.180

Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

- ◆ Japan's ballistic missile defense (BMD) is an effective multi-tier defense system in which Aegis destroyers and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) are both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).
- ◆ To strengthen this arrangement, improvements are being made to the BMD system, including by installing BMD capability to two "Atago" -class destroyers, increasing the capability of the Patriot system (improvement of its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system so as to equip it with new advanced intercept missiles (PAC-3 MSE) [Missile Segment Enhancement] that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and for BMD), and increasing the number of Aegis BMD destroyers (increasing this number by two). By FY2015, all six air defense missile groups will be equipped with PAC-3.
- ◆ ASDF Kyogamisaki sub-base was designated as the deployment site for the 2nd TPY-2 radar in Japan, and necessary facilities and areas were furnished to the United States in December 2013.
- ◆ In both 2013 and 2014, North Korea repeatedly engaged in provocative acts, including the implication of missile launch towards Japan. The MOD and SDF continue to take all necessary measures.



Destroyer Kirishima launching an SM-3

Response to Cyber Attacks



Cyber Defense Group inauguration event



SDF personnel working at the Cyber Defense Group

- ◆ The SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command is continuously monitoring SDF communications networks. Comprehensive measures are being taken, including introduction of intrusion prevention systems, development of defense systems, formulation of measures focused on developing human resources and technological infrastructure, enactment of regulations for responding to cyber attacks, and research on cutting-edge technology.
- ◆ In March 2014, a "Cyber Defense Group" was established under the SDF C4 Systems Command, in order to appropriately deal with the threat posed by cyber attacks which are growing increasingly sophisticated and complicated, and the system for countering cyber attacks was enhanced and strengthened.
- ◆ Japan established frameworks of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with relevant countries, including Japan's ally the United States, and contributes proactively to the efforts of the entire international community.

Chapter 1 Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People and Secure the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Response to Various Disasters

◆ When disasters such as natural disasters occur, the SDF works in collaboration with municipal governments, engaging in the search for and rescue of disaster victims or missing ships or aircraft, controlling floods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and relief supplies. Over 100,000 SDF personnel were dispatched at a peak time for relief operations for the large-scale earthquake and nuclear disaster experienced during the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011.



SDF personnel engaged in a disaster relief activity following heavy snowfall (Kosuge Village, Yamanashi Prefecture)

◆ The SDF has put in place arrangements for an initial response to ensure that disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. This is called “FAST-Force.”



GSDF personnel engaged in a disaster relief activity in Izu Oshima

◆ In October 2013, a total of 64,000 SDF personnel were dispatched to deal with a large-scale landslide which occurred in Izu Oshima as a result of the approaching Typhoon No. 26. In February 2014, a total of 12,000 SDF personnel were dispatched to help areas where households became isolated due to severe road damages caused by heavy snow.

◆ For responses to large-scale earthquakes that are under consideration at the Central Disaster Management Council, the SDF established the “Plan for Countermeasures against Nankai Trough Earthquake” in December 2013.

Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.

◆ In the event of disasters, insurgency, and other emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense is authorized to transport Japanese nationals and other persons from overseas upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and subsequent consultations with the Foreign Minister.

◆ A bill to revise the Self-Defense Forces Act was passed by the Diet in November 2013, containing matters such as the addition of vehicles as a means of transport, expansion of the scope of people the SDF may transport, and expansion of locations where the SDF may use weapons and the scope of people the SDF may protect. The revised Act entered into force on November 22.

◆ Accordingly, it was decided that transport protection vehicles with superior performance against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) would be introduced for ground transport.



Transport protection vehicle (MRAP)



Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Chapter 2 p.223

- ◆ Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, together with Japan's own efforts, constitute the cornerstone of Japan's security.
- ◆ The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.
- ◆ As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, and the United States, at the same time, maintains and strengthens its engagement and presence in the Asia-Pacific region, it has become more important than ever to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the security of Japan.



Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and U.S. President Barack Obama at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April 2014 in Tokyo (Cabinet Public Relations Office)

Initiatives to Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Chapter 2 p.228

Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises



Aircraft of the ASDF and U.S. Air Force flying in formation during a Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise (Cope North Guam)

- ◆ The SDF and U.S. Forces conduct bilateral training and exercises from peacetime in an effort to improve their interoperability and Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities, which in turn contribute significantly to maintaining and increasing the reliability and deterrence of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. The SDF and U.S. Forces have been conducting the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise since FY1985.

Strengthening Deterrence and Response Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

- ◆ In response to the increasingly severe security environment, while increasing the presence of Japan and the United States in the western Pacific region, Japan will build seamless cooperation with the United States ranging from situations on a day-to-day basis to various situations, including cooperation in responding to "gray-zone" situations. Japan will continue to expand joint training and exercises, joint ISR activities, and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas with the United States that will serve as the base of such activities.



MSDF and U.S. Marine Corps commanders exchanging views during a joint exercise in the United States (Dawn Blitz 13)



GSDF personnel and U.S. Forces personnel coordinating during Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise (Operation Rising Thunder 2013)

“2+2” Meeting (October 3, 2013)

- ◆ October 3, 2013, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee held the “2+2” Meeting in Tokyo and reached an agreement as follows:
 - (1) Complete the review task of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation by the end of 2014;
 - (2) Further enhance and deepen bilateral security and defense cooperation, including in such areas as cyberspace and space, and strengthen regional cooperation, including trilateral cooperation with Australia and the ROK; and
 - (3) Regarding the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, renew strong commitment towards the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab, and take a variety of new measures while promptly and steadily implementing the previous agreements from the perspective of mitigating the impact on Okinawa.



Defense and foreign ministers of Japan and the United States paying a courtesy call on Prime Minister Abe on the occasion of the “2+2” Meeting (October 3, 2013) (Cabinet Public Relations Office)

Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan

Chapter 2 p.245

Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan

- ◆ The stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan is the core element of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and also demonstrates the deep commitment of the United States to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. The Government of Japan has been actively taking various measures to enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements in order to ensure the smooth stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan.
- ◆ One of these measures is Japan’s bearing of costs related to the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan while reviewing Host Nation Support with careful consideration given to Japan’s difficult financial situation.

Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan

- ◆ The realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, among other measures, are being undertaken in order to mitigate the impact on local communities, such as those in Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of U.S. Forces. The measures pertaining to Okinawa include the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam, and the return of lands south of Kadena.
- ◆ With regard to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project, the Governor of Okinawa approved the application for the reclamation of public water body on December 27, 2013.
- ◆ During the Okinawa Policy Council Meeting on December 17, 2013, the Governor of Okinawa presented requests, including cessation of the operation of MCAS Futenma within five years and its early return, the re-deployment of about 12 MV-22 Osprey aircraft to bases outside Okinawa, and the total return of Makiminato Service Area within seven years.
- ◆ While fully understanding that these requests reflect the sentiments of all Okinawan people, the Government as a whole is addressing the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, including the establishment of the Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa, consisting of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Governor of Okinawa, and the Mayor of Ginowan.
- ◆ With regard to Kanagawa Prefecture, agreement was reached at the the meeting of the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in April 2014 on the specific timing of the return of the Fukaya Communication Site and the Kami Seya Communication Station. In addition, the Joint Committee agreed to change the number of housing units to be constructed in the Ikego Housing Area to 171.



A meeting of the Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa (Cabinet Public Relations Office)

Promoting Multilateral Security Cooperation and Dialogue in Areas Including the Asia-Pacific Region

Chapter 3 p.265


Significance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogue and Defense Cooperation and Exchange

- ◆ In order for Japan to become a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, the MOD and SDF pursue security cooperation and dialogues as well as conduct defense cooperation and exchanges in light of the characteristics of each country or region in a multi-layered manner, while effectively and efficiently making use of limited resources.

Promoting Capacity Building Assistance and Other Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation

- ◆ Capacity building assistance is an initiative based on the concept of improving the capability of developing countries to deal with situations themselves, and thereby actively creating stability within the region and improving the global security environment. In order to reach this goal, the MOD and SDF provide continuous support such as human resource development and technical assistance in security and defense fields.
- ◆ Since FY2012, Japan has continuously implemented capacity building assistance projects in Timor-Leste, Cambodia, Mongolia, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

High-Level Visits (January 2013-Early July 2014)



Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges


Chapter 3 p.279

- ◆ In order to improve the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as across the globe, and to ensure the security and prosperity of Japan, it is important for us to utilize the Japan-U.S. Alliance as an axis, while developing networks that combine bilateral and multilateral dialogue, exchanges and cooperation frameworks in a complementary and multilayered manner. Accordingly, the MOD and SDF are further promoting multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges based on the characteristics of each country and region.

Counter-piracy Operations

Chapter 3 p.295

- ◆ Japan has conducted counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden since 2009. From December 2013, for the purpose of conducting more flexible and effective unit operations, the SDF surface force participates in the CTF 151 and carries out zone defense in addition to escort missions as before. The ASDF has also been participating in the CTF 151 since February 2014. Furthermore, in July 2014, Japan decided on a policy of dispatching CTF 151 commanders and CTF 151 HQ officers from the SDF.



Destroyer Ariake escorting a private ship

Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

Chapter 3 p.300

Initiatives to Support U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

- ◆ Since the unrest in South Sudan at the end of 2013, the SDF engineering unit dispatched to South Sudan has been conducting activities that support displaced people, such as site preparation activities for the protected refugee camps.
- ◆ At present, an engineering unit dispatched to South Sudan (the 6th engineering unit: approx. 400 personnel) and three UNMISS staff officers are conducting operations in the Republic of South Sudan. (November 2011 – Ongoing)



SDF personnel building a drainage system at a protected refugee camp

International Disaster Relief Operations

International Disaster Relief Operations in the Philippines

- ◆ Over November 8 to 9, 2013, a large-scale typhoon No. 30 hit central Philippines. Following a request from the government of the Philippines, on November 12 the Minister of Defense of Japan decided to conduct international disaster relief operations based on the consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan.
- ◆ The MOD and SDF set up a local operation coordination center in the Philippines and organized the first ever Joint Task Force in international disaster relief operations. Disaster relief activities in the Philippines were conducted by a record 1,100 personnel.
- ◆ During the operations, a total of 2,624 people were treated; a total of 11,924 people were vaccinated; epidemic control operation was conducted in an area of approx. 95,600 m²; approx. 630 tons of supplies were transported by air; and a total of approx. 2,768 people affected by the typhoon were transported by aircraft. (November 2013 – December 2013)



The Japanese, U.S., and Australian sides coordinating during the international disaster relief operations in the Philippines

Emergency International Rescue Operations Concerning the Missing Malaysian Airplane

- ◆ During the operations, a total of six aircraft, including P-3C patrol aircraft and C-130H transport aircraft, and approximately 130 dispatched personnel conducted search activities for about 400 hours on a total of 46 times. (March 2014 – April 2014)



Search and rescue activities by C-130H transport aircraft for the missing Malaysian airplane

Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Chapter 3 p.314

- ◆ Japan plays an active role in international initiatives including conventions and management systems relating to frameworks for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation in regard to weapons of mass destruction, in the form of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, i.e., missiles, and associated technologies and materials.

Defense Production and Technological Bases, and the Current Status of Defense Equipment Acquisition

Chapter 1 p.320

Japan's Defense Production and Technological Bases

- ◆ As Japan has no national arsenal (state-owned munitions factory), the whole of the production base and most of the technological base is in the hands of companies that manufacture defense equipment and associated items (the defense industry).
- ◆ The market for defense equipment is limited to the small amount of demand from the MOD, so manufacturing economies of scale cannot be expected. Furthermore, specialized, advanced technologies and skills are required in the development and manufacture of defense equipment, and it takes a great deal of effort to cultivate and maintain those technologies and skills.



An employee of a defense equipment-related company conducting winding work for a resolver (angle sensor) that turns into parts of commander's periscopes and gunner's periscopes

Current Status of the Acquisition of Defense Equipment

- ◆ In terms of the technical strength of the defense industry, trends in the research and development budget have a considerable influence over the maintenance and improvement of skills among engineers in public and private sectors, because such skills are maintained and cultivated by working on research and development projects. Moreover, although factors such as the increasing performance of equipment have resulted in an increasing trend in research and development costs, in recent years, the ratio of defense-related expenditure accounted for by research and development has leveled off.

Initiatives for Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement and Improving its Fairness and Transparency

Chapter 1 p.325

- ◆ A PM/IPT system is under development in which a cross-organizational Integrated Project Team (IPT) headed by a Project Manager (PM) is established for major projects, so that the project can be managed, in terms of cost, performance and schedule, in a unified way throughout the lifecycle of the equipment product.

Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

Chapter 1 p.329

- ◆ In the "National Security Strategy" set out on December 17, 2013, from the perspective of Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of international cooperation, a more proactive involvement in peace contribution and international cooperation is required through the use of defense equipment and other means, as well as participation in joint development and production of defense and other equipment.
- ◆ The Cabinet gave approval on April 1, 2014 for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. An appropriate degree of consideration was given to the basic philosophy of Japan as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, as well as the role already played by the Three Principles of Arms Export. Then, in learning from the mounting number of exceptional cases, it provides a comprehensive organization of these matters, clarifies the concrete standards, procedures and brakes relating to the transfer of defense equipment, to a greater extent than ever before, and is stated clearly and with transparency both internally and externally.

Research and Development

Chapter 1 p.332

- ◆ From the perspective of optimizing performance, scheduling, and cost throughout the lifecycle of equipment, multiple proposals will be compared and analyzed in terms of performance and cost from the concept and R&D stages. In addition, to avoid a rise in the unit price for mass production of equipment, the Technical Research and Development Institute and Equipment Procurement and Construction Office will coordinate on cost estimates from the development stage as a part of the lifecycle management.
- ◆ International joint development of defense equipment is the primary means within the international community for responding to soaring costs, yet achieving higher performance. Similarly, the MOD is engaged in joint research and development with the U.S. Department of Defense, as well as collaborating with other nations, such as the United Kingdom, in the fields of equipment and technology. Moreover, as the move towards dual use between defense and lifestyle technology, as well as borderless systems, gains momentum, technological information exchange and research collaboration between the Technical Research and Development Institute and research institutions such as independent administrative agencies and universities, is being proactively implemented within Japan, in order to ensure that superior lifestyle technology is incorporated and efficient research and development is conducted.



Mobile combat vehicle currently in development

Initiatives Aimed at Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases

Strategy for Defense Production and Technological Bases

Chapter 1 p.336

- ◆ In view of the present situation of rising competition from overseas companies caused primarily by the recent severe financial circumstances and reorganization of the global defense industry, the MOD decided on the "Strategy for Defense Production and Technological Bases" on June 19, 2014 to replace the former domestic production policy, in order to maintain and strengthen defense production and technological bases, which are important and vital elements that support our defense capabilities.
- ◆ The Strategy not only identifies the targets for and significance of maintaining and strengthening defense production and technological bases, but also presents basic concepts regarding methods of defense equipment acquisition, such as domestic development, international joint development and production, and import; measures for maintaining and strengthening defense production and technological bases, such as improvement of contract systems, measures relating to research and development, and defense equipment and technological cooperation; and the current situation and future direction of defense equipment sectors.

Adapting Defense Equipment for Civilian Use

- ◆ Japan is holding talks with India, which has been considering the acquisition of amphibian search and rescue aircraft, at the Joint Working Group (JWG) aimed at bilateral cooperation pertaining to US-2.



US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft



Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force

Chapter 2 p.342

- ◆ In order to exert their defense capabilities with the maximum effectiveness, it is vitally important that the MOD and SDF enhance and strengthen the human foundation that underlies these capabilities. The various activities of the MOD and SDF are not possible without the understanding and cooperation of all people, as well as local governments and other parties. For this reason, mutual trust between local communities, the people, and the SDF need to be deepened even further.

Recruitment and Employment of Personnel in the MOD and the SDF

- ◆ In Japan, due to the declining birthrate and increasing university enrollments, the recruitable population for SDF personnel has been decreasing in size. Under such circumstances, personnel with superior abilities and a strong desire to enlist are recruited nationwide according to various categories.
- ◆ Furthermore, systems such as the SDF Reserve Personnel System are established. In such systems, people remain engaged in their own jobs as civilians in peacetime, and become SDF personnel and carry out their missions when muster orders for defense are issued.



Personnel who joined the MSDF in April 2014

Daily Education and Training

- ◆ The SDF makes efforts to educate its personnel and train its units to develop them into powerful personnel and forces, while paying careful attention to safety, in areas such as accident prevention.



Education and training of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF



Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources

- ◆ The MOD and SDF promote a variety of measures, including measures for personnel system reform and the further employment of female SDF personnel, in order to appropriately assure the strength of the SDF units while taking into account their respective characteristics, and make effective use of human resources which form the foundations that enable Japan to demonstrate its defense capabilities, and thereby, adequately adapt to the diversification of missions and other changes.



Female GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF personnel

Interaction between the MOD/SDF, and Local Communities and Japanese Citizens

Chapter 2 p.358

Collaboration with Local Communities

- ◆ The MOD/SDF has been conducting various cooperation activities to support the lives of nationals. Such activities are further deepening the mutual trust between the local community and the people, and the SDF. Those activities are greatly contributing to maintaining and revitalizing local communities.




Initiatives to Mitigate the Local Impact of the Stationing of USFJ

- ◆ The MOD is working to promote the effective and appropriate use of returned lands in Okinawa Prefecture previously provided to the U.S. Forces in Japan for their use, based on the "Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces."
- ◆ With regard to the implementation of the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project, it was determined that maximum environmental conservation measures would be taken in order to avoid or reduce impacts on the environment as much as possible. Such measures include consideration and implementation of measures to improve environmental conditions to make them suitable for sea turtles to come onto land and lay eggs, the transplanting of corals and seaweeds, periodic aircraft-based checking for the habitat of dugongs, and use of rubble for land-fill material, which is produced regardless of the project. It was also determined that follow-up surveys and other measures would be enhanced.

Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities

- ◆ The MOD/SDF conducts activities to inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. For example, in commemoration of the anniversary of the SDF, the SDF Marching Festival is held at Nippon Budokan arena every year. In addition, an SDF fleet review was conducted at the GSDF Asaka training site in FY2013.



Reform of the Ministry of Defense

Chapter 2 p.369

Direction of the MOD Reform

- ◆ The "Direction of the MOD Reform," which was reported to the Defense Council and made public in August 2013, determined that full-fledged reform would be undertaken, taking due account of the matters specified in previous considerations, on the basis of the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan as well as in the policy environment.

1954

SDF flag (left) and SDF naval ensign (right) instituted at same time as establishment of Defense Agency. Director General Tokutaro Kimura (center) and Parliamentary Vice-Minister Masao Maeda (far right). (June 1954: Etchujima, Koto-ku, Tokyo)



Troop review commemorating one-year anniversary of Defense Agency (October 1955: Tokyo Jingu Gaien)



1st naval review in Tokyo Bay (October 1957: Tokyo Bay)



Soviet fighter MIG-25 that crash-landed at Hakodate airport (September 1976: Hakodate City, Hokkaido)



SDF personnel supplying water during disaster relief mission in wake of earthquake off the coast of Miyagi Prefecture (June 1978)

1960



Parade by female fife and drum corps of ASDF Kisarazu base at 1st SDF music festival (October 1963: Tokyo Metropolitan Gymnasium)



The five rings created by the Blue Impulse at the Tokyo Olympic Games opening ceremony (October 1964: Above the National Olympic Stadium) (Asagumo Shimbunsha)



SDF personnel from GSDF Camp Jinmachi helping out with rice planting work (June 1965: Wago Village, Yamagata Prefecture)



Japanese flag flown at Iwo-To (June 1968)



Badge system data screen (March 1969)

This year marks the 40th issue of Defense of Japan. Its inaugural issue was published in 1970, and the whitepaper has been published annually since 1976. The first Defense of Japan was black and white, printed on A5 size paper, and contained 94 pages in total. Over the years, it has witnessed a variety of transformations, including the introduction of colored pages, change to A4 size paper, attachment of CD-ROM, and availability on the MOD website. The Defense of Japan 2014 takes a look back at the activities of the MOD/SDF which marks their 60th anniversary in 2014, as well as the history of the publication of the Defense of Japan.

Feature

Celebrating the 40th-Issue Milestone

History of the Publication of Defense of Japan

1976

Second issue published (includes English version; published annually thereafter) "Basic Defense Force Concept"



1980



Destroyer Hiei navigating next to U.S. aircraft carrier USS Constellation during SDF's first participation in Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) hosted by the U.S. Navy (March 1980)

1970

Inaugural issue of Defense of Japan



1977
Started including defense chronology



SDF personnel searching for ANA aircraft that collided into SDF aircraft and crashed near Shizukuishi, Iwate Prefecture (July 1971)



Seven female senior SDF personnel, MSDF's first such personnel, touring units (October 1974)



Delivery ceremony for first set of mass-produced Type-74 tanks (September 1975)
*The History of JGSDF 1950-2000 (Asagumo Shimbunsha)



Then-U.S. President Reagan reviews honor guard (November 1983: State Guest House)



1982
Colored



1984
10th issue of Defense of Japan



First public viewing of T-2 Blue Impulse (July 1982: ASDF Matsushima Air Base)



At the request of Tokyo Metropolitan Government due to eruption of Mt. Mihara, SDF personnel disembarking firetrucks, etc. at Izu Oshima (November 1986)



SDF personnel carrying survivor of JAL flight 123 crash into helicopter (August 1985: Mt. Osutaka, Gunma Prefecture)



Feature

Celebrating the 40th-Issue Milestone

History of the Publication of Defense of Japan



SDF personnel searching for missing people in disaster relief mission in wake of Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (January 1995: Kobe City)



GSDF personnel decontaminating train station following subway sarin incident (March 1995)



SDF personnel retrieving vast quantities of spilled oil during disaster relief mission in wake of Nakhodka accident (January 1997: Coast of Katano Town, Kaga City, Ishikawa Prefecture)



Unidentified boat off coast of Noto Peninsula (March 1999)



Five vessels of first unit deployed to Indian Ocean based on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (November 2001)



First participation of female SDF personnel in PKO (Timor-Leste: May 2002)

2014



Etape for unit providing relief to Rwandan refugees - SDF's first international humanitarian relief activity (October 1994)






First class of female students at National Defense Academy lining up during entrance ceremony (April 1992: Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture)



Minesweeper Sakushima demolishing mines during minesweeper mission in Persian Gulf, SDF's first international operation since its establishment (August 1991: Deep waters of Persian Gulf)



1994
20th issue of Defense of Japan "Transitions during 40 Years of SDF"



SDF personnel lining up and saluting during the first air review with ASDF aircrafts in the background (October 1996)

*For the Blue Sky: 50th Anniversary JASDF (Asagumo Shimbunsha)




GSDF personnel complete work to replace bridge in Cambodia - SDF's first PKO (March 1993)

*The History of JGSDF 1950-2000 (Asagumo Shimbunsha)



1990

Their Majesties the Emperor and Empress pass by SDF band performing at ceremony of accession (November 1990)



MSDF honor guard Present Arms to honor Imperial hearse carrying casket of Emperor Showa in front of Imperial Palace main gate (February 1989)



2000



1999
CD-ROM attached (until 2002)



2000
Feature "Year 2000" Illustration from Hiroshi Motomiya's manga "Salaryman Kintaro" on cover bottom Published in A4-size



2003
Started including Digest Started making whitepaper available on MOD website



ASDF's first aerial refueling training (April 2003: Western Kyushu airspace)



2004
30th issue of Defense of Japan (Column "30 Issues of Defense of Japan") Publication of condensed version (until 2009)



Publication of "Defense of Japan in Manga"

Shift to joint operations system, first Chief of Staff, Joint Staff appointed (right) (March 2006)



Aegis destroyer Kongo's success in test launch of SM-3 for the first time (December 2007)



Patriot PAC-3 (March 2007: Saitama Prefecture)



2007
Feature on "Past Year in Defense of Japan"
Ceremony commemorating transition to the Ministry of Defense (January 2007)



Personnel engaged in medical relief activities as part of disaster relief activities in the Philippines (November 2013: Cebu Island)



2013
Launch of smartphone version



2012
Section on "20 Years of International Cooperation" Launch of e-book version



GSDF personnel searching for missing people during disaster relief mission in wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake (April 2011)



2011
Feature on the Great East Japan Earthquake



2010

2010
Feature on 50th anniversary of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty




2009
cover designed by calligrapher Souun Takeda



MSDF P-3C squadron and patrol aircraft units of the U.S., Germany, and Spain engaged in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden (June 2009: Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport)

Fig. I-0-0-1 Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region (Approximate Strength)




- Notes:
1. Source: "The Military Balance 2014" published by the U.S. Department of Defense, and others.
 2. Figures for Japan, as of the end of 2013, indicate the strength of each SDF; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of ASDF aircraft (excluding transport aircraft) and MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only).
 3. Figures of U.S. ground forces in Japan and the ROK are those of Army and Marine Corps personnel combined.
 4. Combat aircraft include Navy and Marine aircraft.
 5. Figures in parentheses show the total number of central units, such as divisions and brigades. Only divisions are included in North Korea.
 6. The number of U.S. 7th Fleet vessels and aircraft indicates those which are forward-deployed in Japan and Guam.

Legend


Ground forces (200,000 troops)	Naval vessels (200,000 tons)	Combat aircraft (500 aircraft)
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Fig. I-1-1-1 The Impact of Mandatory Reduction of Government Expenditure on Defense Budget



Created based on the "FY2012 budget request" and "FY2013 budget request" published by the U.S. DOD.

Fig. I-1-1-2 Shifts in the U.S. Defense Budget



Notes: Figures shown are narrowly defined expenses based on Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, FY2015. The amount for FY2014 is an estimate.

Fig. I-1-1-3 Structure of the Unified Combatant Command





Fig. I-1-1-4 U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region



Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2013) and other materials.
 2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam.





Fig. I-1-2-1 Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula



		North Korea	ROK	U.S. Forces in Korea
Total armed forces		Approx. 1.19 million personnel	Approx. 660,000 personnel	Approx. 29,000 personnel
Army	Ground troops	Approx. 1.02 million personnel	Approx. 520,000 personnel	Approx. 19,000 personnel
	Tanks	T-62, T-54/-55, etc. Approx. 3,500	M-48, K-1, T-80 etc. Approx. 2,400	M-1
Navy	Naval vessels	Approx. 650; 101,000 tons	Approx. 190; 195,000 tons	Supporting corps only
	Destroyers		12	
	Frigates	3	10	
	Submarines	20	12	
	Marines		Approx. 27,000 personnel	
Air Force	Combat aircraft	Approx. 600	Approx. 620	Approx. 60
	3rd and 4th generation fighter aircraft	Mig-23 x 56	F-4 x 70	F-16 x 40
		Mig-29 x 18	F-16 x 164	
Su-25 x 34		F-15 x 60		
Reference	Population	Approx. 24.7 million	Approx. 49 million	
	Term of Service	Army: 5-12 years Navy: 5-10 years Air Force: 3-4 years	Army: 21 months Navy: 23 months Air Force: 24 months	

Notes: The Military Balance 2014, etc.

Fig. I-1-2-2 Launch of a Missile, which North Korea Called a "Satellite" on December 12, 2012







Fig. I-1-2-3 Range of North Korean Ballistic Missiles




* The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience.

Fig. I-1-2-4 Change in the ROK's Defense Budget




Notes: 1. ROK Defense White Paper 2012 for FY2010 to 2012.
2. The Ministry of National Defense website for FY2013 to 2014.

Fig. I-1-3-1 Change in China's Announced Defense Budget




Notes: The total defense budgets for FY2002 and FY2004 were not disclosed, while the growth rates and the amount of increase for these two fiscal years were disclosed. The total defense budgets for the two fiscal years based on the growth rates and the amount of increase in combination with the initial defense budgets of the previous years were calculated. However, the numbers as a result of the calculation was found to be inconsistent with the numbers China disclosed the following year. In this graph, 168.4 billion yuan and 210 billion yuan for FY2002 and FY2004, respectively, were used based on the calculation conducted on the assumption that the disclosed growth rates and the amount of increase are based on the actual defense expenditures for FY2001 and FY2003.

Fig. I-1-3-2 Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing)



Note: The above image shows a simplified indication of the potential reach of each type of missile taking Beijing as a central point.

Fig. I-1-3-3 Deployment and Strength of the People's Liberation Army



Notes: Army and Air Force Military Regions are identical.

A Group Army consists of several divisions and brigades and has tens of thousands of personnel.

● Military Region headquarters
 Ⓛ Fleet headquarters
 ■ Group Army (Army) headquarters
 ■ Airborne Corps (Air Force) headquarters

		China	Taiwan (Reference)
Total military forces		Approx. 2.3 million troops	Approx. 290,000 troops
Ground forces	Group troops	Approx. 1.6 million troops	Approx. 200,000 troops
	Tanks	Type-99/A, Type-98/A, Type-96/A, Type-88A/B and others Approx. 7,600 vehicles	M-60, M-48A/H and others Approx. 1,200 vehicles
Maritime forces	Warships	Approx. 890 vessels / 1,423 thousand tons	Approx. 410 vessels / 201,000 tons
	Destroyers & frigates	Approx. 70 vessels	Approx. 30 vessels
	Submarines	Approx. 60 vessels	4 vessels
	Marines	Approx. 10,000 troops	Approx. 15,000 troops
Air forces	Combat aircraft	Approx. 2,580 aircraft	Approx. 500 aircraft
	Modern fighters aircraft	J-10 x 264 Su-27/J-11 x 328 Su-30 x 97 (Fourth-generation fighters x 689)	Mirage 2000 x 56 F-16 x 145 F-CK-1 (IDF) x 128 (Fourth-generation fighters x 329)
Reference	Population	Approx. 1.360 billion	Approx. 23 million
	Term of service	2 years	1 year

Source: The Military Balance (2014) and others.

Fig. I-1-3-4 Recent Chinese Activities in Waters near Japan (The wakes shown are an illustration)




Fig. I-1-3-5 Recent Chinese Activities in Airspace near Japan (The flight paths shown are an illustration)




Fig. I-1-3-6 Change in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft






Fig. I-1-3-7 Changes in Taiwan's Defense Budget




Source: "National Defense Reports," Ministry of Defense of Taiwan, etc.

Fig. I-1-3-8 Changes in Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan




Source: Military Balance (of respective years)

Fig. I-1-4-1 Change in Russia's Defense Budget



Notes: Official figures announced by the Russian Government

Fig. I-1-4-2 Location and Strength of Russian Military



		Russia
Total military forces		Approx. 850,000 troops
Ground forces	Ground troops	Approx. 290,000 troops
	Tanks	T-90, T-80, T-72, etc. Approx. 2,550 (Not including mothballed tanks.) Approx. 20,550 including mothballed tanks)
Maritime forces	Warships	Approx. 980 vessels Approx. 2,070,000 tons
	Aircraft carriers	1 vessel
	Cruisers	5 vessels
	Destroyers	15 vessels
	Frigates	29 vessels
	Submarines	63 vessels
Marines		Approx. 20,000 troops
Air forces	Combat aircraft	Approx. 1,560 troops
	Modern Fighter aircraft	224 MiG-29 aircraft 10 Su-30 aircraft 160 MiG-31 aircraft 18 Su-33 aircraft 220 Su-25 aircraft 28 Su-34 aircraft 289 Su-27 aircraft 12 Su-35 aircraft (4th generation fighter aircraft: Total 961)
	Bombers	16 Tu-160 aircraft 62 Tu-95 aircraft 63 Tu-22M aircraft
Reference	Population	Approx. 142.50 million
	Term of service	1year (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system)

Notes: Source: The Military Balance 2014 and others.

Fig. I-1-4-3 Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Russian Aircraft






Fig. I-1-5-1 Comparison of Forces Strength and Defense Budget between Southeast Asia and Japan/China/ROK 2013



- Notes:
1. Source: The Military Balance 2014 and others. The size of each block indicates relative size using Japan as the base size.
 2. For Japan, the force strength shows the actual strength of each Self-Defense Force as of the end of FY2011; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of the number of combat aircraft of the ASDF (excluding transport aircraft) and that of the MSDF (fixed-wing aircraft only).
The Japanese national defense budget is the initial budget excluding the cost of the SACO and the reduction of the local burden among the U.S. forces realignment costs.
 3. The national defense budget of China is from the Finance Minister's Budget Report to the National People's congress in 2013.
 4. The national defense budget of the ROK is from the ROK National Defense White Paper 2013.
 5. The national defense budget of China and the ROK is expressed in U.S. dollars and is calculated using the FY2013 Ministry of Finance exchange rates of 82 yen to 1 dollar, 13 yen to 1 yuan, and 76 yen to 1,000 won.
 6. The Japanese national defense budget is expressed in U.S. dollars converting 2013 figures using the FY2013 Ministry of Finance exchange rate of 82 yen to 1 dollar.

Fig. I-1-6-1 Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate)



Notes: 1. Figures based on the Military Balance 2014, etc.
 2. Combat aircraft include naval aircraft.

Fig. I-1-8-1 Expansion Situation of the NATO-EU Member States





Fig. I-2-1-1 List of Peacekeeping Operations



Notes: According to the United Nations (as of the end of June 2014)

Africa

	Mission	Date Established
①	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	Apr 1991
②	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	Sep 2003
③	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	Apr 2004
④	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	Jul 2007
⑤	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)	Jul 2010
⑥	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)	Jun 2011
⑦	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	Jul 2011
⑧	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	Apr 2013
⑨	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)	Apr 2014

Middle East

	Mission	Date Established
⑩	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	May 1948
⑪	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Jun 1974
⑫	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Mar 1978

Asia

	Mission	Date Established
⑬	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Jan 1949

Europe/CIS

	Mission	Date Established
⑭	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Mar 1964
⑮	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	Jun 1999

The Americas

	Mission	Date Established
⑯	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	Jun 2004

Fig. I-2-3-1 Major Terrorist Groups Based in Africa and the Middle East Regions




Fig. I-2-6-1 Examples of International Joint Development






Equipment	Year development commenced	Year of unit deployment	Participating countries
Transport aircraft (A400M) 	1982	2013	8 countries including U.K., France, Germany, Italy, and Spain (the U.S. withdrew by 2003)
Fighter aircraft (Euro fighter) 	1986	2003	UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain
Fighter aircraft (F-35) 	2001	Unit not yet in operation	9 countries including U.S., U.K., the Netherlands, and Italy
Unmanned aircraft (Euro Hawk) 	2005	Joint development cancelled	U.S., Germany
Unmanned aircraft (nEUROn) 	2005	Unit not deployed	6 countries including France, Sweden, Italy, and Spain

Fig. I-2-6-2 Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional Arms Export
(2008–2012)

	Country	Global shares in defense equipment export (%), 2008–2012	Comparison with 2003–2007 Export Values (%)
1	The United States	30	+16%
2	Russia	26	+28%
3	Germany	7	-8%
4	France	6	-18%
5	China	5	+162%
6	United Kingdom	4	+1%
7	Spain	3	+136%
8	Italy	2	+20%
9	Ukraine	2	+49%
10	Israel	2	+17%
11	The Netherlands	2	-24%
12	Sweden	2	+25%
13	Switzerland	1	+14%
14	Canada	1	-7%
15	Norway	1	+211%
16	Republic of Korea	1	+50%
17	South Africa	1	+49%

Note: Based on SIPRI YEARBOOK (2013). Chart shows countries with shares over 1%.

Fig. II-1-2-1 Newly determined three conditions for the “use of force” as measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution

- When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.
- When there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.
- Use of force to the minimum extent necessary.

Fig. II-1-3-1 Outline of the report

	Right of Collective Self-Defense	Collective Security Measures of the U.N. Entailing Military Measures	U.N. PKOs/ Protection and Rescue of Japanese Nationals Abroad/ International Security Cooperation	Response to an Infringement that does not Amount to an Armed Attack
Constitutional Interpretation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The provisions of Article 9 of the Constitution should be interpreted as prohibiting the threat or the use of force as means of settling international disputes to which Japan is a party and not prohibiting the use of force for the purpose of self-defense. ○ Even from the view of the Government to date that “these measures necessary for self-defense should be limited to the minimum extent necessary,” it should be interpreted that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is also included in “the minimum extent necessary.” ○ When a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan comes under an armed attack and ○ If such a situation has the potential to significantly affect the security of Japan ⇒ Japan should be able to participate in operations to repel such an attack by using forces to the minimum extent necessary, having obtained an explicit request or consent from the country under attack. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Participation in collective security measures of the U.N. will not constitute the use of force as means of settling international disputes to which Japan is a party and therefore they should be interpreted as not being subject to constitutional restrictions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ These activities should be interpreted as not constituting the “use of force” prohibited under Article 9 of the Constitution. The use of weapons in the course of the following activities should be interpreted as not being restricted constitutionally. 1. To come to the aid of geographically distant unit or personnel that are engaged in the same U.N. PKO etc., and to use weapons, if necessary, to defend them, in the event that such a unit or personnel are attacked (“kaketsuke-keigo) 2. To remove obstructive attempts against its missions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Even in the case of an infringement which cannot be judged whether it constitutes “an armed attack (an organized and planned use of force),” action to the minimum extent necessary by the SDF to repel such an infringement should be permitted under the Constitution.
Legislative Policies etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Diet: Legal source is needed. The approval, either prior or ex post facto, of the Diet should be required. ○ The Government: Discussion and approval by the National Security Council under the leadership of the Prime Minister and a Cabinet Decision should be required. (After a comprehensive assessment, a policy decision not to exercise the right of collective self-defense could be made.) ○ In the case that Japan would pass through the territory of a third country, the consent of that third country should be obtained. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Diet: Legal source is needed. The approval, either prior or ex post facto, of the Diet should be required. ○ The Government: Proactive contribution should be made. Decisions should be made carefully, based on comprehensive examination on the political significance etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Requirements in the Rules of Engagements etc. should be amended in line with U.N. standards. ○ The so-called Five Principles on Japan’s Participation in U.N. PKOs also need to be examined in view of its revision. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ It is necessary to enhance the legal system within a scope permitted under international law to enable a seamless response.
<p>The Panel strongly expects that the Government will consider this report earnestly and proceed to take necessary legislative measures.</p>				

Fig. II-2-1-1 Organization of National Security Council




Fig. II-2-1-2 Conceptual Image of Holding Meetings





Fig. II-2-2-1 Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense



*Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs will be established on the day specified by a Cabinet Order within 10 months from the date of promulgation of the Act for the Partial Revision of the Act for Established of the Ministry of Defense, etc. (June 13 2014)


(Excluding temporary or special positions.)

Fig. II-2-2-2 Outline of the Ministry of Defense

Organization	Outline
GSDF*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Regional Armies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Composed of multiple divisions and brigades, and other directly controlled units (such as engineer brigades and antiaircraft artillery groups) ● There are five regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of their respective regions ○ Divisions and Brigades <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Composed of combat units and logistics support units which support combat units, and others ○ Central Readiness Force <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Consisting of an airborne brigade, a helicopter brigade, the Central Readiness Regiment, the Special Operation Group, and the Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit
MSDF*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Self-Defense Fleet <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and such), and the Fleet Submarine Force ● Responsible for the defense of sea areas surrounding Japan primarily through mobile operations ○ Regional Units <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● There are five regional units who mainly protect their responsible territories and support the Self-Defense Fleet
ASDF*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Air Defense Command <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Composed of three air defense forces and the Southwestern Composite Air Division ● Primarily responsible for general air defense duties ○ Air Defense Force <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Composed of key units such as air wings (including fighter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including aircraft warning and control units), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided missile units and others)
National Defense Academy of Japan (Yokosuka, Kanagawa)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ An institution for the cultivation of future SDF personnel <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Conducts training and education for future SDF personnel (including education that complies with the same university establishment standards as other universities) ○ Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course equivalent to master's or doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate and postgraduate courses) and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to a master's degree. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Conducts education and training in order to impart a high level of knowledge and research capability
National Defense Medical College (Tokorozawa, Saitama)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical personnel, the SDF personnel and engineering personnel who are nurses. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Conducts education and training for future SDF personnel, the SDF personnel and engineering personnel who are nurses who will serve as medical doctors (including education that complies with the School Education Act that universities with medical education also comply to) ○ An institution for the cultivation of future SDF officers who are public nurses, nurses, and SDF engineering personnel. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Conduct education and training for future SDF officers who are public nurses, nurses, and SDF engineering personnel (including education in accordance with the establishment of a university to conduct nursing science education based on the School Education Act) ○ Offers a medical course that complies with university establishment standards for PhD programs for schools of medicine. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Provides education and training on sophisticated theories and their application, and to develop research capabilities related to the knowledge obtained.
National Institute for Defense Studies (Meguro-ku, Tokyo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Organization that functions as a "think tank" of the Ministry of Defense <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF ● Conducts research and compiles data on military history ● Educates SDF personnel and other senior officials ● Manages books and documents of historical value located in the connected library
Defense Intelligence Headquarters (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense, which collects and analyzes military data <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Collects various military intelligence, including signal intelligence, images and other information acquired by warning and surveillance activities; comprehensively analyzes and assesses the information; and provides information to related organizations within the ministry ● Consists of six communication sites and its headquarters
Technical Research and Development Institute (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Central organization that conducts equipment-related research and development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Conducts R&D in response to the operational needs of each service of the SDF ● Conducts R&D in a wide range of fields, from firearms, vehicles, ships, and aircraft used by each service of the SDF to equipment for responses to NBC weapons and clothing
Equipment Procurement and Construction Office (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Central organization for affairs related to equipment procurement and a part of the construction work required by the SDF to accomplish its duties <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Necessary equipment include firearms, explosives fuel, guided weapons, ships, aircraft, and vehicles ● Within the construction work related affairs, the drafting of technical standards and evaluation of plans are conducted
Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ This is an organization that inspects overall tasks of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF from an independent position. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● It inspects whether the tasks of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are properly carried out from an independent position in light of legal compliance under orders from the Minister of Defense.
Regional Defense Bureau (eight locations nationwide)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Ensure understanding and cooperation of local public organizations, and conduct cost audit, supervision, and inspection related to acquisition of defense facilities, management, construction, taking measures concerning neighborhood of the base, and procurement of equipment.

*See "Location of Principal SDF Units" at the end of the book.

Fig. II-2-2-3 Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces



Notes: 1. The Chief of Joint Staff is responsible for joint training.
 2. With respect to forces affairs other than operations in regards to the Joint Task Force, command responsibilities of the Defense Minister.

Fig. II-3-1-1 Relations among NSS, NDPG, MTDP, and Annual Budget




Fig. II-3-2-1 Layout of the NSS and the New NDPG




Fig. II-4-1-1 Developments in the Upgrading of Defense Capability to Date




Fig. II-4-1-2 Changes of the Views regarding Defense Capability




Fig. II-4-2-1 Recent Security Related Issues around Japan




Fig. II-4-3-1 Geospatial Information (Conceptual image)




Fig. II-4-3-2 Annex Table of the NEW NDPG

Category		Present (as of the end of FY2013)	Future	
GSDF	Authorized Number of personnel	approx. 159,000	159,000	
	Active-Duty Personnel	approx. 151,000	151,000	
	Reserve-Ready Personnel	approx. 8,000	8,000	
	Major units	Rapid Deployment Units	Central Readiness Force 1 armored division	3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade
		Regional Deployment Units	8 divisions 6 brigades	5 divisions 2 brigades
		Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units	5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments	5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments
Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units		8 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments	
MSDF	Major units	Destroyer Units	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 6 divisions
		Submarine Units	5 divisions	6 divisions
		Minesweeping Units	1 flotilla	1 flotilla
		Patrol aircraft Units	9 squadrons	9 squadrons
	Major equipment	Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Combat Aircraft	47 (6) 16 approx.170	54 (8) 22 approx.170
ASDF	Major units	Air Warning & Control Units	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)	28 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (3 squadrons)
		Fighter Aircraft Units	12 squadrons	13 squadrons
		Air Reconnaissance Units	1 squadron	—
		Air Refueling/Transport Units	1 squadron	2 squadrons
		Air Transport Units	3 squadrons	3 squadrons
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	6 groups	6 groups
	Major equipment	Combat aircraft Fighters	approx. 340 approx. 260	approx. 360 approx. 280

Notes: The current number of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY2013) are respectively approx. 700 and approx. 600, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300 and approx. 300 in the future.

Regarding major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions, their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers), Air Warning & Control Units and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units specified above.

Fig. II-4-3-3 NDPG Comparison Tables

Category		1976 NDPG	1995 NDPG	2004 NDPG	2010 NDPG	
GSDP	Authorized Number of personnel		160,000	155,000	154,000	
	Active-Duty Personnel	180,000	145,000	148,000	147,000	
	Reserve-Ready Personnel		15,000	7,000	7,000	
	Major units	Regionally deployed units in peacetime	12 divisions 2 combined brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades
		Rapid Deployment Units	1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 training group 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division Central Readiness Force	Central Readiness Force 1 armored division
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups
Major Equipment	Tanks Artillery (Main artillery) ¹	(approx. 1,200) ² (approx. 1,000/vehicle) ²	approx. 900 (approx. 900/vehicle)	approx. 600 (approx. 600/vehicle)	approx. 400 (approx. 400/vehicle)	
MSDF	Major units	Destroyer units for mobile operations regional deployment	4 flotillas (Regional units) 10 units	4 flotillas (Regional units) 7 units	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 4 divisions
		Submarine units	6 divisions	6 divisions	4 divisions	6 divisions
		Minesweeper Units	2 flotillas	1 flotilla	1 flotilla	1 flotilla
Patrol aircraft units		(Land-based) 16 squadrons	(Land-based) 13 squadrons	9 squadrons	9 squadrons	
Major equipment	Destroyers Submarines Combat aircraft	approx. 60 16 approx. 220	approx. 50 16 approx. 170	47 16 approx. 150	48 22 approx. 150	
ASDF	Major units	Air Warning & Control Units	28 warning groups 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)	4 warning groups 24 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)
		Fighter Aircraft Units			12 squadrons	12 squadrons
		Fighter-interceptor units	10 squadrons	9 squadrons		
		Support fighter units	3 squadrons	3 squadrons		
		Air Reconnaissance Units	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron
		Air Transport Units	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons
	Aerial Refueling/Transport Units	—	—	1 squadron	1 squadron	
Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups		
Major Equipment	Combat aircraft (Fighters)	approx. 430 (approx. 350) ²	approx. 400 approx. 300	approx. 350 approx. 260	approx. 340 approx. 260	
Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions ³	Aegis-equipped destroyers	—	—	4 ships	6 ships ⁴	
	Air Warning & Control Units	—	—	7 warning groups	11 warning groups/units	
	Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	—	—	4 warning squadrons 3 groups	6 groups	

Notes: 1. Categorized as main artillery up till 2004 NDPG, but categorized in the 2010 NDPG as artillery except for surface-to-air guided missile units.

2. Although not stated in the 1976 NDPG, it is listed here for comparison with the NDPG table after 1995.

3. "Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions" refers to the number of main equipment in the MSDF or number of major units in the ASDF.

4. According to the 2012 NDPG, additional deployment of Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense functions may be carried out within the number of destroyers set above, depending on factors such as the development of ballistic missile defense technology and financial matters.

Fig. II-4-3-4 Fighter Unit Architecture




Fig. II-4-3-5 The Project Manager System




Fig. II-5-1-1 Operations of the Ground Central Command




Fig. II-5-1-2 Changes in Tank and Howitzer Deployment





Fig. II-5-1-3 Programs Related to Providing Effective Deterrent and Response to Various Situations

Category		Main Programs
Ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Introduce new airborne early warning (control) aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. ○ Steadily procure fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), destroyers and submarines
Response to attacks on remote islands	Development of a persistent ISR structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Deploy a coast observation unit to <i>Yonaguni</i> Island as well as establish one squadron in the air warning unit and deploy it at <i>Naha</i> Air Base. ○ Establish a deployment structure for mobile air defense radar on remote islands in the southwestern region.
	Obtaining and securing air superiority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Steadily procure fighter (F-35A) and fighter modernization (F-15). ○ Introduce new aerial refueling/transport aircraft.
	Obtaining and securing maritime supremacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Increase the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers and introduce new destroyers. ○ Steadily procure patrol helicopters (SH-60K) and steadily increase the number of surface-to-ship guided missiles.
	Improvement of capabilities for rapid deployment and response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Introduce tilt-rotor aircraft and steadily procure transport aircraft (C-2). ○ Refit existing Tank Landing Ships (LST), and consider the role of multipurpose vessels. ○ Consider active utilization of civilian transport capabilities. ○ Newly deploy area security units, and newly establish an amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade.
	Development of C3I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Station GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF personnel in the main headquarters of each of the other services. ○ Extend the secured exclusive communication link for the SDF to <i>Yonaguni</i> Island, and newly deploy mobile multiplex communication equipment at <i>Naha</i> Air Base.
Response to ballistic missile attacks		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Increase the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers, promote continuous development of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block II A), and introduce advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE). ○ Conduct studies on the best mix of the overall posture of its future BMD system, including new BMD equipment. ○ Study possible response capabilities to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and will take necessary measures.
Response in outer space and cyberspace		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Steadily develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system, and promote space situational awareness efforts, and research on satellite protection, and work to enhance the resiliency of its satellites. ○ Enhance survivability of the various SDF systems, strengthen information gathering functions, etc., and develop a practical training environment.
Response to large-scale disasters		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Develop capabilities to respond immediately by transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF units, as well as establish a rotating staff posture, in order to respond to various natural disasters.
Strengthening intelligence capabilities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Drastically reinforce capabilities to gather intelligence from the diverse sources, including SIGINT, GEOINT, and HUMINT. ○ Recruit and train personnel who would engage in information gathering and analysis.


Fig. II-5-1-4 Example of Rapid Deployment to the Southwest Area



- Introduce "rapid deployment regiments" to rapid deployment divisions & brigades that will swiftly respond to various situations.
- To enhance readiness and mobility, introduce mobile combat vehicles (MCV) suitable for air transportation


[Amphibious operation capabilities]
Procure amphibious vehicles, along with introducing tilt-rotor aircraft so as to support amphibious operations, etc.

[Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (temp)]
A mobile operation unit will be maintained with specialist functions so that amphibious operations can be carried out effectively.




Mobile combat vehicle

Legend
 : Rapid Deployment unit
 : Regionally deployed unit



[Area security units in the southwestern region]
In addition to deploying a coast observation unit on Yonaguni island, deploy area security units in the remote islands in the southwestern region.



Tilt-rotor aircraft (image)



transport aircraft C-2



Transport vessel

Fig. II-5-1-5 Programs for the Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments

Category	Main Programs
Holding training and exercises	○ Proactively promote bilateral and multilateral combined training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region.
Promoting defense cooperation and exchange	○ Promote multilayered bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange on various levels, including high level exchange and unit exchange.
Promoting capacity building assistance	○ Help the militaries of countries eligible for support strengthen their capacities in various fields, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, landmine/unexploded ordinance disposal and defense medicine. ○ Work with the U.S. and Australia to carry out effective and efficient assistance while coordinating diplomatic policy.
Ensuring maritime security	○ Support anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Eden and provide capacity building assistance to coastal countries in the region. ○ Carry out joint training and exercises with other countries in waters outside of Japan.
Implementing international peace cooperation activities	○ Strengthen information gathering capabilities in the deployed area and improve the armor performance of defense equipment. ○ Enhance posture of engineering units and enhance posture related to telecommunications, supplies, medical services and family assistance, etc. ○ Dispatch SDF personnel to local mission headquarters and UN DPKO develop human resources from a long-term perspective ○ Expand educational content at the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center and enhance cooperation in education with related ministries and agencies.
Cooperating with efforts to promotes arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation	○ Actively engage in order to cooperate with international initiatives on arms control and arms reductions, including human contributions. ○ Promote initiatives for non-proliferation, through participating in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercises.

Fig. II-5-1-6 Annex from the New Medium Term Defense Program

Service	Equipment	Quantity
GSDF	Mobile Combat Vehicles	99
	Armored Vehicles	24
	Amphibious Vehicles	52
	Tilt-Rotor Aircraft	17
	Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA)	6
	Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles	9 companies
	Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles	5 companies
	Tanks	44
	Howitzers (except mortars)	31
MSDF	Destroyers	5
	(Aegis-Equipped Destroyers)	(2)
	Submarines	5
	Other Ships	5
	Total	15
	(Tonnage)	(approx. 52,000 t)
	Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1)	23
Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K)	23	
Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based)	9	
ASDF	New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft	4
	Fighters (F-35A)	28
	Fighter Modernization (F-15)	26
	New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft	3
	Transport Aircraft (C-2)	10
	Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)	2 groups & education
Joint units	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles	3

Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specified above.

Fig. II-5-2-1 Structure of Committees




Fig. II-5-3-1 Main Aspects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities for FY2014

Category		Main Programs
I. Effective deterrence and response to various situations	Ensure security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan	Acquire fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), construct destroyers and submarines, construct multipurpose rescue vessels for disaster dispatch, review the introduction of new airborne early warning (control) aircraft and extended duration unmanned aerial vehicles, etc.
	Response to attacks on remote islands	Deploy a coast observation unit on <i>Yonaguni</i> Island, reorganize ASDF Airborne Early Warning Group, acquire fighter (F-35A), review introduction of tilt rotor aircraft, promote policies related to the utilization of private sector transport capacity, develop amphibious capabilities (newly establish an amphibious unit, develop training and education infrastructure, purchase reference items for amphibious vehicles, and improve amphibious operation performance of vessels, etc.), and integrate the Japan-U.S. outdoor command and telecommunication system, etc.
	Response to ballistic missile attacks	Deploy PAC-3 unit at Ichigaya, convert fixed warning control radar (FPS-7) and add functions for BMD response, carry out survey and research on future ballistic missile defense systems, etc.
	Response in outer space	Carry out technology study on replacement satellite for the current X-band satellite communication satellite (Super Band C2) and examine possible PFI implementation, research telecommunication jamming measures for satellite communication systems, and survey and research approaches to satellite defense, etc.
	Response in cyber space	Develop cyber intelligence gathering equipment, design the next cyber defense analysis system, research technologies to counter cyber attacks on networks, develop and secure human resources for countering cyber attacks, and strengthen partnerships with other countries and private-sector companies, etc.
	Response to large-scale disasters	Maintain and strengthen functions of camps and bases that will serve as a hub during a disaster, carry out training on large-scale and special disasters, review introduction of tilt rotor aircraft, and construct multipurpose rescue vessels for disaster dispatch, etc.
	Strengthening intelligence capabilities	Strengthen structure of Defense Attachés dispatched to Africa and expand the use of geospatial data, etc.
II. Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific region and improvement of the global security environment	Strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation for stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region and carry out training and exercises as needed and as appropriate. More actively participate in international peace cooperation activities in order to respond appropriately to global security issues with the development of wheeled armored vehicles.	
III. Measures for the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance	Steadily carry out specific measures for the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa to Guam, the relocation of Futenma Air Station, and the relocation of aircraft carrier from Atsugi Air Station to Iwakuni Air Station.	
IV. Measures for personnel and education	Strengthen recruiting operations and re-employment assistance, improve and expand SDF reserve personnel, expand the defense meritorious badge, etc.	
V. Initiatives for greater efficiency	Streamline maintenance costs by extending regular maintenance intervals, purchase defense equipment in bulk, revise specifications for the use of civilian items and defense equipment, set up project managers, etc.	
VI. Ministry of Defense reform	Mutually deploy civilian officials and uniformed personnel, newly establish the position of Defense Councillor, manage defense equipment in an integrated manner during the entire lifecycle, strengthen strategy planning function of the Bureau of Defense Policy, carry out initiatives to strengthen information dissemination functions, and strengthen comprehensive coordination function of the Minister's Secretariat	
VII. Other	SDF organization, structure, and personnel	Newly establish an amphibious brigade provisional unit specializing in amphibious operations (tentative name), reorganize ASDF Airborne Early Warning Group, and carry out various unit reorganizations, including the establishment of the Air Tactical Training Group, in order to provide effective deterrent and respond to various situations. Increase the number of active SDF personnel.
	Promotion of base measures	Steadily implement measures surrounding bases in order to achieve harmony between defense facilities and surrounding communities as well as carry out measures to facilitate and streamline the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.
	Strengthening of education and research systems	Carry out measures to strengthen the education and research systems at the National Institute for Defense Studies, National Defense Academy of Japan, and National Defense Medical College, as well as develop an environment where personnel can focus on their work duties.
	Promotion of technological research and development	Research fuel cells for unmanned submersible robots, research robots that can be used to counter threats from a nuclear accident, and research radar and firing systems for detecting stealth aircraft, etc.


Fig. II-5-4-1 Comparison Between FY2013 Budget and FY2014 Budget

(100 million)

Category	FY2013	FY2014	
			Fiscal YOY growth (▲ indicates negative growth)
Annual expenditure (note)	46,804	47,838	1,035 (2.2%)
Personnel and food provisions expenses	19,896	20,930	1,034 (5.2%)
Material expenses	26,908	26,909	1 (0.0%)
Future obligation (note)	31,100	33,594	2,493
New contracts	16,517	19,465	2,948 (17.8%)
Existing contracts	14,583	14,129	▲454 (▲3.1%)

Notes: Does not include SACO-related expenses, U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community), or expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft based on "The Policy Concerning Government Aircraft" (August 7, 2013 decision by the Review Committee on Government Aircraft). If these are included, the figures are 4,753.8 billion yen for FY2013 and 4,884.8 billion yen for FY2014, and for future obligation, 3,230.8 billion yen for FY2013 and 3,630.4 billion yen for FY2014.

Fig. II-5-4-2 Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years



Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, or U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community). Total sum of defense expenditures including these are 4,935.5 billion yen for FY2000, 4,955.0 billion yen for FY2001, 4,955.7 billion yen for FY2002, 4,952.7 billion yen for FY2003, 4,902.6 billion yen for FY2004, 4,856.0 billion yen for FY2005, 4,813.6 billion yen for FY2006, 4,801.3 billion yen for FY2007, 4,779.6 billion yen for FY2008, 4,774.1 billion yen for FY2009, 4,790.3 billion yen for FY2010, 4,775.2 billion yen for FY2011, 4,713.8 billion yen for FY2012, 4,753.8 billion yen for FY2013, and 4,848.8 billion yen for FY2014.

Fig. II-5-4-3 Structure of Defense-Related Expenditures

Structure of Defense-Related Expenditures

Annual expenditure

Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into personnel and food provision expenses and material expenses (operating expenses). Material expenses (operating expenses) are further classified into obligatory outlay expenses and general material expenses (activity expenses).

Personnel and food provisions expenses	Expenses relating to wages for personnel, retirement allowance, meals in barracks, etc.
Material expenses (operating expenses)	Expenses relating to procurement; repair and upgrading of equipment; purchase of oil; education and training of staff; facilities improvement; barracks expenses such as lighting, heating, water and supplies; technology research and development; cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ; and expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan
Obligatory outlay expenses	Expenses paid in FY2014 based on contracts made before FY2013
General material expenses (activity expenses)	Expenses paid in FY2014 based on contracts made in FY2014

Amount of future obligation

In the improvement of defense capabilities, it is common for work in areas like the procurement of equipment and the upgrading of facilities to be carried out over several years. Consequently, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple years is arranged (five years in principle), and the government promises in advance at the time of the agreement to make payment at a fixed time in the future.

Future obligation refers to the sum of money to be paid in the following year and beyond, based on contracts like this which extend for multiple years.

Example: Case in which 10 billion yen of equipment is procured under a contract to run for four years




Fig. II-5-4-4 Relationship Between Annual Expenditure and Future Obligation Due to New Contracts






Fig. II-5-4-5 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures (FY2013)



Notes: 1. () is the budget amount, unit: 100 million yen.


2. The above figure shows SACO-related expenses (12.0 billion yen), excluding the portion meant to reduce the burden of local community (89.0 billion yen) out of the U.S. forces realignment expenses.

Fig. II-5-4-6 Defense Budgets of Major Countries (FY2012)



Notes: 1. Defense budgets are from each country's public documents.
 Conversion to dollar is referred to purchasing power parity as published by the OECD (official rate listed on line) (One dollar=104.684687 yen=4.230683 yuan=18.488463 ruble=847.93237 won=1.481086 Australian dollar=0.689656 pound=0.84096 euro (France))
 2. Defense budgets as a proportion of GDP have been estimated based on figures published by the governments of each country.

Fig. II-5-4-7 Changes in Defense Budgets in Surrounding Countries Over the Past Ten Years



Notes: 1. Created based on the defense budgets published by each country.
 2. These are numerical values obtained by simple calculation of the ratio between the defense budgets each year, with the FY2004 value as 1 (times) (rounded off two decimal places).
 3. The definition and breakdown of the defense budgets of each country are not necessarily clear. As we must take into account various factors such as foreign exchange fluctuations and price levels of each country, it is very difficult to draw a comparison of defense budgets among countries.

Fig. III-1-1-1 Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan



Crew member for destroyer engaging in warning and surveillance



P-3C patrol Aircraft engaging in warning and surveillance in flight



E-767 Early Warning and Control Aircraft



E-2C Early Warning Aircraft




Fig. III-1-1-2 Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands Performed by Chinese Government Ships





Fig. III-1-1-3 Number of Scrambles since the Period of the Cold War and Its Breakdown



Note: The Peak of the period of the cold war

Fig. III-1-1-4 Example Flight Patterns of Russian and Chinese Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded




Fig. III-1-1-5 Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) for Japan and Neighboring Countries




Fig. III-1-1-6 Conceptual Image of Defending Japan's Offshore Islands




Fig. III-1-1-7 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan

1995	Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense
1998	North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory
	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system
1999	Started the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles
2002	Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD
2003	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started
2005	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved a Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development on advanced interceptors for BMD
2006	North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles toward the Sea of Japan
2007	The deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started SM-3 launch tests by Aegis destroyers started
2009	North Korea launched one ballistic missile toward the Pacific Ocean in April and seven toward the Sea of Japan in July Orders for ballistic missile destruction measures were issued for the first time (March)
2012	North Korea launched missiles which it called "Satellites" in April and December
	April: The missile was in flight for over a minute before disintegrating and landing in the Yellow Sea December: Passed through Okinawa airspace towards the Pacific Minister of Defense issued the operation order for the implementation of Destruction Measures against ballistic missiles, etc.
2014	North Korea launched some ballistic missiles in March, June and December
	March 3: Two missiles were launched and landing in the Sea of Japan
	March 26: Two missiles were launched and it were flighted over 500km and landing in the Sea of Japan July 9: Some missiles were launched and it were flighted at most 500km and landing in the Sea of Japan

Fig. III-1-1-8 Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD




Fig. III-1-1-9 Enhanced PAC-3C Missile (PAC-3 MSE: image)




Fig. III-1-1-10 Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles




Fig. III-1-1-11 Outline of the Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development of Advanced Interceptors for BMD




Fig. III-1-1-12 MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks




Fig. III-1-1-13 Conceptual Image of a Cyber Defense Group





Fig. III-1-1-14 Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal



Notes: 1. SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel will be called on by the Minister of Defense as necessary with the approval of the Prime Minister.

2. Disbandment of SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel must be done by the Minister of Defense.

Fig. III-1-1-15 State of Readiness for Disaster Dispatches (Standard)




Fig. III-1-1-16 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (FY2013)

Description	Number of dispatches	Total number of personnel	Total number of vehicles	Total number of aircraft	Total number of vessels
Responses to storm, flood, and earthquake disasters	23	79,708	6,805	598	51
Transporting emergency patients	401	2,116	8	438	0
Search and rescue	25	4,257	800	57	0
Assisting firefighting	93	2,281	283	102	0
Other	13	687	53	60	0
Total	555	89,049	7,949	1,255	51

Fig. III-1-1-17 Outline of Self-Defense Forces Plan for Countermeasures against Nankai Trough Earthquakes




Fig. III-1-1-18 Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces



Fig. III-1-1-19 Ordering Procedure and Image Regarding Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.




Fig. III-1-1-20 Main Details of Revision of the SDF Act

(1) "Transportation safety" (related to Article 84-3, Item 1)

Regarding the current provisions concerning "transportation safety," based on discussions in the previous Diet and other places, the expressions of the provision has been changed to make its original meaning clearer than it is (there is no substantial change to the contents).

(2) Widening the range of individuals subject for transportation (related to Article 84-3, Item 1)

- The following individuals has been added to the individuals subject for transportation in the previous law (Japanese or foreign nationals who require protection).
 - People who will be required in the implementation of the transportation (e.g. Japanese Government officials, company associates, doctors, etc.)
 - People for whom an early visitation or accompaniment by others is recognized as appropriate (e.g. people involved such as family members, etc.)


(3) Implementation of transportation by vehicles (related to Article 84-3, Item 3)

- Vehicles have been added to the aircraft and ships, as a means of transportation used by the SDF.

(4) Amendment of the provisions pertaining to weapon usage (related to Article 94-5)

- Based on (2) and (3) above, necessary amendment of the provisions pertaining to weapon usage was conducted (usage rights of weapons will remain as the self-defense type).
 - 1) The following has been added to the locations where SDF officers engaged in duties can use weapons (places where vehicles are located, places where individuals subject for transportation are waiting on stand-by, and places where operation is to be carried out, such as confirmation of the status of transportation routes, will be added)
 - 2) People who are under the supervision of SDF officers as a result of the transportation duties carried out by them (e.g. individuals subject for transportation under (2), front-line government employees who are active at congregation sites, etc.) will be added to the individuals subject for protection.

Fig. III-1-1-21 Example of Air Defense Operations



- Notes: 1. Aircraft with airborne warning and control functions in waters distant from its national land and with alternative control capabilities for defense ground environments.
2. Keeping armed fighters on an airborne alert so that they can immediately respond to approaches by enemy aircraft.

Fig. III-1-1-22 Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas Surrounding Japan




Fig. III-1-1-23 Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces






Fig. III-1-2-1 Outline of the Emergency Legislation



- Laws established in the ordinary Diet session in 2003 (three laws related to emergency legislation)
- Laws established in the ordinary Diet session in 2004 (seven laws related to emergency legislation)
- Treaties ratified in the ordinary Diet session in 2004 (three related treaties)

Fig. III-1-2-2 Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations



Notes: The Task Force will be established in the Cabinet for general advancement of measures to respond to armed attacks and other situations.

Fig. III-1-2-3 Measures to be Implemented by Designated Administrative Organizations, Municipal Governments or Designated Public Organizations





Fig. III-1-2-4 Responsibilities of the National and Municipal Governments

Main body	Responsibility
Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Has a unique mission to defend Japan, protect the homeland and the lives, bodies, and properties of the people Respond to armed attack situations and take every possible measure by using all organizations and functions Implement all possible measures as a whole nation
Municipal Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Has responsibilities of protecting the region and the lives, bodies, and properties of the residents Implement necessary measures in mutual cooperation with the national government, other municipal governments, and other institutions
Designated Public Institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement necessary measures in the scope of their work, in mutual cooperation with the national government, municipal governments, and other institutions
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strive to provide necessary cooperation for implementation of response measures taken by the designated administrative institutions, municipal governments, or designated public institutions

Fig. III-1-2-5 Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches



- Notes: 1. Armed Attack Situations Task Force Chief or Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief.
 2. If specifically needed.
 3. Ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel will be called on if necessary upon the approval of the Prime Minister.

Fig. III-2-1-1 Deployment Map of the U.S. Forces in Japan





Fig. III-2-1-2 The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa



- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>1. Reasons for Stationing the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Compared to locations such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii and Guam, Okinawa is closer to various regions in East Asia.
⇒ In the event where urgent deployment within this region is required, the U.S. military in Okinawa can respond rapidly. ○ Okinawa has the geographic advantage of being located in a place with certain distance from Japan's neighbors. ○ Okinawa is in a crucial strategic position in terms of the access to the Eurasian Continent and the Pacific Ocean, as it is located more or less in the center of the Nansei Islands and is close to Japan's sea lanes. | <p>2. The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ With their high level of mobility and readiness*, the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa plays various roles, including securing the peace and safety of the region through such endeavors as assisting in the defense of Japan and providing support after the Great East Japan Earthquake as well as dealing with the Java earthquake in Indonesia in May 2006
⇒ The stationing of USFJ in Okinawa, an area with unique geographic characteristics, including the Marine corps, which has high-level mobility and readiness to carry out a wide range of duties and to deal with various types of emergencies, makes a significant contribution to the security of Japan, and to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. |
|---|--|

* The Marine Corps constantly utilizes all combat elements (land, sea and air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to providing a rapid response in the event of all kinds of situations.

Fig. III-2-2-1 Major Consultations on Policies Held Between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials Concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues

Consultative Forum	Participants		Purpose	Legal Basis
	Japanese Side	U.S. Side		
Security Consultative Committee (SCC) ("2+2" Meeting)	Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense	U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense ¹	Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security	Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960, in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Security Subcommittee (SSC)	Participants are not specified ²	Participants are not specified ²	Exchange of view on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States	Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others
Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) ³	Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Director General of the Bureau of Operational Policy, Ministry of Defense; Representative from Joint Staff ⁴	Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from: U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, PACOM	Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies	Established on July 8, 1976, as a subentry under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting Reorganized at the Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial consultation on June 28, 1996
Japan-U.S. Joint Committee	Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others	Deputy Commander of USFJ, Minister at the U.S. Embassy, and others	Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement	Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement

Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.

2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary.

3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.

4. Then Director-General of the Bureau of Defense Operations was added on September 23, 1997.

Fig. III-2-2-2 Framework of Comprehensive Mechanism




Fig. III-2-2-3 Framework of Coordination Mechanism




Fig. III-2-2-4 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between Japan and the United States




Fig. III-2-2-5 Major Milestones in Security Cooperation Between Japan and the United States

1951		The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed
1952	Years of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	The treaty enters into force
1958		Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty)
1960	Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force
1968		(Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan)
1969		Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan)
1972		(Okinawa is returned to Japan)
1976	Formulation of the former guidelines and expanding Japan-U.S. defense cooperation	(Agreement on the establishment of Sub-Committee for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation)
1978		Formulation of the former "Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation" (the Former Guidelines)
1991		(Collapse of USSR and end of the Cold War)
1996	End of the Cold War and establishment of the current guidelines	Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks) SACO Final Report
1997		Formulation of the current "Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation" (the Current Guidelines)
2001		9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.
2003		The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks)
2006	Japan-U.S. relations since the 9/11 Terrorist attacks in the United States	Formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks) The Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia (Abe-Bush Talks)
2007		Irreplaceable Japan-U.S. Alliance (Abe-Bush Talks)
2010		50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
2012		Japan-U.S. Joint Statement: A Shared Vision For the Future (Noda-Obama Talks)
2013		Agreement on the review of the current "Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation" (the Current Guidelines)
2014		The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (Abe-Obama Talks)

Fig. III-2-2-6 Overview of Japan-U.S. Consultations




Fig. III-2-2-7 The Enhancement of Joint/Shared Use, Joint Training/Exercises, and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities (conceptual image)






Fig. III-2-3-1 U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY 2014)




- Notes:
1. Training relocation costs under the Special Measures Agreement extend either into the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ or the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs.
 2. The SACO-related costs refer to the cost for implementing the contents of the SACO Final Report to reduce the impact on people in Okinawa, while the realignment-related costs refers to the cost relating to a step to contribute to reducing the impact on local communities as part of the realignment initiatives. Since the cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ is Japan's voluntary effort to bear some costs in light of the importance of ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs, and is categorized separately.
 3. The costs related to the stationing of USFJ include the MOD-related budget, other ministry-related budgets (base subsidy, etc.): ¥38.4 billion, FY2013 Budget) and the estimated costs of government-owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities (¥166.0 billion, FY2013 Estimated Costs).
 4. Numbers may not add up due to rounding

Fig. III-2-3-2 Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in "Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation"

1. Realignment in the Kanto Area



2. Realignment in Okinawa



3. Relocation of Aircraft, etc.

Relocation of training conducted in **Kadena**, **Misawa** and **Iwakuni** to each of SDF bases, **Chitose**, **Misawa**, **Hyakuri**, **Komatsu**, **Tsuiki** and **Nyutabaru**, as well as to Guam.
Relocation to Guam, etc. was agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in January 2011.

Relocation of carrier-based aircraft squadrons to Iwakuni



Relocation of the KC-130 squadron to Iwakuni




Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni (the airport opened on December 13, 2012)



TPY-2 Radar: deployment of so-called "X-band Radar System")



Deploying TPY-2 Radar
*Confirmed at the "2+2" Joint Statement on October 3, 2013



Legend

- Implemented
- Continuing

Relocation of MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons, etc. from Iwakuni to Atsugi (Confirmed at the "2+2" Joint Statement on October 3, 2013 that they would be maintained at MCAS Iwakuni)

The KC-130 squadron will be deployed on a rotational basis to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam

Relocation of the functions of aircraft for emergency use to Tsuiki and Nyutabaru

Relocation of the CH-53D squadron to Guam (Already relocated to continental U.S.)

Mariana Islands
Saipan
Guam

Fig. III-2-3-3 Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report




Fig. III-2-3-4 Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa





Fig. III-2-3-5 Background for the Futenma Airfield Replacement Facility

Month & Year	Background
April 1996	Then Prime Minister Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the full return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report. → The airfield will be returned within five to seven years, following the completion of an adequate replacement facility.
December 1996	SACO Final Report → A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled).
November 1999	Then Governor of Okinawa Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago City as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be for joint military-civilian use
December 1999	Then Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF “Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma” (Cabinet decision) → Construction in the Nago City Hennoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab
July 2002	“Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities” concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. “Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma” was prepared. → Scale, construction methods, and specific construction site decided.
November 2003	Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Okinawa.
April 2004	The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure started (abolished in 2007).
August 2004	A U.S. Force helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.
October 2005	“2+2” Joint Statement → Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay)
April 2006	“Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the MCAS Futenma Replacement Facility” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago, and the village mayor of Ginoza. → Agreement was reached by creating flight paths avoiding overflight of the surrounding region (the V shape plan).
May 2006	“2+2” Joint Statement → Final adjustments made for the “U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” V shape plan approved “Basic Confirmation Regarding the Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. “GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others” (Cabinet decision) → The cabinet decision of December 1999 was abolished.
August 2006	Establishment of “the Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma”
June 2007	Environmental survey started.
August 2007	The EIA scoping document was sent to the governor, municipal mayors etc. of Okinawa.
March 2008	Survey based on the EIA scoping document was started.
April 2009	Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.=
May 2009	“The Guam International Agreement” was approved by the Diet.
September 2009	Conclusion of a three-party coalition government agreement between the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the People’s New Party. Agreement on reviewing the status of the U.S. Forces realignment and U.S. Forces bases in Japan.
November 2009	Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan–U.S. summit meeting Agreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.
December 2009	Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.
January 2010	“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirmation of efforts to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing the impact on local communities, including Okinawa.
May 2010	“2+2” Joint Statement Intention to locate the Futenma replacement facility at the Camp Schwab Henoko area and adjacent waters was confirmed “Government Efforts Related to Items Authorized by the United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee on May 28, 2010” (Cabinet decision).
August 2010	Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report
June 2011	“2+2” Joint Statement Confirming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the replaced facility should be V-shaped.
December 2011– January 2012	The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the governor of Okinawa.
February 2012	The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. Official discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns South of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.
April 2012	“2+2” Joint Statement The current plan to relocate the air base from Futenma to Henoko was reconfirmed to be the only viable solution.
December 2012	Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.
March 2013	Application for approval of public water body reclamation was submitted to the governor of Okinawa.
October 2013	“2+2” Joint Statement → Recognition was reaffirmed that the Futenma Replacement Facility would be constructed in Henoko should be the only solution to avoid continuous use of the facility
December 2013	Mayor of Okinawa approved reclamation of the public water body related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project

Fig. III-2-3-6 Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base



Notes: 1. The times and years are based on the best case scenario concerning the return of specific facilities/areas after the completion of necessary measures and procedures to be taken by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The periods may become delayed due to such factors as the progress of the preparation for relocation in Okinawa by the Government of Japan and the U.S. Government's efforts for relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps to outside Japan. Furthermore, the times and fiscal years in parentheses do not include the time necessary for relocation of the Marine Corps from Japan because, though the conditions for returning the areas include its relocation to outside of Japan, the plan for the relocation is yet to be decided. Consequently, the times of return of these areas may be changed depending on the progress of the relocation of the Marine Corps from Japan.

2. The area of each area is an approximate figure and may be slightly modified based on the results of future surveys, etc.

3. Studies will be made in the process of developing a master plan to determine the feasibility of additional land returns.

*JC: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee

Fig. III-2-3-7 Chronology of MV-22 Osprey Deployment to Okinawa

June 6, 2011	Provided information to relevant local governments and other organizations on the announcement made by the U.S. Department of Defense to replace the CH-46 deployed at MCAS Futenma with the MV-22 in the latter half of 2012.
June 13–26	Provided safety/noise information that GOJ had been obtained so far to relevant local governments and other organizations.
June 24	Received a letter with 29 questions from Okinawa Governor and others.
September 1	The first written response was handed to Okinawa Governor and others by Administrative Vice-Minister.
September 2–13	Provided an explanation on the first written response to relevant local governments and other organizations.
December 20	The second written response was handed to Okinawa Governor by chief of the Okinawa Defense Bureau.
December 20–January 17, 2012	Provided an explanation on the second written response above to relevant local governments and other organizations.
April 12	A prompt report on the accident involving an MV-22 in Morocco was provided to relevant local governments and other organizations.
June 13–	Provided an explanation on the results of the Environment Review, MV-22 pamphlet, and the content of the third response to the questions to Okinawa Prefecture, relevant local governments and other organizations.
June 14	A prompt report on the accident involving a CV-22 in Florida was provided to relevant local governments and other organizations.
June 26–	Provided an explanation on the information provided from U.S. side regarding the accidents in Morocco and Florida to relevant local governments and other organizations.
June 29–	Provided an explanation on the content of the Host Nation Notification and the press release to relevant local governments and other organizations.
July 20	Provided information from the U.S. side stating that the MV-22 would be offloaded on MCAS Iwakuni on July 23 to relevant local governments and other organizations.
August 1–September 18	Received four questionnaires regarding the Environment Review etc., from the Okinawa Governor and others.
August 28–	Provided an explanation on the “Analysis and Evaluation Report on the MV-22 Accident in Morocco” to relevant local governments and other organizations.
August 28–	Provided an explanation on the “Analysis and Evaluation Report on the CV-22 Accident in Florida” to relevant local governments and other organizations.
August 28–	Q&A session on Osprey deployment with members of the Iwakuni City Council full member committee.
September 19–	Provided an explanation on the report “MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa” to relevant local governments and other organizations.
September 21	Provided Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City with the information that function check flights, etc. were commenced at MCAS Iwakuni.
September 27-28	Provided information on the contents of the responses to the questionnaires from Okinawa Prefecture and others received from August 1 to September 18 to Okinawa Prefecture, other relevant local governments and other organizations.
November 2	In the nationwide prefectural governors meeting hosted by the Government, Defense Minister explained the initial training plan with the MV-22 Osprey, and Prime Minister and Defense Minister asked for the governors’ cooperation in relocating the training to outside Okinawa.
December 10	The MOD received another letter of questions from Governor of Okinawa in response to the answers to his initial questions which the MOD submitted to him in September.
December 12–14	The MOD provided explanations to Okinawa Prefecture and relevant local governments in Okinawa regarding the content of the second set of answers the MOD prepared, since some of these answers did not satisfactorily address the letter of questions from the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture on environmental review.
December 25	The MOD received a request from the Governor of Okinawa to investigate the details of the flight operations of MV-22.
January 28, 2013	The Committee for the Okinawa Prefectural Citizens’ Rally and the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly submitted a petition to the Prime Minister.
April 30	The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding U.S. explanation on the deployment of the squadron (unloaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).
July 1	It was announced that squadron plans to be unloaded at the final week of July to MCAS Iwakuni
September 25	Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.

Fig. III-2-3-8 Facilities and Areas Related to the Reorganization of the USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture




Fig. III-3-1-1 High-Level Visits (January 2013-Early July 2014)




Fig. III-3-1-2 Security Dialogues and Defense Exchanges

Classification	Type	Significance	Outline
Bilateral	Exchange between Defense Ministers and high-level officials	Improving and reinforcing mutual trust and cooperation through frank exchanges of views on regional situations and national defense policies that are important common interests to both sides, as well as enhancing following defense exchanges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan's Defense Minister and Defense Ministers from other countries • Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan's Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister for Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Chief of Joint Staff, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF Chiefs, and their counterparts in the other countries
	Regular consultation between defense	Paving the way for high-level dialogues and exchanges through continuous and direct exchanges of views between national defense policy-makers, and contributing to the enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation between related countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultations between Director-General-level officials, Deputy Director-General-level officials, and their counterparts • Dialogue between Japan's Joint Staff, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, and their counterparts in foreign countries
	Exchange between units	Contributing to the improvement and enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation between related countries through bilateral exercises and events for exchanges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel exchanges • Mutual visits to training squadrons aircraft, and bilateral exercises for search and rescue operations
	Exchange of students	In addition to the original educational purposes, deepening the understanding of the other countries' defense policies and, the situation of their defense units, as well as building mutual trust through the promotion of relatively long-term personnel, and establishing human networks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mutual acceptance of students • Dispatch of students to overseas military-related organizations
	Research exchanges	Deepening mutual understanding between researchers of both countries through frank exchange of opinions for the maintenance and promotion of defense exchanges	Research exchanges between Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies and military-related research organizations in other countries
Multilateral	Security dialogue	Deepening mutual understanding on the recognition of situations and on security perceptions among related countries, and multilateral issues broadly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dialogues at the ADMM-Plus and ARF • Multilateral dialogues sponsored by the Ministry of Defense Japan • Multilateral dialogues sponsored by governments • Multilateral dialogues sponsored by private sectors
	Multilateral exercises and seminars	Improving skills and contributing to improvement enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation through multilateral exercises and seminars	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel exchanges • Multilateral exercises and seminars related to disaster relief, minesweeping, and submarine rescue operations

Fig. III-3-1-3 From Dialogues and Exchanges to Cooperation




Fig. III-3-1-4 Image of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

LEVEL	Examples of Specific Initiatives
Crisis Management and Confidence-Building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Personnel Exchanges (high-level exchange, working-level exchange etc) ○ Unit-to-Unit Exchanges, Mutual Visits by vessels and aircrafts ○ Goodwill Training
Mutual Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Students Exchanges, Research Exchanges ○ Memorandums of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges ○ Information Security Agreement ○ Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) ○ Various Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security (including joint training) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARF Disaster Relief Exchanges (DIREx), Joint Search and Rescue Exercises • JPN-AUS Cooperation (Cambodia PKO, East Timor PKO, Iraq Reconstruction and Assistance Activities) • Pacific Partnership, Cooperation with countries and organizations in Counter-Piracy)
Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Capacity building Assistance

Fig. III-3-1-5 Organizational Chart and Overview of the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)





Fig. III-3-1-6 Status of Activities of Short-Term Dispatch Program

Country	Period	Content	Supporting target	Dispatched personnel
Mongolia	October 17, 2012	Conducting a seminar on the efforts by GSDF Medical corps officials as support in the area of hygiene	Medical officers at Central Hospital of Mongolian military, etc.	Two GSDF personnel One Internal Bureau Administrative official
	June 11–13, 2013	Human Resources Development in the engineering field to contribute to the field of U.N. PKO (Field survey)	Mongolian Military Engineer Unit	Five GSDF personnel Three Internal Bureau Administrative Officials
	July 31–August 6, 2013			Six GSDF personnel One Internal Bureau Administrative Official
Vietnam	October 22–23, 2012	Conducting a seminar on overview of underwater medicine	Medical officers in the Vietnamese navy	Three MSDF personnel One Internal Bureau Administrative Official
	May 22–24, 2013			Two MSDF personnel Two Internal Bureau Administrative Officials
	March 17–21, 2014			Three MSDF personnel Two Internal Bureau Administrative Officials
	September 24–27, 2013	Seminar on aviation safety	Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force	Five ASDF personnel Two Internal Bureau Administrative Officials
Indonesia	February 4–6, 2013	Conducting a seminar on oceanography as support in the area of maritime security	Indonesian Navy Hydro-Oceanographic office	Three MSDF personnel One Internal Bureau Administrative Official
	July 3–5, 2013			One MSDF personnel Two Internal Bureau administrative officials (One Maritime Safety Official)

Fig. III-3-3-1 Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (Comparison with the number of incidents in Southeast Asia)



- Notes: 1. The data is based on a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).
 2. Regarding piracy cases that have occurred off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden in 2014, approximately cases of piracy have been reported as of late April.

Fig. III-3-3-2 SDF's Counter-Piracy Operations





Fig. III-3-3-3 Structure of the Deployed Forces



* Other than the units above, an unit comprising of SDF personnel (within 20 personnel) serving CTF151 Commander and Commander center staff will be structured.

Fig. III-3-4-1 Record of Activities in the International Community by the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces




Fig. III-3-4-2 International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the SDF



Activities based on the Act Concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for Counter-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities. (Ended in January 2010)

Legend : Activities based on time-limited acts
 : Activities based on permanent acts


Fig. III-3-4-3 Basic Policy on Japan's Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Forces (Five Principles)

1. Agreement on a ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts.
2. Consent for the undertaking of U.N. peacekeeping operations as well as Japan's participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts.
3. The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any of the parties to armed conflicts.
4. Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may terminate the dispatch of the personnel engaged in International Peace Cooperation Assignments.
5. The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel, etc.

Fig. III-3-4-4 South Sudan and Its Surrounding Area




Fig. III-3-4-5 Organization of UNMISS



Notes: Blue boxes show the number of Japanese personnel dispatched on UNMISS.

Fig. III-3-4-6 Overview of the Coordination Center and the Engineer Unit Deployed in South Sudan



*Excludes commands relating to judicial police duties.

Fig. III-3-4-7 PKO Centers in Africa



Fig. III-3-4-8 The Philippines and the Surrounding Area




Fig. III-3-4-9 Overview of the Coordination Center and the Engineer Unit Deployed in South Sudan




Fig. III-3-4-10 Malaysia and the Surrounding Area




Fig. III-3-4-11 International Disaster Relief Teams for a Missing Malaysian Airplane





Fig. III-3-5-1 Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.

Category	Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.				Conventional Weapons
	Nuclear Weapons	Chemical Weapons	Biological Weapons	Delivery Systems (Missiles)	
Conventions on Arms control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation, etc.	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)	Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)	The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Treaty), Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (Ottawa Treaty), United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, United Nations Report on Military Expenditures
Export Control Frameworks Aimed at Nonproliferation	Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)	Australia Group (AG)		Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)	Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)
New International Initiatives Aimed at Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540				

Fig. III-3-5-2 Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since 2010)

Date	Exercise	Location	Participation of MOD/SDF
Sep 2010	PSI air interdiction exercise hosted by Australia	Australia	Dispatch of observers
Oct 2010	PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the ROK	Republic of Korea	2 destroyers
July 2012	PSI air interdiction exercise hosted by Japan	Japan	Joint Staff, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Northern Army, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau
Sep 2012	PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the ROK	Republic of Korea	1 destroyer, 1 patrol aircraft (P-3C)
Feb 2013	PSI exercise co-hosted by the U.S. and UAE	UAE	Dispatch of observers


Fig. IV-1-1-1 Scale of the Defense Industry in Japan and its Degree of Reliance on Defense Demand



Note: The distribution of degrees of reliance on defense demand among relevant companies (The average from 2008 to 2012) based on surveys 42 relevant companies


Fig. IV-1-1-2 Current Status of Research & Development Expenditure

Japan's Science & Technology Budget (FY2014 Budget)




Source: Cabinet Office Website on Science & Technology Policy

Defense R&D Expenditure of Major Countries (FY2012)



* FY2011

Percentage of R&D Expenditure out of Defense Expenditure of Major Countries (FY2012)



* FY2011

<Reference>

Percentage of Defense R&D out of Government-funded Research Expenditure in Major Countries

(2012)

Japan	4.6%	USA	53.1%	France	6.3%
UK	14.6%*	Germany	3.8%	ROK	16.3%*
Sweden	8.05%				

* 2011

Source: "OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators"

Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators; THE MILITARY BALANCE 2013

Fig. IV-1-3-1 Concrete examples of the First Principle “the cases where transfers are prohibited”

Situation	Specific examples
(1) Violation of obligations under treaties ratified by Japan and other international arrangements	Stipulated in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II and Protocol IV are prohibitions on the “transfer” of the weapons targeted by each respective convention according with the provisions of each; violation of these responsibilities.
(2) Violation of obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions	<p>At present, the countries where the transfer of weapons, etc., is prohibited based on a U.N. Security Council resolution include North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Lebanon, Eritrea, Libya, and the Central African Republic.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the case of North Korea, Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) established an embargo on tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-diameter artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, military warships, missiles or missile systems, and related supplies such as spare parts for the above. Later, in Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), the subjects of embargo were expanded to include all weapons, excluding small arms and related supplies. • In the case of Iran, Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010) established an embargo on tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-diameter artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, military warships, missiles or missile systems, and related supplies such as spare parts for the above.
(3) Transfer to a nation which is party to a conflict (countries which are the target of measures taken by the United Nations Security Council to maintain or recover international peace and safety after an armed attack occurs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ At the present time, there are basically no “countries which are the target of measures taken by the United Nations Security Council to maintain or recover international peace and safety after an armed attack occurs.” (the so-called “U.N. Forces in Korea,” formed based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 82, 83 and 84, which pertain to the Korean War, are stationed in South Korea, but they exist under the Korean Armistice Agreement.) ○ Examples to date include North Korea in the Korean War (Security Council Resolutions 82 (June 25, 1950), 83 (June 27, 1950), 84 (July 7, 1950) and Iraq in the Gulf War (Security Council Resolutions 660 (August 6, 1990), 661 (August 6, 1990), and 678 (November 29, 1990).

Fig. IV-1-3-2 Concrete examples of the Second Principle “Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted”

Situation	Specific examples
(1) Contribution to the proactive advancement of peace contribution and international cooperation	<p>The following are examples of overseas transfer that contributes to the proactive advancement of peace contribution and international cooperation (limited to cases where there is proactive significance from the perspective of peace contribution and international cooperation.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The transfer destination is the government of another country ○ The transfer destination is the United Nations, a related organization or an organization acting based on a U.N. resolution
(2) Contribution to the security of Japan	<p>The following are examples of overseas transfer that contributes to the security of Japan (limited to cases where there is proactive significance from the perspective the security of Japan.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Overseas transfer relating to international joint development and production with countries involved in a cooperative relationship with Japan in terms of security, exemplified by the United States ○ The following are examples of overseas transfer that contributes to the strengthening of security and defense cooperation with countries involved in a cooperative relationship with Japan in terms of security, exemplified by the United States <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overseas transfer of defense equipment, including the provision of articles and services based on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) • Provision of weapons technology as a part of mutual technology exchange with the United States • Provision of parts and services associated with licensed products from the United States, and the provision of services such as repairs to U.S. Forces • Overseas transfer of defense equipment relating to cooperation in evacuation, transport, warnings, surveillance and minesweeping for countries in a cooperative relationship with Japan in terms of security ○ Overseas transfer required for the activities of Government organizations, including the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter “SDF, etc.”) (including the activities of the governments of other countries or private-sector organizations associated with the activities of the SDF, etc. The same below.) or the security of Japanese people. Examples include the following. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Temporary export of equipment, return of purchased equipment and provision of technological information, associated with the activities of the SDF, etc. (including the exchange of parts requiring repair for better parts.) • Export of equipment for the purpose of escorting or the self-protection of public officials • Export of equipment for the purpose of the self-protection of Japanese people engaged in activities in dangerous regions

Fig. IV-1-4-1 Cooperation with the U.S., other countries and domestic research institutions

Countries and Institutions	Details of cooperation
U.S.	Since 1992, there have been 19 joint research projects and 1 joint development project. At present, following joint research and development projects are underway: (1) research on human effects of human exposure to aircraft fuels and their engine exhaust, (2) research on image gyro for airborne applications, (3) research on hybrid electric propulsion, (4) research on high-speed multi-hull vessel optimization, (5) development of Advanced Ballistic Missile Interceptor.
U.K.	At the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting held in April 2012, it was agreed that a range of appropriate defense for joint development and production is to be identified. In July 2013, the governments concluded an agreement concerning the joint development of defence equipment and began a cooperative research project concerning chemical and biological protection technology.
Australia	At the September 2013 Japan-Australia 2+2 Meeting, Ministers expressed their commitment to “deepening Australia-Japan science and technology cooperation in the field of defence and “initiating information exchanges in defence science and technology fields of mutual.” At the Japan-Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting held that same month, Ministers confirmed the establishment of a framework for discussion regarding equipment and technology cooperation, and the plan to continue the exchange of views and opinions between specialists. At the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting held in April 2014, the both leaders instructed 2+2 Ministers to oversee joint research on marine hydrodynamics as an initial area of science and technology cooperation.
France	At the Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers Meeting held in January 2014, a framework for dialogues on cooperation in the field of defence equipment and control of exports was established. At the May 2014 Summit Meeting, both leaders identified common interests in several areas, including unmanned systems with regard to defense equipment cooperation.
Domestic research institutions	Since 2004, the Technical Research and Development Institute has concluded agreements with independent administrative agencies (the National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, and others.), universities (Teikyo Heisei University, Kyushu University, and others.) and so forth, and is currently engaged in efforts including research cooperation and exchange of technical data in a variety of fields.


Fig. IV-1-5-1 Policies for the Maintaining and Strengthening of Defense Production and Technological Bases

Policies for the Maintaining and Strengthening of Defense Production and Technological Bases	
Improvement of contract systems, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Use of single-tending contracts ○ Even longer-term contracts (integrated procurement for multiple fiscal years) ○ Construction of a flexible system for receiving orders, in joint venture (JV) and other formats ○ Increasing desire to lower purchasing prices and reduce business costs ○ Strengthening of project management throughout its life cycle
Policies relating to research and development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Establishment of a vision for research and development ○ Increasing the ability to examine technology, including cutting-edge technology relating to people's livelihoods ○ Strengthening collaboration with universities and research institutions ○ Using and collaboration with research and development programs, including dual-use technology ○ Funding for promising cutting-edge research for use in defense ○ Strengthening of collaboration with foreign parties
Defense equipment and technological cooperation, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Deepening relationships with the United States regarding defense coordination and technological cooperation ○ Building new relationships in defense coordination and technological cooperation ○ Contribution to international logistics support ○ Improve the foundations for defense coordination and technological cooperation ○ Promotion of adapting equipment for civilian use ○ Technology management and security
Efforts relating to defense industry organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Promoting understanding of the necessity for defense operations and the defense industry ○ Maintaining a robust supply chain ○ Use of industrial organizations and contract systems
Strengthening of systems in the Ministry of Defense	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Consideration of efforts such as unification of departments associated with equipment acquisition, as a part of the MOD reform ○ Consideration of the strengthening of inspection functions and the training of human resources in project management and procurement
Promotion of policies in collaboration with other relevant ministries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Consideration of support measures through the use of policies of other ministries

Fig. IV-1-5-2 Direction in the Various Defense Equipment Sectors


Ground equipment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Regarding tanks and artillery, we will use our world-class level of strength in this area and strive to maintain our production and technological bases to the appropriate level. We aim to build production and technological bases for ground equipment in response to the changes in the security environment enveloping Japan, in terms of armored vehicles, etc. ○ Through efforts such as further standardizing the specifications of wheeled vehicles (family of vehicles), defense equipment will be acquired more efficiently and effectively, and the production and technological bases will be maintained and strengthened ○ Functions such as joint water and land use will be used to reinforce as necessary, Japan's technological weaknesses, and cooperation in defense equipment and technology, that makes use of our strengths, will be promoted. Furthermore, efforts to increase the predictability of enterprises will help to maintain the foundations, in areas like maintaining and inheriting technology and skills
Supplies, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Based on factors such as compatibility with the physical characteristics of the Japanese people, policies will be advanced to increase the predictability of enterprises, so that the relevant foundations can be maintained, thereby making it possible to continue the procurement of supplies from domestic companies ○ Consideration of adapting equipment for civilian use and cooperation in defense equipment and technology, in fields where Japan excels, such as chemical protection equipment
Ships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Although certain countries export ships and transfer technology, it can be difficult to acquire state-of-the-art ships; hence, in order to enable us to respond to the latest technology such as stealth capabilities, the production and technological bases will be maintained and strengthened in such a manner that multiple prime enterprises become involved ○ Consideration will be given to the bulk order of multiple escort ships having a common design, while taking into account the maintenance and strengthening of construction technology bases and ship repair bases. At that time, a review will be considered of the best format for contracts that take into account the effects of lowering prices. ○ The new National Defense Program Guidelines state that the number of submarines will be increased to 22, in order to ensure safety in the waters surrounding Japan. Going forward, efforts will continue to be made to conduct research and development aimed at improving their capabilities, as well as to maintain and strengthen the existing bases
Aircraft	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ For the acquisition of F-35A aircraft, the participation of Japanese companies in construction will be strategically promoted, from the perspective of maintaining and optimizing the production and technological bases. In the future, efforts will be made to coordinate with other relevant countries, with a view to the establishment of regional maintenance and upgrading facilities in the Asia Pacific region. In order to accumulate and improve the technology relating to fighters in Japan, so that development of future aircraft can be considered as an option prior to the retirement of the F-2 (including the possibility of international joint development), strategic considerations will be pursued, including verification research, and the necessary measures taken accordingly. ○ Multifaceted use of the results of development (such as the possibility of adaptation for civilian use, and cooperation in defense equipment and technology) will be promoted. Keeping both the civilian and defense demand for rotary wing aircraft in mind, international joint development and production will be considered as an option, based on the technology cultivated through domestic research and the introduction of technology from abroad via licensed domestic production
Explosives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Balanced with efficient acquisition, the continuation of a certain scale of procurement from domestic companies will be made possible. When various contingencies arise, multiple procurement methods will be combined with this, and the bases maintained to ensure the necessary scale of explosives. Measures will also be considered to raise future predictability for both the Government and the public.
Guided weapons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In order to increase air defense performance, the replacement of the GSDF's SAM and ASDF's Patriot capabilities will be kept in mind, and technological considerations regarding future SAMs will be pursued to further strengthen the relevant technological foundations. A vision for research and development will be established, so that technological considerations regarding future guided weapons can be implemented, including steps to promote the fixed rocket motors and other technologies required to improve performance, such as increasing the launch range, thereby ensuring that they can be used effectively in response to new threats ○ Increasingly, there are examples in this field of international joint development and production on a global scale. Depending on the circumstances, one of the options for participation in international joint development is to select an efficient acquisition method based on the view of increasing interoperability with allies and friendly nations. Joint development between Japan and the United States into the SM-3 Block IIA will be continued, and considering the maintenance and strengthening of the production and technological bases, consideration will be given to moving the project onto the production and deployment stages, after which the necessary steps will be taken.
Communications electronics and command control systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Research and development into cutting-edge technology for the bases required for defense will be implemented with priority, involving the improvement of detection capacity by increasing the detection performance of fixed warning and control radar systems and the simultaneous, parallel use of multiple sonar systems, while at the same time, the technological foundations will be maintained and strengthened by pursuing the applicability of cutting-edge livelihood technology. ○ Because the integration of systems to ensure smooth unified operation, strengthening of functions to support decision-making by commanders, and systems capable of responding to battles based around network data are necessary for future command control systems, livelihood technology foundations will be adopted which have shown remarkable expansion, such as data processing technology and integrated system construction technology, which will make it possible to exchange systems as and when required to reflect the latest technological level. ○ The technology involved in bases required for defense, such as radar technology that uses high-output semiconductors and software wireless technology, comprises a field where Japan is particularly strong, and it is here that cooperation in defense production and technology will be advanced along with adaptation to civilian use, with the goal of strengthening the defense production and technological bases.
Unmanned equipment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ At the present time, the Self-Defense Forces have few pieces of equipment in this area, but it is a field undergoing much research worldwide. Hence, due to the trend toward defense technology based around future battle conditions, smart technology and networking, the perspective of integrated operation will be taken into account. Then, in order to present a direction aimed at unmanned equipment like next-generation unmanned aircraft, a vision for research and development will be established, proactive research will be implemented and the technological foundations ○ There are also a large number of research organizations in the private sector with advanced technology. Cooperation with research institutions will be encouraged with respect to robots that can be used for defense purposes and elemental technology associated with unmanned systems, and the standard of unmanned equipment raised ○ Advanced research and technology and defense equipment are already being used in this sector, in other countries, so Japan will pursue defense equipment and technological cooperation in the form of joint research and development with these countries, and work to raise the level of its own technological foundations
Cyber and space systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ We aim to Together with policies relating to the use of space development and efforts to increase the capability of the Ministry of Defense to respond to cyber attacks. Meanwhile, from the perspective of the defense of Japan, the future outlook of our defense and technological bases, as they pertain to future necessity, will be considered

Fig. IV-2-1-1 Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF



Material sources: Data before FY2013 (excluding data for FY2005 and FY2010) are based on "Population Estimates of Japan 1920-2000" and "Annual Report on Population Estimates," Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
 Data for FY2005 and FY2010 are the proportionally adjusted populations of unknown age ascertained by National Institute of Population and Social Security Research based on "Population Census," Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
 Data from FY2014 onward are based on "Population Projection for Japan" (medium estimates in January 2012), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.

Fig. IV-2-1-2 Overview of Appointment System for SDF Regular Personnel



- Notes: 1. Staff candidates for the medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy faculties will be promoted to the position of First Lieutenant if they pass the national examinations in medicine, dentistry, or pharmaceutical studies and complete the required education and training.
2. Corresponds to Student candidate for enlistment (upper) and Enlisted (upper) candidate before 2008 recruitment.
3. In order to enhance initial education for SDF Personnel in short-term service, starting in July 2010 they will be non-SDF Personnel for the first three months of their enlistment, and will be engaged exclusively in fundamental education and practice as non-regular Ministry of Defense personnel.
4. For SDF students, starting from the FY2010 appointments they will be changed to students with a new non-regular status, rather than SDF Personnel status. The new students will also receive a high school diploma at the conclusion of a student course (three years) through distance learning.
5. A three-year program is to be closed at the end of FY2015. A four-year program at the National Defense Medical College, Faculty of Nursing is started at FY2014.
6. : Enrollment examination : : Examination or non-examination screening.

Fig. IV-2-1-3 Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Regular Personnel

Rank	Designation	Mandatory Retirement Age
General (GSDF, ASDF), Admiral (MSDF) to Second Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF), Ensign (MSDF)	Sho	60
Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)	Shoho	
Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF)	Issa	
Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)	Nisa	55
Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)	Sansa	
Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)	Ichii	54
First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)	Nii	
Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)	Sani	
Warrant Officer (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), Warrant Officer (ASDF)	Juni	53
Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)	Socho	
Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)	Isso	53
Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)	Niso	
Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)	Sanso	—
Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF)	Shicho	
Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF)	Isshii	
Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF)	Nishi	

- Notes: 1. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF Regular Personnel who hold the rank of General (GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff Office, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ADSF Chief of Staff, is 62.
2. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF Regular Personnel who hold positions such as physician, dentist, pharmacist, or musician, military police officer, or the information analyst, is 60. The New MTDP states that it will review this system of retirement at the age of 60.

Fig. IV-2-1-4 Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel

	SDF Reserve Personnel	SDF Ready Reserve Personnel	Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel
Basic concept	○ When defense call-up or disaster call-up is received, they will serve as SDF Regular Personnel	○ When defense call-up is received, or under similar conditions, they will serve as SDF Regular Personnel in a pre-determined GSDF unit, as part of the basic framework of defense capability	○ Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training
Candidate	○ Former Regular Personnel, former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, former Reserve Personnel	○ Former Regular Personnel, former Reserve Personnel	(Same for General and Technical) ○ Inexperienced SDF Personnel (includes those with less than a year of SDF experience)
Age	○ Enlisted (Lower): 18–36 years old ○ Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under two years above the retirement age	○ Enlisted (Lower): 18–31 years old ○ Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under three years below the retirement age for each rank	○ General: over 18 and under 34 years old; Technical: over 53 and under 55 years old depending on technical skills possessed after the age of 18
Employment	○ Employment on screening, based on application ○ Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training	○ Employment on screening, based on application	○ General: Employment on examination, based on application ○ Technical: Employment on screening, based on application
Rank	○ Former Regular Personnel: As a rule, rank at the point of retirement ○ SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: Current specified rank ○ Former Reserve Personnel and Former Ready Reserve Personnel: As a rule, rank at the point of retirement ○ Candidate for Reserve Personnel • General: Private • Technical: Assignment based on skills	○ Former Regular Personnel: As a rule, rank at the point of retirement ○ Former Reserve Personnel: As a rule, designated rank at the point of retirement	○ Not designated
Term of service	○ Three Years/One term	○ Three Years/One term	○ General: Maximum of three years ○ Technical: Maximum of two years
Education/ Training	○ Although the law designates a maximum of 20 days per year, actual implementation is 5 days per year	○ 30 days per year	○ General: 50 days within a maximum of three years (equivalent to SDF personnel cadet course) ○ Technical: 10 days within a maximum of two years (training to serve as an SDF Regular Personnel by utilizing each skill)
Promotion	○ Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)	○ Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who has fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)	○ Since there is no designated rank, there is no promotion
Benefits, allowances, and other terms	○ Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,100/day ○ SDF Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month	○ Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400–14,200/day ○ SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥16,000/month ○ Continuous Service Incentive Allowance: ¥120,000/one term ○ Special subsidy for corporations employing Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month	○ Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥7,900/day ○ Allowance as Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is not paid because defense call-up duty is not imposed on them
Call-up duty and other duties	○ Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up	○ Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up	○ Education and training call-up


Fig. IV-2-1-5 Main Measures for Reemployment Support

Items	Measures for employment support	Description
Measures for retiring SDF personnel	Occupational aptitude testing	Testing aimed to provide retiring SDF personnel with guidance based individual aptitudes
	Technical training	Provide retiring SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement {large sized vehicle operation, large sized special motor vehicle operation, information processing, crane operation, motor vehicle repair, boiler maintenance, nursing care (home helper), etc.}
	Disaster prevention and risk control training	Provide SDF personnel who will take early retirement with technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan
	Correspondence courses	Provide retiring SDF personnel with the capability to acquire public certification (certified insurance labor consultant, health supervisor, real- estate transaction specialist, etc.)
	Business management training	Support SDF personnel who will take early retirement to cultivate social adaptability, as well as provide know-how to lead a stable life after retirement or reemployment
	Career guidance	Prepare soon-retiring SDF personnel to find new employment and provide them with know-how to choose new occupation
	Outsourcing career counselling; etc.	Outsource career counseling, etc. to external experts to meet the needs of each SDF personnel who plans to retire
Measures for internal support personnel	Training for support personnel	Training of labor administration, support activities, etc. to improve quality of support personnel
Measures for outside	Support publicizing to business owners	Publicizing to companies, etc. the effectiveness of SDF personnel who plan to retire
	Inviting business owners on unit tours	Invite business owners to units, etc. and provide them with tours, explanations of the employment support situation, etc.

Fig. IV-2-1-6 Overview of Reappointment System


Items	Administrative officials and others	SDF regular personnel
Objectives	<input type="radio"/> Promote active use of elderly, but talented, human resources; and secure employment until pension age through reemploying retirees who are capable and motivated to work as SDF personnel.	
Job conditions	<input type="radio"/> Full-time <input type="radio"/> Shorter-time service	<input type="radio"/> Limited to full-time service
Period of reappointment	<input type="radio"/> One year, with the possibility of renewal	<input type="radio"/> Appointment may be renewable for up to one year (up to three years for those under 60) <input type="radio"/> Appointment may be extended for a certain period of time (six months to a year) in the case of defense operation, etc.
Maximum age for reappointment	<input type="radio"/> 65	
Leave	<input type="radio"/> Annual leave, sick leave, special leave, care leave (same as before retirement) <input type="radio"/> Annual leave for shorter-time service is limited to no more than 20 days in light of working hours	<input type="radio"/> Annual leave, sick leave, special leave, care leave (same as before retirement)
Salary and allowance	<input type="radio"/> Fixed monthly salary is provided based on job level and rank. <input type="radio"/> Allowances, such as a commuting allowance, are provided	

Fig. IV-2-2-1 Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots)



Notes: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Fig. IV-2-2-2 Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities)



Notes: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Fig. IV-2-2-3 Measures for Harmony Between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

Purpose	Measures	Description of Measures
Preventing Noise Problems	Subsidies to finance sound insulation work	○ Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens; medical facilities such as hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as nursery centers, day-service centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly ○ Housing
	Compensation for relocations	○ Compensation for relocating buildings ○ Land procurement ○ Improvement of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems, and sewage facilities in the area where housing, etc., is to be relocated
	Improving green belts	○ Planting trees, installing grass fields
Preventing Nuisances Besides Noise	Subsidies to finance trouble prevention work	○ Canals, reservoirs, roads, river improvement, television broadcast community reception facilities
Reducing Troubles Related to Living and Business	Subsidies for building facilities meant to stabilize people's lives	○ Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes, fire departments, parks, waste disposal facilities, welfare centers for the elderly, public facilities for learning, etc. ○ Agricultural facilities, fishing facilities
Reducing Impact on Surrounding Areas	Provision of specified defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants	○ Improving public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation centers, and welfare facilities ○ Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance for school buildings, etc.*

* Newly added due to the partial revision of the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Facilities (effective as of April 27, 2011)

Fig. IV-2-2-4 FY2014 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas Near Bases
(Based on Expenditures)


(100 million yen)

Project	Mainland	Okinawa
Projects for preventing disturbances	111	20
Sound insulation projects	442	95
Measures related to relocations	41	2
Subsidies for stabilizing people's livelihoods	192	19
Road improvement projects	59	11
Environs Improvement Adjustment Grants	166	29
Other projects	17	4

Fig. IV-2-3-1 Specific Initiatives in the MOD Reform

Objective	FY2014 (*: FY2014 onward)	Mid-term	Long-term
Mutual assignment of civil and SDF officers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The law will be revised, and Lieutenant Colonel (Commander) or Major (Lieutenant Commander) posts for uniformed personnel be established in the Internal Bureau as core appointments, while new posts will be formally established for civil officers in the Joint Staff and the major units of each Self-Defense Force. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Posts will be mutually established for uniformed personnel in the Internal Bureau, for civil officers (to the upper staffing grades) in the Joint Staff, major units in each of the Self-Defense Forces, and so forth. 	
Overall optimization of defense capacity improvement, and strengthening equipment acquisition functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A procedure for new defense capabilities build-up will be established, in order to attain overall optimization. (A procedure for defense capabilities build-up will be established with an emphasis on assessment of defense capabilities based on joint operation (which to date has been regarded as inadequate); The foregoing will facilitate the elimination of defense capabilities build-up based on individual optimization along the vertical administrative structure of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, so that instead, defense capabilities improvement that is optimized across the board can be implemented). Cross-functional Integrated Project Teams (IPTs), headed by Project Managers (PMs) will be expanded, and project management throughout the life cycle of equipment, etc., will be strengthened. (*) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In order to implement life-cycle-spanning project management in a manner both methodical and appropriate, and to contribute to the total optimization of defense capabilities build-up, and the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases, the Internal Bureau, the various Staff Offices, the Technical Research & Development Institute and the departments involved in equipment acquisition in the Equipment Procurement Office will be integrated according to future considerations, and an organization reform implemented with the idea of extra-ministerial establishment kept in mind. In order for procurement to be carried out with even greater fairness ensured, the monitoring function will also be strengthened. 	
Strengthening integrated operational functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> From the perspective of strengthening the joint operational functions, SDF personnel and civil officers will be mutually assigned to the Internal Bureau and Joint Staff respectively. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In order to resolve the fact of an overlapping of duties between the Internal Bureau and Joint Staff in work associated with actual operations (which is attributable to external explanations, including dealing with the Diet), and to increase speed and efficiency, the work in question will be integrated into the Joint Staff office. Meanwhile, functions such as the planning and drafting of legislation are administrative and systematic in nature, and will therefore continue to fall under the jurisdiction of the Internal Bureau. A review will be made of the organization of the Bureau of Operational Policy, based on the above and from the perspective of strengthening measures to respond to cyber attacks, and so forth. An efficient coordinating organization will be constructed under the Defense Council to respond to circumstances arising due to the executives involved. 	
Strengthening policymaking and public relations capability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In order to strengthen discussion and dialogue with concerned countries, a new vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs will be established to provide overall management of international relationship-related and other business. In order to achieve a precise connection with the National Security Council, the strategy-planning function of the Bureau of Defense Policy will be strengthened according to the current situation regarding the activity of the council. (*) A mechanism (Report Center (provisional title)) will be established, for the unified coordination of information gathering and public relations when conducting crisis management. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In order that public relations are implemented strategically and effectively, the reporting system will undergo a review, so that the spokespersons of the Minister's Secretariat and Joint Staff can function as central to the public relations process. 	
Additional efforts to the above	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It will be ensured that the overall management of information that should not be disclosed externally is conducted thoroughly (this will include a review of the essentials of management duties). Methods and systems for investigating leaks will also be established. (*) The adjunct systems for government affairs, as centered on the Minister's Secretariat, will be strengthened so that administration can be reported to quickly and appropriately at all times. 		

Fig. IV-2-3-2 Deliberation Framework on the MOD Reform



Trend of Security in the Arctic Ocean

The Arctic Region is the area north of the latitude line of 66 degrees 33 minutes north latitude, most of which is covered by the Arctic Ocean. There are eight countries in the Arctic Region: Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway that border the Arctic Ocean, and Finland, Sweden and Iceland that do not border it. In 1996, the Arctic Council was established, which aims to promote cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states, with the involvement of the indigenous communities and other inhabitants on common Arctic issues (e.g., sustainable development and environmental protection).

In recent years, the utility of the Northern Sea Route is increasing due to the abundance of natural resources, needs to shorten sea routes between Europe and Asia in accordance with the decrease of seawater, and to avoid the sea areas that are at risk of international conflicts and piracy. For these reasons, the Arctic states have been more proactively promoting efforts to acquire their interest in resource development and use of the sea route. On the other hand, each Arctic state has its own claims in terms of the demarcation of maritime boundaries based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and extension of continental shelf. It is considered that some of these coastal states including Russia are promoting efforts to provide new military capabilities for the purpose of securing their interest and defending their territories. Traditionally, the Arctic Region has been used for deployment of strategic nuclear forces and as a transit route for them. In addition, due to the decrease of sea ice, surface ships can now navigate for longer period of time and in wider areas than before, and it is considered that the region could be used for deploying maritime forces or maneuvering military forces by using maritime transport capabilities of armed forces in future. For these reasons, the strategic importance of the region is increasing.

Russia shows its clear intention to place strategic importance on the Arctic Region in its various policy papers. At the same time, it has been showing the most active movement compared to other Arctic states, based on the following factors: Russia has the largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) among the Arctic states, the abundance of potential resources in the EEZ, the utility of the Northern Sea Route along the coastlines of Russia and its influence to Russian mainland, and its military superiority among other Arctic states, with deployment of dominant military capabilities including the Northern Fleet. In 2007, Russia restarted patrol by long-range bombers in the Arctic Region, which had been stopped since 1992, and it also announced restarting patrol by ballistic missile submarines, nuclear-powered (SSBN). In September 2012, a missile cruiser that belongs to the Northern Fleet was deployed to the Laptev Sea in the Arctic Region for the first time as a Russian surface ship. In addition, in September 2013, a fleet of vessels of the Northern Fleet advanced to the eastern Arctic Ocean to transport materials used for reopening the Temp airfield on Kotelyny Island of the New Siberian Islands. The operation of the airfield was resumed in October 2013. Furthermore, in 2014 the Russian Naval Air Force further enhanced patrol operation above the Northern Sea Route.

Among the non-Arctic states, 12 countries including Japan and China have been granted observer status in the Arctic Council. China, in particular, is showing intention to be actively involved in the activities in the Arctic Region, such as conducting research activities by sending the scientific research ship Xue Long (Snow Dragon) to the Arctic Ocean.



Trend of Expanding Development of Unmanned Vehicles



In recent years, the demand for unmanned vehicles is rapidly increasing not only in the field of military use but also in disaster relief, industry and agriculture field. Factors behind this include the fact that unmanned vehicles can conduct missions that are not suitable for human beings called 3D (Dangerous, Dirty, Dull), such as dangerous missions conducted in the airspace of the area occupied by the enemy, missions in the area contaminated by chemical substances and radiation, and dull missions such as long hours monitoring and surveillance. In addition, they are more cost-effective than manned vehicles for the following reasons: space and equipment for crew such as cockpit is not required; there is no need to secure the safety of the pilot; and it is possible to reduce the size.

One of the unmanned vehicles for military use is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which was initially used for aerial targets in training and reconnaissance purposes, and has been developed to a multi-purpose vehicle to conduct various missions and a vehicle for attack. Recently developed UAV include stealth type, carrier-based type, and ones equipped with supersonic flight capability. Other unmanned vehicles include Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV), Unmanned Maritime Vehicle (UMV), Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV), and Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV), whose usage has been expanding in land and maritime missions. These vehicles are developed and used for the same purpose as UAV. They are also developed and used in accordance with geographical features and usage, such as clearing land and naval mines, and responding to nuclear disaster¹. Although previous types of unmanned vehicles were developed based on the platform for manned vehicles such as aircraft and cars, it is reported that in recent years more neo-futuristic platforms have been developed, including ones representing insects, walking with two legs like human beings, or walking with four legs like animals. With the progress of various technology including information and communication technology (ICT), it is expected that types of vehicles could shift from man-controlled type to fully autonomous type in future². Such vehicle is called Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS)³, which performs various tasks automatically ranging from target determination to attack. Analysts note that the advancement of artificial intelligence may lead to the deployment of LAWS in actual combat in the near future.

Amid the increasing demand for unmanned vehicles, the United Nations and the countries that use UAV have raised operational issues, such as violation of sovereignty caused by UAV flying over other countries, collateral damage caused by the attack by UAV, and mental fatigue of UAV pilots, and various measures have been discussed regarding these issues.

On the other hand, due to their characteristics, the utility of unmanned vehicles are widely recognized in many countries and it is expected that development and introduction of unmanned vehicles will be further promoted, instead of manned vehicles.

¹ During the aftermath of the nuclear disaster occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on March 11, 2011, the U.S. Forces dispatched the unmanned reconnaissance aircraft Global Hawk to conduct intelligence operation.

² The current unmanned vehicles are also able to perform a certain level of autonomous activities such as travelling.

³ In May 2014, systems for controlling robotic weapons were discussed for the first time at an informal meeting of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).



(Bipedal walking type unmanned vehicle: Boston Dynamics website)

Japan's National Security Secretariat was established in January 2014. The MOD sent me to the Cabinet Secretariat in May 2013 to draft the National Security Council Establishment Law, and I continue to work at the secretariat now.

The National Security Secretariat runs the National Security Council as part of its planning and coordination efforts to ensure that individual policies handled by ministries and agencies are sufficiently coordinated and to ensure that national security policy is consistent. My primary role is to ascertain the current state of issues requiring attention while considering points of contention in the National Security Council and the policies that should be put in place.

Making good policy requires sharing information among everyone involved and having earnest policy debates. The Ministry of Defense has extensive knowledge about defense and military matters, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is well versed in areas such as regional affairs, international law, the economy, public relations, and culture. In fact, various ministries and agencies provide the National Security Secretariat with a wealth of information, both in terms of quality and quantity. My own work entails experiencing something new every day, whether its attending visits by Secretary General of the National Security Secretariat, Mr. Yachi, to the U.S. and Europe or witnessing firsthand the struggles made overseas by Japanese diplomats. The knowledge I have acquired through working in the Ministry of Defense serves as a foundation for new information and experiences that are creating new ideas.

At a time when international affairs are becoming increasingly strained and opaque, it is critical that our government comes together and makes use of the depth and breadth of the wisdom of its ministries and agencies to fully protect the foundation that support Japanese citizens' well-being. To serve as lubricant to make this mechanism work, we, staff of the National Security Secretariat, are working hard towards our goals together from state-level perspective.



Shigeyuki Uno (far back), attending talks with U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel and
Director General of the National Security Secretariat Yachi

Difference between “Dynamic Defense Force” and “Dynamic Joint Defense Force”



The NDPG 2010 specified to build a dynamic defense force, which proposed the concept of deterrence by conducting continuous and strategic implementation of ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) activities. However, due to recent increasing and prolonged gray zone security situation trends – (the situation that is neither exactly peacetime nor conflict), and the concern that such situations could escalate into a more serious situation, the security environment surrounding Japan is becoming more severe. For these reasons, the concept of the NDPG 2010 may no longer be adequate to maintain or build the required deterrence capabilities to respond to such situations. Based on this background, the new NDPG the new NDPG propose to prevent escalation of situations, demonstrating Japan’s resolution to protect the country and its high capabilities, through strategic implementation of training and exercise to adapt to changes in situations, and responsively reinforce defense posture through prepositioning of units to respond to security environment and rapid deployment. This shows a new concept of deterrence to replace with the concept of deterrence proposed in the NDPG 2010, mainly focusing the ISR activities, to deal with circumstances with higher intensity, responding to the increasingly severe security environment.

The Statement by the Minister of Defense, which was released when NDPG 2010 was formulated, stated that, “not only ensuring the “quality” and “quantity” of equipment but the amount of the SDF activities will be the focus.” However, as the “Dynamic Defense Force” does not include the logic of defense force build up to develop both the “quality” and “quantity”, the focus was placed solely on an increase in the “amount of activities” of defense force. Therefore, it had to be said that ensuring the “quality” and “quantity” of defense force that supports the activities of the SDF, which increasingly require higher effectiveness than before, had not necessarily been sufficient.

In the light of such a situation, the concept of “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” presented by the new NDPG, for the first time, implemented the capability assessment based on a joint operation regarding various anticipated circumstances, from the viewpoints that ensuring not only the amount of activities but also a sufficient level of “quality” and “quantity” of defense force will be required in order to build an effective deterrence particularly in the present security environment. Based on this, the following points were determined: functions and capabilities that require particular emphasis will be drawn from a comprehensive perspective; assured ensuring of maritime supremacy and air superiority; ensuring “quality” and “quantity” of defense force by focusing on developing the mobile deployment capability; strengthening a wide range of logistical support foundations in order to perform a variety of activities in an effective manner.

Deployment of Ground Troops to the Southwestern Region and Enhancement of Rapid



The GSDF has decided to promote the following operations to strengthen the defense posture in the southwestern region based on a three-step concept of deterrence and response: “dispatch of units from peacetime”; “rapid deployment”; and “recapturing.”

[Dispatch of Units from Peacetime]

- First, deploy dispatch a GSDF coast observation unit to Yonaguni Island to organize the structure required to carry out regular and persistent ISR activities.
- Also, strengthen the posture of the remote islands in the southwestern region defense by establishing area security units in the remote islands where no SDF units are deployed, in order to enable an immediate response in the case of various contingencies, including disasters.

[Rapid Deployment]

- In order to be able to respond swiftly to and deal effectively and nimbly with various situations, the GSDF will transform two divisions and two brigades respectively into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In doing so, the rapid deployment divisions and brigades shall introduce mobile combat vehicles (MCVs) suitable for transportation by aircraft and other means, as well as organize rapid deployment regiments that immediately respond to various situations.

[Recapturing]

- In a bid to conduct sufficient amphibious operations, which land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade (tentative name) of several regiment-scale units specializing in amphibious operations will be established.

In order for the GSDF to implement a more effective, new defense posture in the southwestern region, it is essential to improve rapid deployment capability of the GSDF units and to be able to carry out swift and flexible nation-wide operations.

To achieve this, new equipment such as tilt-rotor aircraft, amphibious vehicles and MCVs will be installed, as well as organizing a new integrated headquarters (Ground Central Command (tentative name)) that controls the regional armies of the GSDF, as well as promote efficiency and rationalizing command and control function of each regional army headquarters. At the same time, a “mobile ground defense force that responds rapidly” will be established to realize a Dynamic Joint Defense Force.


Increasing the Number of Destroyers and Submarines

The new National Defense Program Guidelines specify to ensure sea superiority in order to effectively conduct various operations, such as around-the-clock surveillance and anti-submarine warfare, and to secure the defense of the surrounding waters and the safety of maritime traffic.


For this reason, in terms of the MSDF squadron, the guidelines specify to increase the number of destroyers to 54, and the number of submarines from 16 to 22, following on from the 2010 Guidelines.

In accordance with this increase, the total number of escort divisions and submarine divisions will be increased by one unit, respectively, from the current number of divisions, resulting in 14 destroyer units and 6 submarine divisions.

In addition, in light of the increase in the number of destroyers, for the purpose of securing the necessary capabilities, “new destroyers” will be introduced while taking account of the cost situation. The new destroyers will be equipped with detachable facilities, as well as capabilities for anti-mine operations which were traditionally conducted by minesweeping vessels, in order to respond to various operations. Furthermore, the body of the destroyer will be made more compact compared to the existing general purpose destroyers, by carefully selecting equipment and functions. For example, they will be equipped with a towed array sonar system (TASS) instead of a sonar system on the body. The detail will be reviewed with the Ministry of Defense, aiming to start procurement in the second half of the period of the new Mid-Term Defense Program.



Future posture of destroyers and other vessels (plan)



Functions of the new destroyer (Minesweeping by unmanned underwater vehicle and other equipment)

Enhancement of the Posture of Air Defense and Patrol and Surveillance

For the purpose of enhancing the defense posture in the southwestern region, the ASDF plans to increase the number of F-15 fighters at Naha Air Base from one squadron to two squadrons. In addition, in order to keep up with the modernization of military air power of the surrounding countries and to ensure the ability to take adequate response in future, it is planned to modernize the current F-15 fighters and improve the capability of F-2 fighters, as well as continually introduce of F-35A fighters, which procurement started in FY2012. Furthermore, in light of the operational posture of the fighter units and the geographical characteristics of the southwestern region, it is planned to introduce new aerial refueling/transport aircraft required for the fighter units to conduct various operations in the airspace surrounding Japan.

Moreover, the capability of surface-to air PATRIOT guided missile system will be further improved, and new interceptor missile with advanced capabilities (PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement [MSE]) will be introduced, which is capable of responding to cruise missile and aircrafts, as well as conducting ballistic missile defense (BMD).

In addition to such efforts, considering the situation that military activities are becoming more active in other countries in the sea areas and airspace surrounding Japan, including the southwestern region, it is planned to develop an infrastructure to deploy a mobile air control and warning radar in the offshore islands in the southwestern region, and to improve the current E-767 airborne warning and control system (AWACS), in order to ensure a watertight surveillance posture in peacetime.

Since the territory of Japan includes many offshore islands, the role of airborne early-warning groups that complement the fixed warning and control radars is important for the surveillance of the airspace surrounding Japan. Considering this situation, a new squadron consisting of E-2C early warning aircrafts, the 603rd Squadron, was established at Naha Air Base in April 2014, for the purpose of further enhancing the surveillance posture in the southwestern region. Furthermore, a new airborne warning and control system (AWACS) will be developed in the future, due to the necessity of ensuring the surveillance posture that can respond to various situations from the earliest stage for a prolonged period of time.



F-15 fighter



E-2C early warning aircraft




F-35A fighter

Formation of the Tactical Air Training Group

Recent years have witnessed phenomenal modernization of equipment and enhancement of military technology accompanying scientific and technological advancements. Accordingly, it is demanded that the Ministry of Defense adapt appropriately to the changes in the combat style at the tactical level, including electronic warfare and unit operations that utilize networks. Therefore, in FY2014, to more effectively improve the SDF's advanced tactical skills in order to prevent the relative decrease of Japan's air defense capabilities and to ensure the maintenance of air superiority, the ASDF has announced it would reorganize the groups that provide trainings and exercises and that are under the direct control of the Air Defense Command, including the Tactical Fighter Training Group (Nyutabaru Air Base), the Air Defense Missile Training Group (Hamamatsu Air Base, Chitose Air Base) and the Base Defense Development & Training Squadron (Hyakuri Air Base), as well as groups related to electronic warfare, into the Air Tactics Development & Training Wing.

Previously, investigation and research related to combat skills, tactics and trainings for the forces were provided by the training units that are organized by function in the ASDF.

The formation of the Air Tactics Development & Training Wing will enable not only to operate units by function as before, but also to conduct systematic and continuous investigation and research of combat skills and tactics in which multiple functions are linked. Furthermore, providing trainings in which various functions, including electronic warfare function, are linked will improve the capacity of the operation of units and enable effective responses to various situations.



Introduction of Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (EAVES)

The new National Defense Program Guidelines considers that it is becoming more and more important to respond to various situations at the right time and in the right manner, and to grasp military movements of other countries in peacetime in order to protect lives and property of Japanese people and defend Japan's territorial land, waters and airspace without fail, as well as ensure information superiority by conducting persistent ISR activities in a wide area surrounding Japan to detect various signs at the early stage.

In light of this perspective, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) have superior capabilities, as they can confine the danger and burden to the crew and conduct persistent ISR activities in a wide area. UAVs are essential for the Ministry of Defense and SDF to respond to various situations in the current security environment, since they can gather information in relatively remote areas from Japan's territorial waters and airspace, which is difficult to do with the SDF's current equipment, as well as conducting persistent ISR activities in the airspace when the situation turns into an emergency.

For this reason, the new Mid-Term Defense Program specifies to introduce UAV in order to ensure the security in the sea areas and airspace surrounding Japan and to enhance intelligence capability.



Endurance Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) (image)

Reemployment of SDF Pilots

- The reemployment system for SDF pilots is intended to prevent the outflow of young pilots to civil aviation companies in an unregulated manner, and for the employment of SDF pilots over a certain age by civil aviation companies.
- The SDF started this system in 1962 in order to ensure the appropriate age composition of SDF pilots and maintain the strength of the ASDF. So far, approximately 750 pilots of fighters and transport aircraft have worked at civil aviation companies and elsewhere.
- According to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), due to the expanding demand for air transportation in the Asia-Pacific Region, approximately 4.5 times more numbers of pilots will be necessary by 2030, and it is expected that there will be a shortage of 9,000 pilots per year. As there is a high demand for the trained SDF pilots among civil aviation companies, especially new ones, allowing transfer of SDF pilots over a certain age within a reasonable level that does not interfere with the missions of the SDF is meaningful from the viewpoint of development of Japan's aviation industry.
- In view of the important roles the reemployment system has played to date, the Ministry of Defense announced it would re-start the system on 14 March 2014, taking the neutrality and fairness of official duties into consideration. The Ministry will also promote the appointment of those pilots reemployed under the reemployment system as SDF Reserve Personnel to support the operations of the forces.

Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)

- The Ministry of Defense defines the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the area surrounding Japan in order to identify aircrafts flying around Japan by using radar and take effective countermeasures against intrusions into Japanese airspace.
- Generally, the ADIZ is set by each country as its own air defense measures; however, it does not mean that it defines the boundaries or areas of territorial airspace or land for the country.
- The ADIZ of Japan is used to identify the nationality of the aircraft flying around Japan and whether there is a danger of intrusion into Japanese airspace, and to judge whether scramble should be conducted. For example, if a fighter with unidentified nationality is flying toward Japanese airspace through the ADIZ, ASDF fighters will scramble, regarding the situation as "a danger of intrusion." On the other hand, an aircraft that merely passes through the ADIZ does not usually make it a target of scramble actions.
- As above, not all the aircraft flying across the ADIZ are regarded as the target of scramble actions in Japan. For example, in terms of civil aircraft, the flight plans are usually submitted to the aviation authorities in advance in accordance with international standards, and therefore, the aircraft of other countries flying across the ADIZ will not be regarded as a target of scramble actions, as long as they follow the planned courses and fly under the control of the air traffic controller. As such, Japan's ADIZ does not infringe the principle of the freedom of overflight over the high seas recognized under international law.



What kinds of international rules are there concerning ocean navigation?



First, there is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which sets out that the high seas are open to all states. The law establishes the concept of “freedom of the high seas.” This concept includes the notion of free surface and air navigation, allowing all nations’ ships and aircraft to freely navigate oceans and the airspace above them in principle. As this right is recognized by international law, any violation of this right is impermissible.

Furthermore, free surface and air navigation are recognized in exclusive economic zones (EEZs).

On the matter of territorial water navigation, all nations’ vessels may in principle continuously and swiftly pass through other nations’ territorial waters in a manner that is not “prejudicial to the peace, good order or safety” of that coastal nation. This is referred to as the “right of innocent passage”. As a general rule, coastal nations are not allowed to interfere with other nations’ innocent right of passage. On the other hand, in the case of airspace, foreign aircraft is not subject to the right of innocent passage. As such, flight through territorial airspace requires the permission of that nation.

What happens when a foreign country’s vessel passes through territory not subject to the “right of innocent passage”?



The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea establishes that actions such as using force against a coastal nation, gathering military information or conducting military training, fishing, and surveying are not considered “innocent.” In order to prevent such non-innocent passage, coastal nations are able to take necessary measures in their own territorial waters.

In such cases, if said foreign vessel is in violation of Japanese law, measures will be taken, such as stoppage of the vessel and on-the-spot inspection. For example, continued intentional loitering of a foreign vessel within Japan’s territorial waters violates the Act on Navigation of Foreign Ships through the Territorial Sea and Internal Waters and permits Japan to forcibly remove such vessels from its waters.

However, under international law, warships or government vessels for non-commercial purposes belonging to a foreign nation are generally exempt from foreign jurisdiction, and coastal nations are not permitted to take measures such as on-the-spot inspections and seizures.



VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel on Warning and Surveillance Operations

— Comments from the Squadron Commanding Officer



JASDF Hamamatsu Airbase (Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka Prefecture)
Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF) Hidetoshi Tsurugai, Commanding Officer, Airborne Early-Warning Group, Flight Warning and Surveillance Wing, the 602nd Squadron
(currently Captain, 5th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, JASDF Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing)

The 602nd Squadron operates the E-767 early warning and control aircraft (AWACS) and is in charge of warning and surveillance operations for areas surrounding Japan. The E-767 is operated by approximately 20 air crew, each of whom are delegated operational responsibilities such as operating aircraft, radar, and communications equipment, or overseeing warning control and intelligence operations with a day-to-day solemnity.

Since September 2012, the number of scrambles as air space anti-intrusion measures has increased in Japan. As an ASDF personnel protecting Japanese airspace, I feel it is a worthwhile task to undertake these warning and surveillance operations at the front lines amid this intense security environment. We work day and night with a persistent sense of urgency, heightened awareness, and sense of duty.

I feel a great sense of pride but also great responsibility when getting into one of the only four E-767s in the world to carry out these duties. I will continue to work with this E-767 AWACS and the crew of the 602nd Squadron to steadfastly defend Japan's airspace.



Hidetoshi Tsurugai (far right) commanding personnel during a warning and surveillance operation



An E-767 taking off for an aircraft warning mission in the Southwest area

A New Chapter for the 603rd Squadron — Comments from a Squadron Commander

JASDF Naha Air Base (Naha City, Okinawa Prefecture)
Lieutenant Colonel Masao Murakami, 603rd Squadron Commander,
Flight Early-Warning Group, Airborne Early-Warning Group



Created on April 20, 2014, the 603rd Squadron is the JASDF's newest unit. As its first commander, I lead the 603rd Squadron's daily warning and surveillance operations in the airspace of southwestern Japan.

In the Southwest, despite the extremely vast amount of airspace subject to warning and surveillance, there are a limited number of warning control radar systems installed. The 603rd Squadron therefore has to do its surveillance from the air and from a distance. While it is not an easy task to perform warning and surveillance of such a wide area, we work day and night with a strong sense of duty and urgency with the belief that our efforts directly contribute to the defense of Japan.

Our unit was originally based in Misawa Air Base in Aomori Prefecture. It was after the unit's realignment was decided that the personnel and their family members, along with our equipment, made the hasty move to Okinawa. To be honest, I'm sure that the realignment conducted in such hectic circumstances created hardships at times for the personnel. But to put it the other way around, it goes to show that the assignment demanded of us is important, and I find this work very rewarding.

Recent years have seen an increase in aircraft scrambling by the ASDF, and detecting as far away as possible aircraft that could intrude into Japanese airspace allows us to respond more quickly. We intend to dedicate ourselves to a unified effort as the 603rd Squadron, never letting our guard down as the first line in our nation's defense.



Ceremony to mark the creation of the 603rd Squadron



Masao Murakami (right) receiving the unit commander's standard from the Minister of Defense Onodera

Q&A

Formation of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (Tentative Name)



The new National Defense Program Guidelines specifies to formulate the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (tentative name). What is the role of this brigade?



At present, a regiment unit which consists of approximately 700 personnel called the Western Army Infantry Regiment is based at JGSDF Camp Ainoura in Nagasaki Prefecture. The role of this regiment is to respond to the invasion of offshore islands of Japan by guerillas and special operations force, as well as conduct disaster relief operations. It currently has the functions to conduct amphibious landing operations to the islands by a helicopter or boat, however, in order to defend the territory of Japan, which consists of more than 6,800 islands, it is extremely important to develop a new capability that can respond to full-scale amphibious operations, in which rapid deployment of forces is required.

The Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (tentative name) is specialized in the defense of islands, and consists of approximately 3,000 personnel that will be divided into units for conducting amphibious landing, units for operating amphibious vehicles, units for providing fire support for the amphibious landing, and other units. It is planned to be organized by FY2018.

In order to accumulate know-how on amphibious operations, the GSDf has been conducting combined trainings with the U.S. Marines since 2005, and their proficiency is highly praised by the U.S. Marines.



GSDf Western Army Infantry Regiment personnel jumping off from a moving helicopter one after another during an infiltration exercise

What is the difference between the U.S. Marine Corps and the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (tentative name) in terms of conducting amphibious operations?



The U.S. Marine Corps has well-balanced, various capabilities required for amphibious operations such as amphibious landing, fire support, and maritime transport. It is capable of taking the initiative to conduct amphibious operations. On the other hand, the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (tentative name) conducts amphibious operations as a joint operation with the MSDF and ASDF and is different from the U.S. Marine Corps in this regard.



Q&A

Cyber Defense Group



What is the Cyber Defense Group?



The Cyber Defense Group was launched at the end of March 2014 with the aim of capably responding to threats from increasingly sophisticated and complex cyber attacks. The group provides 24-hour monitoring of the MOD and the SDF network and response to situations involving cyber attacks.

What will change with the establishment of the Cyber Defense Group?



The Cyber Defense Group will allow for the centralized collection of and research into information pertaining to cyber attack threats, information that had previously been decentralized among the various SDF departments. Accordingly, the results of these efforts will be shared throughout the entire MOD, and will enhance efforts aimed at improving security throughout the government and further bolster collaboration with the private sector. As an example, currently, the group is raising the level of government-wide security through efforts that include sending personnel to the National Information Security Center (NISC). Leveraging the achievements of the group going forward will make an even greater contribution to initiatives at the government at large.



Will the protection of the defense industry, critical infrastructure, and other private companies fall under the purview of the Cyber Defense Group?



At present, there are no plans to have the Cyber Defense Group provide direct protection for systems and networks owned by private corporations involved in national defense or critical infrastructure. However, collaboration with organizations in the defense industry is a priority for the MOD. To collaborate with private organizations, the Cyber Defense Collaboration Council (CDC) was established in 2013 as an intermediary between the MOD and the defense industry, with information sharing and other initiatives being explored. Through such endeavors, the future state of collaboration with the private sector will also be considered



Ceremony for the Presentation of the Unit Flag to the Cyber Defense Group

Japan-U.S. Cybersecurity Cooperation

Seeking the ideal means to ensure the stable and continued use of cyberspace, the MOD and SDF facilitate better coordination with related ministries and agencies, as well as organizations in other countries. In particular, close cooperation on protecting cyberspace as a platform supporting numerous operations is critical between Japan and the U.S., which share an alliance.

Director General-level and Division Director-level staff have been holding regular meetings among different departments to discuss various issues related to information communication. Initiatives are also underway at various levels among Japan and U.S. defense personnel, one of which includes the establishment of the Japan-U.S. Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG), whose actions include policy-level talks.

In the 2+2 Meeting in October 2013, an agreement was reached to improve collaboration on initiatives concerning cyberspace, a new strategic sector. In addition, developing a response to issues pertaining to topics such as cyberspace was established as one of the objectives of reviewing the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. These and other initiatives demonstrate the important role that cyberspace will play in future Japan-U.S. defense collaboration, and it will be important to utilize the framework of the newly-established CDPWG to push Japan-U.S. cyber collaboration to a new level. Going forward, efforts seeking to resolve cyberspace-related issues will be further bolstered while further coordination is sought with cyberspace-related talks between the U.S. and Japan, which represent a framework for the U.S. and Japanese governments as a whole.



Japan-U.S. Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG)

Participation in Disaster Relief Activities (the Tsubaki Rescue Operation) in the Search for Persons Gone Missing Following Typhoon No. 26

JGSDF Camp Nerima (Nerima-ku, Tokyo)

Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF) Jun Kameyama, Regimental Executive Officer, JGSDF 1st Infantry Regiment



Acting on orders from our Commanding General in the 1st Division in connection with a request for assistance from the Governor of Tokyo on October 16, 2013, we immediately set out for the site.

With human lives our primary duty, we fought through landslides, building rubble, and driftwood day and night. We worked to find the survivors as quickly as possible as we thought about how worried their families must be. In addition, for this disaster relief effort, a joint task force comprised of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF personnel—each with their own duties—was formed. Even if the locations and specifics of the work they performed varied, everyone was the same in their concern for the victims.

As we carried out our efforts, elementary school students held up handmade signs near the airport and around town to offer us encouragement. The sight of the children filled us with great strength and reminded us once again that the SDF exist to serve local communities and the people of Japan.



Elementary school students (in Izu Oshima) supporting disaster relief personnel with handmade placards

1st Transport Unit, JMSDF (Kure City, Hiroshima Prefecture)

1st LCAC Unit

Lieutenant (MSDF) Terukuni Yoshida, then-Craftmaster (now employed with the 1st Transport Unit)

The mission we had been given in this disaster relief effort was to transport heavy machinery and vehicles belonging to the JGSDF, police, and other organizations that had been loaded onto the “Osumi” transport vessel in Yokosuka to Oshima. We used LCACs (landing craft air cushions) to transport pistons between transport vessels on standby on and off the coast of Oshima and got many vehicles onto land.

During our first transport effort, under the pressure of the “72-hour time limit after which the probability of survival is said to plummet,” we used 2 LCACs to conduct nonstop operations for 27 hours, which I had never experienced.

The long hours no doubt exhausted those in the unit. Yet, because of our sense of mission in the relief effort and the slogan of “all for the victims”, we curiously felt little fatigue until our mission was completed.



An LCAC performing a landing on Izu Oshima

JASDF Iruma Airbase (Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture)

Technical Sergeant (ASDF) Kazuki Kitamura, 402nd Air Wing, 2nd Air Transport Unit

Typhoon No. 26 in Izu Oshima in October 2013 caused large mudflows and other damage. The disaster relief efforts conducted by GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF personnel in response included searching for missing persons and distributing relief goods. As an air transport crew member in the 402nd Air Wing, my responsibilities included transporting goods and personnel to the affected area in a C-1 transport aircraft.

Some of the specific duties of air transport crew members providing disaster relief are transporting goods, vehicles, and personnel needed for air-based searches, and loading and unloading daily necessities for affected areas into and out of transport aircraft. We also used the aircraft to evacuate elderly hospital patients to the mainland.

These efforts saw everyone in the 2nd Tactical Airlift Group work day and night with those in the 1st and 3rd Tactical Airlift Groups to fly here and there and carry out our duties. While I sincerely hope such a disaster never happens again, I am dedicated to daily training to keep myself fully capable of responding with everything I have in the event that I am ever called upon to perform similar duties.



Kazuki Kitamura, inside a C-1 transport aircraft

South Sea Rescue Field Exercise

JGSDF Camp Zentsuji (Zentsuji City, Kagawa Prefecture)
 Second Lieutenant (GSDF) Yuji Izumi, Training Officer, Medical Corps, 14th Logistics Support Unit



The South Sea Rescue Field Training Exercise conducted by the JGSDF Middle Army in October 2013 was done in preparation for an earthquake originating in the Nankai Trough. With central support from Kochi Prefecture, the training focused on—among other things—establishing response guidelines and coordinating with related local governments.

The medical corps that I am a part of works with the Kochi University Medical School Hospital, which has been designated the central hospital for disasters in the prefecture. In addition to building first aid centers and hospital rooms and deploying outdoor surgery systems, the corps coordinates with related organizations such as DMAT¹ as part of the emergency medical care we provide. During training, Kochi University Nursing School students acted as patients and told us their conditions with a strong sense of realism. As makeup had been used to make bodily wounds look genuine, trainees constantly worked with a sense of urgency.

Emergency transport to a wide-area medical evacuation center² and DMAT transport to isolated regions let us closely coordinate with MSDF warships and JGSDF helicopters.

As an earthquake originating in the Nankai Trough would cause extreme destruction, I hope to use the experience gained in this training exercise and continue to improve my skills in order to save as many lives as possible should such occur.



GSDF personnel checking a patient's condition in collaboration with DMAT

¹ DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Team): A highly-mobile medical team dispatched during the acute stage of a disaster (roughly within 48 hours after the disaster occurs)

² Wide-area medical evacuation center: A facility that temporarily accommodates patients brought in from disaster sites

VOICE

For Young People Who Will Ensure Maritime Security in the Future

—Short-Term Exchange Program for Next-Generation Naval Officers

MSDF Staff College (Meguro-ku, Tokyo)

Captain (MSDF) Toshihiko Inomori, International Planning Group Leader, Planning Section, Planning Department



Organized every year by the MSDF Staff College, the Short-Term Exchange Program for Next-Generation Naval Officers seeks to promote cooperation among countries through their navies. Naval officers of Lieutenant Commander class from various countries come to Japan and interact with the student MSDF personnel in the school's Command and Staff course for approximately two weeks.

The program, which began in 2000, originally targeted Pacific Rim countries. 2010 saw the program expand to countries in South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, and the contents of the program have changed significantly. Program participation grows each year, with 23 countries participating in 2013.

In FY2013, the program included lectures, training, and seminars focused on "issues faced by navies." We lectured our security policy and so on to promote understanding of the participants from each country, and the training session provided an opportunity for participants to strengthen relationships. Planned primarily by students from the college, the seminars allowed for wide-ranging discussions concerning how to ensure maritime security and the sharing of seamanship knowledge.

The participating naval officers, who were all of commanders, had a certain amount of work experience and an flexibility as young people. I believe the exchange program comes at the right time to encourage interactions among the naval officers who will see to ensuring the security of their countries in the future. We continue to conduct this program with the expectation that these participants will lead the way in further naval cooperation among various countries over the next 10 to 15 years as the people who will ensure maritime security.




Participants from the Djibouti Navy, receiving a course completion certificate from the Principal of the JMSDF Staff College

VOICE

Defense Attaché (Australia)

Embassy of Japan in Australia
Captain (MSDF) Hiroyuki Nakamura, Defense Attaché



Working in the capital city of Canberra at the Embassy of Japan in Australia makes me realize how the defense relations between Japan and Australia are becoming stronger at an accelerated pace. The frequency of meetings involving the Ministry of Defense and SDF participation, training and other forms of operational coordination, and interaction among Defense Attachés aimed at collecting military intelligence are clearly increasing.

The deepening of Japan-Australian relations became clear in the rescue efforts for Malaysia Airlines flight 370. The SDF dispatched two SDF P-3C patrol aircrafts to Perth in Western Australia. These joint rescue efforts with Australia, which demonstrated the cooperative capability our countries nurtured through joint training, and the fluidly-conducted maintenance and supply operations that took advantage of the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, showed the ability of MSDF air units and Australian Air Force patrol units to work together in a practical capacity.

Our National Security Strategy establishes Australia as a partner that shares universal value and strategic benefits, and dictates ongoing efforts to enhance our cooperative relationship. Australia reform its national defense capabilities and framework by 2030. With the peace and stability of areas around Japan a key contributor to Australia's national interests, the importance of maintaining good relations between Japan and Australia will continue to grow.

Although there is sometimes trouble in living here because of cultural and lifestyle differences, as Defense Attaché, I will continue to work being proud to be involved in strengthening Japan-Australia relations, and I look forward to making my life abroad an even more fulfilling one.



Hiroyuki Nakamura
(in front of the Embassy of Japan in Australia)

Japan-U.S. Defense Chief Security Dialogue



In April 2014, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff made a visit to the United States and held a meeting with the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Defense Chief Security Dialogue.

The two chiefs exchanged opinions regarding the necessity of strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces according to the trend in the Asia-Pacific Region and through enhancement of defense cooperation between Japan and the United States, and also discussed about the role of each country's military capabilities through a review of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

The dialogue started in 2013 between the United States and the allied countries, and this was the first one held between Japan and the United States.

As the security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe, frank exchange of views through direct dialogue between the top-level uniformed personnel of Japan and the United States has extremely important significance for the peace and stability not only in Japan but also in the region.

During this dialogue, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff and the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the SDF and the U.S. Forces will continue sharing information and promoting efforts to improve the effectiveness of bilateral actions between Japan and the United States, in order to effectively respond to common security issues, while maintaining the long-term strong relationship based on the Japan-U.S. alliance.



Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Iwasaki and U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey at the Japan-U.S. Defense Chief Security Dialogue

Deployment of the U. S. Forces Equipment with Advanced Capabilities (Such as P-8 Patrol Aircraft and Global Hawk) to Japan

The United States has been promoting efforts that place a focus on the Asia-Pacific Region (rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Region), and as announced in the Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) on October 3, 2013, Japan and the United States confirmed that deployment of equipment with more advanced capabilities to Japan has a strategic importance and will contribute to the security of Japan and the region. Among other measures, the United States intends to deploy its equipment including MV-22 Osprey, P-8 patrol aircraft, Global Hawk, and F-35B to Japan in order to modernize its capabilities. In December 2013, six P-8 patrol aircraft were deployed by the U.S. Navy to Kadena Air Base, as part of the phased replacement of P-3 aircraft, for the first time outside of the United States. Replacing with P-8 patrol aircraft, which has more advanced capabilities, will improve patrol capabilities of the United States Forces Japan. As for Global Hawk, the temporary deployment to Misawa Air Base started in May 2014. Once the stable operation of Global Hawk has been established, the intelligence capability of the U.S. Forces will be further improved. The deployment will improve deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces in Japan, which consequently will contribute to the defense of Japan and maintaining the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan.



P-8 patrol aircraft deployed to Kadena Air Base



Global Hawk of the U.S. Air Force arriving at Misawa Air Base
(Website of U.S. Misawa Air Base)

(ADMM)-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) and Military Medicine (MM) Exercise

Colonel (GSDF) Yoshitaro Matsushita, Deputy Director of Medical Logistics, Joint Staff (medical)



I participated in this exercise, which was organized by ADMM-Plus, in June 2013.

Based on the idea that relief efforts and medical assistance would be needed in the event of a disaster, this training was conducted in host country Brunei as a joint effort between the Experts' Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief¹ on HA/DR² and the Experts' Working Group on Military Medicine (EWG on MM³). The training scenario has a relief unit, including medical teams from various countries, gathering to provide relief, receiving a request from a nation hit by a large typhoon. Fleet, aircraft, rotorcraft, and medical treatment teams from Japan participated in the exercise.

Due to the necessity for relief efforts to be tailored to the affected nation during a disaster, it is essential to have a multinational coordination center (MNCC⁴). For this exercise, I was the leader on the Japan side for the MNCC. My assignment was to ensure effective relief efforts by integrating all avenues for receiving a variety of requests from the affected region into the MNCC, coordinating with the leadership of each country's military, and conducting appropriate and timely dispatch of rescue forces. A standard operating procedure (SOP⁵) from the medical field proved very helpful in our activities. This SOP was created mainly by Japan and Singapore as the co-chairs for the military medicine aspect of ADMM-Plus. The exercise had each country treat and evacuate disaster victims according to the SOP and verify the effectiveness of the SOP. It was a major achievement that these countries were able to go beyond differences in tradition and culture to create the SOP, which I believe will play a major role in future international relief efforts. The exercise also served to strengthen relationships between each country's military and to foster trust.

- 1 EWG (Expert's Working Group)
- 2 HA/DR (Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief)
- 3 MM (Military Medicine)
- 4 MNCC (Multi-National Coordination Center)
- 5 SOP (Standard Operating Procedure)



SDF medical corps personnel talk about therapeutic measures with an Indonesian medical officer



Medical treatment being administered by personnel from Japan, Brunei, and Indonesia

The Fifth Japan–ASEAN Defense Vice-Minister-Level Meeting



From 17 to 19 February 2014, the Fifth Japan–ASEAN Defense Vice- Ministerial Forum was held in Ginowan City in Okinawa Prefecture. It was held outside Tokyo for the first time, since the government is promoting international conferences in Okinawa Prefecture, and it also provided an opportunity for the participants to deepen understanding of various aspects of Japanese culture.

One of the agendas at the meeting was the possibility of cooperation between Japan and ASEAN in terms of equipment and technology in non-traditional security fields. It was the first time that cooperation in the equipment and technology field was discussed at the forum. The participants expressed their expectation for cooperation in the response to natural disasters, which is one of the challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region, specifically in terms of transportation capability of the MOD and the SDF, and equipment and technology cooperation in the field of command and communication system and sensors.

In addition, on the last day of the meeting, the MOD introduced equipment and technology in the non-traditional security fields to the vice-ministers of other countries, through the panel exhibition and display of the actual equipment, including explosive ordnance disposal robots, through-wall human detection equipment, and hand throw type reconnaissance robots. At the exhibition venue the participants were listening to the explanation attentively and asking a lot of questions, which showed their great interest in equipment and technology cooperation between Japan and ASEAN countries.

The year 2013 marked the 40th anniversary of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, and further cooperation and development is necessary. It is important to continue promoting efforts to look for specific and practical cooperation through events such as Japan–ASEAN Defense Vice- Ministerial Forum.



A scene from the exhibition of equipment

VOICE

New World

—Participating in Vehicle Maintenance Training

Timor-Leste Defense Force

Logistic Service Component Maintenance Company Abraon De Jesus Mendes




I joined the Timor-Leste Defense Force in 2009 out of a desire to defend the independence of East Timor and contribute to social progress as a soldier.

I became part of the Maintenance Company, where my senior serviceman taught me about changing tires and oil. The Ministry of Defense began offering vehicle maintenance training in December 2012, and it made me very happy to have been able to take part in phase I and II. Opportunities to systematically learn about vehicle maintenance are virtually nonexistent in this country. The latter half of phase II, in particular, provided a nonstop stream of new experiences as GSDF members became my instructors. We always chatted each other up when working and did cleaning during breaks. Although it was difficult to get good at being punctual and communicating, I learned that doing so was a major part of teamwork and safety management. At the end, instructors showed me how to perform maintenance in the field and their speed astounded me. My goal now is to study hard and become able to repair the many non-operational vehicles sitting at camps.

I really enjoy training with GSDF personnel. The instructors teach us closely and repeatedly review things we find difficult. Break times find us teaching each other Tetun and Japanese, and every day I learn to say more and more.

Someday I would like to see one of the GSDF maintenance garages where my instructors work. I also plan to work hard to see that the Timor-Leste Military, so lacking in many things, can one day repair vehicles by themselves.



At auto mechanics garage

Collaboration between the Multilateral Joint Military Exercise Cobra Gold and the Official Development Assistance

The MOD and the SDF participate in a multilateral joint military exercise (Cobra Gold), which is held in Thailand annually, hosted by the United States and Thailand, and is proactively promoting efforts to improve the joint operation capabilities of the SDF, various skills and the collaboration capability in multilateral operations. At the “Cobra Gold 14,” the SDF conducted operations under the collaboration with the Official Development Assistance (ODA), which was the first case in its training.

During the training, five personnel from a medical team of the SDF provided healthcare treatment and consultations to the residents in rural areas of Thailand. In collaboration with this operation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Embassy of Japan in Thailand) decided to provide healthcare facilities equipped with beds and medicine cabinets to three primary schools through the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects; thus contributing to improving welfare in Thailand in a tangible form.

The MOD and the SDF will continue working in close collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a regular basis in the civilian sector such as healthcare assistance. It is expected that the combination of the international contribution schemes of each organization will produce a synergy effect, which will enhance the effectiveness of international cooperation.



Japanese Ambassador to Thailand Sato presenting the architectural rendering of the school infirmary to the Ministry of Education of Thailand



An SDF medical officer examining a local resident

Embassy of Japan in Thailand Political Division, Researcher Saya Kiba

Prior to the “Cobra Gold 14,” the local elementary schools that were used for the training sites had requested the Embassy of Japan in Thailand to provide support for creating healthcare facilities that can be used by the local residents after the training. Following this, the embassy conducted field research and at the same time requested the Royal Thai Army and the U.S. Forces to provide public health data. Through such coordination, it was decided to provide healthcare facilities that will help to improve basic medical care services in the local area. During the training period of “Cobra Gold 14,” the SDF medical team provided health education and treatments at these elementary schools, and Shigekazu Sato, Japanese Ambassador to Thailand, attended the groundbreaking ceremony for the healthcare facilities.

The collaboration between the SDF and ODA has been implemented previously in various countries where international peace cooperation activities were conducted, including Iraq, Haiti, Timor-Leste, and South Sudan. This collaboration in Thailand was a trial case to find how a synergy effect can be achieved in Japan’s international cooperation activities through the coordination and collaboration between the SDF and the embassy and a valuable opportunity for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well to deepen understanding of the SDF’s international peace cooperation activities. It was also a valuable experience for the SDF to deepen understanding of economic cooperation.

VOICE

Participation in Submarine Rescue Exercise in the Western Pacific (Pacific Reach 2013)

JMSDF Submarine Flotilla 2 (Kure City, Hiroshima Prefecture)
Captain (MSDF) Eiji Futa, Commanding Officer, Chihaya submarine rescue vessel



This submarine rescue vessel exercise was conducted in the Western Pacific by nations with submarine rescue capabilities with the goal of improving these capabilities and strengthening relationships of trust among these nations' navies. This exercise has been conducted every two to three years since 2000. This was the 6th exercise to have been conducted, and was the second time Japan participated as the host, the first being in 2002. Japan, Republic of Korea, and Australia were the three participants with warship units. The U.S. and Singapore were the core training coordinators, with numerous other countries participating as observers.

Conducted in September 2013, the exercise plan had to be altered in response to a typhoon that had arrived in the area. However, amid harsh environmental circumstances marked by high waves in the aftermath of the typhoon, a deep-submergence rescue vehicle of the Chihaya submarine rescue vessel, docked to a submarine on the ocean floor assuming the occurrence of an accident and rescued its crew. By placidly carrying out their duties in the face of stormy weather, we were able to demonstrate the impressive extent of the MSDF's submarine rescue vessel capabilities, seen as some of the greatest in the world. I believe the exercise taught everyone much about submarine rescues and provided valuable experience, along with strengthening relationships of trust among the navies of the participating nations.



Eiji Futa (center), engaged in an operation at the RIC (Rescue Information Center) on the Chihaya submarine rescue vessel

VOICE

Firsthand Account of Defense Cooperation and Exchange

JGSDF Camp Ichigaya (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)
Sergeant (GSDF) Major Tomoyuki Nakata, Policy and Programs Department, GSO (currently the-Central Intelligence Unit)



For the roughly 4 years since being assigned to the International Policy Planning Section (currently the International Security Cooperation and Policy Office) in 2010, my duties have included interpretation and English translation of materials used in meetings.

Defense cooperation and exchange continues to be a critical means of fostering trust. Although due to the time differences between Japan and our counterpart countries there were often coordination work done over late night or early morning international phone calls, I always felt my work was rewarding and approached it with pride.

It is no easy task to maintain good relations with the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and other countries' ground forces. I give the greatest possible attention to every word and phrase I utter and every word I write to avoid miscommunicating our intentions to our counterparts. Although the work requires a great deal of mental stamina and perseverance, I will continue dedicating myself every day to fulfilling my duties.



Tomoyuki Nakata (left), interpreting at a conference among military personnel

* This column was written when Sergeant Major Nakata was a member of the Policy and Programs Department of the GSO.

VOICE

America-Japan-Australia Trilateral Exercise (Exercise Cope North Guam)



JASDF Tsuiki Airbase (Chikujo-gun, Fukuoka Prefecture)
First Lieutenant (ASDF) Taiji Yamashita, Arms Platoon, Armament Maintenance Squadron,
8th Air Wing Maintenance Supply Group

I took part in the Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral exercise among air forces in Guam (Cope North Guam 14) as a Support and Maintenance Team Member in the F-2 Fighting Fleet in February 2014. The aim of the exercise was to improve pilots' tactical skills, and the Support and Maintenance Team's mission was to provide various forms of support including preparing the aircraft and ordnance to be used in the exercise to ensure that operations went smoothly from start to finish. To this end, we worked closely with all relevant departments to make the arrangements for USAF facilities and regulations, conducting the exercise without issue. I was impressed by the well-mannered treatment shown to us by the United States Air Force and Royal Australian Air Force personnel throughout the course of making arrangements with relevant departments, and each organization learned about how to maintain each other's aircraft in our interactions. The experience was an extremely valuable one that allowed us to learn more about each other and strengthen friendships.

I believe the coordination among the three countries will be deepened further in the areas of not only security but also disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. I hope to make the most of this valuable experience and promote further understanding and trust among U.S., Japanese, and Australian personnel.



Japanese, U.S., and Australian maintenance personnel who participated in Cope North Guam 14 (Taiji Yamashita: front row, far right)



In this globalized age where people, capital and information transfer freely between borders, there have been new kinds of threats emerging such as natural disasters and terrorism, which call upon an international cooperation to address.

We can see some examples of such cooperation from past earthquakes or flooding in many countries, including the recent case of the missing flight MH 370 of Malaysia Airlines where many countries dispatched their ships and planes to aid in the search.

Such joint operation requires effective coordination. In Asian countries, especially, a kind of unofficial coordination that relies on personal networking is highly essential to success.

I had a chance to study at the National Defense Academy of Japan (BODAI) during 1975-1979 as the 23rd term student and was one of the first Thai students there funded by the Thai government. Back then, there were other foreign students there only coming from Singapore. By now, there are more than 150 Thai military graduates from BODAI working in all the three services of the Royal Thai Armed Forces. Every year, at a class reunion in Bangkok, we can hear all the alumni gathered at the reunion sing the school anthem “Boei Daigakko Gakuseika” altogether at the end of the event. It is a truly rare thing to see outside BODAI.

In coordination both between countries and armies, the BODAI alumni networking is greatly helpful. Even if some alumni don't know each other personally, they can coordinate easily thanks to this connection.

At present, BODAI provides education for students from many ASEAN countries. From this, we can see the growth of this network in ASEAN which will contribute to joint cooperation in the future.

All the foreign alumni have received education and training to make them good military officers. If the Ministry of Defense of Japan gives them further opportunities to go back and study courses in Japan such as professional courses in each field and senior courses, it will allow them to grow further in their government service career, and will strengthen this BODAI alumni network.



Admiral Tanarat Ubol (far right), receiving a visit from and exchanging views with a former academy exchange student, currently working for the Information Fusion Center in Singapore.

Strengthening Relations Between Fellow Squadron: No. 3 Squadron of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and 201st Squadron JASDF



ASDF Chitose Air Base (Chitose, Hokkaido)

Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF) Yoshifumi Nakata, Squadron Commander, the 201st Squadron, 2nd Squadron
(Currently at Defense and Operation Division, Headquarters, Air Defense Command)



The 201st Squadron of the ASDF based at the ASDF Chitose Air Base and the No. 3 Squadron of the RAF based at RAF Coningsby announced a sister squadron relationship on July 18, 2013 as part of efforts to strengthen collaboration and exchange between Japanese and British defense forces.

Sister squadrons are flight units that regularly conduct activities together. In 2013, three members of the No. 3 Squadron, including Commanding Officer Ian Townsend, visited the 201st Squadron, exchanging views on topics such as squadron duties and flight operation and boarded one of the ASDF's F-15s. Through the exchange, it was an extremely interesting experience that reminded us of the many similarities we share in areas such as the operation of our units, and illuminated our differences in things like the extent to which we each use simulators.

We will be visiting the No. 3 Squadron of the RAF next, and I am eagerly looking forward to the discoveries we will make together. I hope to continue strengthening the bond we share with the No. 3 Squadron of the RAF so that we can further improve our skill in running our units.



Japanese and British sister squadrons, strengthening relations
(Wing Commander Townsend: 3rd from left, Lieutenant Colonel Nakata: 3rd from right)



The two squadron commanders who completed a signing ceremony for the sister squadron.

RAF Coningsby (Lincolnshire, England)

Lieutenant Colonel Ian Townsend, Wing Commander, No. 3 Squadron



In response to an agreement made by the RAF Chief of the Air Staff in August 2011 during a visit to Japan, No 3 (Fighter) Squadron (3(F)Sqn) were tasked to conduct an exchange visit to Japan in order to establish a UK/JASDF sqn-based affiliation.

3(F) Sqn were selected to participate in this exchange as 2 Japanese officers had previously served with the Sqn. In Oct 1927, Lieutenant Yoshir Kamei of the Imperial Japanese Navy became the first RAF foreign exchange officer, followed by Captain Sersuku Namba^(note) from the Japanese Air Service who were to study the organisation, flying operations and daily running of an RAF fighter sqn.

In Jul 2013, 3 officers from 3(F) Sqn visited Chitose Airbase and were hosted by the 201st TFS. The aims of the visitors from the UK were very similar to those of the Japanese officers almost 90 years earlier with an emphasis on sharing information on how we conduct fighter operations. Of particular interest was the similarity in approach taken between the 2 nations in homeland defense and the delivery of Quick Reaction Alert fighters, a role undertaken at both RAF Coningsby and Chitose Airbase.

Having been exceptionally well hosted, a strong relationship has been formed between the 2 Squadrons and regular correspondence is undertaken updating each other on activities. A reciprocal visit to the UK is planned in the summer (2014) where 3(F) Sqn will, once again, host Japanese officers.

Note: Kanji characters are unknown because no corresponding record on the Japanese side remains.

VOICE

Participating in the Multinational Combined Task Force (CTF 151)

JMSDF Escort Division 4 (Kure City, Hiroshima Prefecture)
Captain (MSDF) Hiroaki Tajiri, Escort Division 4 Commander



I assumed this post in December 2013 as part of the 17th Counter-Piracy Marine Unit and served in this capacity until April 2014. In addition to the escort missions which the SDF has done, my unit has started to participate in Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151).

CTF 151 is a multinational initiative led by the U.S. that seeks to address counter-piracy operations. Units from the participating countries conduct surveillance (zone defense) for designated waters based on the laws of their country and in coordination with CTF 151 headquarters.

When we received reports in January 2014 from a ship that had been attacked by pirates, aircraft was sent out from the destroyer Samidare on a search. It found and began tracking a suspicious vessel. The operation was later handed over to a P-3C patrol aircraft, a French naval vessel belonging to an EU unit. The suspicious vessel turned out to be of Indian registry and had been boarded by pirates. The crew was safely released and the pirates arrested. Our success was the product of effective information sharing and coordination among each country's counter-piracy units, and was an achievement that demonstrated the consummate professionalism on the part of each unit member towards the missions they were given.

That same month our convoy was visited by the Commander of CTF 151, Commodore Aage Buur Jensen of the Royal Danish Navy. The visit proved to be a valuable opportunity to exchange views concerning improving information sharing and cooperation towards making counter-piracy operations more effective.

Today, despite the unforgiving conditions we face so far away from Japan with temperatures above 50 degrees Celsius and humidity close to 100% on many of the days, we continued to engage in counter-piracy operations to maintain maritime traffic safety, contribute to the stability and development of Japan, and help ensure peace and stability among the international community.



CTF 151 Commander and Commodore in the Royal Danish Navy (front row center) and Hiroaki Tajiri (front row, second from left)

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
South Sudan Office Director Atsushi Hanatani
(currently Senior Research Fellow, JICA Research Institute)

JICA has been acting in Juba since 2006, and after the dispatch of the SDF to UNMISS from 2012 onwards has been cooperating with the SDF in the support of nation building in South Sudan. The SDF has assisted us in carrying out ODA projects such as the construction of the water treatment plant and the preparation of a site for the jetty alongside the Nile River. JICA in turn has helped the SDF in the road maintenance task by conducting a technological survey on the road. Through these activities the SDF and JICA have enhanced their partnership and have also conducted joint road cleanup campaign, in which they cleaned up the roads with the local residents with the intent of raising the locals' awareness of how to dispose waste adequately.

Although worsened public safety in December of 2013 forced JICA personnel to evacuate the country, I hope public safety and ODA/PKO coordination will be soon restored.

UNMISS Headquarters

Captain (GSDF) Junko Araki, Intelligence Officer
(currently with the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit, JGSDF Central Readiness Force)

I am working in Juba as an intelligence officer for #5 UNMISS Headquarters since January 2014.

The JMAC (Joint Mission Analysis Center) where I work is staffed with 23 personnel, composed of civilians, military personnel, and police officers. As part of the Information Management Group, I work with majors from the Netherlands and Yemen and am primarily responsible for putting data gathered from within and outside of UNMISS into databases and preparing statistical data related to battles, crimes, domestic evacuee numbers, etc. in South Sudan.

Although I sometimes have a hard time because of the unstable situation I must work within, including a deteriorating security situation in South Sudan since December 2013, and the highly-restrictive living conditions, every day is extremely fulfilling as I communicate with people of different nationalities within and outside of the tasks we perform while acquiring expertise in information management from different countries and learn so much from other cultures and past missions in which I have participated.

I am grateful that I have been a part of the UN missions through my work at the UNMISS Headquarters and would like to accomplish my duties till the very end of my term.

* This column was written by the author during her field work.



Atsushi Hanatani (center), cleaning the road with SDF personnel



Junko Araki (left), coordinating with UNPOL (UN police) personnel

Manuals for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Units



The United Nations (U.N.) which has been conducting reconstruction supports for many countries in which national land was destroyed by conflicts and other crises facilitating the effort to create manuals for the U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) units as part of new initiatives in order to clarify the capabilities required for the PKO units, and to promote understanding of the participating countries. This initiative is based on the intention to improve the efficiency of the PKO units' operation, and the manuals will be used as guidelines when units from different countries participating in PKOs are to conduct joint missions, and when training the troops in their countries before dispatch.

The manuals will be created according to types of forces, such as engineer and aviation, and will incorporate topics including the capabilities, missions, equipment, and organization of units that are required in each field.

Japan is involved in the creation of manuals in three fields: engineer, logistics, and transportation. For the Engineer Unit Manual Working Group consisting of 23 countries, Japan has been selected as the chair country since the activities of the Engineering Unit in Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Haiti, and South Sudan, where it is currently dispatched, are highly praised, and Japan has been selected as the chair country of the "Engineer Unit Manual Working Group," in which 23 countries are participating, and is leading the formulation of the engineer unit manual. The first Workshop of Engineer Unit Manual was held in Tokyo in March 2014, and experts from the participating 14 countries and three international organizations exchanged opinions regarding the basic concept toward the formulation of the engineer manual.

At the opening remarks, Minister of Defense Onodera expressed Japan's intention to actively promote efforts for the formulation of the manual, as a country that plays a leading role in international peace cooperation activities.

Working toward the completion of the manual in the early 2015, Japan will continue taking the initiative to lead other countries in the effort to formulate the engineer unit manual.



The first Workshop of Engineer Unit Manual (Tokyo)

VOICE

Participation in International Emergency Relief Efforts in the Wake of Typhoons in the Philippines

4th Escort Flotilla, MSDF (Kure City, Hiroshima Prefecture)
Rear Admiral (MSDF) Hisanori Sato, the 4th Escort Flotilla Commander



Since the international disaster relief efforts it carried out in Honduras in 1998, the SDF have since taken part in 13 instances of international disaster relief activities. The international disaster relief joint task force that went to the Philippines was one of the largest ones in our history. Under the joint task force commander, a medical treatment and flight support unit, a marine detachment, and an air transport unit were formed and led by the GSDF, ASDF, and MSDF, respectively. These units performed relief efforts in affected areas as the first joint task force with a mission overseas.

In the afflicted areas, the medical treatment team in the medical treatment and flight support unit patrolled different areas providing medical care and performing other duties, the air transport unit transported relief goods and typhoon victims temporarily evacuating the area, and the marine detachment maintained a center for marine operations for the medical treatment and flight support unit. When I was sent to help as the joint task force commander, I wanted very much to repay the Philippines for the support unit they quickly sent to Japan to help after the Great East Japan Earthquake. My top priority was accurately ascertaining the situation on the ground and what was needed, and I focused on ensuring efficient support operations.

Our rescue efforts involved numerous instances of working with units from not just the disaster-stricken Philippines but also the UN, U.S., UK, Australia, and other countries. Through this experience, I felt deep down that not only had we helped the Philippines, but we had also improved relations with other countries.



Hisanori Sato (left of center), exchanging views with U.S. commanders

VOICE

6th Logistics Support Regiment (Higashine City, Yamagata Prefecture)
First Lieutenant (GSDF) Yukino Oshiro, Operation Training Officer, Medical Care Team of
the International Disaster Relief Unit



As the Medical Operation Officer for the Medical Care Team of the International Disaster Relief Unit in the Philippines, I was in charge of liaison and coordination with local medical care providers and other organizations. Working in those conditions amid a tangle of confused information, I got a direct sense of the importance of not only accurately identifying medical needs but also ensuring good coordination with different countries from the outset.

The thorough Japanese medical care we provided to the victims on site earned us their deep trust, and the great acclaim we received for our meticulous support so distinctive to Japan was a great source of happiness and pride for me as a member of the medical care team. It was a very meaningful experience to have helped provide medical care and other services as part of the international disaster relief activities carried out by the SDF with their excellent disaster relief capabilities, and to have been able to support people from so many different countries.



Yukino Oshiro (far right) with nurses from the Philippines Department of Health

VOICE

JASDF Komaki Airbase (Komaki City, Aichi Prefecture)
Captain (ASDF) Hiroko Mochizuki, the 401st Squadron, the 1st Air Transport Unit Group



From November 15 to December 20, 2013, the 401st Squadron dispatched two C-130H transport aircraft to assist in international disaster relief efforts in the wake of the typhoons in the Philippines. My contribution as a copilot involved flying between Manila and afflicted areas, airlifting typhoon victims and relief goods allocated to Japan by a multinational coordination center. Looking at the disaster sites from the aircraft, the landscape was full of trees and houses blown or knocked down by the typhoons. Although relief efforts continued for days on end, typhoon victims carrying air cargo formed long lines every day at the airport. Among the support provided by numerous countries in these efforts was the help from U.S., Australian, and Philippine military forces in loading and unloading cargo. Being a part of it all made me realize the importance of air transport when major disasters strike and the expectations that the countries in the Asia-Pacific region have for Japan. The experience also served as an opportunity to work alongside female soldiers from various countries and taught me about the role women play in international support efforts and the extent of their involvement.



Local support personnel and Hiroko Mochizuki (center)



Royal Navy liaison officer
Lieutenant Commander Joe Currin



JS DDH ISE and HMS ILLUSTRIOUS exchanged liaison officers during Relief Operations in the Philippine Islands in 2013. As the Royal Navy representative, I had the privilege of spending a week onboard JS DDH ISE working with the Joint Task Force (JTF) staff of the SDF. I joined ISE on November 27 after she had completed several days of operations delivering aid to the Eastern Philippines. HMS ILLUSTRIOUS was positioned off the island of Panay in the west. However both ships shared a common purpose and approach to their respective operations. Providing assistance to those affected by Typhoon Haiyan was the primary focus for all onboard HMS ILLUSTRIOUS and within the Japanese JTF. Whilst attending daily JTF meetings I witnessed a number of structures and procedures that are similar to our own; it is clear that tradition and protocol are an important part of the JMSDF and they draw close parallels to the RN. I very much enjoyed my time on board ISE together with the SDF personnel while they performed their Relief Operations. As Island nations our Maritime Forces share much in common. This exchange has reinforced our similarities in terms of ethos and doctrine.



Joe Currin conducting a briefing (center)

Working at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)



The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, Netherlands)
Former Major General (GSDF) Ichiro Akiyama, Director of Inspectorate (first term: 1997-2002,
second term: 2004-2009)

The OPCW monitors the state of efforts to dispose of chemical and other weapons through member nation reports and inspections by the Inspection Division. During my first term as the organization's first Director of Inspectorate, I and 230 staff from 57 countries began inspection operations. My second term saw me replace nearly half of my staff in order to innovate operations that had begun to lose substance. Both of these tasks were quite difficult.

When I resigned, the Director-General gave me an undeserved compliment, saying he was "grateful for my integrity and competency." I also had the honor of attending the ceremony when the OPCW won the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2013. I am proud that I, however unwittingly, played a part in "Proactive Contribution to Peace" espoused by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.


The capabilities and dedicated efforts of Japanese nationals, including the personnel dispatched from the GSDF, have been highly valued at the OPCW. This is the result of the GSDF continued efforts to develop human resources through language training, synthesizing and analyzing chemical substances, and disposing of aging chemical weapons, and is what I want everyone in Japan to know.



November 28, 2013 – Ichiro Akiyama, making a courtesy call on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe ahead of the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for OPCW (Cabinet Public Relations Office)

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, Netherlands)
Captain (GSDF) Shintaro Seino, Inspector

Many people in Syria, including young children, have become victims of a toxic chemical attack delivered by 140 mm rockets. My duty as an inspector at the OPCW is to monitor the disposal of chemical weapons at chemical weapon disposal facilities and other locations and verify the number of such weapons. While the activities on site are conducted in a very hot and demanding environment, I plan to make the most of the education and work experience gained through the GSDF and dedicate myself to the destruction of all chemical weapons.



Shintaro Seino at OPCW headquarters
(with the OPCW logo in the background)


**Product Development Dedicated to Angle Accuracy, and the
Craftsmanship Behind Its Success**

Tamagawa Seiki Co., Ltd.
No. 1 Office Manager Takashi Kumagai

Following its founding near the Tamagawa River in 1938, Tamagawa Seiki Co., Ltd. built a factory in Iida City, Nagano Prefecture, the hometown of the company's founder. There it built oil gauges for aircraft during the Pacific War. The company continued to work for the defense industry even after the war, developing quality products that began with angle sensors, servomotors, and gyro instruments. In addition to equipment mounted on tanks and other combat vehicles (power amplifiers, slip rings, gun turret rotation and boom hoisting motors, etc.), recent years have seen our company making sophisticated machinery including control systems for flying objects, land-based systems, aircraft, and ship-mounted equipment.

One of Tamagawa Seiki's distinguishing features is the sensors that use winding wire, which is where the company began, and most of the angle sensors and winding wire for motors used for defense, air, and space applications are handmade by women. Our high-precision angle sensor magnet wire is 0.1 mm gauge or lower, and the sophisticated craftsmanship involved in putting dozens of coil bundles into an iron core without error while maintaining a steady tension when winding allows us to make high-precision products.

Winding has been perpetuated as women's work at Tamagawa Seiki, with techniques being passed down over the years. It takes at least five years for a person to become able to do winding work on their own, and our company has endeavored to build a workplace that allows women to keep working even after marriage and childbirth. As we move forward, we will continue to maintain the characteristics that allow us to focus on quality.



An employee conducting winding work for a resolver (angle sensor) that turns into parts of commander's periscopes and gunner's periscopes

Bringing High Precision Grinding Techniques to the Next Generation

President Yasuhiko Yotsui, Yotsui Kousakusyo, Ltd.



For almost 100 years since our founding in 1917, Yotsui Industries has been engaged in shipbuilding as a subcontractor to a builder in Kobe. Nearly 100% of the products we make are for defense applications, and our focus is on the production and repair of parts for submarines and escort vessels. We have been working with submarines since 1957 and the Oyashio, the first submarine Japan built after the war, in our efforts to provide high-quality products using manufacturing technologies developed through many years of experience and achievements.

Because of the environments in which submarine parts are used, high pressure resistance is an extremely important factor in their production. Just as in space, even the slightest opening can cause disaster for submarine passengers. Movies have shown scenes where the actor closes a hatch in a passageway to prevent water from flooding an adjacent area. Manufacturing these hatches requires scrupulous attention and many years of experience, and is only possible using 1/1000 mm grinding techniques. Over the last 10 years, we have consistently hired younger workers and engaged proactively in the transfer of techniques from older to younger employees, techniques which have been developed through experience for which mere machining techniques are no substitute.

Although it is often said recently that young people today have no affinity for manufacturing, I believe we can engender in our workers a dedication to high quality and a passion for work by making them aware of their role in our country's defense.



Conducting grinding work for a submarine hatch



Submarine "Soryu"

Serious about our Mission to Protect Aircraft and Passengers with Highly-Practiced Skills

Yuichiro Matsushima, Aircraft Division Manager and Senior Managing Director, Fujiwara Co., Ltd.




Fujiwara Co., Ltd. was founded in Nagoya soon after the war ended. We are the only manufacturer in Japan who has made windshields for defense-related aircraft and helicopters for 68 years.

First, we produce semi-finished goods of complex shapes that start from primarily acrylic resins specially processed to be of high strength and precision. Then we use our own eyes to check for optical distortions and other phenomena that could obstruct pilots' field of view and thoroughly polish them out for the final product, employing sophisticated techniques achieved through many years of experience.

Much of what we do to satisfy needs in terms of optics is highly dependent on human sensation and sensibility, which cannot be clearly defined by rules or standards. It is no exaggeration to say that our production of windshield products is supported by the skills of our engineers, who have been with us for a decade or more. However, as it has been difficult to plan our business from a long-term perspective, our workforce of skilled workers has rapidly aged and there was a long period of time when few younger workers were hired. The passing on of our techniques has thus not proceeded as we would have liked, and we are now barely surviving by keeping retirees on. We now fully realize the importance of uninterrupted hiring of young people and their continued efforts in order to pass on the techniques that take so long to develop.



Polishing windshield glass



T-4 Blue Impulse

Check Out Dual Wavelength Infrared Sensors!

In our times, where computerization is at such an advanced level, it is said that one's information gathering capabilities directly influence their abilities to fight. Thus, the sensors and devices that actually collect the information are playing an increasingly important role. In particular, infrared sensors are useful for detecting a variety of targets as they detect heat and can therefore be used anytime day or night. The SDF employs them in a range of equipment including searching and tracking systems, monitoring systems, missile guidance systems, and fire control systems.

The number of pixels in an infrared sensor is being increased in order to achieve high-definition infrared images that can pick up even minute details. Initiatives are underway to improve sensors' target extraction and discrimination capabilities by acquiring images at multiple infrared wave bands, which leads to gaining more information from the target objects.


Dual band infrared sensors currently being researched at the Ministry of Defense are capable of taking infrared images at a 1024 x 1024 pixel resolution equivalent to HD at both mid- and far-infrared wave bands simultaneously. As for detector elements, by leveraging Japan's vaunted semiconductor technologies, quantum dot infrared sensors, which can be produced indigenously, were selected and for the first time in the world, a large number of pixels density and high-definition dual wavelength infrared sensors were materialized.

With dual wavelengths, we can anticipate improvements in acquiring images suited to a variety of environments as well as advanced target identification and discrimination capabilities. Dual band infrared sensors will also be useful among general consumers as a dual-use technology for ensuring safety and security (disaster prevention, security, and monitoring) as well as collision avoidance (in cars and robots).



High-definition dual wavelength sensor
(1024 x 1024 pixels)

Visibility of a small boat in images using two infrared wavelengths



Examples of images taken of a small boat navigating the sea, using two different wavelengths



The small boat becomes visible when the two images are combined

The High Technical School Soft Baseball Team, a National Tournament Winner!

JGSDF Camp Takeyama (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture)
Defense Instructor (Baseball Team Advisor) Tetsuya Tsurubuchi, High Technical School of the JGSDF



The Soft Baseball Team of the High Technical School of the JGSDF (“High Technical School”) joined the Japan High School Baseball Federation in 2008. In the summer of 2013, its sixth year in the Federation, the team took part for the first time in the 58th National High School Soft Baseball Tournament and skillfully played their way to becoming the national champions.

The High Technical School allows students aged 15 through 18 who have graduated from a middle school to live a dormitory life studying and playing sports for three years while receiving an education to one day become SDF regular personnel. Students here can also receive their high school diploma thanks to a partnership with the Kanagawa Prefectural Yokohama-Shuyukan Senior High School.

In the tournament, the High Technical School Baseball Team played from August 26 to 30, shrugging off the pressure of being new to the tournament. They advanced smoothly for the brackets, achieving a walk-off win in the finals after going into extra innings against Nitta High School, a strong rival from Shikoku. In the final innings, an ace and then High Technical School student Samejima, despite having injured his right calf, marshaled his mental toughness and continued to pitch without complaint to avoid disturbing his fellow teammates’ concentration. The sight of his teammates single-mindedly protecting the field behind him and their words of encouragement (“even if they get a hit, we’ll get the points back!”) was what kept him going. It made my eyes well up with tears to later hear about their pitiful plight.

The 23 third-year students (including Samejima) of the 56 members of the High Technical School Baseball Team that took part in the tournament graduated on March 21, 2014, leaving their nest at the school to take up duties in defense of their country.



High Technical School Baseball Team members who received the championship flag and medal at the closing ceremony for the 58th National High School Soft Baseball Tournament (August 30, 2013)

60 Years with the GSDF's Reserve Personnel System and Voices of Reserve Personnel



The GSDF's Reserve Personnel system marks its 60th anniversary in FY 2014.

The SDF Reserve Personnel system, which seeks to respond to changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, has seen its own changes. Formulated in FY 1997, the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system puts reserve Ready Personnel into frontline units alongside active-duty SDF personnel. The Reserve Personnel Candidate system, which targets those with no experience as SDF personnel, was put together in 2001 to develop and expand Japan's defense infrastructure, ensure stable procurement of SDF Reserve self-defense Personnel, and make effective use of the private sector's top-caliber specialized skills. The Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 provided the first opportunity for Ready Reserve Personnel and Ground, Maritime and Air SDF Reserve Personnel to muster for disaster relief. Expectations among local communities and the country at large were fulfilled as Ready Reserve Personnel performed duties such as searching for missing persons and providing livelihood support while Reserve Personnel provided interpretation services, camp security, and other forms of logistics support.



First SDF Reserve Personnel call-up training




Poster for 60th anniversary of Reserve Personnel System

Reserve First Lieutenant (GSDF) Kiyoharu Hayata
Kumamoto Provincial Cooperation Office (Kumamoto City, Kumamoto Prefecture)
(Magokoro Adult Day Care Center, Koshi Suzukake Garden Director)

Participation in the Chinzei 25 Exercise

The first time I was called up for the Chinzei 25 exercise, which is conducted by the GSDF Western Army, was for five days in November 2013. Having been engaged in nursing-related duties during peacetime, the training provided me with many first experiences, among which were the transport of prisoners of war and other personnel and the receiving of them at collecting points. Although there were times when I was bewildered, the excellent examples provided by active-duty SDF personnel during training helped me a great deal. At the same time, feeling the weight of the responsibilities we would face as reserve personnel carrying out our duties alongside active-duty SDF Reserve Personnel in an emergency renewed my determination to enthusiastically participate in future training opportunities.



Kiyoharu Hayata (far right), conducting a body search for prisoners of war

Hiroshima Provincial Cooperation Office (Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture)
Reserve Leading Seaman Kenji Nakata
(Amami FM D-WAVE Broadcast Production Department)

Supporting the SDF that takes Responsibility for Security

My decision to become a SDF Reserve Personnel was a desire to help the SDF that takes responsibility for security in Japan. After my time with the SDF, I returned to civilian life as a salesperson back home in Amami Oshima. I currently work as an "operator," producing radio programs and manipulating broadcasting equipment. I have just joined the company and am still quite green with much to learn, but I work hard as part of the staff that make our daily radio shows a success. Just like our broadcasts, the SDF play an important role in disaster response and in emergencies as a highly respected organization that ensures the safety and security of the Japanese people. As a SDF Reserve Personnel I will keep my role in mind in order to execute my mission should a crisis occur.




On the job at a radio station

Aichi Provincial Cooperation Office (Nagoya City, Aichi Prefecture)
Reserve Airman First Class Yukinari Takeguchi, (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Inc.)

Preparing to Do My Part for the SDF

My work involves using the experience I accumulated with the ASDF to maintain equipment mounted on F-15 fighters at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The Great East Japan Earthquake occurred five years after I left the SDF. Watching media coverage of situations at disaster sites, I volunteered to become a SDF Reserve Personnel out of a desire to help in some way. Although I only have a little experience in the reserves, I plan to use the knowledge and experience I developed as an SDF personnel and dedicate myself to training so that I can do my part for the SDF in an emergency.



Yukinari Takeguchi, working at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

Q&A

The MOD and SDF as Highly-Skilled Organizations



What kind of qualifications etc. do those working for the MOD or the SDF possess?



For the purpose of executing the missions reliably in any given situation, including situations involving defense and security, disaster response, and peacekeeping operations in foreign countries, the MOD/SDF possess the ability to act without relying on private infrastructure or technologies for a certain period of time, that is, "self-sufficiency" as an organization. Consequently, MOD officers and SDF personnel are equipped with a variety of qualifications and skills (e.g. SDF regular personnel, administrative officials, technical officials, and instructors).

For example, with regard to the operation of equipment, there are qualified personnel such as large special-purpose vehicle operators, licensed mariners, small boat operators, commercial pilots, automotive mechanics, weather forecasters, and wireless operators. There also are personnel with skills such as rangers, airborne personnel, divers, medical technicians, inflight technicians, gunners, buglers, and personnel skilled in combative techniques and/or skiing. Furthermore, at camps, bases, and other locations where personnel perform daily tasks, there are personnel who have special qualifications and skills such as architects, electricians, boiler engineers, hazardous material handlers, dietitians, network specialists, logistics personnel, and firefighters. Personnel support themselves to secure their own food, clothing, and shelter that serve as the foundation of SDF operations. In addition, medical doctors, nurses, pharmacists, emergency medical technicians, and other such qualified personnel engage in medical activities at SDF hospitals and camp clinics. Personnel with teacher's license also work at SDF educational institutions.

As such, the MOD/SDF has an aspect as an organization comprised of highly-skilled individuals with a variety of qualifications, which makes it a microcosm of our society.



Weather forecaster giving a briefing



Certified air traffic controllers conducting air traffic control

Making More Extensive Use of Hokkaido's Training Environment

With vast training areas that include the Yausubetsu Maneuver Area, Hokkaido-Dai Maneuver Area, and Kamifurano Maneuver Area, Hokkaido is home to about half of all the space dedicated to GSDF maneuver areas. It is an advantaged training environment that allows for a variety of training tailored to different training purposes and unit sizes.

To remain capable of quickly and precisely responding to a variety of situations such as an attack on an island in the area, the SDF must constantly expand and enhance various training programs. It is therefore critical to make more extensive use of the many advantages offered by Hokkaido's training environment.

While it may seem a burden for SDF to have to travel as far as Hokkaido, this traveling is itself critical to ensuring that GSDF units are capable of shipping out to anywhere in the country.

SDF units' proficiency will be further enhanced with new firing ranges that let SDF personnel take part in training involving a mix of weaponry including tanks and artillery, new landing training grounds for the newly-launched "amphibious rapid deployment brigade (name pending)," and even higher-quality training environments in Hokkaido.



Hokkaido's training environment (image)

VOICE

Female SDF Regular Personnel (Enlisted Personnel) Working in Various Locations

JGSDF Camp Kokubu (Kirishima City, Kagoshima Prefecture)

Sergeant (GSDF) Mami Nagae, Wire Communications Sergeant, 12th Infantry Regiment Heavy Mortar Company



I work as a wire communications sergeant with the Heavy Mortar Company. Like other SDF personnel, I conduct general affairs work after conducting various drills, including long-term exercises and training in such subjects as shooting, marching, and urban warfare. This keeps me very busy, and at times it is physically demanding.

In October 2013, I married a senior SDF personnel from the same company as myself. As we are both SDF personnel, if either of us is participating in an exercise or an educational program, it is hard to find time for the two of us. However, this in turn has allowed us to care for each other. I put effort into making breakfast even on days that I have rigorous training from the early morning, and my husband helps out with the housework. His “thank you always” makes it all the worthwhile. I hope we can continue to be a couple that support each other. I want to keep my family happy as a wife and at the same time steadily fulfill my national defense duties as an SDF personnel.



Mami Nagae (in front), conducting wire communications work during a company training

JMSDF Tateyama Air Base (Tateyama City, Chiba Prefecture)

Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF) Yukiko Noda, the 211th Squadron, the 21st Air Unit



I am the first woman to be working as a flight navigator in MSDF patrol helicopter. It was my experience in helicopter operations during the Great East Japan Earthquake that inspired me to become a flight navigator. During disaster recovery, I maintained the helicopters' electronic equipment. Many helicopters set out from Tateyama Air Base on search and rescue missions for people gone missing. Seeing the many civilians helping out gave me a strong desire to help as an aircrew member.

MSDF patrol helicopters are operated by two pilots and two flight navigators who duties include maritime patrol and rescue operations. Because of the small number of people involved, success is only achievable if every person carries out their duties to the fullest extent. This led to moments of frustration as instruction was sometimes harsh. However, I will keep training and continue working hard so that I can be a navigator capable of handling any task required of me.



Yukiko Noda, conducting preflight inspections

JASDF Iruma Airbase (Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture)


Staff Sergeant (ASDF) Kana Sakikawa,

Air Defense Control Unit, Central Air Defense Control Corps, Central Airborne-Warning Control Group



I am currently a member of the Air Defense Control Unit at Iruma Airbase. The unit's primary duties during peace time involve measures to prevent the encroachment of Japanese airspace, for which it conducts 24-hour surveillance operations using radar. The measures I undertake to protect Japan's airspace include scrambling interceptors when unidentified aircraft are detected. Recent years have seen increased aircraft activity around Japan's periphery, and the number of scrambles has increased. As such, my workplace has been engulfed by heightened tension on an increasing number of instances. At the same time, it is rewarding to work in an environment where there is no difference between men and women.

I will continue to be proud of the work I do in my mission to protect this blue sky as a member of the Warning and Control Unit on the front line of national defense.



Kana Sakikawa monitoring vessel wakes

Childcare Support from the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces



The hours worked by members of Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces, and SDF personnel in particular, are irregular due to things like night shifts and periods of regular personnel reassignment. To provide childcare services suited to self-defense force members' unique circumstances and ensure their ability to rapidly respond to situations, childcare facilities are being built inside government buildings, and systems are being put in place to allow parents to put their children in temporary care when suddenly called into work.

Childcare facilities inside government buildings provide services for children aged zero to preschool age that include extended day care, temporary childcare, overnight childcare, and emergency temporary childcare, in addition to basic childcare. The Ministry of Defense and SDF built childcare facilities at JGSDF Camp Mishuku in 2007, at JGSDF Camp Kumamoto in 2009, in the JMSDF Yokosuka Naval Base district in 2010, and at JGSDF Camp Makomanai in 2011. Another facility will be built in the JGSDF Asaka dormitory district in 2015.

Temporary childcare for when a disaster or other situation that urgently requires a parent's presence at the office involves temporarily providing childcare at a camp or base (150 locations as of March 31, 2013) for usually five days for children whose parents have nowhere else to turn and must check in for work. The necessary safety mats, baby bedding, and other necessities are provided.

There are also programs that include those that give parents time off to help ensure a good work-childcare balance. One of these is leave to look after children's health (including giving vaccinations and administering medical exams), which gives SDF personnel with children up to kindergarten age 5 days of leave a year if they have one child, and 10 days of leave for two or more. There are also personnel who arrive at work early and leave late, some of whom have kindergarten-age or younger children, send their elementary school-age children to afterschool activities, or look after a family member. These personnel are permitted to change their work start and end times without changing the number of hours they work in a day.



Childcare facility inside government building "Konohana Nursery" (Yokosuka area)

VOICE

Aspirations of First-Generation Nursing Students of the Medical Education Department at the National Defense Medical College



National Defense Medical College (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture)

Tomoka Akiho, SDF regular personnel candidate and nursing school student, Nursing Faculty, Medical Education Department

Now that my matriculation ceremony is over, I now feel like a real nursing student at the National Defense Medical College. I am extremely proud to wear the uniform of the college. Whether study, training, or student life, I work with drive and enthusiasm in everything I do to become a good SDF nurse and avoid bringing shame to the uniform. In the future, I hope to and make international contributions and take part in disaster relief activities. To this end, I will spend the next four years maintaining an awareness of things going on around me and working with my peers as I develop useful skills.

While I know there will be difficulties to face as a first-generation student, there will also be things that only such students can accomplish. I will make every effort possible as I push on.

National Defense Medical College (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture)

Asaka Abe, technical officer candidate and nursing school student, Nursing Faculty, Medical Education Department

I felt considerable trepidation in my decision to enter the National Defense Medical College. I would leave my family to become part of the Ministry of Defense—an experience unknown to those who attend general universities—and become a first-generation student at that. But I was also expecting great happiness and fulfillment for the opportunity to learn how to grow into a working adult as well as a nurse. Although many things were unfamiliar and confusing when I began my studies, these feelings turned to genuine happiness as I met the teachers and senior classmates in other faculties who took pains to teach me properly and the dependable people at my level, the people who thought and acted with me.

Over the next four years at the National Defense Medical College, I will remain committed to everything I do.



Tomoka Akiho (right) studying with classmate Asaka Abe (left)



How does the SDF collaborate with local communities?



The GSDF Northern Army has provided assistance with creating snow sculptures at the Sapporo Snow Festival—an event visited by more than two million people every year—since the event's sixth iteration held in 1955. Every year for about a month, roughly 15,000 SDF personnel joined in various activities such as building snow sculptures, performing maintenance, and transporting snow. The Northern Army has thus become indispensable to the snow festival, and will continue to collaborate in these efforts and further strengthen relations with the local community.



Sculpting the Sultan Abdul Samad Building out of snow



Based in Okinawa, the MSDF Fleet Air Wing 5 makes the most of its positioning at the Hachinohe Air Base in Aomori Prefecture and works together with local SDF personnel using P-3C patrol aircraft to transport snow every year from Mt. Hakkoda to places in Okinawa such as elementary schools, foster care facilities, and children's centers. As it rarely snows in Okinawa, this was the first time for most of these children to see real snow. The children built snowman together with the SDF personnel, threw themselves down on the snow, and delighted in the feel of the snow. In return, sugarcane grown in Okinawa was delivered to children in Hachinohe, Aomori Prefecture so they could enjoy Okinawa flavor.

Through these efforts, the MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft serves as a bridge between Naha and Hachinohe City that makes children smile.



Students of Ueno Elementary School in Miyakojima, playing in snow from Mt. Hakkoda



Two especially important tasks in Okinawa are building good relations with residents and local governments around the base, and gaining their understanding and trust concerning defense-related matters. The ASDF Naha Air Base is therefore making efforts to foster goodwill and trust through diligent work at traditional Okinawan events such as the Naha Harii (traditional boat race) and Eisa Festival in Naha City as well as volunteer activities including cleaning efforts in places such as Mabuni Hills (Mabuni-no-Oka) in Itoman City and Senagajima Island in Tomigusuku City.



ASDF Personnel Participating in the Naha Harii (traditional boat race)

Introduction of Historical Buildings

The SDF owns a number of historical buildings. The most famous examples include Nogikan (built in 1898) in the GSDf Camp Zentsuji in Kagawa Prefecture, and the cavalry school of the Imperial Japanese Army (built in 1911) in Camp Narashino, Chiba Prefecture.

In addition, there is Shirakabe Heisya (White Wall Barrack) Public Historical Center adjacent to the GSDf Camp Shibata in Niigata Prefecture that was built in 1874 as barracks of the 8th Infantry Battalion of Tokyo Garrison of the Imperial Japanese Army. It is very old and has significant historic value. Although it is built by a traditional Japanese construction method, the influence of the French-style military system and architectural designs can be seen in many places. In particular, “blend of Japanese and Western styles” and “the roof trusses that show the progress of architectural technology in Japan” are highly praised from the viewpoint of architectural study, and are preserved in the original condition as much as possible. Furthermore, the barrack stores documents related to Lord Mizoguchi, the family who once ruled the area around the camp in the Edo Period, the 16th infantry regiment of the former Japanese Army that was stationed from the Meiji Period to the start of the second world war, and the 30th Infantry Regiment of the GSDf that is stationed after the war to present. These materials and the building are open to the public.



Roof trusses of Shirakabe Heisya Public Historical Center (GSDf Camp Shibata)



The cavalry school of the Imperial Japanese Army (GSDf Camp Narashino)



Nogikan (GSDf Camp Zentsuji)

Why not visit historical buildings in the camps and bases in your neighborhood?

Towards the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games



It was announced on September 7, 2013 that Tokyo will be hosting the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. To better prepare for the event, the MOD set up the MOD/SDF Special Action Committee on the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games on September 10, chaired by the Defense Minister. The committee is working towards the success of the event with the support of all organs of the Ministry.

At the Tokyo 1964 Olympic and Paralympic Games, the SDF provided a variety of support, including an aerobatic demonstration performed by the Blue Impulse aerobatic team. For 2020, the SDF will cooperate with other authorities to handle security and other safety measures. The GSDF Asaka training grounds are the planned site for the Shooting Sport competition.

We have witnessed many Olympic medalists of SDF personnel trained in the JSDF Physical Training School, which now offers nine special courses: wrestling, boxing, judo, shooting, archery, weight lifting, track and field, swimming, and modern pentathlon. With the help of past SDF medalists, the MOD is investing considerable effort to assist SDF athletes capable of competing at an international level. The Ministry will also be supporting the training of athletes in women's rugby and canoeing.



Defense Minister Onodera (on the left) and SDF medalists exchanging views during a meeting of the MOD/SDF Special Action Committee

Ofunato Daiichi Junior High School Third-year student Kei Yoshino, President of Student Council

We came up with the concept of “expressing our thanks for earthquake recovery assistance and our hopes for the future” for our school trip and visited the MOD on September 5, 2013.

I will never forget the SDF personnel that came to Ofunato soon after the earthquake struck. Their rescue efforts and subsequent help with cleaning up debris and setting up soup kitchens gave us a sense of security, safety, and hope.

I am thankful for having the opportunity to show—in front of General Shigeru Iwasaki, Chief of Joint Staff and everyone else—the recovery that Ofunato has made and to present them with a “big-catch flag” we made with our good wishes for them.

We will continue to marshal our wisdom and strength to bring about a full recovery as soon as possible.



Big-catch flag expressing good wishes (Ofunato Daiichi Junior High School students and the Chief of Joint Staff (far left))



Surrounding a newly-planted “yumemachizakura” tree (Tokyo Metropolitan Oshima High School students and Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kenji Wakamiya (center))

Tokyo Metropolitan Oshima High School Second-year student Yumi Takeda, President of Student Council

We visited the MOD on February 22, 2014 to express our gratitude to the members of the MOD/SDF who came to our aid during the Izu Oshima landslide disasters caused by typhoon No. 26 in October 2013. Every school on the island presented colored paper and saplings of yumemachizakura trees—a type of tree that was developed in Oshima—as a token of gratitude.

The SDF personnel and MOD officers kindly talked to us, which relaxed our nervousness. We were deeply moved when we learned that those who attended the ceremony and tree planting were the ones who had helped rebuild Izu Oshima. We are glad to be able to express our gratitude directly to them.

Lastly, we want to take this opportunity to express our thanks to the personnel involved in the Oshima disaster relief activity and staff that made our visit to the ministry possible. Thank you so much.

Chapter 1 Defense Policies of Countries

Section 1 The United States

1 Security and Defense Policies

Despite its changing influence in relative terms, the United States remains the world's most powerful nation, and it is believed to consistently play a significant role in ensuring peace and stability throughout the world. In January 2012, the Obama administration released the new Defense Strategic Guidance¹. Based on the understanding that the United States is at an inflection point due to factors both inside and outside the country, that is, the U.S. Forces' withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan after a decade of war and the demand for deep cuts in government spending including defense spending under the government's serious fiscal situation, the guidance was developed to review defense priorities and present a blueprint for the Joint Force in 2020. In the new Defense Strategic Guidance, the Obama Administration articulated a policy that would place the Asia-Pacific region at the focus of U.S. strategy, including the security strategy (Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific Region). Furthermore, in March 2014 the Administration published the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the second review since President Obama took office. The 2014 QDR builds on the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and embodies the priorities outlined in it, including rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region, indicating that the Obama Administration continues to place an emphasis on the region.

Meanwhile, as the growing budget deficits of the U.S. government in recent years have called for deep cuts in spending, in January 2012 the Department of Defense announced that the reduction in defense spending will amount to about 487 billion dollars over the 10 years from FY2012 to FY2021². In addition, the government budget sequestration³, including defense spending, was initiated in March 2013, bringing various impacts on the U.S. Forces including suspension of training, delayed deployment of aircraft carriers, and grounding of air squadrons. Although the Bipartisan Budget Act of the Democratic and Republican parties mitigated the sequestration spending cuts for FY2014 and FY2015, the QDR emphasizes that the risks to the U.S. Forces would increase considerably if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016. Much

¹ The formal title of the document is "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense."

² According to the document published by the DoD concerning the FY2013 budget request that was submitted to Congress in February 2012, "the amount of reduction" here means the difference between the total DoD base budget for 10 years estimated at the time of the FY2012 budget request (submitted to Congress in February 2011) and the total DoD base budget for 10 years estimated at the time of the FY2013 budget request.

³ It has been pointed out that the mandatory cuts in defense expenditure resulting from the Budget Control Act will amount to about 500 billion dollars by the time of the budget for FY2021.

attention will be paid to how the mandatory sequestration cuts in defense spending will impact the U.S. defense strategies and security policies outlined in the QDR and other documents.

1 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

In March 2014, the Department of Defense released the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR outlines policies concerning U.S. Forces' capabilities and composition in anticipation of the security environment of the next 20 years. The United States Code mandates that the Secretary of Defense submits the QDR to the Congress every four years. The 2014 QDR builds on the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and embodies the priorities outlined in it.

(1) Understanding of Security

The 2014 QDR states that the future international security environment remains uncertain and complicated due to the shifting international balance of power; the greater interaction between states, non-state entities and private citizens; the proliferation of technology; and the rapidly accelerating spread of information. In addressing this challenging environment, the QDR states that the United States collaborates with allies and partners to accomplish a wide range of goals, and leverages the technological and human capital strengths of the U.S. Forces.

The QDR recognizes that the Asia-Pacific region is increasingly central to global commerce, politics and security. At the same time, the report points out that defense expenditure in the region continues to rise and countries within the region continue to enhance their military and security capabilities, bringing greater risk that tensions arising from long-standing sovereign disputes or claims to natural resources will spur disruptive competition or erupt into conflict. In particular, it notes that the rapid pace and comprehensive scope of China's military modernization continues, combined with a relative lack of transparency and openness regarding both military capabilities and intentions. In relation to North Korea, the review says that its long-range missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, particularly its pursuit of nuclear weapons in violation of international obligations, constitutes a significant threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and is a growing, direct threat to the United States.

As for the Middle East, the report suggests that the sectarian divide is among the sources of trans-national division, while competition for resources will worsen tensions and could escalate into broader conflicts, particularly in fragile states. The report states that Iran remains a destabilizing actor that threatens security by defying international law and pursuing capabilities that would allow it to develop nuclear weapons. Even as Iran pledges not to pursue nuclear

weapons, its other destabilizing activities including development of mid- and long-range missiles and support to terrorists and insurgents, will continue to pose a threat to the security of the Middle East and the U.S. allies and partners.

Furthermore, it states that as countries in the Middle East and Africa undergo political and social change, terrorist groups seek to expand their influence, and internal strife in Syria has become a magnet for global jihad, bringing ongoing spillover effects including an influx of foreign fighters and a flood of refugees into neighboring countries. In Africa, it mentions that terrorists, criminal organizations and pirates exploit ungoverned and under-governed territory, causing potential for rapidly developing threats, particularly of terrorist attacks in fragile states, that could pose acute challenges to U.S. interests.

The report says that Europe remains the principal partner in promoting global security, particularly in addressing challenges such as persistent unrest and violence in the Middle East and North Africa.

The QDR states that while the United States is willing to undertake security cooperation with Russia, both in the bilateral context and in seeking solutions to regional challenges, Russia's multi-dimensional defense modernization and actions that violate the sovereignty of neighbors present risks and thus the United States will engage Russia to increase transparency and reduce the risk of military miscalculation.

Concerning the global trends, the report refers to the emergence of international partners with the capacity to play security roles in their respective regions, as well as international cooperation and shared norms of behavior at unprecedented levels of global interconnectedness. At the same time it also states that the spread and proliferation of technology offers new tools for state and non-state adversaries such as terrorists to pursue asymmetric approaches in the 21st century operational environment. Furthermore, the report states that in coming years, countries such as China will continue seeking to counter U.S. strengths using anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) approaches⁴ and by employing other new cyber and space control technologies. It also says that elements such as cyberspace, space, sophisticated technology, WMD, terrorism and climate change poses additional challenges.

(2) Defense Strategy

The 2014 QDR emphasizes the following three pillars, which are interdependent and mutually

⁴ See Part I Overview, Section 2, footnote 4

reinforcing, in order to embody priorities outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance including rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region and strong commitment to stability in Europe and the Middle East.

(1) Protect the Homeland: Maintain the capability to deter and defeat attacks on the United States. Protection of the homeland includes assisting U.S. civil authorities in protecting U.S. airspace, shores, and borders, and in responding effectively to domestic disasters.

(2) Build security globally: Continue a strong U.S. commitment to shaping world events in order to deter and prevent conflict and to assure the allies and partners of the shared security.

(3) Project power and win decisively: the U.S. Forces deter acts of aggression in one or more theaters by remaining capable of decisively defeating adversaries, while projecting power to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

The QDR states that across the three pillars, the U.S. Forces are capable of simultaneously implementing the following undertakings, and if deterrence fails at any given time, U.S. forces could defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region⁵.

1) Defending homeland

2) Conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations

3) Deterring aggression and assuring allies through forward presence and engagement in multiple regions.

Furthermore, in order to achieve the three pillars, the Department of Defense seeks innovative approaches to how to fight, how to posture the force, and how to leverage the asymmetric strengths and technological advantages. More specifically, the QDR mentions positioning additional forward-deployed naval forces in critical areas, such as the Asia-Pacific region, and deploying new combinations of ships, aviation assets, and crisis response forces.

(3) Rebalancing of the Joint Force

Given major changes in the U.S. security environment including geopolitical changes, changes in modern warfare, and changes in the fiscal environment, the 2014 QDR states that the

⁵ The 2010 QDR stated that the U.S. Forces possess the capability of countering attacks by two countries while also being able to conduct a wide range of operations. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance states that the United States maintain forces that are able to fully deny a capable state's aggressive objectives in one region while being capable of denying the objectives of – or imposing unacceptable costs on – an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.

Department of Defense will rebalance the Joint Force for a broad spectrum of conflict, rebalance and maintain the presence and posture abroad, and rebalance capability, capacity and readiness. The QDR also says that while the force will become smaller, it will become more modern as well, with readiness improving. Furthermore, it states that particularly in an era of reduced budget and other resources, the Department will redouble its efforts to protect key capability areas listed below, that are most closely aligned to the pillars of the defense strategy.

1) Missile defense: Increase the number of Ground-Based Interceptors and build depth into the sensor network. Deploy a second radar in Japan that will improve early warning and tracking of any missiles launched by North Korea. Increase defense interceptor reliability and effectiveness to improve discrimination capabilities, and to establish a more robust sensor network. Study the best location in the United States for an additional missile defense interceptor site.

2) Nuclear deterrence: Continue to invest in modernizing the essential nuclear delivery systems, warheads, command and control, and nuclear weapon infrastructure.

3) Cyber: Develop the Cyber Mission Force that operates and defends the Department networks and supports military operations worldwide by 2016. In addition, the Department migrates its information systems to a common, Defense-wide network infrastructure known as the Joint Information Environment.

4) Space: Diversify and expand the coverage of Space Situational Awareness (SSA)⁶ through international partnerships. In the near-term, investment in technology demonstrations and capabilities required to evolve toward more resilient architectures. Additionally, accelerate initiatives to counter adversary space capabilities including adversary intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and space-enabled precision strike.

See ▶ Part I, Chapter 2, Section 4-1 (Outer Space and Security)

5) Air/sea: Invest in combat aircraft, including fighters and long-range strike, survivable persistent surveillance, resilient architectures, and undersea warfare to increase the Joint Force's ability to counter A2/AD challenges. Deepen collaboration with key allies and partners as they develop future forces and capabilities to counter more sophisticated aggressors.

6) Precision strike: The Air Forces will procure air-to-surface missiles that allow both fighter and bomber aircraft to engage a wide range of targets effectively, even when the enemy's air defense have not been fully suppressed. The Navy is developing a new, joint, long-range anti-ship cruise missile, which will improve the Joint Force's ability to engage surface combatants in defended airspace.

7) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR): Rebalance investments toward systems

⁶ The number of Special Operations Forces personnel as of March 2014 is 66,000.

that will be effective in defended airspace and denied areas, in the wake of the drawdown of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and in light of growing challenges from state adversaries. Make critical space based systems more resilient by expanding the access to commercial and allied space ISR systems.

8) Counter Terrorism and Special Operations: Grow overall Special Operations Forces (SOF) strength to 69,700. As forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan, more SOF will be available to support Combatant Commanders' efforts to counter a range of challenges across the globe.

9) Resilience: Improve the resilience of air, naval, ground, space and missile-defense capabilities, even in the face of large-scale, coordinated attacks. Disperse land-based and naval expeditionary forces to other bases and operating sites and provide ability to operate and maintain front-line combat aircraft from austere bases while using only a small complement of logistical and support personnel and equipment.

The QDR emphasizes that if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016, risks for the U.S. forces posed by shifts in the security environment would grow significantly⁷.

2 Rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific Region

As indicated by the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the 2014 QDR, the United States places emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and is continuing a policy to enhance its presence in the region. In November 2011, U.S. President Obama delivered a speech in the Australian Parliament, clearly stating, for the first time, that he will give top priority to the U.S. presence and mission in the Asia-Pacific region and indicating that the U.S. will maintain its strong presence in Japan and the Korean Peninsula, while enhancing its presence in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the 2014 QDR states that the centerpiece of the Department of Defense commitment to the rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region is to modernize and enhance security alliances with Australia, Japan, the ROK, the Philippines and Thailand.

Concrete examples of the enhancement of U.S. Forces' presence in the Asia-Pacific region include enhanced presence of the U.S. Forces in Australia. In November 2011, U.S. President Obama and then Australian Prime Minister Gillard jointly announced U.S.-Australia force posture initiatives, which include: (1) the rotational deployment of U.S. marines to Darwin and Northern Australia for around six months at a time where they will conduct exercises and training with the Australian Defence Force⁸; and (2) increased rotations of aircraft of the U.S.

⁷ Some of the implications anticipated in the case of the return of the sequester-level cuts include a reduction in end strength of active Army to 420,000, retirement of the USS George Washington aircraft carrier (10 aircraft carriers), a reduction in end strength of marine corps to 175,000, a further retirement of air force aircraft and a slowdown of purchases of F-35 aircraft.

⁸ The initial deployment would consist of a company of 250 U.S. marines and aims to eventually

Air Force through northern Australia, which will offer greater opportunities for joint training and exercises with the Royal Australian Air Force. The joint initiatives are described as part of the efforts to embody the basic concept of the force posture of the U.S. Forces presence in the Asia-Pacific region, which intends to pursue “a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable military presence.” Other examples include the rotational deployment of up to four Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)⁹ to Singapore announced by then U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates in June, 2011. In April 2013, LCS Freedom arrived at Singapore and started the first rotation. Also, the United States repeatedly conducted joint military exercises with and provided military technologies and assistance to Southeast Asian countries in an effort to build up trusting relationships and strengthen the readiness of the countries. Furthermore, the 2014 QDR states that 60 percent of U.S. Navy assets will be stationed in the Pacific by 2020 including enhancements to its critical naval presence in Japan, and the Air Force will move forces such as ISR assets to the region.

The United States has been expressing its stance to emphasize the Asia-Pacific region not only to its allies and partners but also to China. The 2014 QDR states that the United States is building a sustained and substantive dialogue with China to improve the ability to cooperate in concrete, practical areas such as counter-piracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the same time, the United States will manage the competitive aspects of China-U.S. relations in ways that improve regional peace and stability consistent with international norms and principles.

3 Nuclear Strategy

While U.S. President Obama aims to realize a world without nuclear weapons, he notes that this will not be realized in the near future, and indicates the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released in April 2010, indicates that the nuclear security environment is changing and nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are an imminent threat today. Furthermore, it points to the necessity of working on the issue of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers, in particular Russia and China.

establish a rotational presence of up to a 2,500-person Marine Air-Ground Task Force including aircraft, ground vehicles, and artilleries over a few years. From April to October of 2013, about 200 U.S. Marine Corps personnel were deployed as the second rotation.

⁹ Fast and agile war vessels designed to defeat asymmetrical threats with A2 capability in near-shore environments

The NPR presents five key objectives based on awareness of this security environment: (1) preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; (2) reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons; (3) maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; (4) strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and (5) sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

In June 2013, U.S. President Obama delivered a speech on the reduction of nuclear weapons in Berlin, which was then followed by the release of the Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy by the Department of Defense on the same day. The report revealed U.S. intentions to negotiate with Russia to pursue up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons.

See ▶ Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2-1 (Nuclear Weapons)

4 FY2015 Budget

As the budget deficit of the U.S. Government is deepening in recent years, the Budget Control Act enacted in August 2011 established a deep cut in government spending by FY2021. In January 2012, the DoD announced that the reduction in defense spending in light of the act will amount to about 487 billion dollars over the 10 years from FY2012 to FY2021 (about 259 billion dollars over the five years from FY2013 to FY2017). In March 2013, the mandatory sequestration of government spending including defense spending started based on the provisions of the Budget Control Act. The Bipartisan Budget Act by the Democratic and Republican parties which passed in December 2013 mitigated the sequestration caps for FY2014 and FY2015. The FY2015 budget request that was announced following the Act includes 495.6 billion dollars¹⁰ to fund base defense programs. For Overseas Contingency Operations, the budget includes 58.6 billion dollars, an amount that is 20.9 billion dollars less than the amount in the FY2014 budget request, reflecting the plan to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. The key principles of the defense budget are as follows: (1) Seek a balanced force; (2) Prepare for prolonged readiness challenges including uncertain fiscal outlook; (3) Continue to focus on institutional reform; and (4) Pursue compensation changes. Major decisions include a reduction of end strength of active Army from the current 520,000 down to 440,000-450,000 personnel, maintaining 11 aircraft carriers of the Navy, a commitment to the F-35 development and procurement program, and retirement of all A-10 tactical fighters and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. In relation to these decisions, the 2014 QDR states that while the forces will become smaller, it will become more modern as well, with readiness improving. However, unless the Congress and the President agree to a new budget bill or other such measures are taken, the

¹⁰ A reduction of about 400 million dollars compared to the FY2014 budget under the Bipartisan Budget Act that mitigated the sequestration caps. A reduction of about 31 billion dollars compared to the FY2014 government budget request

sequestration will happen again from FY2016. The 2014 QDR states that concerning the risks for the U.S. Forces posed by shifts in the security environment, the Department can manage these risks under the President's FY2015 Budget plan, but the risks would grow significantly if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016¹¹. Attention will be paid to future trends in sequestration of government spending including defense spending.

See ► *Fig. I-1-1-1 (The Impact of Mandatory Reduction of Government Expenditure on Defense Budget); Fig. I-1-1-2 (Shifts in the U.S. Defense Budget)*

2 Military Posture

1 General Situation

In regard to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear force, the U.S. is moving ahead with its reduction based on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that came into force in February 2011. In April 2014, it announced that its deployed strategic warheads¹² stood at 1,585, while its deployed delivery platforms stood at 778¹³. The U.S. is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the nation's new ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons¹⁴.

In regard to Missile Defense (MD), the U.S. announced the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) in February 2010. On homeland defense, the review noted that the U.S. would use ground-based interceptors to respond to ICBMs from North Korea and Iran, and that in regard to regional defense, the U.S. would expand investments in MD systems while taking a phased adaptive approach (PAA) that is tailored to each region and improve the MD capabilities step by step, working with partner countries and properly sharing the burden. However, in January 2012, the U.S. announced that it will continue investments in MD programs in its homeland and Europe while reducing the spending for deployable regional MD systems with a view to increasing reliance on its allies and partners in the future. Further, in March 2013, the U.S. announced that it will additionally deploy ground-based interceptors in the U.S. homeland and mobile radars for BMD in Japan in order to bolster homeland security in response to North Korea's nuclear test and the advancement of its long-range ballistic missile development, while restructuring the program of the standard missile (SM-3) Block IIB scheduled for deployment in Europe.

¹¹ See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1, footnote 7

¹² Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear warheads equipped in heavy bombers. (A deployed heavy bomber is counted as one nuclear warhead)

¹³ The figure as of March 1, 2014.

¹⁴ The concept is designed to address anti-access (A2) challenges and enable prompt strikes of any target in the world using non-nuclear long-range precision guided missiles.

The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the individual branches of the broader armed forces, rather it is operated under the leadership of the Unified Combatant Commands, comprising leaders from multiple branches of the armed forces. The Unified Combatant Commands consist of three commands with functional responsibilities and six commands with regional responsibilities.

The U.S. ground forces consist of about 520,000 soldiers, and about 190,000 marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries. As described in the Defense Strategic Guidance, the Army continues its transition to a smaller yet capable force fully prepared to conduct a full range of operations worldwide. The Marine Corps aims to acquire forces capable to respond to any threat as a “middleweight force,” bridging the seam between smaller special operations forces and larger heavy conventional forces. In January 2012, the DoD announced that it will reduce the number of active Marine Corps personnel to 182,000 and in February 2014 the number of active Army personnel to 440,000 – 450,000, with further reductions to both in the future.

The U.S. maritime forces consist of about 1,030 vessels (including about 70 submarines) totaling about 6.10 million tons. The 6th Fleet is deployed in the East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and Africa; the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet in the western Pacific and Indian Ocean.

The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,500 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and the ROK.

Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in cyberspace, the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was founded in order to oversee operations in cyberspace. The U.S. Cyber Command attained Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in May 2010 and commended full capability in November in the same year¹⁵.

See ► Fig. I-1-1-3 (Structure of the Unified Combatant Command)

¹⁵ As cyber-related units, Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM), 24th Air Force/Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER), and Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER) have been newly formed.

2 Current Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States, which is a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The Pacific Command is a command with regional responsibilities and is responsible for the largest geographical area. The U.S. Forces stationed in the ROK and Japan fall under the control of the Pacific Command. Furthermore, in order to broaden the perspective of the U.S. Forces and promote better understanding of the U.S. Forces from allies, the Pacific Command headquarters accept personnel from allies in the region. Under this scheme, personnel from Canada and Australia are currently serving in the Pacific Command as deputy director level-officials.

The Pacific Command consists of the U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific, and U.S. Pacific Air Forces, which are all headquartered in Hawaii¹⁶.

The U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) is composed of two divisions and deploys such forces as the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii and the 2nd Infantry Division and 19th Sustainment Command in the ROK, in addition to about 2,300 personnel in Japan, including the I Corps (Forward) headquarters and the headquarters, U.S. Army Japan¹⁷.

The U.S. Pacific Fleet consists of the Seventh Fleet, which is responsible for the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and the Third Fleet, responsible for the East Pacific and Bering Sea. The U.S. Pacific in total controls about 180 vessels. The Seventh Fleet is centered on a carrier strike group with main stationing locations in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial lands, people and sea lines of communication and the critical national interests of the U.S. and its allies. The fleet consists of aircraft carriers, amphibious ships and the Aegis combat system.

The U.S. Pacific Maritime Corps deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland and Japan. Of this force, about 16,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which are equipped with F/A-18 fighters and other aircraft and are both deployed in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the Western Pacific.

¹⁶ In 2013, the U.S. Army Pacific upgraded the rank of its Commander from lieutenant general to general, and thus the commanders of the Army Pacific, Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Air Forces have all become four stars.

¹⁷ The figures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2013), and could change according to unit deployment.

The U.S. Pacific Air Force deploys three air forces, of which three air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters C-130 transport aircrafts) are deployed in the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan, and two air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters) in the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

See ► Fig. I-1-1-4 (U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region)

Section 2 Korean Peninsula

On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two—north and south—for more than half a century. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.6 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asian region, to say nothing of Japan.

See ► *Fig. I-1-2-1 (Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula)*

1 North Korea

1 General Situation

North Korea has been advocating the construction of a strong socialist state in all areas—ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy¹ and it adopts “military-first politics” to realize this goal. The “military-first politics” has been defined as a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise in the revolution and national construction on the principle of military-first and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of the revolution². In fact, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Kim Jong-un, who is in a position to control the military, mentioned the importance of military power in his New Year Address³ in January 2014: “Strengthening defense capabilities is the most important of all state affairs, and the country’s dignity, people’s happiness and peace rest on powerful arms” and regularly visits military organizations. This indicates that he intends to continue attaching importance to, and relying on, the military forces.

Although North Korea has been facing serious economic difficulties and has depended on the international community for food and other resources, it seems to be maintaining and enhancing

¹ North Korea used to vow that it would open the door to a “powerful and prosperous nation (Kangseong Daeguk)” in 2012, which marked the 100th anniversary of the birth of the late President Kim Il-sung. Recently, however, North Korea has also been using the expression, “powerful and prosperous country (Kangseong Kukka).”

² Joint editorial of the Korean Workers’ Party’s newspaper “Rodong Shinmun” and its journal “Workers” (June 16, 1999).

³ Until 1994, the late President Kim Il-sung gave a “New Year Address” every year on January 1st. From after his death in 1995 to 2012, the Korean Workers’ Party’s newspaper “Rodong Shinmun,” the Korean People’s Army’s newspaper “Korean People’s Army” and the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League’s newspaper “Youth Vanguard” jointly published a joint New Year Editorial.

its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. North Korea deploys most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to the official announcement at the Supreme People's Assembly in April 2014, the proportion of the defense budget in the FY2014 national budget was 15.9%, but it is believed that this represents only a fraction of real defense expenditures.

Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles and by maintaining large-scale special operations forces. In addition, North Korea repeatedly uses provocative words and actions against relevant countries, including Japan. In particular, from March to April 2013, North Korea underscored that it would exercise its right to preemptive nuclear attack against the United States and other countries, and that the strike zone of its ballistic missiles included Japan, naming specific cities⁴.

Such military trend in North Korea constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but of the entire region and the international community. Needless to say, North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated. Sufficient attention needs to be paid to the development and deployment of ballistic missiles, the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, and proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles by North Korea.

Partly because North Korea maintains its extremely closed regime, it is difficult to accurately capture the details and intentions of its behavior. However, it is necessary for Japan to pay utmost attention to them.

2 Military Posture

(1) General Situation

North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for all the soldiers, modernizing all the armed forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country)⁵.

North Korea's armed forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with a total troop strength of roughly 1.2 million. North Korea's military forces are believed to have been maintaining and

⁴ For example, "It is a matter of course that Yokosuka, Misawa and Okinawa are located within the range of our attacks along with Guam." (March 31, 2013, Rodong Shinmun) and "the entire territory of Japan could not escape from North Korea's retaliatory attacks (in this context, the article listed the Japanese cities of Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kyoto)" (April 10, 2013, Rodong Shinmun)

⁵ Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth plenary meeting of the fourth Korean Workers' Party's Central Committee in 1962.

enhancing their capabilities and operational readiness, but most of its equipment is outdated.

Meanwhile, North Korea has large-scale special operations forces that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage to guerrilla warfare, among other forces. Moreover, North Korea seems to have many underground military-related installations across its territory.

(2) Military Capabilities

The North Korean Army comprises about one million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored forces including at least 3,500 tanks and artillery. North Korea is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240 mm multiple launch rockets and 170 mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital city of Seoul. Despite limited resources, it is deemed that North Korea continues to selectively reinforce its conventional forces and improve its equipment, such as main battle tanks and multiple launch rockets⁶

The Navy has about 650 ships with a total displacement of approximately 101,000 tons and is chiefly comprised of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile craft. Also, it has about 20 Romeo class submarines, about 70 midget submarines, and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operations forces.

The Air Force has approximately 600 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union, but some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2 transport aircraft as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operations forces.

In addition, North Korea has so-called asymmetric military capabilities, namely, special operations forces whose size is estimated at 100,000 soldiers⁷. In recent years, observers

⁶ According to “The Military Balance 2014,” North Korea is replacing Soviet-made T-54 and T-55 tanks with the Ch'onma-ho that North Korea independently produced based on the T-62. In mid-May 2013, North Korea is believed to have conducted a test launch of a 240mm multiple launch rockets with the range extended from 60km to 70km.

⁷ It had been said that North Korea possessed two types of special operations forces: one under the military forces and the other under the Korean Workers' Party. However, it has been reported that these organizations were consolidated in 2009 and the Reconnaissance General Bureau was established under

indicate North Korea is placing importance on and strengthening its cyber forces⁸.

North Korea's military forces actively conduct various types of training to maintain and enhance their operational readiness. Meanwhile, given the serious food situation and other underlying circumstances, it is believed that military personnel are mobilized for agricultural activities as well as for large-scale construction projects, including the construction of the Masikryong Ski Resort promoted by First Chairman Kim Jong-un⁹.

3 WMD and Ballistic Missiles

While North Korea continues to maintain large-scale military capabilities, its conventional forces are considerably inferior to those of the ROK and the U.S. forces in the ROK. This is the result of a variety of factors, including decreases in military assistance from the former Soviet Union due to the collapse of the Cold War structure, limitations placed on North Korea's national defense spending due to its economic stagnation, and the rapid modernization of the ROK's defense capabilities. It is thus speculated that North Korea is focusing its efforts on WMD and ballistic missile reinforcements in order to compensate for this shortfall.

The development of WMDs and missiles by North Korea constitutes, coupled with provocative words and actions, including missile attacks against Japan, a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan. Additionally, such development poses a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to the non-proliferation of weapons, including WMDs.

(1) Nuclear Weapons

a. Recent major developments regarding the issue of North Korea's nuclear development

With regard to the issue of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, six rounds of the

the auspices of the armed forces. The existence of the bureau was officially confirmed in March 2013 when Korean Central Broadcasting Station reported General Kim Yong-chol as the Director of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Moreover, James Thurman, (then) Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, stated "North Korea possesses the world's largest special operations force of over 60,000" in his speech at the Association of U.S. Army in October 2012. Also, the ROK Defense White Paper 2012 points out, "The number of North Korea special force troops is estimated to reach approximately 200,000."

⁸ In his speech at the Association of the U.S. Army in October 2012, James Thurman, (then) Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea said "the North Koreans possess a significant cyber warfare capability which they continue to improve," explaining his understanding that North Korea has stepped up its efforts to enhance cyber attack capabilities in recent years. Regarding North Korean cyber attacks against the Republic of Korea, see Part I, Chapter 2, Section 5

⁹ In June 2013, First Chairman Kim Jong-un issued a written appeal urging the military to unconditionally complete the construction of the Masikryong Ski Resort by the end of the year, and the construction was completed in December of that year. Military personnel have also been mobilized for the construction of such facilities as the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum, Munsu Swimming Complex (pool facility), and Unha Scientists Street (high-end residential area).

Six-Party Talks have been held since August 2003, aimed to take peaceful measures to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, the Joint Statement was adopted, which focused on the abandonment of “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” by North Korea. In 2006, the Talks was suspended as North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles and conducted a nuclear test¹⁰ and the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolutions 1695 and 1718 in response. Later, North Korea returned to the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks and the agreement of the sixth round of the Talks in October 2007 included completion of the disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and “a complete and correct declaration of all its (North Korea’s) nuclear programs by the end of the year.” However, the implementation of the agreement has not been completed¹¹ and the Six-Party Talks has been suspended since December 2008.

In 2009, North Korea again conducted a missile launch and a nuclear test¹². In response, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1874 in June 2009, imposing additional sanctions on North Korea. Later, meetings of head negotiators of the Six-Party Talks from North and South and U.S.-North Korea high-level talks have been held, but the Six-Party Talks has not yet resumed. In response to North Korea’s launch of a missile, which it called a “Satellite,” in December 2012, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2087 in January 2013 to expand and strengthen the sanctions of the past resolutions. Furthermore, in response to a nuclear test conducted by North Korea in February 2013, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2094 in March 2013 that includes additional and strengthened sanctions against North Korea.

North Korea announced in 2005 that it manufactured nuclear weapons, and declared itself a “nuclear weapons state” in 2012 in its revised constitution. In 2013, North Korea continued to take steps to boost its standing in the international community as a “nuclear weapons state.” In March 2013, it adopted the so-called “new strategic line” policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development and reiterated that nuclear weapons were neither a political bargaining chip nor a thing for economic dealings, alleging that North Korea would be able to concentrate on economic development and on improving the lives of the people as long as nuclear

¹⁰ On October 27, 2006, as a result of the independently collected information and its analysis as well as Japan’s own careful examination of the U.S. and the ROK analyses, the Japanese government judged that there was an extremely high probability that North Korea had conducted a nuclear test.

¹¹ In June 2008, North Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear program. However, as of June 2014 no agreement has been made concerning a specific framework for verification.

¹² Given that North Korea announced on May 25, 2009, via the Korean Central News Agency, that it had successfully conducted an underground nuclear test, and in light of the fact that the Japan Meteorological Agency detected a seismic wave with a waveform that differed from usual, which could possibly have resulted from a North Korean nuclear test, the government believes that North Korea conducted a nuclear test on that day.

deterrence was solid. In April of the same year, North Korea adopted a law “On Consolidating the Position of Nuclear Weapons State for Self-Defense.” In this way, it is showing no signs of changing or softening its stance of proceeding with the development of nuclear weapons.

With regard to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, some have argued that it is a so-called brinkmanship policy designed to establish North Korea’s standing as a de facto nuclear weapons state, and thereby, gain an advantage in negotiations with the United States and other countries and receive some sort of reward. On the other hand, taking into account that North Korea’s ultimate goal is allegedly the maintenance of the existing regime¹³ that North Korea considers its own nuclear deterrence is needed to counter the nuclear threat of the United States¹⁴ and is in no position at least in the short-term to overturn its inferiority in conventional forces vis-à-vis the United States and the ROK, that North Korea asserts Iraqi and Libyan regimes collapsed due to their lack of nuclear deterrence¹⁵, and that North Korea reiterates nuclear weapons will never be traded away at negotiations, North Korea is deemed to be developing nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for maintaining the existing regime.

b. The current status of the nuclear weapons program

Details of the current status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are largely unclear, partly because North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In light of the unclear status of past nuclear developments and in view of the implementation of nuclear tests conducted in October 2006, May 2009, and February 2013, the possibility cannot be dismissed that North Korea has already made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program¹⁶.

With regard to plutonium, a fissile material that can be used for nuclear weapons¹⁷, North Korea

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense’s “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” March 2014.

¹⁴ For example, a statement issued by the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on March 14, 2014 alleges that the United States threatens and intimidates North Korea with nuclear strikes, and that North Korea has come to possess nuclear deterrence out of necessity in order to protect the autonomy of its nation and people.

¹⁵ For example, a comment in the Rodong Shinmun dated December 2, 2013 contends, “The situation in Iraq and Libya teaches an acute lesson that countries under the constant threat of U.S. preemptive nuclear attack have no choice but to become a victim of U.S. state terrorism, unless the countries have powerful deterrent capability.”

¹⁶ The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the United States Director of National Intelligence of January 2012 pointed out that “these tests (in 2006 and 2009) strengthen our assessment that North Korea has produced nuclear weapons.”

¹⁷ Plutonium is synthetically produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium with neutrons, and then extracting it from used nuclear fuel at a reprocessing facility. Plutonium is then used as a basic material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural uranium. This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is

has suggested its production and extraction on several instances¹⁸. Moreover, in June 2009, North Korea announced that it would weaponize all of its newly extracted plutonium¹⁹. In April 2013, North Korea announced its policy to readjust and restart all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, including the nuclear reactor, the disablement of which was agreed upon in the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks in October 2007. In November 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) opined that while lack of inspection makes it impossible to conclusively determine, multiple activities were observed from satellite imagery suggesting that the nuclear reactor was restarted²⁰. Because the restarting of the reactor could lead to the production and extraction of plutonium by North Korea, such developments are of great concern.

As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used for nuclear weapons, in 2002 the United States announced that North Korea acknowledged the existence of a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons. Later in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement of uranium enrichment. Furthermore, in November 2010, North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility to American nuclear specialists and later announced that it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with thousands of centrifuges. North Korea insists that the enriched uranium is used as fuel for light water reactors and that therefore the uranium enrichment program is a peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, a series of North Korean behaviors concerning uranium enrichment indicate the possibility of the development of nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium²¹.

After the adoption of Resolution 2087 by the U.N. Security Council in January 2013, North Korea announced statements suggesting implementation of a nuclear test. Notwithstanding the

used to boost the U235 concentration to nuclear weapon levels (over 90%).

¹⁸ In October 2003, North Korea announced that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods that contains plutonium and then in May 2005 that it had completed extraction of an additional 8,000 used fuel rods.

¹⁹ Then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Walter Sharp testified before the House Armed Services Committee in April 2011 that “we assess North Korea currently holds enough plutonium to make several nuclear weapons.” The ROK Defense White Paper 2012 estimates that North Korea has approximately 40kg of plutonium.

²⁰ The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the United States Director of National Intelligence of January 2014 noted, “North Korea has followed through on its announcement by expanding the size of its Yongbyon enrichment facility and restarting the reactor that was previously used for plutonium production.” It is said that if the reactor is restarted, North Korea would have the capability to produce enough plutonium (approximately 6kg) to manufacture approximately one nuclear bomb in one year.

²¹ The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the United States Director of National Intelligence of January 2012 pointed out that “the North’s disclosure (of a uranium enrichment facility) supports the United States’ longstanding assessment that North Korea has pursued uranium-enrichment capability.” Also, the ROK Defense White Paper 2012 notes that, “It is likely that North Korea is operating a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Program, considering that a Foreign Ministry spokesman mentioned the term ‘uranium enrichment’ in 2009, and the revelation of a uranium enrichment facility in November 2010.”

fact that the international community including Japan strongly urged North Korea not to conduct a nuclear test, North Korea carried out a test in February 2013²². It is likely that North Korea has further developed its nuclear weapons program by gathering necessary data through the test.

It is believed that North Korea is working to develop a nuclear weapon to mount on a ballistic missile as part of its nuclear weapons program. In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile requires a considerably high degree of technological capacity. However, considering the fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s and that North Korea conducted a nuclear test in February 2013, it is difficult to eliminate the possibility that North Korea has achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquired nuclear warheads²³. All related developments will need to be carefully monitored.

North Korea's nuclear weapons development, considered in conjunction with North Korean efforts to enhance ballistic missile capabilities, including extending the range of ballistic missiles that could become the delivery vehicles of WMDs, poses a grave threat to Japan's security and significantly impairs peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the international community. Therefore, they can never be tolerated.

(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons

North Korea is an extremely closed regime. In addition, most materials, equipment and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian use, which in turn facilitates camouflage. For these reasons, details of the status of North Korea's biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are unclear. However, with regard to biological weapons, it is believed that North Korea has some infrastructure for

²² At around 11:59 am on February 12, 2013, the Japan Meteorological Agency detected a seismic wave centered in the vicinity of North Korea with a waveform that differed from usual, which was unlikely to be a natural earthquake. On the same day, North Korea announced via the Korean Central News Agency that it successfully conducted a nuclear test. On this basis, the government of Japan verified the facts in coordination with other relevant parties, including the United States and the Republic of Korea. As a result of taking into consideration the aforementioned information holistically, the Japanese government determined that North Korea conducted a nuclear test. North Korea announced that it had "succeeded in the third underground nuclear test," "the test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on a high level with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb, unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power," and "physically demonstrating the good performance of the DPRK's nuclear deterrence that has become diversified."

²³ The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2010 pointed out that "we must assume if there are no major changes in its (North Korea's) national security strategy in the next decade, it will be able to mate a nuclear warhead to a proven delivery system."

their production despite ratifying the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987. As for chemical weapons, North Korea has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents as well as a substantial stockpile of such agents²⁴.

(3) Ballistic Missiles

As is the case with WMDs, many of the details of North Korea's ballistic missiles are unknown, partly owing to the country's extremely closed regime. It appears, however, that North Korea gives high priority to the development of ballistic missiles out of political and diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of earning foreign currency²⁵, in addition to enhancing its military capabilities. As was observed in March, June, and July 2014, North Korea often launches ballistic missiles to conduct military provocations against relevant countries, including Japan²⁶.

a. Toksa

North Korea is thought to be developing a short-range ballistic missile, Toksa, with its range estimated to be approximately 120km²⁷. It is deemed that Toksa is the first ballistic missile

²⁴ For example, the ROK Defense White Paper 2012 pointed out, "Following the commencement of production in the 1980s, it is estimated that North Korea has a stock of 2,500-5,000 tons of various chemical weapons stored in multiple facilities throughout the country. Moreover, North Korea likely has the capability to produce a variety of biological weapons including anthrax, smallpox, pest, francisella tularensis, and hemorrhagic fever virus." Moreover, the U.S. Department of Defense's "Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" of May 2013 pointed out that, "North Korea probably could employ CW [chemical weapons] agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles."

²⁵ North Korea admitted that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the Korean Central News Agency [KCNA] on June 16, 1998, and statement made by a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman on December 13, 2002)

²⁶ On March 3, 2014, at around 6:20 am and around 6:30 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Scud missiles in the east-northeast direction from the vicinity of Wonsan in the eastern coast of the Korean Peninsula. It is estimated that both missiles flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. Furthermore, on the 26th of the same month, from around 2:30 am to 2:40 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Nodong missiles in the eastern direction from the vicinity of Sukchon in the western coast of the Korean Peninsula. It is estimated that both missiles flew approximately 650 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. In addition, on June 29, 2014, at around 5 am, North Korea launched multiple ballistic missiles in the eastern direction from the vicinity of Wonsan in the eastern coast of the Korean Peninsula. It is estimated that the ballistic missiles launched flew a maximum of approximately 500 km and all fell into the Sea of Japan. Also, on July 9 of the same year, from around 4 am to around 4:20 am, North Korea launched multiple ballistic missiles in the northeast direction from the southwestern area of North Korea (approximately 100 km south of Pyongyang). It is estimated that the ballistic missiles launched flew a maximum of approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan.

²⁷ In March 2007, then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Burwell B. Bell testified before the House Armed Services Committee that, "North Korea is developing a new solid propellant short-range ballistic missile. Recently, in March 2006, North Korea successfully test-fired the missile. Once operational, the missile can be deployed more flexibly and rapidly than the existing system and North Korea will be able to launch the missile in a much shorter reparation period."

owned or developed by North Korea which adopts a solid fuel propellant²⁸.

b. Scud

It is believed that, since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed Scud B and Scud C²⁹, a variant of Scud B with extended range, and has exported these ballistic missiles to the Middle East and other countries. At present, North Korea is considered to deploy Scud ER (Extended Range) which has an extended range due to the extension of the scud's body as well as the reduction in weight of the warhead, among other factors. The range of a Scud ER is estimated to reach 1,000km³⁰, and it is possible that a part of Japan falls within this range.

c. Nodong

North Korea is also thought to have started its development of longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, including Nodong. It appears that Nodong, which is believed to be already deployed, is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300 km, and may reach almost all of Japan.

It is highly probable that Nodong was used in the launch into the Sea of Japan in 1993. A total of six ballistic missiles fired from the Kittaeryong district in the southeastern part of North Korea in July 2006 are believed to be Scud and Nodong³¹. In July 2009, North Korea is believed to have launched a total of seven ballistic missiles from the same district, and it is possible that they were either Scud or Nodong missiles³². Furthermore, in March 2014, North Korea launched ballistic missiles presumed to be Scud and Nodong missiles towards the Sea of Japan. In these launches, North Korea launched multiple missiles in the early morning and late evening hours from locations which had never been used in the past, utilizing a transporter-erector-launcher

²⁸ Generally, solid fuel propellant missiles are considered to be militarily superior because they are filled with a propellant in solid form in airframes and are capable of immediate launches compared with liquid fuel propellant missiles, making signs of their launches unlikely to be detected in advance, and they are relatively easy to store and handle.

²⁹ The ranges of Scud B and Scud C missiles are estimated to be about 300km and 500km, respectively.

³⁰ U.S. Department of Defense's "Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" of 2014.

³¹ Of the seven ballistic missiles North Korea launched in total in July 2006, the third missile is believed to be a Taepodong-2 fired from the Taepodong district in the northeastern coastal area. Other launches of Scud and Nodong missiles had more practical characteristics based on some indications, namely: the missiles were launched before dawn; a number of different types of ballistic missiles were launched in succession over a short period of time; launches were carried out using transporter-erector-launchers (TELs); and ballistic missiles with different ranges were landed within a certain area. This leads to the assumption that North Korea has improved the operational capability of ballistic missiles.

³² All of the seven ballistic missiles launched were assumed to have landed in the military target practice area, for which a navigation warning was issued by the Japan Coast Guard upon notification by North Korea on June 22, 2009.

(TEL). This suggests North Korea has the capacity to launch ballistic missiles from locations and at timings as it chooses. Also, the Nodong missiles were launched from the western coast of North Korea in the eastern direction to fly across the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, it is deemed that North Korea is building up its confidence in the performance and reliability of its ballistic missiles.

Although details about Nodong's capability have not been confirmed, as the ballistic missile is believed to be based on the Scud technology, it is deemed that it does not have the accuracy to carry out strikes on specific target installations.

d. Taepodong-1

Taepodong-1 is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid fuel propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong used as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. It is estimated to have a range of at least approximately 1,500 km. The ballistic missile launched in 1998 is assessed to be based on Taepodong-1. North Korea is believed to have shifted its focus to the development of a longer range missile, and Taepodong-1 may have been a transitory product for the development of Taepodong-2.

e. Musudan

It is believed that North Korea is currently developing a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) "Musudan." It has been pointed out that Musudan is a revamped version of the Russian Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) SS-N-6 that it acquired in the early 1990s. It will likely be loaded onto a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), just like its Scud and Nodong counterparts, and then operated. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the new missile boasts a range of between 2,500 and 4,000km, meaning that Guam in addition to all parts of Japan could fall within its firing range³³.

It is very difficult to verify the intention of North Korea's military activities because of its closed regime. In addition, it is believed that North Korea has constructed underground military facilities across the country, and the ballistic missiles such as Toksa, Scud, Nodong and Musudan, would be loaded onto TELs. These make it difficult to detect in advance individual and specific signs of the launch of missiles with TELs, such as detailed launch sites and

³³ In the statement for the House Armed Services Committee in March 2009, General Sharp, then Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, stated that preparations are currently under way in North Korea to field a new intermediate range ballistic missile capable of striking Okinawa, Guam, and Alaska. Furthermore, the ROK's Defense White Paper 2012 notes that, "In 2007, [North Korea] fielded the Musudan missile (range of over 3,000km). Following these deployments, North Korea has gained direct strike capabilities against South Korea, Japan, Guam, and other surrounding countries."

timings³⁴.

f. Taepodong-2

Taepodong-2 is believed to be a missile with four engines, each of which is developed based on technologies of Nodong, in a cluster in its first stage and the same type of engine in its second stage. Its range is estimated to be approximately 6,000km for the two-stage type while the range of its three-stage variant can be more than approximately 10,000km assuming that the weight of the warhead is not over approximately one ton. A Taepodong-2 is believed to have been launched from the Taepodong district located in the northeastern coastal area in July 2006, and was damaged during flight at an altitude of several kilometers, several tens of seconds after the launch without separating the first stage, and fell near the launch site. In the launch of a missile in April 2009, which it called a "Satellite," it is thought that North Korea used a Taepodong-2 or a variant of it from the same district again. It is estimated that the missile crossed over Japan, and flew more than 3,000 km before falling in the Pacific Ocean. In April 2012, North Korea conducted a launch believed to be using a Taepodong-2 or its variant from the Tongch'ang-ri district on the northwestern coast of North Korea, which it called a "Satellite." The missile flew over a minute and then fell into the Yellow Sea by breaking into several pieces. The launch is believed to have been a failure³⁵.

In December of the same year, North Korea again conducted a launch using a Taepodong-2 variant, which it called a "Satellite" launch, from the Tongch'ang-ri district. In this launch, all falling objects are estimated to have fallen in the danger areas which were set beforehand by North Korea, while an object including the possible third stage propelling device is estimated to have continued flight while changing its trajectory and put an object into orbit around the earth³⁶. The launch showed that North Korea has developed technologies to extend the range such as those to separate multi-stage propulsion devices and technologies to improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles such as those to control posture and guidance. It is thus believed that North Korea's ballistic missile development has entered a new phase. As for the technology to extend

³⁴ According to the U.S. Department of Defense's "Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" of March 2014, North Korea possesses a maximum of 100 TELs in total for Toksas and Scuds, a maximum of 50 TELs for Nodongs, and a maximum of 50 TELs for IRBMs (understood as referring to Musudans). Furthermore, according to "IHS Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments China and Northeast Asia (2012)," North Korea possesses approximately 600 Scuds, approximately 200 Nodongs, and approximately 50 to 150 other intermediate- and long-range missiles.

³⁵ After the launch, North Korea announced that "the earth observation satellite failed to enter its preset orbit," admitting the failure of the launch.

³⁶ It is not confirmed that the object put into orbit around the earth is performing communication or transmitting/receiving any signal to/from the ground. Therefore, it is not assessed that the object actually functions as an artificial satellite.

the range, in particular, it is believed that significant advancements have been made assuming from the technologies verified through the launches this time and in the past that if North Korea develops long-range ballistic missiles, they may potentially reach the central, western and other areas of the U.S. mainland, while some details regarding a few of the related technologies are still unclear.

g. KN08

The details of the new missile KN08 which was showcased at the military parade in April 2012 and July 2013 are unknown. However, the missile is believed to be an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)³⁷. Whereas the Taepodong-2 is launched from a fixed launch pad, the KN08 is carried by a TEL, making it difficult to detect signs of its launch in advance, and is likely intended to increase survivability.

h. Trends in and outlook of ballistic missile development

An underlying factor that allowed for North Korea's rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches is believed to be North Korea's imports of various materials and technologies from outside of the country. It is also pointed out that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missile airframes and related technologies, and that it promotes the further development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation³⁸. It is further pointed out that North Korea is conducting tests at transfer destinations and using the results. Moreover, because a test launch of a long-range ballistic missile would contribute to extending the range of other shorter-range missiles, increasing the warhead weight and improving the circular error probability (CEP), the launch of long-range ballistic missiles such as Taepodong-2, including the launch in December 2012, may lead to the improvement of the performance of Nodong and other ballistic missiles possessed by North Korea.

³⁷ The "Worldwide Threat Assessment" of the United States Director of National Intelligence of January 2014 assessed that, "North Korea has publicly displayed its KN08 road-mobile ICBM twice. We assess that North Korea has already taken initial steps towards fielding this system, although it remains untested."

³⁸ For example, because Nodong is similar in shape to Shahab-3 of Iran and Gauri of Pakistan, analysts point out that Nodong airframes or related technologies may have been transferred. In addition, concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles by North Korea, the "Worldwide Threat Assessment" of the United States Director of National Intelligence of January 2014 pointed out that "North Korea's export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria's construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007, illustrate the reach of the its proliferation activities." Moreover, in the report entitled "Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," which was published by the U.S. Department of Defense in May 2013, it was pointed out that North Korea uses various techniques to circumvent measures taken by each country on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, including sending cargo through multiple front companies and intermediaries.

North Korea continues to claim that it will continue to conduct “satellite launches” and will develop and launch more capable satellite launch vehicles. It is highly possible that North Korea will further develop its long-range ballistic missiles by continuing to repeat similar launches under the name of “satellite” launches to carry out further technical tests towards bringing its long-range ballistic missiles to the stage of practical use³⁹. Should North Korea make further progress in its longer-range ballistic missile capability and simultaneously achieve the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquired nuclear warheads, North Korea may come to have a one-sided understanding that it secured strategic deterrence against the United States. Should North Korea have a false sense of confidence and recognition regarding its deterrence, this could lead to increases in and the escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region and could create situations that are deeply worrying also for Japan.

In this light, coupled with its nuclear issue, North Korea’s ballistic missile issue has become more realistic and imminent for Northeast Asia and the international community from the perspective of both the improvement of the capability and transfer and proliferation, and such developments are profoundly worrisome.

See ► Fig. I-1-2-2 (Launch of a Missile, which North Korea Called a “Satellite” on December 12, 2012); I-1-2-3 (Range of North Korean Ballistic Missiles)

4 Domestic Affairs

(1) Developments concerning the Kim Jong-un Regime

After the death in 2011 of Kim Jong-il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Kim Jong-un became the de facto head of the military, party and the “state” by assuming the position of Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, First Secretary of the Korea Workers’ Party and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission by April 2012. The framework of the Kim Jong-un regime was laid out in a short period of time. Since the transition to the new regime, there have been a number of announcements of party-related meetings and decisions. Some analysts point out the “state” is run under the leadership of the party. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, underscores the importance of military strength and makes frequent visits to military organizations. On such bases, it is anticipated that the First Chairman will continue to attach importance to military strength.

³⁹ Going forward, it is possible that North Korea will seek out increased reliability of long-range ballistic missiles as well as such technologies as those for protecting a payload from high temperature when it reenters into the atmosphere from higher altitude with high velocity, those for precision guidance, and those for building underground launch sites and silos, which enhance survivability of missiles.

The post-transition years have seen many changes in personnel, especially at high levels of the military and the cabinet, reportedly aimed at strengthening the power base of First Chairman Kim Jong-un. Following on from 2012, many personnel reshuffles were carried out from 2013 to June 2014 with the three key military posts, namely, the Director of General Political Department being replaced once, the Chief of the General Staff being replaced twice, and the Minister of the People's Armed Forces being replaced twice. As a result of such reshuffles, all of the three key military posts have come to be held by individuals selected by First Chairman Kim Jong-un.

In December 2013, Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission and First Chairman Kim Jong-un's uncle, was executed for "plotting to overthrow the state." It is believed that by executing Vice-Chairman Jang Song-thaek who was considered to be the guardian of First Chairman Kim Jong-un, the First Chairman endeavored to strengthen and consolidate his regime as its sole leader⁴⁰.

To date, no disruptions have been caused by such personnel changes, and various "national" events and Field Guidance by First Chairman Kim Jong-un have been carried out in an orderly manner. The regime thus appears to be on track to a certain degree. However, the intensification of competition for loyalty in the wake of the execution of Vice-Chairman Jang Song-thaek, among other factors, could propel North Korea to turn to military provocative actions without careful consideration, and uncertainty may have risen. Some also point to the concern over social control such as the increasing inequality between the rich and the poor and the inflow of information from abroad – a concern which needs to be monitored from the perspective of regime stability.

(2) Economic Conditions

In terms of the economy, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages in recent years due to the vulnerability of its socialist planned economy and shrunken economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. In particular, it is deemed that North Korea is still forced to rely on food assistance from foreign countries⁴¹.

⁴⁰ The North Korean media repeatedly calls for the strengthening of the "monolithic leadership system" and "single-hearted unity." For example, an editorial in the Rodong Shinmun dated January 10, 2014 urged the people to stay "cautious even of trivial phenomena and elements which erode our single-hearted unity."

⁴¹ In November 2013, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) forecasted North Korea's production of principal foods to be 5.98 million tons between November 2013 and October 2014, and estimated the necessary imported

To tackle a host of economic difficulties, North Korea has attempted limited improvement measures and some changes to its economic management systems⁴², and seems to be implementing economic cooperation projects with other countries, including China. First Chairman Kim Jong-un continues to frequently emphasize the need to improve the economic situation and announced the establishment of economic development zones⁴³. In addition, according to reports, a new economic policy is under way to enlarge the discretion of plants and other entities over production and sales plans. These all suggest North Korea is placing importance on the rebuilding of the economy. Nonetheless, it is seen unlikely that North Korea would carry out any structural reforms that could lead to the destabilization of its current governance system, and thus various challenges confront the fundamental improvement of its current economic situation.

5 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with the United States

The United States has indicated it would work to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in close cooperation with other countries, aiming to resolve the issue through the Six-Party Talks. The United States consistently makes its position clear that it is necessary for North Korea to comply with the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and take specific measures to improve North-South relations before resuming the Six-Party Talks.

In response, North Korea has been criticizing the United States, claiming that its “hostile policy” towards North Korea and lack of trust between them stand in the way of the peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and argues that the conclusion of a U.S.-North Korea peace agreement is necessary to build a relationship of trust⁴⁴. As such, a significant gap has been observed between the two parties’ stances. Since the U.N. Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2087 in January 2013, North Korea, claiming that the “hostile policy” of the United

amount of grains to be approximately 0.34 million tons.

⁴² For example, North Korea conducted a so-called redenomination (decreasing the denomination of its currency) at the end of 2009. The redenomination is said to have led to economic disorder, such as price escalation due to shortfall of supply, etc., which in turn increased social unrest.

⁴³ During the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Korea Workers’ Party on March 31, 2013, First Chairman Kim Jong-un instructed the establishment of economic development zones in each province. Pursuant to these instructions, the Economic Development Zone Law was enacted in May of that year. In November 2013, the establishment of 1 special economic zone and 13 economic development zones was announced.

⁴⁴ For example, during the 20th Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF) held on July 2, 2013, Pak Ui-chun, Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea, delivered an address, stating, “The U.S. drop of its hostile policy should start from the conclusion of a peace treaty between the U.S. and the DPRK on the basis of the respect for the latter’s sovereignty and halt to all sanctions and military provocations against it.”

States has entered a dangerous state, contends that there can be no denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula before the denuclearization of the world, and therefore, there will be no more talks for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while leaving room for dialogue for ensuring peace and security in the region. The divide between the two parties' positions has still not been bridged. In June 2013, North Korea, in the form of an important statement by the spokesperson of the National Defense Commission, proposed to hold U.S.-North Korea senior-level talks. However, the United States remained firm on its stance that North Korea must first take concrete steps to show it is headed towards denuclearization, and the talks have yet to materialize.

North Korea, further still, reacted sharply to the U.S.-ROK combined exercise, alleging that such activities were a manifestation of the U.S. "hostile policy" towards North Korea. On the occasion of the U.S.-ROK combined exercise carried out from March to April 2013, North Korea launched several ballistic missiles and multiple launch rockets, while criticizing the United States. Furthermore, North Korea reiterated that it would continue to launch missiles and strengthen its nuclear deterrent as a right of self-defense.

(2) Relations with the Republic of Korea

Relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea worsened under the administration of President Lee Myung-bak, spurred by the outbreak of incidents that heightened North-South military tensions, including the sinking of an ROK patrol vessel in March 2010⁴⁵ and the shelling incident of Yeonpyeong Island in November of the same year⁴⁶. Even after the administration of President Park Geun-hye was inaugurated in February 2013, North Korea lodged protests against the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2087 in January 2013 and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2094 in March 2013, as well as to the U.S.-ROK combined exercise conducted in March to April. North Korea adopted a hardline rhetoric, abrogating all agreements on North-South non-aggression⁴⁷. Following the U.S.-ROK

⁴⁵ On March 26, 2010, the ROK's naval patrol ship "Cheonan" sank near the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea. In May 2010, a joint military-civilian survey group comprising experts from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and Sweden released survey results indicating that the ROK naval ship had split and sank as a result of a shock wave and bubble effect created by the underwater blast of a torpedo fired by a small North Korean submarine.

⁴⁶ On November 23, 2010, North Korea bombarded Yeonpyeong Island as the ROK military engaged in firing exercises off the coast of the island facing the Yellow Sea, causing deaths and injuries on the ROK side including civilians.

⁴⁷ In January 2013, North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea issued a statement saying that if the South "takes direct part in the U.N. 'sanctions,' the DPRK will take strong physical counter-measures against it." Furthermore, in February of the same year, the Rodong Shinmun published an editorial saying, "(if ROK tightens sanctions as a countermeasure against the nuclear test, it) will not be able to avoid deadly retaliation."

combined exercise that was conducted until the end of April 2013, North Korea gradually softened its provocative words and actions against the ROK. By August, North Korea agreed to the resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex⁴⁸ which had de facto suspended its operations. In addition, North Korea has held dialogues with the ROK, including the North-South separated family reunion meeting which was held for the first time in three years and four months in February 2014. However, when the U.S.-ROK combined exercise commenced at the end of February 2014, North Korea engaged in military provocations, including intrusion into the ROK's airspace using small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)⁴⁹ and a large-scale maritime live-fire drill in an area near the northwest islands of the ROK covering Baengnyeong Island and Yeonpyeong Island⁵⁰.

Meanwhile, there have been developments in recent years towards ROK-China cooperation not only in the economic realm but also in the political and diplomatic realms. Under such circumstances, Japan needs to pay attention to what policies are adopted for the ROK by North Korea, which has heretofore repeated dialogue and provocations.

(3) Relations with China

The China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded in 1961, is still in force⁵¹. Currently, China is North Korea's biggest trade partner, and the bilateral trade volume set a record again in 2013. In 2013, trade with China accounted for approximately 80% of North Korea's total trade, and observers point out North Korea's increasing dependence on China. Furthermore, it appears the two countries are undertaking port and commercial facility construction projects, as demonstrated by the promotion of joint

⁴⁸ In April 2013, North Korea prohibited ROK nationals from entering the Kaesong Industrial Complex (located in the city of Kaesong in southwest North Korea, close to the military demarcation line with the ROK; many ROK companies operate businesses by employing North Korean workers), which commenced operations in 2004 as a North-South economic cooperation project; subsequently, North Korea withdrew all North Korean workers and announced the temporary suspension of the project. In May 2013, all personnel from the ROK also withdrew from the Complex.

⁴⁹ On March 24, March 31, and April 6, 2014, crashed UAVs were discovered in Paju, Baengnyeong Island, and Samcheok, respectively. In May of the same year, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced that a scientific study confirmed that the UAVs originated from North Korea and that the flights were clear military provocations in violation of the ceasefire agreement and North-South non-aggression agreement. North Korea criticized the ROK for fabricating the incidents, and asserts that the facts should be uncovered through a ROK-North Korea joint study.

⁵⁰ According to an announcement by the ROK Ministry of National Defense, on March 31, 2014, North Korea fired roughly 500 rounds using its multiple launch rockets and artillery pieces, of which about 100 landed in the ROK's sea area south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL). The ROK government issued an evacuation order to people living near Baengnyeong Island and other areas, and returned fire with about 300 rounds. No damages in the ROK were reported.

⁵¹ It includes a provision that if either of the signatories (China and North Korea) is attacked and enters into a state of war, the other would make every effort to immediately provide military and other assistance.

development and joint management projects in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone and the Hwanggumphyong-Wihwado Economic Zone since June 2011.

With regard to the situation in North Korea and its nuclear issue, China has expressed support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. In addition, China endorsed U.N. Security Council Resolutions 2087 and 2094. Following the adoption of the two resolutions, China issued notices in February and April 2013, stating that China would thoroughly enforce the embargo of items set forth in both resolutions. In September 2013, China released a list of supplies and technologies banned for export to North Korea that could be diverted to WMD programs. Through such measures, China has demonstrated commitment to executing the sanctions resolutions against North Korea.

Meanwhile, China seems intent on maintaining friendly and cooperative relations with North Korea, holding a China-North Korea strategic dialogue among diplomatic authorities in June 2013 and dispatching Li Yuanchao, Vice President, to a North Korean event commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Korean War armistice.

China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on North Korea. On the other hand, North Korea does not necessarily adopt actions which are in line with the position of China over nuclear and ballistic missile issues. Furthermore, Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission, who played a key role in economic cooperation with China was executed. Given such circumstances, North Korea-China relations and China's influence on North Korea must continue to be monitored.

(4) Relations with Russia

While North Korea and Russia became estranged with the end of the Cold War, they signed the Russia-North Korea Treaty on Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation in 2000⁵². In August 2011, Kim Jong-il, then Chairman of the National Defense Commission, visited Russia. A Russia-North Korea summit was held for the first time in nine years, and the two sides agreed to cooperate on a gas-pipeline project, among other matters. In September 2012, after the transition to the Kim Jong-un regime, the two countries signed an agreement that writes off 90% of the debt owed to Russia by North Korea, and in such ways, friendly relations have been maintained

⁵² The previous treaty (Soviet-North Korea Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty) had contained the provision that if either of the signatories (Russia and North Korea) is attacked, the other would immediately provide military and other assistance by any means available. This provision, however, was dropped from the new treaty.

between the two countries. Furthermore, in September 2013, a railway opened for service connecting Khasan, a coastal area in the Russian Far East, and Rajin Port in northeastern North Korea.

Concerning North Korea's nuclear issue, Russia, along with China, has expressed support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. After the nuclear test conducted by North Korea in February 2013, Russia issued a statement that condemned the test but expressed that it was against sanctions that could influence normal trade and economic relations with North Korea.

(5) Relations with the Other Countries

Since 1999, North Korea has made efforts to establish relations with a series of West European countries and others, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with European countries⁵³ and participation in the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, it has been reported that North Korea has cooperative relationships with countries such as Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Myanmar and Cuba in military affairs including arms trade and military technology transfer. In April 2013, North Korea's attempt to export gas masks and other items to Syria was intercepted by Turkish authorities. In July of the same year, the North Korean vessel Chong Chon Gang sailing from Cuba to North Korea was seized by Panamanian authorities near the Panama Canal. As a result, contents of cargo that violated U.N. sanctions resolutions were confiscated, including MiG-21 fighters and a surface-to-air missile system.

2 The Republic of Korea and the U.S. Forces in the ROK

1 General Situation

In the ROK, the administration of Park Geun-hye was inaugurated in February 2013. The Park administration maintains that forging trust through dialogue is most critical for improving the North-South relations. With regard to the nuclear issue, the administration sets out that North Korea's nuclear development can never be tolerated and that the ROK will address this issue in concert with the international community. In August 2013, the ROK unveiled a policy called the "Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula," which aims to realize denuclearization by building trust through efforts, including humanitarian initiatives and North-South exchanges. The ROK states that it would make a decisive response to military provocations by North Korea and emphasizes the importance of building a solid posture to deter and address the threat of North Korea.

⁵³ For example, the United Kingdom and Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2000 and 2001, respectively.

U.S. forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established very close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. forces stationed in the ROK have been playing a vital role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale armed conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. The two countries are now making a shift to a new joint defense system of “the ROK forces leading and the U.S. forces supporting” through the transition of the wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK⁵⁴. The way in which this system will be developed based on the present-day situation in the Korean Peninsula will need to be monitored.

2 Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the ROK

The ROK has a defensive weakness, namely, its capital Seoul, where a quarter of the country’s population is concentrated, is situated close to the DMZ. The ROK has set the National Defense Objective as follows: “to protect the country from external military threats and invasions, to support peaceful unification, and to contribute to regional stability and world peace.” As one of the “external military threats,” the ROK, in its Defense White Paper, used to designate North Korea as the “main enemy.” However, the ROK presently uses the expression, “the North Korean regime and its armed forces...are our enemies”⁵⁵.

In 2005, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced the “National Defense Reform Basic Plan 2006-2020” for “the restructuring of the military from its current quantitative, conventional form centered on troops to a qualitative, high-tech military force structure that is information and technology-intensive⁵⁶.” In 2009, in light of the changes in the situation, such as the missile launches and nuclear test by North Korea, the Defense Reform Basic Plan 2009-2020 was announced. The Basic Plan identified, among other measures, the scaling down of the initially planned reduction in the force strength and the possibility of preemptive strikes

⁵⁴ The United States and the ROK have been operating the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to run the U.S.-ROK combined defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective combined operations in the case of emergency. Under the U.S.-ROK combined defense system, the operational control authority over the ROK forces is to be exercised by Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, who also serves as Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in wartime.

⁵⁵ The ROK Defense White Paper 2012 described North Korea as follows: “North Korea poses a serious threat to our security by developing and increasing its large scale conventional military power, its nuclear program, missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction, and by continually perpetrating acts of armed provocation such as the attack on the ROK Ship *Cheonan* and the shelling of *Yeonpyeongdo* (island). As long as these threats persist, the North Korean regime and its armed forces, which are the entities who pose these threats, are our enemies.”

⁵⁶ An act on national defense passed in 2006 obliges revision and supplementation of the National Defense Reform Basic Plan based on an analysis and assessment of the changes in conditions and the performance of national defense reform.

against North Korean nuclear and missile facilities. Meanwhile, in response to the sinking of the ROK patrol ship and the artillery shelling on Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, in August 2012, the ROK Ministry of National Defense released the Defense Reform Basic Plan 2012-2030, incorporating the enhancement of deterrence against North Korea and further streamlining of the military⁵⁷. In March 2014, the Park Geun-hye administration unveiled the Defense Reform Basic Plan 2014-2030, which envisions long-term defense force enhancements for dealing with potential threats following the unification of the Korean Peninsula, while maintaining a readiness posture against North Korean threats⁵⁸.

3 Military Posture of the ROK

The ROK's military capacity is as follows. The ground forces consist of 22 army divisions and two marine divisions, totaling 550,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of about 190 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 195,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy combined) consist of approximately 620 combat aircraft.

In recent years, the ROK has been focused on modernizing its Navy and Air Force in particular in order to establish a system of omnidirectional military posture to deal with all types of threats, not least threats from North Korea. The Navy has been introducing submarines, large transport ships and domestically built destroyers. In February 2010, the first mobile force in the ROK was created⁵⁹. In April 2012, the Air Force completed the introduction of F-15K fighters which had been implemented since 2002. The Air Force is currently promoting a program for the installation of the F-35 as a next-generation fighter with stealth capabilities.

In October 2012, the ROK government announced a revision of its missile guidelines stipulating the range of ballistic missiles it possesses; the revision includes the extension of their maximum range from 300km to 800km to enhance the deterrence against military provocation by North Korea. In addition, in response to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, the ROK intends to

⁵⁷ In order to reorganize the ROK armed forces into a structure tailored to the operational environment of the Korean Peninsula, the ROK Ministry of National Defense intends to greatly enhance its operational capability in the northwestern offshore island region, reorganize the upper command structure in preparation for the transition of the wartime OPCON, gradually promote troop reduction and reorganization, and greatly expand capabilities to handle missile and cyber warfare. Moreover, in order to build a highly efficient and advanced defense structure, it will promote streamlining, reorganize the human resource management system, and improve the military's welfare and service environment.

⁵⁸ In order to secure capabilities for responding to existing and potential threats, the ROK Ministry of National Defense plans to install three additional Aegis vessels, enhance the military power of next-generation destroyers and submarines, and install mid- and high-altitude unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and multi-functional satellites.

⁵⁹ The primary missions of the Seventh Mobile Corps, which is the first mobile force established in the ROK, are described as the protection of sea lanes, deterrence against North Korea and support for the government's external policies.

work on expansion of its missile capabilities⁶⁰, construction of systems to execute its missile capabilities⁶¹, promotion of the development of a missile-defense system⁶², etc.

In recent years, the ROK is actively promoting equipment export, which reached 3.4 billion dollars in 2013. It is reported that export items have become diverse to include communication electronics and naval vessels.

The FY2014 defense budget (main budget) amounts to approximately 35.7057 trillion won, an increase of approximately 3.5% over the previous fiscal year, marking the 15th consecutive rise since FY2000.

See ▶ Fig. I-1-2-4 (Change in the ROK's Defense Budget)

4 U.S.-ROK Alliance/U.S. Forces in the ROK

The United States and the ROK have implemented various efforts to deepen the U.S.-ROK alliance in recent years. At the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in June 2009, an agreement was reached on the “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea” that includes an evolution into “a comprehensive strategic alliance” to expand the scope of the alliance globally beyond the Korean Peninsula and widen the partnership of the two countries to non-military areas. Furthermore, the 42nd ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2010 announced a joint communiqué incorporating the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation to embody the future vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, which shows a further strengthening of the bilateral relationship. In March 2013, the two countries signed the ROK-U.S. Counter-Provocation Plan for dealing with North Korea’s

⁶⁰ In April 2012, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced that the country has developed and already fielded missiles that include cruise missiles able to strike throughout North Korea. In February 2013, the ministry indicated that it would accelerate the development of 800km-range ballistic missiles, possession of which was made possible by the revision of the missile guidelines in October 2012, and announced that it has fielded cruise missiles to be launched from vessels or submarines and capable of attacking the entire area of North Korea. Also in October, during an event commemorating the 65th anniversary of the founding of the armed forces, the ROK armed forces displayed to the public for the first time the Hyeonmu 2 ballistic missile, which is said to have a 300km range, and the Hyeonmu 3 surface-to-surface cruise missile, which is said to have a 1,000km range. In April 2014, the ROK conducted a successful test launch of a new ballistic missile with a range of 500km.

⁶¹ The ROK Ministry of National Defense calls the system “Kill Chain” and explains that the system is capable of detecting and identifying signs of missile launch, determining attack, and actual attacking instantaneously.

⁶² In December 2006, the ROK indicated promotion of its own missile defense system (Korea Air and Missile Defense: KAMD). It is reported that the ROK is advancing the construction of the system to be completed by around 2015. Meanwhile, the ROK Ministry of National Defense denies the participation in the U.S. missile defense system and stresses that it would build its own system, reportedly because the United States and the ROK understand threats differently.

provocations⁶³. Furthermore, at the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in May 2013, a joint declaration was released to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the conclusion of the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, in which the two countries affirmed that they would continue to strengthen their alliance in order to deal with 21st century security challenges. At the 45th SCM in October of the same year, both countries approved the Tailored Deterrence Strategy, a strategy designed to enhance deterrence against North Korean nuclear and other WMD threats⁶⁴.

In addition, the two countries have been working to solve issues such as realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and transition of wartime OPCON to the ROK. However, as for the realignment of the U.S. forces in the ROK, although the relocation of U.S. forces Camp Yongsan located in the center of Seoul to the Pyongtek area, south of Seoul, and the relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the northern side of Han Gang to the southern side of the river had been agreed upon in 2003, there seems to be delays in the relocation to the Pyongtek area⁶⁵. For the transition of the wartime OPCON to the ROK⁶⁶ scheduled on December 1, 2015, the U.S.-ROK Strategic Alliance 2015, which provides the framework for the transition of the wartime OPCON, was signed in October 2010. Nevertheless, given the increasing seriousness of North Korean nuclear and missile threats, among other factors, the two sides have decided to continue talks on the conditions and timing of the transition. After the completion of the realignment of the U.S. forces in the ROK and the transition of the wartime OPCON, defense of the ROK will change from “the U.S.-ROK joint defense system” to the new joint defense system of “the ROK forces leading and the U.S. forces supporting,” which could have a significant impact on the nature of the U.S. forces in the ROK. As such, these developments will need to be followed.

⁶³ The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff has announced that the plan contains consultative procedures as well as robust and thorough response methodologies for the United States and the ROK to take joint responses in the event of a North Korean provocation. However, the details of the plan have not been made public.

⁶⁴ According to the Joint Communiqué of the 45th ROK-U.S. SCM, this strategy establishes a strategic framework for tailoring deterrence against key North Korean threat scenarios across armistice and wartime, and strengthens the partnership between the United States and the ROK. However, the details have not been made public.

⁶⁵ The United States is proceeding with the realignment of its forces stationed in the ROK in line with the June 2003 agreement to relocate its forces to the southern side of Han Gang in two stages and the October 2004 agreement to cut the number of its forces stationed in the ROK by 12,500 from approximately 37,500. However, the two countries agreed at the summit meeting in April 2008 to maintain the current strength of 28,500 as the appropriate level.

⁶⁶ In 2007, the United States and the ROK agreed to dismantle the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and complete the transition of the wartime OPCON in April 2012. Later in June 2010, however, agreement was reached to postpone the transition to December 1, 2015 for various reasons, including the increasing military threat posed by North Korea.

5 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with China

China and the ROK have been working to strengthen their relations. At the May 2008 China-ROK Summit Meeting, the two countries agreed to upgrade the China-ROK relationship from a “full-scale cooperative partnership” to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” Following the inauguration of the Park Geun-hye government, in June 2013, President Park held a summit meeting with President Xi Jinping during her visit to China, and the two sides announced the Joint Statement on the Korea-China Future Vision. At the working-level, also in June, the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff visited China for the first time in six years. Further, in December 2013, the first China-ROK Dialogue on Diplomacy and Security was held between the directors-general of the foreign and defense ministries of the two countries, and the two sides agreed to hold the dialogue regularly. In July 2014, President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to the ROK and released a joint statement in which agreement was reached on items, including promoting bilateral dialogue in the areas of politics and security and realizing the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Meanwhile, the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” (ADIZ) issued by China in November 2013 overlapped in some areas with the ROK’s ADIZ, and furthermore, included the airspace above the sea areas surrounding the reef, Jeodo (Chinese name: Suyan Rock), regarding which China and the ROK have conflicting claims to the jurisdictional authority over the exclusive economic zone. Against this backdrop, the ROK government announced the expansion of its own ADIZ in December 2013 and enforced it from the same month.

(2) Relations with Russia

Military exchanges have been under way between the ROK and Russia in recent years, including exchanges among high-ranking military officials. The two countries have also agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry and military supplies. At the ROK-Russia Summit in September 2008, they agreed to upgrade the bilateral relations to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” In March 2012, the two countries held the first ROK-Russia defense strategic dialogue and agreed to regularize the dialogue. In November 2013, President Vladimir Putin visited the ROK, and a joint statement was issued in which the two sides agreed to strengthen dialogue in the areas of politics and security.

(3) Overseas Activities

Since its dispatch of an engineering unit to Somalia in 1993, the ROK has participated in a number of U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO). In December 2009, the ROK unveiled plans to

substantially expand the number of personnel sent overseas on PKO missions from the current level⁶⁷. In July 2010, the ROK created the “International Peace Support Force,” a special unit for overseas dispatch. Since March 2013, the ROK has dispatched troops composed primarily of engineering units to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).

The ROK has sent troops to Afghanistan for the purpose of protecting Korean members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). Further, the ROK has dispatched naval vessels to off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden where they have been engaged in the protection of ROK-registered ships and maritime security operations (MSO) of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). Since January 2011, the ROK has dispatched a ROK special forces unit for the purpose of supporting the training of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) special forces units, joint exercises, and protecting ROK citizens in emergency situations. Additionally, in December 2013, the ROK dispatched a disaster recovery support unit consisting of approximately 500 personnel, including engineering unit and medical personnel, to the Philippines in the wake of its typhoon disaster.

⁶⁷ The ROK intends to further improve the legal and institutional foundations for the ROK armed forces to expand their participation in PKO activities. In December 2009, an act concerning the participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations was enacted.

Section 3 China

1 General Situation

China, the world's most populous country, has a vast landmass surrounded by a long borderline shared with 14 countries as well as a long coastline. China is also a nation with various races, religions, and languages. Most of its ethnic minorities populate the borderlands often with the same ethnic groups living across the borders. China, with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining a distinct culture and civilization. China's pride in its unique history and semi-colonial experience in and after the 19th century is driving its desire for a strong nation and fueling its nationalism.

In recent years, China has increased its presence in the international community. For example, China has been playing a certain role in non-traditional security areas. It actively sends personnel to U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and has been sending its ships continuously for anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, which have been highly appreciated by the international community.

China is strongly expected to recognize its responsibility in the international community, accept and comply with international norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative manner on regional and global issues. On the other hand, there have been disputes between China and other countries on issues relating to trade imbalances, currency rates, and human rights. Especially in regard to conflicts over maritime interests, China has adopted so-called assertive measures, including attempts to alter the status quo by coercive measures based on China's own assertion which is incompatible with the existing international law and order¹. These measures include dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences and raise concerns over China's future direction.

China has various domestic problems. Corruption within central and local communist party leaderships is becoming a significant political problem. As a result of China's rapid economic growth, there are emerging problems such as regional disparities between urban-rural and coastal-inland regions, wealth gaps among urban residents, inflation, environmental pollution,

¹ China makes its own assertion about the Senkaku Islands, which are an inherent territory of Japan. In addition, in May 2013, a newspaper of the CCP carried an article which seemingly calls into question the fact that Okinawa is part of Japan, stating for example that, "It may be time to revisit the unresolved historical issue of the Ryukyu Islands." The Chinese government explained that the article was written by researchers in their personal capacity.

and lack of agricultural and industrial water. Moreover, issues associated with the rapid aging of the population are forecasted to arise in the future. China is expected to continue to tighten its control over society as these potentially destabilizing factors to the government administration expand and diversify. However, analysts point out that with the spread of the Internet, coupled with other factors, the Chinese government will face increasing difficulties controlling the activities of the masses. Moreover, China has domestic ethnic minority issues, such as protest activities by ethnic minorities in areas such as the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. According to reports, some ethnic minorities are undertaking campaigns seeking separation and independence. Against this background, Xi Jinping assumed the post of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission at the first plenary session of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP in November 2012, and then assumed the post of President at the first session of the 12th National People's Congress in March 2013, thus seizing control of the three powers of party, military and government. The environment surrounding the Xi government is not optimistic. During the third plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in November 2013, the session adopted "The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms" regarding reforms in a wide range of areas, such as economics, politics, culture, society, environment, and national defense and the military. Through the Decision, the Central Committee decided to establish a central leading team for comprehensively deepening reform, which is deemed responsible for the overall design of the reform. The team held its first meeting in January 2014. How these reforms will take shape, including how China will deal with corruption problems within the party, will be a point to watch out for going forward.

On the diplomatic field, it is believed that, in order to maintain national stability, China is aiming to maintain stability in the strategic international environment by sustaining good relations with major powers such as the United States and Russia, to maintain stable situations in neighboring countries, to promote multipolarization of the world, and to secure interests necessary for economic development such as natural resources and energy supply.

On the military front, China has been strengthening its military forces broadly and rapidly by sustaining large increases in its defense budget. In particular, China gives priority to the Taiwan issue as a core issue of national sovereignty. It is deemed that China is strengthening its military forces for the time being with the aim of improving military capabilities to prevent Taiwan's independence. As part of such efforts, it is believed that China is enhancing its asymmetric military capabilities to deter military forces of other countries from approaching and advancing to China's surrounding region, and to inhibit their military activities in the region (so-called

“Anti-Access/Area Denial” [“A2/AD”] capabilities²). Additionally, China has been actively trying to acquire capabilities for missions other than for dealing with the Taiwan issue. With China now having considerable influence in the international community not only politically and economically but also militarily, other countries are closely watching China’s military trends.

2 Military Affairs

1 Defense Policies

China positions the buildup of strong defense capabilities and powerful military forces that match national security and interests of development as the strategic mission to modernize the state, while it considers the main goal and mission of national defense policies to be to defend the sovereignty, security, and interests of development of the state, to protect the harmony and stability of the society, to promote modernization of national defense and the military forces, and to protect the stability and peace of the world³.

China has a policy to actively promote “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” which mainly aims to promote the mechanization and informatization of its military power, based on its military strategy to win local wars under informatized conditions, in response to global trends in military developments observed in the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Iraq War and other wars. It is believed that China emphasizes not only physical means but also non-physical means in military affairs and warfare, and incorporated the concept of “Three Warfares” — “Psychological Warfare,” “Media Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare” — into the tasks of the political work of the military⁴. In addition, China has set forth a policy of close

² For a definition of A2/AD capabilities, see Part I Overview, Section 2, footnote 4.

³ China’s National Defense in 2010. In the China’s Peaceful Development white paper released in September 2011, China explained that it pursues “peaceful development” but “never seeks hegemony,” and stated that it is firm in upholding its “core interests” which include the following: “state sovereignty”; “national security”; “territorial integrity”; “national reunification”; “China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability”; and “the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development.”

⁴ China amended the Regulations on the Political Work of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2003 to add Media, Psychological, and Legal Warfares to the PLA’s political work. The U.S. Department of Defense’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (August 2011) explains these warfares as follows:

- Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build public and international support for China’s military actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to China’s interests.
- Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations.
- Legal Warfare uses international and domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible political repercussions of China’s military actions.

coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors.

China is believed to be strengthening its military forces with its top priority foremost in mind, namely, dealing with the Taiwan issue, more specifically, improving China's capabilities to hinder the independence of Taiwan and foreign military support for the independence of Taiwan. Furthermore, in recent years, China is working actively to acquire capabilities for missions other than dealing with the Taiwan issue, and stresses the use of the military in non-traditional security areas. With regard to China's military strengthening, China proclaims that it would "realize the basic mechanization and achieve major progress in construction of informatization by 2020" and "by focusing on the capability to win local wars under informationized conditions, it will improve the abilities to accomplish diversified military missions and thoroughly complete the historical military missions in a new phase of the new century⁵," suggesting that China's military forces will be developed in tandem with the enhancement of its national strength.

China has been sustaining large increases in its defense spending and broadly and rapidly reinforcing its military forces, mainly its nuclear and missile force as well as its Navy and Air Force. As part of such efforts, it is understood that China is strengthening its so-called "A2/AD" capabilities. In addition, China is working to improve joint operational capabilities, enhance capabilities for extended-range power projection, conduct practical exercises, cultivate and acquire highly-capable personnel for administering operations of informatized forces, and improve the foundation of its domestic defense industry. Furthermore, China has been rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities in the seas and airspace, including the East China Sea and South China Sea. In particular, China has adopted so-called assertive measures, including attempts to alter the status quo by coercive measures, in response to issues involving conflicting maritime interests. Japan has great concerns over such Chinese military activities, etc., together with the lack of transparency in its military affairs and security issues, and needs to pay utmost attention to them. These activities also raise security concerns for the region and the international community.

2 Military Transparency

China has not disclosed specific information on possession of weapons, procurement goals and past procurements, organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, and a detailed breakdown of the national defense budget. Moreover,

⁵ China's National Defense in 2008 also states the following target: "by and large reach the goal of modernization of national defense and armed forces by the mid-21st century."

China has not set out a clear, specific future vision of its military strengthening. The transparency of its decision-making process in relation to military and security affairs is not enough either.

China has released defense white papers including China's National Defense every two years since 1998, and it conducts numerous dialogues with national defense authorities of other countries. Furthermore, in August 2007, China expressed its will to return to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and to participate in the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, and has submitted annual reports based on each framework. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense has been giving monthly press conferences by a spokesperson since April 2011. In addition, in November 2013, the position of spokesperson was newly established at seven departments, including the Navy and Air Force⁶, and the spokesperson disseminates information regarding developments related to the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Such moves by China can be perceived on the one hand as efforts that contribute to the improvement of the transparency of military forces, and on the other as efforts to strengthen "Media Warfare."

However, with regard to national defense spending, China has not provided a detailed breakdown of the procurement expenses of major equipment and other details. In the past, China used to disclose the total amounts and general purposes for the following three categories: personnel; training and maintenance; and equipment⁷. Nonetheless, such explanations have not been offered in recent years. Moreover, in China's defense white paper titled, "The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces," released in April 2013, its contents were limited to selective topics. While on some topics it gave more details than in the past, there was no reference to national defense spending that was described in previous defense white papers. Thus, transparency is declining in regard to national defense spending, and China has not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a responsible nation in the international community.

In addition, incidents have been occurring that incite concerns over China's military decision-making and actions, including Chinese explanations that are contrary to the truth. For example, details have yet to be disclosed regarding causes of the Chinese nuclear-powered

⁶ The seven departments are: PLA General Political Department; PLA General Logistics Department; PLA General Armaments Department; PLA Navy; PLA Air Force; PLA Second Artillery Corps; and People's Armed Police.

⁷ China's National Defense in 2008 provided a breakdown of personnel expenses, operation maintenance costs, and equipment costs, respectively, for the active force, reserve force, and militia, as far as the FY2007 defense budget figures are concerned.

submarine's submerged navigation in Japan's territorial waters in November 2004, although it constitutes a breach of international law. Furthermore, with respect to the incident of a Chinese naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer (January 2013), among other incidents, both the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave explanations which were inconsistent with the facts, such as denying the use of the radar itself. Additionally, with regard to the incident in which Chinese fighters flew abnormally close to aircraft of the JMSDF and JASDF (May 2014), the Chinese Ministry of National Defense gave explanations that were contrary to the truth, namely that Japanese aircraft "entered the airspace for the Chinese drills without reporting to China and conducted dangerous acts." In recent years, amid the significant changes in the environment surrounding the military, including advancement in military specialization and diversification of missions associated with military strengthening, some see that relations between the CCP leadership and the PLA have become increasingly complex, and others see that the degree of military influence on foreign policy decisions has been changing⁸. Such situations are also a point to watch out for in terms of crisis management. Another point to watch out for is the relationship between the National Security Commission, which was established at the third plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee and which China announced was tasked with the unified planning and coordination of important national security matters, and the Central Military Commission that has been instructing and commanding the PLA and the PLA itself.

China's influence in the international community has risen not only politically and economically but also militarily, and other countries are closely following China's moves. In order to allay other countries' concerns over China, it is becoming more important for China itself to improve the transparency of its national defense policy and military capabilities. It is hoped that China will increase transparency concerning its military affairs by such efforts as disclosing specific information pertaining to its defense policies and military capabilities.

3 National Defense Budget

China announced⁹ that its national defense budget for FY2014 was approximately 808.2 billion yuan¹⁰. The initial budget amount announced represented a growth of approximately 12.2%

⁸ For example, some point out that there is an increasing number of cases in which the PLA expresses its position on security issues concerning national sovereignty or maritime interests. On the other hand, others point out that the extent of the military's involvement in the party's decision-making process is limited because the number of PLA representatives to key decision-making bodies of the CCP is fewer than in the past. Meanwhile, the PLA has repeatedly stressed "absolute instruction of the forces by the party."

⁹ National defense budget within central fiscal expenditures.

¹⁰ Converting national defense budgets of foreign countries into another currency simply by applying currency exchange rates does not necessarily reflect an accurate value due to difference in price level. If,

(approximately 88.1 billion yuan)¹¹ compared to the initial budget amount for the previous fiscal year. This shows that the Chinese national defense budget continues to increase at a rapid pace¹². The nominal size of China's announced national defense budget has grown approximately 40-fold over the past 26 years and almost quadrupled in size over the past ten years. China positions the buildup of defense capabilities as important a task as economic development, and it is believed that China is continuing to invest resources in the improvement of its defense capabilities in tandem with its economic development.

In addition, it must be noted that the amount of the defense budget announced by China is considered to be only a part of its actual military expenditures¹³. For example, it is believed that the announced defense budget does not include all the equipment procurement costs and research and development expenses.

See ▶ Fig. I-1-3-1 (Change in China's Announced Defense Budget)

4 Military Posture

China's military forces are composed of the PLA, the People's Armed Police Force (PAP)¹⁴, and the militia¹⁵. It is provided that these bodies be instructed and commanded by the Central Military Commission¹⁶. The PLA is defined as a people's army created and led by the CCP,

hypothetically, China's national defense budget for FY2014 was converted at a rate of 16 yen per yuan (FY2014 rate that the Japanese government uses for official purposes), this would result in approximately 12,931.7 billion yen. The 2013 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that China's military expenditures for 2012 were approximately \$166.1 billion, ranking it second place in the world behind the United States.

¹¹ China announced that the rate of growth for its FY2014 national defense budget is "an increase of approximately 12.2% compared to the previous year," but this is the growth rate calculated by comparing the spending of FY2013 with the initial budget of FY2014.

¹² China's announced national defense budget within central fiscal expenditures achieved double-digit-percent growth on the initial-budget basis every year since FY1989 except in FY2010.

¹³ The U.S. Defense Department's "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China" (June 2014) estimates China's military-related defense spending as having been at least \$145 billion in FY2013. The same report indicates that China's official defense budget does not include major categories of expenditure such as foreign procurement.

¹⁴ Missions of the PAP include security of party and government, border security, social projects, and firefighting activities. According to China's National Defense in 2002, it is to maintain state security and social stability, and assist the PLA in wartime in defense operations.

¹⁵ The militia engages in economic development in peacetime and other activities and has a duty to provide logistical support for combat operations in wartime. China's National Defense in 2002 explains, "Under the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations and provides combat support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social order." According to Jiefangjun Bao, the official daily publication of the PLA, dated October 9, 2012, "China now has 6 million primary militia members" as of 2010.

¹⁶ Formally, there are two Central Military Commissions—one for the CCP and another for the state. However, both commissions basically consist of the same membership, and both are essentially regarded

comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Second Artillery Corps (strategic missile force).

During the third plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee, it was decided that the functions and organizations of the Central Military Commission and other bodies would be optimized, that the system of instruction and management of forces would be perfected, that the Central Military Commission's command structure for joint operations and command system for joint operations in theaters would be developed, and that reforms of joint operation trainings and logistical support mechanisms would be promoted. It is believed that these reforms are aimed at developing a more practical PLA through improving its joint operational capabilities and logistical support capabilities. Although how these reforms will take shape is currently unclear, the developments to come, such as the reforms' impact on the security of the region including Japan, will be a point to watch out for.

(1) Nuclear and Missile Forces

China has made independent efforts to develop nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile forces since the middle of the 1950s, seemingly with a view to ensuring deterrence, supplementing its conventional forces, and maintaining its voice in the international community. With regard to the nuclear strategy, it is recognized that China employs a strategy where it can deter a nuclear attack on its land by maintaining a nuclear force structure able to conduct retaliatory nuclear attacks on a small number of targets such as cities in the enemy country¹⁷.

China possesses various types and ranges of ballistic missiles: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM); submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); intermediate-range ballistic missiles/medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM/ MRBM); and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM). The update of China's ballistic missile forces from a liquid propellant system to a solid propellant system is improving their survivability and readiness¹⁸. Moreover, it is also believed that China is working to increase performance by extending ranges, improving accuracy, mounting warheads, introducing Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MaRV) and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV), and other means.

as institutions for the CCP to command the military forces.

¹⁷ China's National Defense in 2010 states that "China consistently upholds the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, adheres to a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country." On the other hand, the "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China" (May 2012) of the U.S. Department of Defense points out that there is some ambiguity over the conditions under which China's "no first use" policy would or would not apply.

¹⁸ For differences between the liquid-propellant system and solid-propellant system, see Part I, Chapter 1, Section 2, footnote 27.

China has deployed the DF-31, which is a mobile type ICBM with a solid propellant system mounted onto a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL), and the DF-31A, a model of the DF-31 with extended range. According to some analysts, China has already deployed the DF-31A and will increase its numbers¹⁹. Regarding SLBM, China currently appears to be developing a new JL-2 whose range is believed to be approximately 8,000 km, and constructing and commissioning Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to carry the missiles. Once the JL-2 reaches a level of practical use, it is believed that China's strategic nuclear capabilities will improve by a great margin.

As for the IRBM/MRBM covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan, China has deployed the solid-propellant DF-21, which can be transported and operated on a TEL, in addition to the liquid-propellant DF-3 missiles. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It is believed that China possesses conventional ballistic missiles with high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21, and it has been pointed out that China has deployed conventional anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), which could be used to attack ships at sea including aircraft carriers. In addition to IRBM/MRBM, China also possesses the DH-10 (CJ-10), a cruise missile with a range of at least 1,500 km, as well as the H-6 (Tu-16), bombers that are capable of carrying nuclear weapons and cruise missiles. It is deemed that these missiles will complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan²⁰. Concerning SRBM, China possesses a large number of solid-propellant DF-15 and DF-11, and they are believed to be deployed facing Taiwan²¹. It is believed that their ranges cover also a part of the Southwestern Islands including the Senkaku Islands, which are inherent territories of Japan.

China announced that it had conducted tests on midcourse missile interception technology in

¹⁹ The U.S. Department of Defense's "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China" (June 2014) indicates that China is developing a new road mobile ICBM known as "DF-41," possibly capable of carrying multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV).

²⁰ In its Annual Report of November 2010, the U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission (a bipartisan consultative body created by Congress with the aim of monitoring, investigating, and submitting reports on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship with China) pointed out, among other items, that China could attack five out of the six main U.S. Air Force bases in East Asia with its normal missiles (ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles), and also has the ability to target air bases in Guam by enhancing the capability of its bombers.

²¹ The U.S. Department of Defense's "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China" (June 2014) states that as of November 2013 China possessed more than 1,000 SRBM. In addition, in March 2011, Taiwan's National Security Bureau Director Tsai Der-sheng said that China has developed and deployed new "DF-16" missiles and that these are highly destructive long-range missiles, which will mainly be used against Taiwan and in order to prevent U.S. intervention.

January 2010 and 2013. Attention will be paid to China's future trends in ballistic missile defense.

See ► *Fig. I-1-3-2 (Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing))*

(2) Ground Forces

The size of the Chinese ground forces is the largest in the world with approximately 1.6 million personnel. Since 1985, China has continuously sought to modernize its armed forces by curtailing the number of personnel and streamlining organizations and systems in order to improve efficiency. China aims to develop highly capable military forces, while reducing units inferior in equipment and technologies. Specifically, it is improving mobility by such measures as switching from the past regional-defense model to a nationwide-mobile model, working to motorize and mechanize its infantry. In addition, China is believed to be strengthening its airborne troops (belonging to the Air Force) and special operations forces and helicopter units. It is continuing its efforts to make its military units multi-functional, to build a command system for improvement of its joint operational capabilities and efficient operations, and also to work on reforms to improve its logistical support capabilities. In 2009, China carried out "Stride 2009" exercises which were deemed the largest ever mobile exercises conducted by multiple military regions, and it has been carrying out similar "Mission Action" mobile exercises since 2010. These exercises are believed to have been designed to verify and improve capabilities necessary for deployment of army units to distant areas, such as the army's long-range maneuvering capabilities and logistical support capabilities, including mobilization of militia and public transportation. Furthermore, the Navy and Air Force also reportedly took part in "Mission Action 2013," suggesting that such exercises are also intended to improve joint operational capabilities.

See ► *Fig. I-1-3-3 (Deployment and Strength of the People's Liberation Army)*

(3) Naval Forces

The naval forces consist of three fleets—the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets. The Chinese Navy has approximately 890 ships (including approximately 60 submarines), with a total displacement of approximately 1.42 million tons. The Navy is in charge of maritime national defense and protection of the sovereignty of territorial waters and maritime rights and interests. The Chinese Navy introduced Kilo-class submarines from Russia and is actively constructing new types of domestic submarines in order to enhance²² its submarine force.

²² In recent years, in particular, China is believed to be substantially increasing the number of state-of-the-art Yuan class submarines, which are domestically produced. These submarines are believed to be superior in quietness and to be equipped with an air independent propulsion (AIP) system, which allows them to remain submerged longer by loading oxygen beforehand, eliminating the need to supply

Additionally, the Navy is increasing surface combatant ships with improved air defense and anti-ship attack capabilities, large landing ships, and supply ships. Also, it commissioned a large hospital ship in October 2008.

With regard to aircraft carriers, China has renovated the Varyag, an incomplete Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier purchased from Ukraine. China began trial navigations in August 2011, and named the carrier “Liaoning” and put it into commission in September 2012²³. Even after the carrier was commissioned, China seems to be continuing training of carrier-based aircraft pilots and research and development of necessary technologies including the development of a domestic carrier based fighter, J-15, such as its takeoff and landing tests on the “Liaoning.” In November 2013, the carrier sailed in the South China Sea for the first time and conducted sea trials in this sea area²⁴. Some analysts point out that China may also be constructing its first domestic aircraft carrier²⁵.

In view of these developments concerning the strengthening of the naval forces, it is believed that China is trying to build capabilities for conducting operations in more distant waters in addition to the near sea defense. It is necessary to continue to monitor the development of the Chinese naval forces.

(4) Air Forces

The Chinese Air Force and Navy have approximately 2,580 combat aircraft in total. The number of fourth generation modern fighters is rising steadily. China imported from Russia and produced under license the Su-27 fighters, and imported from Russia the Su-30 fighters equipped with anti-surface and anti-ship attack capabilities. China is also mass-producing the J-11B fighter, which is pointed out to be an imitation of the Su-27 fighter, as well as the domestic J-10 fighter. Additionally, China is developing the J-20 and J-31, which are pointed out to become next-generation fighters²⁶. It is also making continuous efforts to improve

oxygen from the atmosphere by surfacing, etc.

²³ The U.S. Department of Defense’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2014) expresses the view that the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” continued fixed-wing aircraft training. It also notes that China is not expected to embark an operational wing until 2015 or later.

²⁴ In May 2013, it was reported that the first carrier air wing was officially established in China.

²⁵ The U.S. Department of Defense’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2014) points out that China will likely build multiple domestically-produced aircraft carriers over the next decade and that the first Chinese-built aircraft carrier will likely be operational in the early 2020s.

²⁶ In his testimony at the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2011, (then) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated his view that China had the potential to deploy 50 next-generation fighters equipped with stealth capability by 2020 and 200 fighters by 2025. In January 2011, China successfully

capabilities which are essential for operations of modern air forces by introducing the H-6 tanker and KJ-2000 Airborne Early Warning and Control system. Furthermore, it is reported that China is developing a new Y-20 large cargo aircraft²⁷ in order to improve its transportation capability. In addition to domestically developing, producing and deploying a variety of aircraft and introducing them from Russia, China seems to be domestically developing a variety of unmanned aircraft, including those capable of long-hour flights at high altitude for reconnaissance and other purposes and those capable of carrying missiles and other weapons for attack purposes. China also appears to be producing and deploying some of these unmanned aircraft.

Judging from the modernization of air forces, it is believed that China is not only improving its air defense capabilities for its national territory, but also aiming to build up capabilities for air superiority and anti-surface and anti-ship attacks in areas which are further distant from China, and improving long-range transportation capabilities²⁸. Further attention needs to be paid to these activities conducted by the Chinese air forces.

(5) Military Use of Space and Cyber Warfare Capabilities

China may be utilizing space for military purposes. In addition, it has interest in cyber space. This can be attributed to the fact that information gathering and command and communication in the military sector, which are vital for swift and efficient exercise of military strength, increasingly rely on satellites and computer networks.

See ▶ Part I, Chapter 2, Section 4 (Outer Space and Security); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 5 (Trends Concerning Cyberspace)

5 Maritime Activities

(1) General Situation

In recent years, China is believed to be aiming to build up capabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters and airspace. Accordingly, China has been rapidly expanding its maritime

conducted its first flight test of the J-20 prototype.

²⁷ On January 26, 2013, the Ministry of National Defense of China announced that it succeeded in the first trial flight of the Y-20 large cargo aircraft developed by China and that it would continue various related tests and trial flights based on its plan.

²⁸ China's National Defense in 2008 explains that China's Air Force is "working to accelerate its transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and increase its capabilities for carrying out reconnaissance and early warning, air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection, in an effort to build itself into a modernized strategic Air Force." The U.S. Department of Defense's "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China" (August 2010) explains that China's Air Force has continued its conversion from a force for limited territorial defense to a more flexible and agile force able to operate off-shore in both offensive and defensive roles, using the U.S. and Russian Air Forces as models.

activities based on sea power and air power, both qualitatively and quantitatively. With regard to its activity in the sea areas and airspace surrounding Japan, Chinese naval vessels²⁹ and navy and air force aircraft have been observed conducting training exercises of some kind, such as carrier-based helicopter flights and fleet formation and maneuver exercises, as well as information gathering activities. A large number of Chinese government ships and aircraft belonging to maritime law-enforcement agencies³⁰ have also been observed, which were engaged in monitoring activities for the protection of its maritime rights and interests³¹. Such activities by China include those that involve incursion into Japan's territorial waters, violation of Japan's airspace, and dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences, including a Chinese vessel's direction of a fire control radar at a JMSDF destroyer, the flight of fighters abnormally close to JSDF aircraft, and activities that could infringe upon the freedom of overflight over the high seas, such as the establishment of the "East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone," and are extremely regrettable. China is urged to accept and comply with international norms.

(2) Situation of Activities in Japan's Surrounding Sea Areas

Regarding the activities of naval forces, the number of Chinese naval surface vessels advancing to the Pacific Ocean has increased in recent years, and such advancements are currently conducted routinely. Every year since 2008, Chinese naval fleets have been passing the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island. However, in April 2012, a naval fleet passed the Osumi Strait eastward for the first time, and in October of the same year, they

²⁹ Examples of the activities of Chinese naval vessels are: a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japan's territorial waters, breaching international law in November 2004; it was confirmed that a total of five Chinese naval vessels, including one Sovremenny-class destroyer, were sailing near the Kashi gas field (Tianwaitian in Chinese) in the East China Sea and some of them circled around said gas field in September 2005; a Chinese Song-class submarine surfaced in the vicinity of the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in international waters reportedly near Okinawa in October 2006. The foreign submarine's approach to a U.S. aircraft carrier is a noteworthy military incident.

³⁰ Surveillance and other activities in the seas used to be conducted by "Haijing" of the Ministry of Public Security, "Haijian" of the State Oceanic Administration of the Ministry of Land and Resources, "Yuzheng" of the Bureau of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture, "Haixun" of the Maritime Safety Administration of the Ministry of Transport, and the maritime anti-smuggling force of the General Administration of Customs, all of which were under the State Council. In March 2013, China decided to reorganize the four agencies, excluding "Haixun," into the new State Oceanic Administration and that the new organization would carry out surveillance and other activities under the name of "China Coast Guard" under the guidance of the Ministry of Public Security. In July of that year, the China Coast Guard was formally launched. It is believed that the State Committee of Border and Coastal Defense, under the guidance of the State Council and the Central Military Commission, is coordinating maritime activities by these maritime law-enforcement agencies and the Navy. In January 2013, it was reported that China plans to build 36 maritime law enforcement ships within the next five years.

³¹ Concerning the PLA, there is a view that by turning exception into normality through uniform peacetime and wartime force deployment and exceeding traditional activity spaces, China intends to desensitize the alertness of others and make the international community tolerate and accept changes in the situation. (Taiwan's 2009 National Defense Report).

navigated the sea area between Yonakuni Island and Nakanokami Island near Iriomote Island northward for the first time. In July 2013, Chinese naval fleets passed the Soya Strait eastward for the first time. As such, the Chinese naval fleets' advancement and homing routes between the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean continue to become diverse by incorporating the areas north of Japan, and it is understood that China seeks to improve its deployment capabilities to the open ocean. Furthermore, in October 2013, China reportedly conducted "Maneuver 5," the first joint exercise by its three naval fleets in the western Pacific Ocean.

In addition, Chinese naval vessels appear to routinely conduct operations in the East China Sea³². After referring to its own position regarding the Senkaku Islands, China alleges that patrols by Chinese naval vessels in the sea areas under its jurisdiction are completely justifiable and lawful. In January 2013, a Chinese naval vessel directed fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer and is suspected to have directed fire-control radar at a helicopter based on the JMSDF destroyer.

With regard to the activities of Chinese government vessels, in December 2008, "Haijian" vessels belonging to the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) of the Ministry of Land and Resources of China hovered and drifted inside Japan's territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands – operations which are not permitted under international law. Subsequently, in August 2011 as well as in March and July 2012, "Haijian" vessels and "Yuzheng" vessels belonging to (then) Bureau of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture of China intruded into Japan's aforementioned territorial waters³³. As these examples demonstrate, "Haijian" and "Yuzheng" vessels have gradually intensified their activities in Japan's territorial waters in recent years. Such activities intensified considerably and Chinese government vessels began to intrude into the aforementioned territorial waters intermittently after September 2012, when the Japanese government acquired property rights to and ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island). In April and September 2013, eight Chinese government vessels intruded into the aforementioned territorial waters simultaneously.

In September 2010, Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels and a Chinese fishing trawler collided in Japan's territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands.

In October 2012, vessels of the East Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy and "Haijian" and

³² For example, a PLA Daily article dated February 19, 2014 reported that in recent years, the average number of days in a year that a unit in the East Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy conducted operations exceeded 190 days.

³³ In February 2012, a survey vessel of the Japan Coast Guard conducting a marine survey in Japan's exclusive economic zone was demanded to stop the activity by two "Haijian" ships that belong to the SOA. Similar incidents occurred in May and September 2010.

“Yuzheng” vessels conducted a joint exercise with a focus on maintaining and defending China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime interests. Furthermore, the Navy is believed to be supporting maritime law enforcement agencies both in terms of operation and equipment, including handing over retired Navy vessels to the China Coast Guard³⁴ that was formally launched in July 2013.

See Fig. I-1-3-4 (Recent Chinese Activities in Waters near Japan)

(3) Situation of Activities in Japan’s Surrounding Airspace

In recent years, activities by Chinese naval and air force aircraft, which appear to be activities for gathering information about Japan of some form, have been observed frequently. The number of scrambles by the JASDF against Chinese aircraft is also increasing dramatically.

With regard to the activities of air forces in the airspace above the East China Sea, Chinese aircraft have been diversifying their flight patterns. In September 2007, multiple H-6 bombers flew into Japan’s Air Defense Identification Zone above the East China Sea and advanced near the Japan-China median line. Similarly, in March 2010, a Y-8 early warning aircraft advanced near the Japan-China median line. In March 2011, a Y-8 patrol aircraft and Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft crossed the Japan-China median line and approached within approximately 50km of Japan’s airspace near the Senkaku Islands. In 2012, China intensified the activities of its aircraft, including fighters. In January 2013, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense made public the fact that Chinese military aircraft regularly conducted warning and surveillance activities and that Chinese fighters conducted activities believed to be Combat Air Patrols (CAP) in the East China Sea. In addition, in the most recent Chinese defense white paper, the phrase “air vigilance and patrols at sea” was added for the first time ever.

On November 16 and 17, 2013, a Tu-154 intelligence gathering aircraft flew over the East China Sea on two consecutive days. On November 23, the Chinese government announced that it established “the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)” including the Senkaku Islands which China described as if they were a part of China’s “territory,” that it obligated aircraft flying in the said zone to abide by the rules set forth by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, and that the Chinese Armed Forces would take “defensive emergency measures” in the case where such aircraft does not follow the instructed procedures. Japan is deeply concerned about such measures, which are profoundly dangerous acts that unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea, escalating the situation, and that may cause unintended consequences in the East China Sea. Furthermore, the measures unduly infringe the

³⁴ See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3, footnote 28

freedom of overflight over the high seas, which is the general principle of international law. Japan is demanding China to revoke any measures that could infringe upon the freedom of overflight over the high seas. The United States, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and the European Union (EU) have expressed concern about China's establishment of such zone.

On the very day that China announced the establishment of the East China Sea ADIZ, a Tu-154 intelligence gathering aircraft and a Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft flew over the East China Sea, respectively. On the same day, the Chinese Air Force announced that it conducted its first patrol flight since the establishment of the ADIZ. Subsequently, the Chinese Armed Forces announced on November 28 that its KJ-2000 Airborne Early Warning and Control system and Su-30 and J-11 fighters conducted patrol flights in the ADIZ, and announced on the following day that its Su-30 and J-11 fighters scrambled. On December 26, 2013, the Chinese Armed Forces announced that in the one month that passed since the establishment of the ADIZ, a total of 87 reconnaissance aircraft, early warning aircraft and fighters were mobilized to the relevant airspace.

In March and April 2011 and in April 2012, Chinese helicopters, etc. that appeared to belong to the SOA flew close to JMSDF destroyers which were engaged in monitoring and surveillance in the East China Sea³⁵. Further still, in May and June 2014, two Su-27 fighters of China flew abnormally close to the aircraft of JMSDF and JASDF that were conducting routine monitoring and surveillance activities in the East China Sea. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that JSDF aircraft conducted dangerous acts against Chinese aircraft. However, the operations of JSDF aircraft were legitimate activities in compliance with the international law. There is no truth to the Chinese assertion that JSDF aircraft carried out dangerous acts.

With respect to air forces' advancement into the Pacific Ocean, it was confirmed for the first time by the JASDF's scrambling fighters that a Y-8 early warning aircraft and a H-6 bomber flew through the airspace between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advanced to the Pacific Ocean in July and September 2013, respectively. Similar flights were conducted by two Y-8 early warning aircraft and two H-6 bombers (total: four aircrafts) on three

³⁵ On March 7 of the same year, 2011, a Chinese Z-9 helicopter believed to belong to the SOA flew as close as approximately 70m and as low as approximately 40m above the water around the Japanese destroyer Samidare, which was patrolling the waters in the central area of the East China Sea. On March 26, a Z-9 helicopter flew again as close as approximately 90m and as low as approximately 60m above the water around the destroyer Isoyuki. Furthermore, on April 1, a Y-12 aircraft which was believed to belong to the SOA flew as close as approximately 90m and as low as approximately 60m above the water around Isoyuki. On April 12, 2012, a Y-12 aircraft, which was believed to belong to the SOA, flew as close as approximately 50m and as low as approximately 50m above the water around the destroyer Asayuki.

consecutive days in October of the same year and by one Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft and two H-6 bombers (total: three aircrafts) in March 2014. As such activities demonstrate, China has been further intensifying the activities of its aircraft, including fighters.

Regarding Japan's airspace over and around the Senkaku Islands, in December 2012, a fixed-wing aircraft belonging to the SOA violated the territorial airspace first as a Chinese aircraft. Since then, fixed-wing aircraft belonging to the SOA have been frequently observed flying near the airspace.

See ▶ Fig. I-1-3-5 (Recent Chinese Activities in Airspace near Japan); I-1-3-6 (Change in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft)

(4) Situation of Activities in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean

China has also been intensifying its activities in the South China Sea, including waters around the Spratly Islands and the Parcel Islands, over which territorial disputes exist with neighbors, including some ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member states. In March 2009, Chinese ships, including a naval vessel, a maritime research ship of the SOA, a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries' patrol ship, and trawlers, approached a U.S. Navy acoustic research ship operating in the South China Sea to obstruct its operations. In addition, in December 2013, a Chinese naval vessel cut across the bow of a U.S. Navy cruiser operating in the South China Sea at point blank range. It is also reported that Chinese naval vessels fired warning shots at fishing boats of neighboring countries. Furthermore, in recent years, there has been growing friction between China and its neighboring countries over the South China Sea, as illustrated by protests by Vietnam and the Philippines against China's activities in these waters.

See ▶ Part I, Chapter 1, Section 5 (Southeast Asia)

Additionally, Chinese naval vessels have advanced into the Indian Ocean. Since December 2008, Chinese naval vessels have been navigating in the Indian Ocean and advanced into the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to take part in international anti-piracy efforts. In 2010 and 2013, a Chinese Navy's hospital ship carried out "Mission Harmony," a medical service mission, to assist countries, including countries off the coast of the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, from the end of 2013 to the beginning of 2014, a Chinese naval nuclear submarine reportedly advanced into the Indian Ocean and conducted operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. In the same year, a Chinese naval vessel is said to have advanced into the Indian Ocean from the Sunda Strait and conducted trainings. As such examples demonstrate, the Chinese Navy has improved its capacity to execute operations in more distant waters, including the Indian Ocean.

(5) Objectives of Maritime Activities

Taking into consideration such factors as the situation of the development of Chinese naval and air forces, situation of activities in sea areas and airspace, statements in defense white papers, China's geographical location and economic globalization, the maritime activities of the Chinese Navy, Air Force and other organizations are considered to have the following objectives.

The first one is to intercept operations by enemies in waters and airspace as far as possible from China in order to defend its territory, territorial waters and territorial airspace. Behind this objective is an increase in effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology.

The second one is to develop military capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan's independence. For example, China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. In order for China to try to prevent foreign intervention into Taiwan surrounded by the sea in all directions through China's use of force, it needs to enhance its military operational capabilities at sea and airspace.

The third one is to weaken the control of other countries over the islands to which China claims territorial sovereignty, while strengthening the claim of its territorial sovereignty, through various surveillance activities and use of force in the seas and air space surrounding the islands.

The fourth one is to acquire, maintain, and protect its maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in oil and gas drilling as well as building facilities and surveying for the drilling in the East China Sea and South China Sea³⁶.

The fifth one is to defend its sea lanes of communications. In the background is the fact that its sea lanes of communications, including its crude oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are extremely important for the globalizing Chinese economy. The question of which parts of its sea lanes of communication the Chinese Navy deems it should defend depends on such factors as the international situation at the time. However, given the recent strengthening of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, it is believed that the Chinese Navy and Air Force will develop a capacity

³⁶ With regard to resource development in the East China Sea, in September 2010, China unilaterally announced postponement of the negotiation to conclude an international agreement with Japan for implementing the June 2008 agreement. While the negotiation has not been resumed yet, it is pointed out that China is highly likely carrying out gas production in the Kashi gas field (Tianwaitian in Chinese) and elsewhere. Meanwhile, China's State Oceanic Administration announced that the "Haiyangshiyou 981," an oil-drilling rig, succeeded in its first drilling in the South China Sea in May 2012.

to defend areas going beyond the waters near China.

Given these objectives and recent trends in China's activities in sea areas and airspace, it is believed that China plans to further expand the sphere of its maritime activities, and further intensify its operations in waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, as well as the South China Sea and the airspaces over these seas areas. Therefore, more attention needs to be paid to activities such as operations of naval vessels as well as Navy and Air Force aircraft, various surveillance operations near Japan, developments of facilities that serve as bases for these activities³⁷, and evolution of China's interpretation regarding the legal status of coastal areas in China's exclusive economic zones³⁸.

6 International Military Activities

In recent years, the PLA has begun emphasizing non-traditional security missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and anti-piracy. In order to carry out these missions, it has been actively dispatching its units overseas. It is believed that in the background of the PLA's stance on international military activities is the expansion of China's national interests beyond its national borders, which in turn increased its necessity to protect and promote its national interests overseas, as well as China's intent to raise its stature by demonstrating its will to fulfill its responsibilities to the international community.

China states that it consistently supports and actively participates in the U.N. PKO. According to "The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces," among other sources, it has sent more than 22,000 military personnel to the U.N. PKO. According to the United Nations, as of the end of April 2014, China had deployed a total of 2,180 personnel, civilian police officers, and military observers to U.N. PKO, including the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Missions in Mali (MINUSMA). Thus, China shows a certain presence in the U.N. PKO. In the background of China's proactive attitude to the U.N. PKO is deemed to be its intent to strengthen its relations with the regions where the PKO is conducted, particularly with African nations.

³⁷ It is reported that China is constructing a large-scale naval base that has underground tunnels for nuclear-powered submarines in the city of Sanya located in the southern tip of Hainan island. Experts point out that the base is in a strategically important location that secures access to the South China Sea, as well as the western Pacific, and that China is advancing construction work in order for the base to play a role as a major hub of the South Sea Fleet, including for the deployment of aircraft carriers.

³⁸ It is pointed out that, in recent years, China aims to limit military activities of other countries in coastal areas of China's exclusive economic zones by employing its own interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). For instance, the Chinese government announced in a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 26, 2010 that it is opposed to unsanctioned military activities by any country in coastal areas of China's exclusive economic zones.

Furthermore, as its first mission in distant waters, the Chinese Navy has dispatched vessels to the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden since December 2008 in order to escort Chinese and other ships. The Chinese Navy is hence improving its capacity to execute naval operations in more distant waters, demonstrating that China is placing a greater emphasis on protecting its sea lanes of transportation.

In view of the deteriorating situation in Libya, China carried out an evacuation operation of Chinese nationals from the country from February through March 2011. In this operation, China dispatched a naval frigate and transportation aircraft of the Air Force to Libya in addition to private chartered aircraft. This is the first participation of the military in an evacuation operation of Chinese nationals living overseas. In addition, from November to December 2013, China dispatched a hospital ship to conduct medical relief activities in the Philippines. It has been pointed out that through such activities, China is trying to build a pacifist and humanitarian image of its military forces and to demonstrate, both domestically and internationally, its intent to place priority on military operations other than war, as well as its desire to prove the ability to project its military power to distant locations.

7 Education and Training

In recent years, the PLA has been conducting practical exercises including such large-scale exercises as cooperative exercises of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and landing exercises in order to strengthen its operational capabilities. The goal of “being able to fight and winning battles” was repeatedly mentioned in statements addressed to the military by General Secretary Xi Jinping as well as in the military training instructions given by the general staff. This is considered as evidence that the military is promoting implementation of more practical exercises. The whole PLA military training conference in 2006 emphasized promotion of a shift from military training under the conditions of mechanization to military training under the conditions of informatization. The new Outline of Military Training and Evaluation, in effect since 2009, highlights training for military operations other than war (MOOTW), education in knowledge and expertise required for informatization, simulated training of high-tech weapons and equipment, network training, and training in complex electromagnetic environments where electronic interference occurs, in addition to joint exercises by different services.

In the education spectrum, the PLA aims to develop military personnel versed in science and technology. In 2003, it launched a human resource strategy project to develop human resources capable of directing joint operations/informatized operations and of building informatized

armed forces. The project has a goal of achieving a big leap in the development of military personnel to 2020. In recent years, the PLA appears to be increasing its wage standards. It is believed that its objective is to secure highly capable human resources. Moreover, in 2000, in order to recruit highly capable and highly educated people, the military started a system where it provides scholarships for civilian college students and then allows them to enter the military as commissioned officers after graduation. On the other hand, in recent years, it is pointed out that there is an issue concerning treatment of veterans.

China has been developing a mobilization system with a view to effective use of civilian resources in the case of war and other emergencies. In February 2010, China enacted the National Defense Mobilization Law, which is the basic law for wartime mobilization, and in July the same year, put the law into effect.

8 National Defense Industry Sector

While China imports highly sophisticated military equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, China is believed to place emphasis on their indigenous production. The country manufactures much of its military equipment domestically and is actively carrying out research and development of new equipment. China's national defense industry sector appears to be developing due to improvement of private industry infrastructures accompanying economic growth, use of dual technologies, and the absorption of foreign technologies, as well as its own efforts. The sector is serving the role of supporting the strengthening of Chinese military forces³⁹.

Growth in the Chinese defense industry was once hindered by inefficiency caused by excessive secrecy and other factors. However, in recent years, reform of the defense industry has progressed. In particular, emphasis has been placed on two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for developing the national economy, and, in turn, civilian technologies are absorbed for a buildup of national defense. Specifically, the technologies of the defense industry have contributed to the development of civilian space exploration, the aviation industry, and the shipbuilding industry.

³⁹ The U.S. Department of Defense's "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China" (August 2011) explains with regard to China's defense industry that the shipbuilding and defense electronics sectors have witnessed the greatest progress, coupled with technological development in the sectors of missile and space systems. In contrast, the sectors of guidance and control systems and engines and advanced applications and software have experienced slower progress, and China still heavily depends on foreign enterprises for technologies in these sectors.

Furthermore, China encourages and supports international cooperation and competition in dual-use industries, thus appearing to have an interest in absorbing foreign technologies through dual-use industries.

3 Relations with Other Countries

1 General Situation

On the one hand, China has adopted so-called assertive measures, including attempts to alter the status quo by coercive measures, especially for issues involving conflicting maritime interests. On the other hand, China recognizes that a peaceful and stable international environment is necessary for maintaining sustainable economic development and enhancing China's overall national power. Based on such recognition, in its relationships with other countries, China proactively carries out military exchanges including reciprocal visits by senior military officials and joint military exercises. In recent years, China has been engaged in vigorous military exchanges not only with major powers such as the United States and Russia and with its neighboring countries including Southeast Asian countries, but also with countries in Africa and Latin America. China is believed to consider military exchanges as a strategic means to safeguard its national interests, and as such to position military exchanges as an element in China's overall diplomatic strategy. The objectives of China's promotion of military exchanges include alleviating other countries' concerns regarding China by strengthening its relations with these countries, creating a favorable security environment for China, enhancing China's influence in the international community, securing stable supplies of natural resources and energy, and building foreign bases.

2 Relations with Taiwan

China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the Taiwan issue is therefore a domestic issue. The country maintains that the "one-China" principle is the underlying premise and foundation for discussions between China and Taiwan. China also claims that it would never abandon its efforts for peaceful unification, and expresses that it will take up policies and measures to solve issues of Taiwanese people's interest and to protect their due authority. Meanwhile, China is strongly opposed to any foreign intervention in the unification of China as well as any move towards the independence of Taiwan, and on this basis, has repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force. The Anti-Secession Law, enacted in March 2005, clearly lays out the non-renunciation of the use of military force by China⁴⁰.

⁴⁰ The law stipulates, "In the event that the 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures

Ma Ying-jeou (Kuomintang), re-elected in the presidential election in January 2012, continues to advocate, in his second term, a policy of pursuing Taiwanese economic development by expanding economic exchanges with China and the status quo rather than independence. As exemplified by the entry into force of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), the bilateral relationship is deepening primarily along the economic realm. In February 2014, the Minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of China and the Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan held the first ministerial meeting between China and Taiwan. On the security front, while China urged that the two countries make contact and hold exchanges over military issues at an appropriate time in order to explore the creation of mechanisms for building mutual trust over military security, Taiwan has shown a cautious stance, stating that the conditions are not yet met⁴¹. Regarding the Senkaku Islands, China and Taiwan have their own assertions⁴², and Taiwan has expressed reluctance to work with China. Attention will be paid to trends in the future relations between China and Taiwan including trends of political dialogues on military affairs.

3 Relations with the United States

There are various outstanding issues between the United States and China, such as human rights in China, the Taiwan issue, and trade issues. However, since a stable U.S.-China relationship is essential for China to develop its economy, it is believed that China will continue to aspire to maintain stable relations with the United States.

The United States expresses that it welcomes a China that takes on a responsible leadership role with the international community on such global issues as the recovery of the world economy, climate change, and proliferation of WMDs. The United States proclaims that it will monitor the strengthening of Chinese military capabilities, recognizes that the two nations do not agree on every issue, and makes it clear that the United States will be candid on human rights and other issues. It also states that disagreement between the two countries should not prevent cooperation on issues of mutual interest⁴³.

to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

⁴¹ For China's stance, see the remarks made by (then) Chinese President Hu Jintao at the discussion on December 31, 2008, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the announcement of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. For Taiwan's stance, see the “Quadrennial Defense Review” released by the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan on March 13, 2013.

⁴² The Taiwanese authority's vessels intruded into Japan's territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands three times in 2012.

⁴³ The U.S. National Security Strategy (May 2010). In addition, the Defense Strategic Guidance of January 2012 states, “China's emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways” and “our two countries have a strong stake in peace and

China hopes to forge a kind of U.S.-China relationship it calls “a new model of major country relationship” based on mutual respect and “win-win” cooperation. However, consensus has not necessarily been reached between the United States and China regarding the specifics of the relationship.

Regarding the Senkaku Islands, the United States has reiterated that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the islands. China protested, stating that it would never accept any word or deed that includes the islands within the scope of the treaty (statement by a spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2010).

China and the United Nations have deepened military exchanges and conducted various policy dialogues. China has dispatched observers to U.S. military exercises, and joint drills have been conducted between the Chinese and U.S. navies on mutual port visits. A military hotline between the defense departments of the two countries was set up in April 2008. In November 2013, the U.S. and Chinese armies conducted a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise. In addition, from June 2014, Chinese navy vessels participated in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) for the first time. However, while China wishes to develop relations between the Chinese and U.S. militaries, it asserts that there are a number of issues that must be resolved in order to realize the sound development of the relations. The issues include U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, activities of U.S. military vessels and aircraft within China’s exclusive economic zones, legal hurdles in mutual military exchanges, and a lack of strategic trust in China on the part of the United States⁴⁴. In addition, some unstable facets have been observed in military exchanges of the two countries. For example, China notified suspensions of the major military exchanges with the United States when the U.S. Department of Defense notified Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan in October 2008 and January 2010. On the other hand, the United States maintains that China’s military development, lack of transparency of the decision-making process, and other issues raise questions about its future conduct and intentions. It asserts that U.S.-China relations must be undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing misunderstanding. For this reason, with regard to military exchanges, it is believed

stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship.”

⁴⁴ Remarks by (then) Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Xu Caihou in a meeting with (then) U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (October 2009). Then Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff Department Ma Xiaotian stated at the 11th round of the U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks held in December 2010 that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. laws that impose restrictions on contacts between the military forces of the two countries, and the frequent military reconnaissance operations conducted by U.S. naval vessels and aircraft in coastal areas of China’s exclusive economic zones constituted key obstacles to developing stable military-to-military ties.

that the aim of the United States is to improve the current situation, wherein such exchanges are frequently suspended once problems arise, and to build relations that are capable of maintaining more stable channels of decision-making for mutual understanding. In recent years, for instance, Strategic Security Dialogues have been established in 2011 in the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogues, and these dialogues have been held annually.

4 Relations with Russia

Since the China-Soviet confrontation ended in 1989, both countries have placed importance on their bilateral relationship. The deepening of the “strategic partnership” between China and Russia, which was established in the mid-1990s, has been emphasized. In 2001, the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation⁴⁵ was concluded. Subsequently, in 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between the two countries came to a settlement. The two countries share an idea that they will promote multipolarization of the world and establishment of a new international order. In addition, economic motives including natural resource and energy supply have been driving the good relationship between them in recent years.

On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including fighter aircraft, destroyers, and submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China. However, some point out that their trade amounts have been on the decline in recent years due to the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China. It is also pointed out that Russia, which shares a land border with China, has a policy of not supplying sophisticated weapons to China that would cause a threat to Russia and that Russia has a concern about competition with China in arms exports.

China-Russia military exchanges include regular visits by high-ranking army officials. In addition, joint military exercises are conducted, such as the large-scale joint naval exercise, “Naval Interaction,” in the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan off the coast of Vladivostok, and northern East China Sea in April 2012, July 2013, and May 2014, respectively⁴⁶. It is believed

⁴⁵ Regarding the military field, this treaty mentions military confidence building or strengthening of mutual troop reductions in border areas, military cooperation such as military technical cooperation, and holding discussions in the event that there is awareness of any threat to peace.

⁴⁶ China and Russia conducted their first large-scale joint exercise in the Shandong Peninsula and other areas in China in August 2005. In August 2007, July 2009, September 2010, June 2012, and July to August 2013, member states of the SCO conducted joint anti-terrorism exercises. The purpose of SCO is to promote cooperation in areas where the member states have common interests, such as maintenance of peace and stability in the region, joint actions against terrorism, and politics, trade, and economy. In addition to the anti-terrorism exercise “Peace Mission,” the SCO is making efforts for the stabilization of Central Asia, including Afghanistan, through such decisions as approving Afghanistan to be a SCO

that through these exchanges the two countries can deepen mutual understanding and build confidence between their military forces and show their presence as a pole in the multipolarizing world, and China can learn operational methods of Russian weapons and military operational doctrines.

5 Relations with the Other Countries

(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, China has been continuously developing bilateral relations with the countries through active mutual top-level visits and other means. For example, China has had good relations with Myanmar and has assisted in developing Myanmar's infrastructure such as pipelines for petroleum or natural gas, ports, and railroads. It also has supplied key military equipment. Some pundits point out that this close relationship is associated with Myanmar's location which provides China the shortest access to the Indian Ocean⁴⁷.

China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China and the ROK), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In October 2013, President Xi Jinping visited Indonesia and Malaysia, and Premier Li Keqiang visited Brunei, Thailand and Vietnam. While China has been deepening its economic and cultural cooperation with ASEAN member states through diplomatic forums, more recently, it has been proactively advancing cooperation in the area of national security by enhancing exchanges of military personnel such as mutual visits of their high-ranking military officers and exchanges and cooperation between military departments.

(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. It shares borders with the three countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and has ethnic minorities settled in the areas straddling borders. Naturally, the region hosts lively exchanges between the people of those countries. Therefore, China is greatly concerned about the political stability and security situations in Central Asian states such as terrorism by Islamic extremists. Chinese engagement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was established in June 2001, is viewed as an indication of China's concerns in such areas. Moreover, China is also strongly interested in the wealth of energy and natural resources of Central Asia with a view to diversification of its supply source and procurement

observer country at the SCO summit meeting held in June 2012.

⁴⁷ Some observers also believe that Myanmar is attempting to end its excessive dependence on China in terms of diplomacy.

methods of these resources and is promoting cooperation in the energy field with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines between China and Central Asian nations.

(3) Relations with South Asian Countries

China has traditionally maintained an extremely close relationship with Pakistan, and mutual visits by their leaders take place frequently. It is believed that, as illustrated by the joint development of the JF-17 fighter, their cooperation in the military sector, including exporting weapons and military technology transfer, is also deepening. As the importance of sea lanes increases for the globalizing Chinese economy, it is believed that the importance of Pakistan is rising for China. This is partly because of the geopolitical features of Pakistan, namely it faces the Indian Ocean.

China and India have an unsettled border, and it is deemed that “problems” over this area have arisen between the two countries even in recent years⁴⁸. On the other hand, in recent years, China has been committed to improving its relationship with India while also paying consideration to maintaining balance with Pakistan. Identifying China’s relationship with India as a strategic partnership, China actively conducts mutual visits by top leaders. It is believed that the deepening of bilateral relations is attributed to the importance China places on the economic growth of both countries as well as China’s response to strengthening U.S.-India relations.

Regarding military exchanges, China has conducted a variety of joint exercises with Pakistan and India since 2003, including joint naval search and rescue exercises.

(4) Relations with EU Countries

For China, the European Union (EU) countries are now as important a partner as Japan and the United States, especially in the economic field. China, through diplomatic opportunities, strongly requests EU countries to lift their arms embargoes against China which have been imposed since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989⁴⁹.

Regarding information technology, avionics, and air-independent propulsion systems for

⁴⁸ According to a press conference by the spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense of China in August 2013.

⁴⁹ For example, in November 2010, (then) Chinese President Hu Jintao visited France, and on this occasion, China and France announced a joint statement that included text supporting the lifting of the arms embargoes against China. It is deemed that some EU countries have positive opinions about the lifting of their arms embargoes against China.

submarines and other areas, EU member countries possess more advanced technologies than China or Russia which exports weapons to China. Therefore, if the EU arms embargo on China were lifted, it is possible that the weapons and military technologies of EU countries would transfer to China, and that they would be utilized as a bargaining chip to gain the edge in weapons transactions with Russia. For this reason, Japan has consistently expressed to the EU its objection to lifting the arms embargo on China, as well as requested EU member states to carry out more rigorous management of the exports of arms, dual-use goods, and their technologies to China. Continuous attention will need to be paid to future discussions within the EU.

(5) Relations with Middle East, African Countries, Pacific Islands, and Central and South American Countries

China has been enhancing its relations with Middle Eastern and African nations in the economic realm, including active assistance towards their infrastructure development and investment in their resource and energy development, and has been further expanding its influence in the region. In recent years, not only interactions among top levels of states and high-ranking military officials but also arms exports and exchanges between military forces are actively conducted. Behind these moves, some see China's intention to ensure stable supply of energy and natural resources and also to secure its overseas hubs in the future.

China has also been boosting its relations with the Pacific islands. It has been developing oil, natural gas, and cobalt mines in Papua New Guinea and has signed an agreement on military cooperation with the country. Proactive and continual economic assistance has also been implemented to other islands. Furthermore, military exchanges are being promoted with Fiji and Tonga.

Chinese military officials visit countries including Argentina and Brazil on a regular basis to enhance its relations with Central and South American countries. China has been working to improve its relations with these countries through such activities as the medical services missions by a hospital ship of the Chinese Navy.

6 International Transfer of Weapons

China is expanding provision of weapons such as small arms, tanks, and aircraft to developing countries in Asia, Africa, and other areas. It is reported that the main recipients are Pakistan, Iran, and Bangladesh, while weapons are also being exported to African countries such as Namibia, Egypt, Algeria, and Sudan as well as Central and South American countries including

Venezuela and Bolivia. Some experts claim that China transfers weapons in order to strengthen its strategic relationships with the allies, enhance its influence in the international community, and secure energy and natural resources. Some observers point out that China supplies weapons to countries that struggle with democracy or have human rights problems. Attention will be on whether China will increase the transparency of international weapons transfer in response to the concerns of the international community.

4 Military Capabilities of Taiwan

Taiwan, under the guidance of building the “hard rock” defense advocated by President Ma Jeou Ying, identifies prevention of war, homeland defense, response to contingencies, deterrence of conflict, and regional stability as the strategic objectives, and takes the military strategy of “resolute defense and credible deterrence.”

Taiwan, for improved expertise of its military personnel and other purposes, aims to transform its armed forces currently consisting of drafted personnel and volunteers into all-volunteer forces, while reducing the total forces from 275,000 to 215,000 personnel by the end of 2014. However, the Ministry of National Defense reportedly stated that the transformation into all-volunteer forces would not be feasible until 2016. At the same time, the Taiwanese armed forces attribute importance to the introduction of advanced technologies and improvement of joint operational capabilities. Additionally, in light of the serious damage that occurred from the typhoon in August 2009, the Taiwanese armed forces identify disaster prevention and relief as one of their major missions.

With regard to Taiwan’s military power, at present, ground forces, including the Navy Marine Corps, have a total of approximately 215,000 personnel. In addition, it is believed that approximately 1.65 million reserve personnel of the air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kidd-class destroyers which were imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses relatively modern frigates and other vessels. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 A/B fighters, Mirage 2000 fighters, Jing Guo fighters, etc.

In view of the fact that the PLA is enhancing its missile, naval, and air forces, the Taiwanese military believes it still needs to modernize its equipment. The U.S. Department of Defense has notified Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act⁵⁰, but

⁵⁰ Recently, the Department of Defense notified Congress of possible sales to Taiwan of Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles and AH-64D attack helicopters in October 2008, possible sales of PAC-3 missiles,

Taiwan also wishes to purchase the F-16C/D fighter aircraft and other arms from the United States. The issue is to be observed. Taiwan is also promoting the independent development of military equipment. The Tien Kung II surface-to-air missiles and Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles are deployed and it is believed that the Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missiles are being developed in order to acquire long-range attack capabilities, while the Tien Kung III surface-to-air missiles are being developed in order to ensure the capabilities to deal with ballistic missiles.

The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are generally characterized as follows:

1) Regarding ground forces, China possesses an overwhelming number of troops; however, their capability of landing on and invading the island of Taiwan is limited. Nevertheless, China is making efforts to improve its landing and invasion capabilities in recent years, such as building large landing ships.

2) Regarding naval and air forces, China, which overwhelms Taiwan in terms of quantity, has also been steadily strengthening its naval and air forces in recent years in terms of quality, where Taiwan had superiority over China.

3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, China possesses numerous short-range ballistic missiles, etc. with a range that covers Taiwan, and Taiwan seems to have few effective countermeasures.

In addition to the sizes of forces and performance and quantity of military equipment, a comparison of military capabilities should take into account various factors such as the objectives and characteristics of envisioned military operations, the operational posture, proficiency in military personnel, and logistics. Nevertheless, as China is rapidly strengthening its military power, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in favor of China. Attention should be paid to the strengthening of both the Chinese and Taiwanese military capabilities and U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan.

See ▶ Fig. I-1-3-7 (Changes in Taiwan's Defense Budget); I-1-3-8 (Changes in Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan)

UH-60 helicopters, Osprey-class mine hunters, and others in January 2010, and possible arms sales including equipment necessary to upgrade F-16A/B fighter aircraft in September 2011.

Section 4 Russia

1 General Situation

Russia, while claiming that it has completed the stage of revival and strengthening, and setting an agenda of constructing a prosperous Russia, attaches importance to becoming an influential power underpinned by its new position of economic, cultural and military power¹. Specifically, Russia recognizes that it must undertake a number of sweeping modernizations, including departing from its conventional resource-dependent economy, establishing a democratic political system based on the Russian tradition and eradicating corruption.

Then Prime Minister Putin who had served as president for eight years (two terms) from 2000 to 2008 won the presidential election in March 2012 and took office in May of the same year.

How President Putin will gain broader support in the country and handle issues concerning the modernization including structural reform of the economy while maintaining his power base will be the focus of attention². According to an opinion poll, the people overwhelmingly supported the “annexation” of Crimea in March 2014. Coupled with the success of the Sochi Olympic Games, the approval ratings of President Putin have increased sharply.

2 Security and Defense Policies

1 Basic Posture

Russia believes that it needs to plan for further strengthening of military capability in light of potential challenges and threats toward Russia’s security³.

Approved in May 2009, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation through to 2020 sets out the objectives and strategic priorities, in domestic and foreign policies.

The National Security Strategy views that Russia’s influence has been strengthened by a policy of promoting the multipolarization of the world and using the potential of Russia. The unilateral approach to the use of force and confrontation of major countries in international relations is

¹ Annual State of the Nation Address by President Putin (December 2012).

² In his papers to serve as a campaign platform published after January 2012, then Prime Minister Putin listed as his policies: expanding the participation in politics by the people; prevention of corruption; strengthening of domestic industries by departing from the resource-dependent economy to modernize the economy, and that the middle class should play a leading role in society.

³ Statement made by President Putin at the expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board (December 2013)

listed as having a negative impact on the interests of Russia, and Russia expresses vigilance over the United States' plan to deploy a missile defense system (MD) in Europe as well as the approach of NATO's military infrastructure to the Russian border.

As for national defense, Russia cites as challenges a shift to a new military structure by increasing the number of permanent readiness units⁴ and improving organizational and military alignment, while maintaining the capabilities of its strategic nuclear forces.

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, formulated in February 2010 as a document substantiating the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere, demonstrates the recognition that, while the probability of a large-scale war breaking out is on the decline, the military dangers facing Russia are increasing, which is demonstrated by the approach of NATO's military infrastructure to the Russian border, including the expansion of NATO, as well as the construction and deployment of strategic MD systems. Furthermore, it also states that Russia will maintain permanent combat-readiness to deter and prevent conflict.

The doctrine regards nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear wars and wars that use conventional weapons and claims that Russia maintains a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capacity and reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to an event where nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction are to be used against it or its allies or under circumstances wherein conventional weapons have been used against it and where the survival of the country itself is imperiled.

2 Military Reform

Russia began a full-scale process for military reform in 1997 by heeding the three pillars of reform: downsizing, modernization, and professionalization.

Moreover, based on the policy statement "Future Outlook of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" that was approved by then President Medvedev in September 2008, Russia is advancing measures to modernize its army, including troop reductions, structural reforms (from the command structure based on divisions to that based on brigades⁵), strengthening of

⁴ The permanent readiness units have been created by reorganizing troops in the midst of a military forces reduction after the launch of the Russian Federation's military forces, to strengthen combat readiness through concentrating personnel. The units are expected to promptly respond during the first phase of a large-scale war or in the event of a minor conflict.

⁵ The command structure is reorganized from the four-tiered structure of military district–army–division–regiment, to a three-tiered structure of military district–operational command–brigade. This was supposed to have been completed in December 2009, but in May 2013 the

combat-readiness, and the development and introduction of new equipment.

Regarding the downsizing of the military forces, the country aims to achieve troop reduction in order to maintain an adequate troop level of one million personnel by 2016⁶. Since December 2010, Russia reorganized its six military districts into four military districts (western, southern, central and eastern districts), and based on this, Russia established an integrated strategic command in each military district and is carrying out integrated operations of its entire military forces such as the ground force, naval force and air force under the control of the Military District Commander.

Regarding the modernization of the military forces, based on the state policy on military equipment for the period of 2011 to 2020 that appeared to have been approved by President by the end of 2010, Russia intends to further modernize its equipment and invest about 20 trillion rubles (about 55 trillion yen) to increase its percentage of new equipment up to 70%⁷ by 2020.

Regarding the professionalization of the military forces, in order to make the combat readiness of the permanent readiness units effective, Russia is promoting the introduction of a contract service system which selects personnel through contracts from among the conscripted military personnel. However, further review has been under way to address difficulties in securing personnel due to such problems as a high turnover rate and financial restraints⁸.

It is thought that Russia will continue these measures to improve the conventional military forces along with its efforts to maintain its strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities against the backdrop of the national defense budget that has been increasing in recent years.

See ► *Fig. I-1-4-1 (Change in Russia's Defense Budget)*

3 Military Posture and Trends

Guards Tamanskaya Motorized Rifle Division and the Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division, which had supposedly been reorganized in brigades under the Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov, were revived and participated in a victory parade.

⁶ It was decided that the total military force would be limited to 1 million people as of 2016 by a presidential order in December 2008 (about 1.13 million people as of 2008).

⁷ In his paper on national defense policy published in February 2012 to serve as a campaign platform, then Prime Minister Putin indicated to strengthen military power including nuclear force, aerospace defense and naval power by spending about 23 trillion rubles (about 63 trillion yen) in 10 years.

⁸ Reasons behind the promotion of the contract service system may include decrease of the population suitable for military service and the shortening of the conscription period (from January 2008, the conscription period has been shortened to 12 months). At the expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2013, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated that personnel adequacy was 82% and the contracted soldiers were about 220,000.

Russia's military force is derived not only from the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but also from forces such as the Border Troops of the Border Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) and the Interior Troops of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation Armed Forces have three services (forces) and three independent corps (units): ground force, naval force, air force and strategic-rocket unit, aerospace defense forces⁹, and airborne unit¹⁰.

See ► *Fig. I-1-4-2 (Location and Strength of Russian Military)*

1 Nuclear Forces

Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure its global standing and to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States as well as to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces. It is thus believed that Russia is working to maintain a state of immediate readiness for its nuclear force unit.

Russia still possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and long range bombers (Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks) following only the United States in scale.

Russia is obligated to reduce strategic nuclear arms pursuant to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty concluded with the United States¹¹. Russia is working to accelerate the development and introduction of new weapons following the policy to prioritize the modernization of nuclear forces based on its state policy on military equipment.

Russia started the deployment of the RS-24, which is considered as a multi-warhead version of the Topol-M, in March 2011¹². In January 2013, "Yuri Dolgoruky," the first of Borey-class

⁹ The Aerospace Defence Forces were established in December 2011 based on the existing space unit and the units assigned under the air force as one corps with missions including outer space surveillance, missile attack alarm, defense against ballistic missiles and aerospace attacks and satellite launches.

¹⁰ 3 air assault brigades which were under the ground forces were reorganized in the airborne unit in November 2013.

¹¹ In April 2010, Russia and the United States signed the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) and the treaty came into force in February 2011. Each side is obligated to reduce deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and their deployed delivery platforms to 700 within seven years after the entry into force of the treaty. In April 2014, the U.S. announced that Russia's deployed strategic warheads was 1,512 and their deployed delivery platforms was 498 as of March 1, 2014.

¹² In March 2011, the first regiment of RS-24 missiles was operationally deployed in the division in Teykovo, in the Ivanovo Oblast northeast of Moscow. In December 2013, at the expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated that in 2013 one rocket regiment and two rocket battalions will be upgraded to RS-24 missiles and an additional rocket regiment and four rocket battalions will be upgraded to RS-24 missiles in 2014. In addition, it is believed that Russia is

nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), which are believed to carry the new-type SLBM Bulava, was delivered to the Northern Fleet¹³. And “Alexander Nevsky,” the second of these submarines, was delivered to the Pacific Fleet in December 2013.

In October 2013, a surprise inspection designed to validate the combat readiness of strategic nuclear units was implemented under the control of President Putin, involving two ICBMs and two SLBMs as well as live firing of three air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) from long-range bombers. In May 2014 also, a field training exercise was conducted including one ICBM and two SLBMs as well as live firing of six ALCMs¹⁴.

As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia scrapped ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the United States, and removed tactical nuclear weapons from naval vessels and stored them in onshore missile silos in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of nuclear forces.

2 Conventional Forces and Other Issues

It is assumed that Russia is implementing the development and procurement of conventional forces based on its state policy on military equipment. There is a need to pay close attention to Russia’s development, procurement and deployment of new equipment in addition to the introduction of Su-35 fighters, which includes the so-called fifth generation fighters¹⁵ and the Mistral-class amphibious assault ships¹⁶.

promoting the development of a new heavy ICBM that can destroy robust ICBM launch sites and mount a large number of warheads, light-weight mobile solid-fuel ICBMs, as well as new warheads of enhanced capability to penetrate missile defense.

¹³ Russia plans to build eight Borey-class SSBNs by 2020. Of the 19 test launches of Bulava missiles conducted between September 2005 and September 2013, 11 test launches were successful. It is believed that the September 2014 Bulava missile test launched from the Alexander Nevsky failed due to a faulty nozzle part. The Russian Ministry of Defence is planning an additional five tests.

¹⁴ Under the leadership of President Putin, an exercise of strategic nuclear units, said to be the largest in recent years, took place in October 2012. The objective of the exercise was to assess the automated communication management system and the new command algorithms for strategic nuclear forces through the integrated action of all components of strategic nuclear systems. The exercise involved one ICBM and one SLBM and the firing of four ALCMs. Surprise inspections are exercises designed to assess the combat readiness of the various service commands by ordering units to complete operational maneuvers without prior warning.

¹⁵ According to various news reports, the fifth prototype of Russia’s fifth generation fighter, the PAK FA (Future Air Complex for Tactical Air Forces), conducted trial flights in October 2013. In March 2013, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Bondarev, stated that the PAK FA will be introduced in 2016.

¹⁶ In December 2010, Russia decided to purchase two ships from a consortium with France. Their construction contract was signed in June 2011, and the launching ceremony of the first ship, Vladivostok, was held in October 2013 in a French shipyard. Furthermore, it is said that Commander of the Pacific Fleet Sergei Avakyan reported to Minister of Defence Shoigu, who visited Vladivostok in February

Furthermore, Russian military forces have been carrying out a range of exercises¹⁷ and since February 2013, they have been conducting surprise inspections designed to validate the combat readiness of the military districts and independent corps for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union¹⁸. Outside of Russia, Russian military forces have continued to participate in the counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden since 2008, and maintained deployment of vessels in the Mediterranean Sea¹⁹. In September 2013, a Kirov-class missile cruiser was deployed to the eastern Arctic for the first time, where it conducted military exercises²⁰.

In this way, the Russian military forces are showing signs of growing activity and expansion of their area of operations.

As for the future Russian military forces, since there are opaque elements which may be influenced by Russia's future economic and social development, it is necessary to continue to observe their future trends.

4 Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan

1 General Situation

Russia newly established the Eastern Military District and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010²¹. In addition to ground forces, the Pacific Fleet, air force, and air defense units have

2014, that the docking infrastructure for the Vladivostok and a second ship, the Sevastopol, will be constructed before the end of September 2015.

¹⁷ Advancing its military reform, Russia has been conducting large-scale exercises for verification and other purposes. Exercises involving field training at the level of military district and above include: "Vostok-2010" conducted in the former Far Eastern Military District and the former Siberian Military District between June and July 2010, and; "Center 2011" in the Central Military District, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in September 2011. "Caucasus-2012" was carried out in the Southern Military District in September 2012. In addition, "Zapado-2013" was carried out in the Western Military District and in the territories of Belarus in September 2013.

¹⁸ Surprise inspections were conducted in February 2013 in the Central Military District and Southern Military District; in March 2014 in the Southern Military District; in May 2014 in the Western Military District; in July 2014 in the Eastern and Central Military Districts; in October there was a surprise inspection of the strategic nuclear units; and between February and March 2014 unannounced inspections were conducted in the Western and Central Military Districts. At the December 2013 the expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board, Minister of Defence Shoigu said that continued unannounced inspections are essential.

¹⁹ Russia's naval fleet in the Mediterranean, for which formation was completed on June 1 2013, are positioned as a permanent operational force.

²⁰ The Temp Airport on the New Siberian Islands (Novosibirsk) located in the Eastern Arctic, has been closed since 1993, but in October 2013, was restored to operation through the support of the Northern Fleet.

²¹ Eastern Military District's headquarters are in Khabarovsk.

also been placed under the control of the Military District Commander, who has unified control over each of these services.

The current presence of the Russian military forces in the Far East region is comparatively much smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian military operations in the vicinity of Japan appear to be increasingly active.

Given that the Russian military forces set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear units as well as dealing with conflicts through the inter-theater mobility of its round-the-clock readiness units, it is necessary to continue paying attention to the positioning and trends of the Russian military forces in the Far East region while also keeping in mind the movement of units in other regions.

(1) Nuclear Forces

As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, ICBMs, such as SS-25s and about 30 Tu-95 long-range bombers are deployed mainly along the Trans-Siberian Railway. In addition, the Delta III-class SSBNs carrying SLBMs are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. By and large strategic nuclear units maintain readiness posture. In a surprise inspection conducted in October 2013 and a field training exercise conducted in May 2014 for the strategic nuclear unit, the Delta III-class SSBNs launched SLBMs in the Sea of Okhotsk. And in December 2013, the second of the Borey-class SSBNs Alexander Nevsky is being deployed in the Pacific Fleet²².

(2) Ground Forces

As part of its military reforms, it is believed that Russia is promoting reorganization from a division-based command structure to a brigade-based one, while also shifting all of its combat forces into permanent readiness units. The Eastern Military District now consists of eleven brigades and one division with about 80,000 personnel in total and has a naval infantry brigade with an amphibious capability.

(3) Naval Forces

The Pacific Fleet is stationed and deployed from its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fleet comprises about 240 ships with a total displacement in the region of

²² In January 2014, ITAR-TASS reported that the submarine is expected to arrive in Vilyuchinsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula, where the submarine will be stationed, in Autumn 2014. Furthermore, in February 2014, Minister of Defence Shoigu visited Vilyuchinsk to inspect the state of construction of the submarine docking infrastructure.

about 600,000 tons, including about 20 major surface ships and about 20 submarines (about 15 of which are nuclear powered submarines) with a total displacement of about 300,000 tons.

(4) Air Forces

In the Eastern Military District, Russia deploys about 340 combat aircraft from its Air Force and Navy combined. This number continues to shrink, but existing models are being modified and new models (Su-35 fighters) are being introduced²³ to improve their capabilities.

2 Russian Forces in Japan's Northern Territories

Since 1978 under the regime of the former Soviet Union, Russia has been redeploying ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of Japan's Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan. The numbers of military personnel are considered to be far less than at past peak times, however, one division with mainly defensive duties is stationed in this region and there are deployed tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles²⁴.

After then President Medvedev visited Kunashiri Island²⁵ for the first time as head of state in November 2010, Russia started replacement of equipment and construction of facilities, among other measures, to ensure the security of the "Kuril" Islands.

The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was about 9,500, and at the Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defence Minister Rodionov made it clear that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 soldiers by 1995. In July 2005, when then Russian Defence Minister Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clearly showing an intention to maintain the status quo²⁶.

²³ In February 2014, 12 Su-35 fighter jets entered service with the 23rd Fighter Regiment based in Khabarovsk.

²⁴ The 18th Machine Gun and Artillery Division which comprises two regiments is Russia's only machine gun and artillery division following the military's progress in reforming divisions into brigades, and is stationed on Etorofu Island and Kunashiri Island. The Division aims to prevent landings, and participated in surprise inspections conducted for the Eastern Military District in July 2013.

²⁵ After the visit, Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island were visited by First Deputy Prime Minister Shuvalov in December 2010, by then Regional Development Minister Basargin in January to February 2011, and by then Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov in May 2011. Furthermore, Security Council Secretary Patrushev visited Kunashiri Island and Suisho Island of the Habomai Islands in September 2011. In addition, in January 2011, Deputy Minister of Defence Bulgakov, and, in February 2011, then Minister of Defence Serdyukov visited Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island and inspected the units stationed there. Furthermore, Prime Minister Medvedev visited Kunashiri Island in July 2012.

²⁶ During the 1998 visit to Russia by our Administrative Vice-Minister of Defence, then Russian Minister of Defence Sergeyev commented that the number of Russian troops stationed in the northern territories

As mentioned above, Russian troops continue to be stationed in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, and it is hoped that the issue will be resolved at an early date.

3 Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

Activities by Russian military forces in the vicinity of Japan including exercises and drills that are believed to have objectives such as verification of the results of military reform are on the rise.

In the large-scale military exercise “Vostok-2010” that was conducted from June to July 2010, it is thought that Russia could verify its ability to respond to conflicts under its new command structure and also its ability to manage units from different services in an integrated manner. In addition, by mobilizing troops that are not stationed in this region to the Far East exercises, it is considered that Russia verified its ability to deploy forces in regions far from where they are stationed²⁷.

In July 2013, a surprise inspection was conducted in the Eastern Military District involving about 160,000 personnel, more than 5,000 combat vehicles, 130 aircraft and 70 naval vessels. Furthermore, between August and September 2013, the Pacific Fleet conducted large scale exercises involving about 15,000 personnel, 50 naval vessels and 30 aircraft in the coast region, Sakhalin, waters off east of Kamchatka Peninsula, and Chukchi Peninsula²⁸. Notably, as part of these exercises naval infantry of the Pacific Fleet conducted landing drills on the Kuril Islands for the first time since the end of the Cold War²⁹.

The number of exercises carried out by Russian ground forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased from the peak, however, some activities seem to be on the rise again.

was being steadily decreased. Also, a senior official of the General Staff stated that troops on the “Kuril Islands” would be maintained at around 3,500, within the process of reorganizing the division into a brigade.

²⁷ In September 2011, a large-scale exercise was held involving anti-vessel and anti-aircraft live fire drills and landing drills in eastern Kamchatka Peninsula. More than 10,000 personnel, 50 naval vessels and 50 aircraft participated in the exercise. Furthermore, between June and July 2012, various exercises, including landing drills, were conducted in Sakhalin involving about 7,000 personnel, 40 naval vessels, and 60 aircraft. Through these drills and exercises, the units trained and improved ability to cope with various situations. Moreover, Vostok 2014, a large-scale exercise, is planned to be held in the Eastern Military District in 2014.

²⁸ In August 2013, the naval infantry of the Pacific Fleet completed a landing drill for the first time on Chukchi Peninsula in the Arctic.

²⁹ An article published on the Ministry of Defence website on the November 27, 2013 Naval Infantry Day

With regard to naval vessels, their activities seem to be on the rise in recent years. For example, joint exercises and counter-piracy operations have been carried out, in long voyages by vessels deployed in the Pacific Fleet, and nuclear submarines are carrying out patrols³⁰. In September 2011, 24 naval vessels including a Slava-class guided missile cruiser passed through the Soya Strait one after the other. This was the first time ever identified since the end of the cold war that Russian naval vessels on this scale passed through the strait³¹. In a surprise inspection conducted in the Eastern Military District (July 2013), 23 vessels passed through the Soya Strait. In August of the same year, 16 vessels passed through the Soya Strait.

Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing flights by long-range bombers and carrying out flights of Tu-95 long-range bombers and Tu-160 long-range bombers which are refueled in mid-flight and supported by A-50 early warning aircraft and Su-27 fighters³². Moreover, due to an upturn in its fuel situation, among other factors, pilot training time is on an upward trend, and in September 2011 and March and December 2013 Tu-95 long-range bombers, etc. took a route that circled the area encompassing Japan. There also seems to be an increase in activities such as flights approaching Japan and exercises and training³³, as exemplified by the abnormal flights of Russian aircraft detected on seven consecutive days and the flights by six individual Tu-95 long-range bombers on one single day between March and April 2014³⁴.

See ▶ *Fig. I-1-4-3 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Russian Aircraft)*

5 Relations with Other Countries

³⁰ The number of cases of the Russian fleet passing through the three international straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) of Japan that have been identified and disclosed in FY2013 is as follows: eleven cases in the Soya Strait (eleven in 2011, six in 2012), one case in the Tsugaru Strait (one in 2011, two in 2012), and four cases in the Tsushima Strait (seven in 2011, five in 2012).

³¹ A part of 24 naval vessels participated in an exercise conducted in the eastern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula and other places.

³² The Russian Ministry of Defence announced in January 2014 that surveillance flights of two Tu-95 long-range bombers took place with the assistance of Su-27 fighter jets and A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft.

³³ Long-range flights in the vicinity of Japan were carried out in areas surrounding Japan by Tu-95 long-range bombers in July, September and November 2011, February and April 2012 and March and December 2013; by Tu-22 middle-range bombers four times in August 2011; and by Tu-142 patrol aircraft in December 2013. When Tu-95 long-range bombers took a route that circled the area encompassing Japan in September 2011, they were refueled in mid-flight by an IL-78 air tanker in the temporary danger zone set by Russia. In addition, when Tu-95 long-range bombers flew in the vicinity of Japan in February 2012 and February 2014, other aircraft such as A-50 early warning aircraft flew with them. Two Su-27 fighters and two Tu-95 long-range bombers invaded Japanese airspace in February 2013 and August 2013 respectively.

³⁴ In April 2014, Deputy Minister of Defence Antonov stated that "Russian air force aircrafts operated in strict compliance with international law." The Deputy Minister also asked the Japanese Ministry of Defense to "alter its attitude toward cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defence."

1 General Situation

Recognizing that, amid the trend toward multipolarity, Russia's international position as one of the poles of influence is being strengthened, Russia sets out its basic foreign policy to achieve its national interests³⁵. Moreover, stating that its diplomacy is to be conducted based on the national security that serves the interests of its people, Russia aims at a practical diplomacy conducive to solving issues toward modernizing the country's economy³⁶.

Toward this goal, while strengthening the economic cooperation with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, Russia is taking initiatives to strengthen its ties with the United States and European countries to achieve modernization, launching the building of a partnership with the European Union (EU)³⁷. Also from the perspective of its own modernization, Russia considers that it needs to strengthen its relationships with countries in the Asia-Pacific region³⁸. Close attention should be paid to how Russia, with its diplomatic stance focused on the benefits of achieving its own modernization, will develop its relations with other countries in the future, including in the area of security.

2 Relations with Asian Countries

Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and the relationship with Asian countries is also important from the viewpoint of economic development in Siberia and the Far East³⁹, anti-terrorist measures, and security⁴⁰. In the presidential order concerning foreign policy issued in May 2012, President Putin holds up his policy to participate in the integration process of the Asia-Pacific region in order to accelerate socioeconomic development in the East Siberia and Far East regions, and stated that Russia will work to develop relationships with Japan, South Korea and other

³⁵ The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in July 2008).

³⁶ According to the speech by then President Medvedev at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations (July 2010) and the annual state of the nation address (November 2009, November 2010 and December 2011). In his paper on foreign policy published in February 2012 to serve as a campaign platform, then Prime Minister Putin showed his stance to ensure Russia's security and interests while developing mutually-beneficial cooperative relationships with other countries.

³⁷ In Izvestia on October 4, 2011, then Prime Minister Putin advocated the foundation of a "Eurasia Union" to strengthen economic partnerships in the region built on the customs union and the unified economic block. In addition, eight CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia) signed the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement in the same month.

³⁸ According to the speech by then President Medvedev at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations (July 2010) and the annual state of the nation address (November 2010).

³⁹ Russia is currently developing resources in Siberia and Sakhalin.

⁴⁰ The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in July 2008). In his paper on foreign policy to serve as a campaign platform published in February 2012, then Prime Minister Putin expressed his recognition that the importance of the whole Asia-Pacific region was rising.

countries in addition to China⁴¹, India and Vietnam⁴².

Under this policy, Russia has participated in various frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region⁴³. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit was held in Vladivostok in September 2012.

With regard to Russia-India relations, the two countries maintain a close relationship under a strategic partnership, with the leaders of both countries paying mutual visits to the other. In October 2013, President Putin held talks with Prime Minister Singh when he visited Russia, during which they reached an agreement on enhanced military cooperation including arms exports. The two countries are strengthening their military technology cooperation, including the joint development of the fifth generation PAK FA fighter jet and the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. Additionally, since 2003 Russia and India have been conducting INDRA anti-terrorism exercises involving the armies and navies of both countries. Regarding the relationship with Japan, Russia states that it will develop mutually beneficial cooperation and is intensifying its approach in many fields including politics, economy and security.

3 Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States

(1) General Situation

Russia has positioned the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS as the highest priority of its diplomatic policy. Stating that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS⁴⁴, Russia has been making efforts to maintain its military influence⁴⁵, such as by dispatching troops to be stationed in Ukraine (Crimea), Moldova (Transdnester⁴⁶),

⁴¹ See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3-3 for the relationship with China

⁴² President Putin made an official visit to Vietnam and ROK in November 2013.

⁴³ Russia has participated in regional frameworks, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the East Asia Summit (EAS since 2011.)

⁴⁴ After the conflict with Georgia in August 2008, then President Medvedev indicated that Russia recognized as one of its five principles of diplomacy the area of privileged interests for Russia.

⁴⁵ While some CIS countries continue to prioritize their relations with Russia, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, others are attempting to maintain a distance from Russia. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova have been taking mostly pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia. In September 2012, Kyrgyzstan and Russia agreed on a 15-year extension of the period of use of Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan, which otherwise would end in 2017. In October 2012, Tajikistan and Russia agreed to extend the lease of the base of Russia's 201st Motor Rifle Division in Tajikistan until 2042. In December 2013, Su-27 fighters of the Russian naval force were deployed in Belarus for the first time.

⁴⁶ In Transnistria, located on the eastern side of the Dniester River, ethnic Russian residents declared separation and independence from Moldova in 1990, but was never recognized as such by the international community. Following the annexation of Crimea into Russia, in March 2014 the Parliament of Transnistria urged Russia to also incorporate the region. Moreover, during a telephone conference between President Putin and President Obama in March 2014, President Putin pointed out that

Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia, which left the CIS in August 2009 (South Ossetia, Abkhazia)⁴⁷.

With increasing activities by Islamic armed insurgents in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia has been pursuing military cooperation centered on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized the Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)⁴⁸. Furthermore, in June 2009, a permanent joint rapid reaction force was established to strengthen the functions of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force⁴⁹.

In addition, out of concern that the worsening security in Afghanistan could lead to the destabilization of Central Asia, Russia and Central Asian countries are supporting Afghanistan while considering measures to strengthen the security of borders with Afghanistan⁵⁰.

(2) Ukraine

Following political upheaval in Ukraine in February 2014, the Yanukovich Government collapsed and was replaced by an interim government led by the opposition party. At the same

Transnistria is experiencing a blockade. A Russian unit of about 1,500 troops is currently stationed in Transnistria.

⁴⁷ After the conflict with Russia in August 2008, Georgia withdrew from the CIS in August 2009, but Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Georgian territory and continues to have troops stationed in the regions. In the parliamentary election in October 2012 “Georgian Dream,” an opposition alliance with a campaign promise of improving Georgia-Russia relations, defeated the ruling “United National Movement” that adopts an anti-Russian policy. In the presidential election of October 2013, Giorgi Margvelashvili, backed by “Georgian Dream,” was elected and became president in November of the same year. In his inauguration speech, President Margvelashvili stated that he was ready to deepen the dialogue with Russia, expressing his intention to continue with pro-Euro, pro-U.S. lines while pursuing improvement of the relationship with Russia.

⁴⁸ In May 1992, leaders of six countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus joined the treaty, which came into effect in April 1994. However, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in 1999 without renewing it. In May 2002, CST was reorganized into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Uzbekistan returned to CST in August 2006 but gave notice of suspension of participation in CSTO in June 2012, effectively withdrawing from the organization.

⁴⁹ Learning from the fact that CSTO could not sufficiently respond to the request by Kyrgyzstan for peace keeping at the time of the ethnic conflict in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, CSTO has been discussing improvement in the efficiency of its crisis response system. The CSTO summit meeting in December 2011 warned against foreign forces’ stationing in a member state by requiring the consent of all member states when any member state builds a base of a third country. CSTO joint exercises, “Vzaimodeistvie” (cooperative operation), were implemented in Kazakhstan in October 2009 and October 2010, in Armenia in September 2012, and in Belarus in September 2013.

⁵⁰ During the December 2013 Russian the expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board, President Putin said that the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in 2014 would be a destabilizing element to not only Afghanistan but also the wider Central Asia and could also pose a threat to the national interests and security of Russia.

time in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in southern Ukraine, military forces, believed to be Russian forces, occupied the Council of Ministers Building and the Parliamentary Building. The military forces also took control of arterial roads to the airport and the rest of Ukraine as well as some major Ukrainian military forces facilities. In March 2014 after Russia took effective control of Crimea, a referendum was held, asking Crimean citizens if they wanted Crimea to be “annexed” by the Russian Federation. Following the referendum, Russia “annexed” Crimea. In March, 2014 President Putin criticized western nations in a speech, pledging to protect the interests of ethnic Russian citizens of Ukraine. The United States, European countries and Japan condemned the referendum as it violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and is in violation of international laws including the Charter of the United Nations, and have refused to recognize the “annexation” of Crimea⁵¹. Said countries have expressed the view that Russia’s changing of the status quo by force or coercion is a global issue that impacts the entire international community, including Asia. In April 2014, forces believed to be ethnic Russian citizens increased the intensity of their protests and attacks against the interim Ukrainian government in eastern and southern Ukraine. During this period, buildings including the Council of Ministers Building were seized. In response, the interim Ukrainian government accused Russia of involvement and made attempts to expel the occupying forces by flinging the military, etc. However, this has not led to the resolution of the situation. On the other hand, Russia is believed to have deployed military forces consisting of as many as 40,000 personnel near the Ukraine-Russia border. In May 2014, a presidential election was held in Ukraine, except in Crimea and some parts of Eastern Ukraine, in a free, fair, and peaceful manner. Candidate Mr. Petro Poroshenko was elected by winning a majority of the votes and assumed the office of President in June of the same year. There have been indications that a diplomatic solution is being sought over the Ukrainian situation, but the situation is in a state of flux and the outlook remains extremely volatile and uncertain.

4 Relations with the United States

⁵¹ Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei stated during a March 2, 2014 press conference that "China maintains the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs of other countries and respects the independence, sovereignty and the protection of territories of Ukraine." During a March 7, 2014 press conference, Hong Lei said, "China has always opposed the rushed implementation of sanctions during a period of deteriorating international relations and the use of sanctions as a means of intimidation. China hopes that all relevant nations seek to avoid a further deterioration of the situation and seek political resolution of the crisis." Hong Lei avoided directly answering the question as to whether he believes that the referendum in Crimea was in violation of international law, saying "China urges all forces in Ukraine to resolve the issue peacefully through dialog and negotiation under a legal and well-ordered framework. China also urges all forces in Ukraine to protect the interests of Ukrainians, promptly restore order and maintain the peace and stability of the region." Moreover, China refused to adopt the March 2014 United Nations Security Council Resolution ruling the referendum in Crimea invalid. During the speech delivered by President Putin following the March 2014 referendum in Crimea, Putin expressed his gratitude to China.

With the inauguration of the Obama administration in January 2009, the U.S.-Russia relationship, which had been stalled due to the Russo-Georgian War, went through a period in which both sides took the stance of improving relations, but the gap between them has not yet been filled.

In August 2013, the U.S. expressed strong disapproval over Russia's decision to grant temporary asylum to Snowden, a former U.S. intelligence agency employee⁵². Consequently, the U.S. notified Russia of its intention to postpone the U.S.-Russia Summit scheduled to take place in September the same year⁵³. In relation to Syrian affairs, Russia expressed strong disapproval over President Obama's announcement to take military action against Syria on the grounds that the Syrian Government used chemical weapons. Russia successfully encouraged the al-Assad regime of Syria to abandon all chemical weapons.

Russia strongly opposed the deployment plan of the MD system in Europe by the United States, stating that it would have a negative impact on Russia's nuclear deterrent capabilities. But in September 2009, the United States announced that it was reviewing the proposed deployment of the MD system in Europe⁵⁴, which was cautiously welcomed by Russia.

However, Russia's understanding is that the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) effective from February 2011 would be invalidated if the United States developed, both quantitatively and qualitatively, its MD capabilities and threatened Russia's potential strategic nuclear strength⁵⁵. Russia also indicates that it would withdraw from the new START in response to the United States' recent advancement of its MD plan in Europe⁵⁶.

It is believed that Russia intends to establish a certain level of cooperative relationship in military exchanges with the U.S. as exemplified by Russian naval vessels' first participation in RIMPAC conducted in the seas around Hawaii in July 2012. However, in light of Russia's

⁵² Former U.S. intelligence agency employee Edward Snowden was charged with espionage for revealing domestic and international intelligence gathering practices by the U.S. Edward Snowden later sought asylum in Russia.

⁵³ The U.S.-Russia Defense Ministers and Foreign Ministers meeting (Two-Plus-Two meeting) was held in Washington in August 2013 as scheduled. This was the first meeting of its kind since the Moscow meeting in March 2008 five-and-a-half years ago.

⁵⁴ Refer to Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1 - 2 for the U.S. deployment plan of the MD system in Europe.

⁵⁵ Statement by the Russian Federation concerning missile defense (April 8, 2010)

⁵⁶ Russia has demanded a legal guarantee that the MD plan of the United States is not targeted at Russia, and claimed that the United States is not considering Russia's concerns. Russia issued a Presidential statement in November 2011, mentioning countermeasures such as fielding of early-warning radars and the possibility of its withdrawal from the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. In addition, in November 2013, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that if the Geneva agreement on Iran's nuclear issues was implemented, a U.S. MD system for Europe would not be needed.

attitude toward the Ukrainian situation, the United States announced that military exchanges with Russia would be halted in March 2014⁵⁷. Furthermore, the U.S. exhibited actions to restrain Russia by dispatching a missile destroyer to the Black Sea as well as F-16 fighter jets to Poland.

5 Relations with Europe and NATO

While the relationship between Russia and NATO temporarily deteriorated due to factors such as the Russo-Georgian War, through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia now participates to a certain extent in NATO decision-making and acts as an equal partner in areas of mutual interest.

At the NRC summit held in Lisbon in November 2010, Russia and NATO stated that both sides would work toward building a true and modernized strategic partnership. They are now searching for possibilities of dialogue and cooperation in fields such as missile defense (MD), Afghanistan, cooperation to fight terrorism, and anti-piracy measures. With regard to MD cooperation, there has been no progress in the cooperation of Russia and NATO. For example, the talks at the meeting of NRC defense ministers held in June 2011 highlighted the difference in position between NATO advocating MD cooperation in which only information and data would be exchanged under the two independent systems of NATO and Russia, and the position of Russia aiming at “sector MD” in which both sides operate integrally by setting zones for each country’s responsibility under a unified MD system of NATO and Russia.

Meanwhile, there remains the unsolved problem between Russia and NATO about the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement⁵⁸. In addition, NATO and European countries decided in April 2014 to cease practical support including military aspects, excluding the ambassador-level meetings of NRC, in response to Russia’s “annexation” of Crimea⁵⁹.

⁵⁷ Following the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia, U.S. Department of Defense spokesperson Kirby announced in March 2014 that the U.S. will cease all military exchange with Russia including joint exercises with Russian forces, consultations, and port calls.

⁵⁸ At the 1999 Istanbul summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), an agreement was reached on changing the troop ceilings set formerly by blocks to those set by country and territory and on complying with the current CFE Treaty until the adapted CFE Treaty comes into effect. Dissatisfied with NATO members having refused to ratify the adopted CFE Treaty due to Russian forces not withdrawing from Georgia and Moldova, although Russia had ratified it, in December 2007 Russia suspended the implementation of the CFE Treaty and halted inspections based on this treaty. At the time of writing, only four countries had ratified the adapted CFE Treaty—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—and it has not yet come into effect. Besides this, Russia has proposed dissolving the existing security framework that has NATO at its center and creating a new European security treaty that would provide new fundamental principles for security in Europe and the Atlantic region.

⁵⁹ NATO issued a statement of condemnation over the Ukraine situation. NATO deployed additional military forces in Eastern Europe and the Baltic region, but member nations have shown varied attitudes

NATO dispatched early warning and control aircraft (AWACS) with an aim to monitor the airspace of NATO member states bordering Ukraine as well as the Black Sea.

6 Exportation of Arms

Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country's export value has been increasing in recent years⁶⁰. In January 2007, the Russian government granted the exclusive right to export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part of its ongoing initiatives to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral part of the nation's military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev.

Russia has exported its fighter jets and warships to countries including India, ASEAN member countries, China, Algeria, and Venezuela⁶¹.

toward Russia. In addition to the cessation of military cooperation with Russia, the UK also announced halting of military equipment exports and the deployment of fighter jets for enhanced patrolling of the Baltic region's airspace. Germany also expressed intentions to halt military equipment exports to Russia.

⁶⁰ According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russian arms exports between 2009 and 2013 increased by 28% compared to the period between 2004 and 2008.

⁶¹ Russia concluded sales contracts with Indonesia for the Su-27 and Su-30 fighters in 2003 and 2007, and with Malaysia and Vietnam for the Su-30 fighters in 2003, and has delivered the fighters to these countries. There are also reports of a sales contract with Vietnam in 2009 for the Su-30 fighters and Kilo-class submarines. In January 2014, the first of the Kilo-class submarines, "Hanoi," arrived in Vietnam. With regard to India, aircraft carrier "Admiral Gorshkov," which had been refurbished in Severodvinsk, was delivered to India, renamed as INS Vikramaditya, which arrived in India in January 2014. Moreover, in 2006, Russia concluded sales contracts with Algeria and Venezuela for arms, including Su-30 fighters, and has delivered some of these arms. Russia's exports to China have included Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. However, against the backdrop of the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China, while some point out that the value of its exports to China has been declining, exports such as aircraft engines for repair purposes continue.

Section 5 Southeast Asia

1 General Situation

Southeast Asia occupies a strategic position for traffic linking the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, and is an important region for Japan. The countries in Southeast Asia are making efforts to achieve political stability and steady economic growth, and lately have realized overall economic development to varying degrees. Such economic development has deepened interdependence within and outside the region. However, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial disputes over the South China Sea, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there are incidents such as piracy by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed. In order to cope with these issues, the countries in Southeast Asia are working to build sufficient military forces not only for traditional national defense and maintenance of domestic public security but also for addressing new security issues such as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. In recent years, against the backdrop of economic development, they have been modernizing their military forces, particularly their naval and air forces.

See ► Fig. I-1-5-1 (Comparison of Forces Strength and Defense Budget between Southeast Asia and Japan/China/ROK 2013)

2 Security and Defense Policies of Each Country

1 Indonesia

Indonesia is a country of importance in Southeast Asia with the world's largest Muslim population, a vast land and territorial waters, and strategic importance for maritime traffic. Although Indonesia does not suffer from any immediate external threats, it is faced with internal risks, including activities of Muslim radicals, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and secession and independence movements in Papua Province.

As a national defense policy, Indonesia is promoting "Total Defence" through both military defense and non-military defense activities under the idea that all people utilize all resources available in the country to maintain its independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unification. Furthermore, as a military reform, Indonesia aims to achieve what it calls Minimum Essential Force (MEF), the requirements for minimum defense capabilities.

Indonesia emphasizes cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries¹, and practices an

¹ At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting held in July 2012, member states were divided over the

independent and active foreign policy. It is strengthening its cooperative relationship with the United States in such fields as military education and training, and military equipment procurement², and is involved in joint training with the United States. These include the “CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training)”³ and the “SEACAT (Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism)”⁴ exercises. In 2010, President Obama visited Indonesia to conclude a comprehensive partnership between the two countries. Furthermore, in August 2013 when US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel visited Indonesia, the two countries agreed on the sale of eight AH-64 attack helicopters from the United States to Indonesia, and concurred on strengthening bilateral defense cooperation.

Indonesia’s special operation forces are also engaged in the counter-terrorism training “Sharp Knife” in cooperation with China’s special operation forces. In October 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Indonesia and held talks with President Yudhoyono about strengthening cooperation against terrorism, as well as in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In addition, Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Moeldoko visited China in February 2014 and held talks with Chief of General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army, Fang Fenghui, covering issues such as strengthening and improving bilateral defense relations.

See ► Part I, Chapter 1, Section 7-3 (Relations with Other Countries); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-6 (Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries [1 Indonesia])

2 Malaysia

Malaysia, which is located at the center of Southeast Asia, considers itself to have common strategic interests with its neighboring countries. Although Malaysia does not acknowledge any imminent external threats at present, it believes that its forces should maintain a level of readiness that enables them to deal with all military threats, and therefore it places importance on “Independence,” “Total Defence,” “Commitment to the Rule of the Five Power Defence

contents of the joint declaration, and the joint declaration was ultimately not adopted. However, after the meeting, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, held successive talks with foreign ministers from the respective member states. This led to the formulation of ASEAN’s Six Point Principles on the South China Sea.

² Concerning the issue of Timor-Leste, the United States suspended International Military Education and Training for Indonesian military personnel in 1992. IMET provides opportunities for studying and training at the U.S. military educational institutions. Though the restriction was partially lifted in 1995, the United States suspended IMET again in 1999. Later in 2005, the United States lifted the restriction and decided to resume arms export to Indonesia.

³ A general term that refers to a series of bilateral exercises that the U.S. conducts with Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Timor-Leste.

⁴ A general term that refers to counter-terrorism joint exercises that the U.S. conducts with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

Arrangements (FPDA)⁵,” “Cooperation to the U.N. for World Peace,” “Measures against Terrorism,” and “Defence Diplomacy” in its defense policy. Moreover, as part of “Defense Diplomacy,” Malaysia undertakes bilateral joint exercises such as the “CARAT” and “SEACAT” exercises with the U.S., which is not a FPDA country, and also conducts bilateral exercises with India to promote military cooperation.

Despite competing territorial claims over the South China Sea, Malaysia has a strong economic relationship with China and the leaders of both countries often visit with each other. In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Malaysia, and Malaysian Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein visited China. It is reported that the two countries agreed to conduct the first joint military exercises in 2014.

See ▶ Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-6 (Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries [9 Malaysia])

3 Myanmar

Myanmar shares borders with China and India, which are leading actors in the changes of the balance of power in the international community, and is also located on the border of South Asia and Southeast Asia. As such, its strategic significance is pointed out. Following the collapse of its socialist regime in 1988, the armed forces seized power in Myanmar, and the military junta suppressed pro-democracy movements. In response, the United States and European countries imposed economic sanctions. Against the backdrop of a slump in its economy as a result of economic sanctions and isolation in the international community, Myanmar issued a road map to democracy in 2003⁶. After a general election in 2010, Thein Sein was elected as a new president in February 2011. The road map to democracy was completed in March 2011 with the launch of the new administration led by Thein Sein.

Since the launch of the new administration, the government of Myanmar has been actively making initiatives toward democratization, including the release of political prisoners and ceasefire agreements with ethnic minorities⁷. In November 2013, peace talks were held between

⁵ Entered into force in 1971. This agreement states that Australia, New Zealand and the U.K. will discuss what response should be adopted in the event of aggression towards or the threat of an attack on Malaysia or Singapore. The five countries carry out various exercises based on these arrangements.

⁶ Consists of seven steps of: reconvening of the National Assembly, stepwise implementation of processes necessary for democratization, drafting a new constitution, a national referendum, convening of Pyithu Hluttaws, holding of elections and the establishment of a new government.

⁷ About 30% of Myanmar’s population is ethnic minorities, some of which demand secession or greater autonomy for their regions. In 1960s, the government of Myanmar implemented oppressive policies including human rights violations such as forced labor and forced migration, which led to armed conflicts with armed groups of ethnic minorities.

the government and ethnic minorities concerning a nationwide ceasefire agreement, and talks have been held continuously since then. The international community cautiously welcomed these initiatives, with the United States and European countries successively easing economic sanctions on Myanmar. In May 2013, President Thein Sein became the first president from Myanmar to visit the United States in almost 50 years. During the visit, he held talks with President Obama. In June the same year, Chief of the Defense Staff of the British Armed Forces, General Sir Richards, visited Myanmar as the first military official from western countries since its reform process began.

On the other hand, concerns about nuclear issues and military ties with North Korea are also pointed out⁸, and the international community has growing concerns regarding the impact on democratization of the conflicts which have emerged since 2012 between the Rohingya Muslim ethnic group and Buddhists.

In foreign policy, Myanmar upholds the principle of independence and non-alignment. On the other hand, China is thought to be an especially important partner to Myanmar since its period of military rule. Myanmar receives economic support from China. In October 2013, a gas pipeline connecting the two countries was completed and started full-scale operations. In the military area, China is regarded as a major supplier of equipment. In addition, in the same month, the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services visited China and held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Myanmar is also strengthening its cooperative relationship with India both in economic and military areas.

ASEAN accepted Myanmar as the 2014 chair of ASEAN, and its leadership in ASEAN-related international conferences is drawing much attention.

See ▶ Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-6 (Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries [7 Myanmar])

4 The Philippines

The Philippines perceives that it is confronted with new security challenges, including

⁸ It is reported that at talks with then ROK President Lee Myung-Bak, President Thein Sein admitted that some weapons trading took place with North Korea in the past 20 years and indicated that the country would not engage in such trade in the future. He denied cooperation with North Korea in nuclear development. Moreover, it has been reported that, at the 11th IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) held in June the same year, then Defense Minister Hla Min disclosed that academic studies on nuclear technology had begun under the previous government, but that this research had been abandoned when the new government was inaugurated and that Myanmar had also suspended its political and military ties with North Korea.

non-traditional issues and concerns in the security environment, such as cross-border crime. At the same time, it identifies long-standing security issues, such as the territorial disputes over the South China Sea and terrorism perpetrated by domestic antigovernment armed groups, as the major threats to national security. In particular, the government of the Philippines had been engaged in armed conflicts with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) for over 40 years. With the help of the International Monitoring Team⁹, significant progress was made in the peace process, which resulted in the signing of the Framework Agreement towards a resolution of the Mindanao peace process in October 2012. In January 2014, the Government of the Philippines and the MILF jointly signed the annex on Normalization¹⁰ and in March of the same year, they signed the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangasamoro: FAB¹¹. On the other hand, military clashes occurred between the government army and another armed groups opposing peace process¹². As such, it is thought that it will take time to achieve practical peace.

Having a historically close relationship, the Philippines and the United States recognize that the U.S.-Philippines alliance is essential for the peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. The two countries have maintained the cooperative relationship under the mutual defense treaty and military assistance agreement, even after the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in 1992¹³. The two countries have been conducting the large-scale annual joint military exercise Balikatan since 2000 as well as the “CARAT” and “SEACAT” joint exercises. In addition, the United States dispatched the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JISOTF-P) to the south Philippines to support the armed forces of the Philippines in their campaign against

⁹ As of January 2013, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Norway and EU are the member states of IMT.

¹⁰ After a framework agreement was concluded in 2012, amongst the four annexes that had been continuously reviewed by the Philippine government and the MILF, an agreement had already been reached on items related to transitional arrangements and modalities, revenue generation and wealth sharing, etc., and power sharing. The final item left was talks about normalization.

¹¹ The goal of this agreement is to launch an autonomous government in 2016 after formulating the Bangsamoro Basic Law, holding a referendum in order to demarcate a jurisdictional domain, abolishing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and establishing the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA).

¹² In September 2013, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which opposes peace talks with the government, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) clashed with government military forces over three weeks at Zamboanga, located in the southern part of Mindanao. In January 2014, there were reports that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) had engaged in armed conflict with national military forces.

¹³ In 1947, a military base agreement was concluded that allows the United States to use Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station for 99 years and a military assistance agreement was also concluded in 1947, followed by the mutual defense treaty in 1951. With the revision of the 1966 military base agreement, the time limit for the presence of U.S. military bases in the Philippines was set for 1991. Then, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station were returned in 1991 and 1992, respectively. Subsequently, the two countries concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998, establishing the legal status of U.S. military personnel visiting for joint military exercises in the Philippines.

Muslim extremist groups, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)¹⁴. In November 2011, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario and then U.S. Secretary of State Clinton signed the Manila Declaration commemorating the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty. In April 2012, the first U.S.-Philippines Ministerial Dialogue (“2+2”) was held. In December 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited the Philippines announcing support of 40 million USD in three years in order to enhance maritime defenses and counter-terrorism capabilities.

In April 2014, the two countries signed the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement¹⁵ aimed at strengthening bilateral cooperation in such areas as maritime security, capacity-building of the Philippine military through expanded joint exercises, and disaster relief.

The Philippines has territorial disputes with China over the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. In recent years, both countries have been exercising greater assertiveness in pressing their territorial claims and in raising objections against each other’s actions and assertions.

See ► Part I, Chapter 1, Section 5-4 (Trends Concerning the South China Sea)

See ► Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-6 (Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries [4 The Philippines])

5 Singapore

Given its limited national land area, population and resources, Singapore’s existence and development depend on the peace and stability of the region in the globalized economy, and it gives high priority to national defense, with defense spending accounting for about one-quarter of its national budget.

Singapore identifies deterrence and diplomacy as the twin pillars of its national defense policy. Deterrence is provided by a robust national army and stable national defense spending, and diplomacy is established by strong and friendly relations with the defense institutions of other countries. Singapore is also working on capability improvement and modernization of the national army in order to defend the nation against direct threats and to respond to cross-border security issues, such as terrorism and piracy in peacetime. Since its land area is small, Singapore

¹⁴ With the aim of building a Muslim nation, ASG conducts activities such as terrorist bombings, assassinations and abductions in the southern Philippines.

¹⁵ This Agreement enables the U.S. Forces to build facilities and develop infrastructure at the bases of the Philippine military, preposition and store equipment and supplies for the defense of the Philippines as well as for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, etc.

uses the military training facilities of other countries, such as the United States and Australia, and regularly sends its forces there for training.

Singapore emphasizes the importance of the cooperative relations with ASEAN and the FPDA¹⁶, and has concluded defense cooperation agreements with countries within and outside the region. With the aim of contributing to peace and stability in the region, Singapore supports the United States' presence in the Asia-Pacific and permits it to use military facilities in Singapore. Since 2013, Singapore and the United States has agreed to deploy U.S. littoral combat ships (LCS) to Singapore with a rotation of a maximum of four deployed ships, and a ship was accordingly deployed in April 2013¹⁷. In addition, Singapore conducted joint exercises with the U.S. such as the "CARAT" and "SEACAT" exercises.

Singapore and China conducted joint counter-terrorism exercises in 2009 and 2010 and have developed active reciprocal leaders' visits. In May 2013, Foreign Minister Wang Yi of China visited Singapore and Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Hsien Loong visited China in August of the same year.

See ► Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-6 (Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries [3 Singapore])

6 Thailand

The Yingluck Administration, inaugurated in August 2011, has refined its security policies, aiming to improve army capabilities, enhance the defense industry, promote cooperative relations with neighboring countries, and strengthen capabilities to respond to non-traditional threats. Attacks and bombing incidents by Muslim radicals seeking secession/independence have become a frequent occurrence in southern Thailand and the new administration has identified the rapid restoration of peace and safety for the life and property of the people in the South as an urgent task.

In August 2013, a large-scale anti-government demonstration broke out in the heart of the capital city of Bangkok in response to the submission of an amnesty bill¹⁸ by the ruling party to the House of Representatives. The demonstration spread even after the bill was repealed in

¹⁶ See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 5-2, footnote 5

¹⁷ It has been reported that the second vessel is scheduled to be deployed in late 2014.

¹⁸ This gives amnesty to those who were arrested in the political upheaval since the military coup in 2006. It is said to allow the return home of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who is living abroad and has been convicted.

November of the same year. The House of Representatives was dissolved in December 2013, and a state of emergency¹⁹ was declared in January 2014. However, protesters continued with the demonstrations. Although general elections were held for the House of Representatives in February of the same year, voting activities were often disrupted by the protestors, and voting had to be halted at many voting centers. Consequently, in March of the same year, the Constitutional Court ruled that the House of Representatives elections were a violation of constitutional rights and therefore deemed invalid. The ruling party objected to this ruling. On May 7 of the same year, the Constitutional Court ruled that the personnel reshuffle that the cabinet conducted in the past was unconstitutional, resulting in the instant dismissal of (then) Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and Cabinet members²⁰. Amid such circumstances, martial law was declared across the whole of Thailand on May 20 of the same year. On May 22, forces led by the military launched a coup and seized full control of the nation.

Thailand has unresolved border issues with neighboring countries, such as Myanmar and Cambodia. Thailand has a border dispute with Cambodia over the undefined border area²¹ surrounding the Preah Vihear Temple and has experienced intermittent armed conflict since 2008. The International Court of Justice issued provisional preservation measures ordering both countries to immediately withdraw their military personnel. Based on this and leaders' meetings, in July 2012, both countries started withdrawing their forces from the disputed area. In November 2013, the International Court of Justice declared the temple and a part of surrounding area to be Cambodian territory. Although the rest of the area was not clarified, both countries accepted the judgment, proceeding with further deliberation on the decision at the working level joint committee going forward.

Under its flexible omni-directional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries, including Japan, the United States and China. Since the conclusion of the Military Assistance Agreement in 1950, Thailand

¹⁹ In November 2013, the ruling party gave up on the passage of the bill, however, anti-government forces shifted the objective of the demonstrations to “overthrowing the current government,” continuing the demonstrations.

²⁰ The Constitutional Court ruled that the transfer of then National Security Council chief to a sinecure position in September 2011 was conducted for political purposes to promote a relative of (then) Prime Minister Yingluck to a higher position. The Court ruled that this was unconstitutional as it infringes on the provisions of the Constitution which prohibit state ministers from intervening unjustifiably in public servant appointments. The Prime Minister who was responsible for the reshuffle and relevant ministers were instantly dismissed on the grounds that the reshuffle constituted reason for dismissal provided for in the Constitution.

²¹ A Hindu temple located on the border between Cambodia and Thailand. The International Court of Justice ruled in 1962 that the temple was situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia; however, the land around the temple remains undefined.

and its ally²², the United States, have maintained a cooperative relationship, and have been conducting the multinational military exercise “Cobra Gold” since 1982, as well as the “CARAT” and “SEACAT” joint exercises. However, in May 2014, the United States froze its military assistance in response to the coup.

Thailand promotes military exchanges with China; for example, the marine forces of Thailand and China hold a joint military training program codenamed “Blue Assault,” and Thailand and China agreed on the joint development of a multi-barreled rocket launching device in April 2012.

See ▶ Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-6 (Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries [5 Thailand])

7 Vietnam

Vietnam realizes that it is confronted with more diverse and complex security challenges, that the issues in the South China Sea have serious impacts on the maritime activities of Vietnam, and that non-traditional threats, such as piracy and terrorism, are matters of concern.

During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union was the largest donor of assistance for Vietnam, and Russia owned a naval base in Cam Ranh Bay. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vietnam rapidly expanded its diplomatic relations, and established diplomatic ties with the United States. At present, Vietnam pursues an omni-directional diplomatic policy and states that it will actively participate in international and regional cooperation in order to build friendly relations with all countries. In May 2013, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung announced the first participation in peacekeeping operations by Vietnam’s national armed forces. Furthermore, in May 2014, a PKO Center was established at the Foreign Relations Department of the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defence. As such efforts exemplify, Vietnam is committed to making contributions to the international community.

In recent years, Vietnam is strengthening its relationship with the United States in the military area through joint exercises with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Navy ships’ calling at Vietnam, for example. In September 2011, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on promoting cooperation between the two defense ministries. In December 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited Vietnam, announcing support of 1.8 million USD in maritime capacity building.

²² Thailand is in alliance with the United States based on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact, of 1954 and the Rusk-Thanat communiqué of 1962.

Vietnam and Russia elevated their bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2012, and continue to strengthen cooperation in the area of national defense. In March 2013, the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Sergei Shoigu, visited Vietnam, and the two parties agreed to jointly construct warship replenishment facilities along Cam Ranh Bay. Furthermore, when President Vladimir Putin visited Vietnam in November of the same year, he agreed that Russia will provide support for training People's Army of Vietnam and Vietnam People's Navy. In recent years, the two countries have also been moving forward on cooperation in the energy sector, such as nuclear power generation. Vietnam is also almost completely dependent on Russia for its defense equipment.

Vietnam and China, under their comprehensive strategic partnership, are proactively conducting exchanges of high ranking government officials, as illustrated by the visit of President of Vietnam Sang to China in June 2013 and the visit of Premier of China Li Keqiang to Vietnam in October of the same year. However, the two countries have contentious issues such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea. In recent years, both countries have been actively involved in asserting their territorial rights and each expressed its objections to the activities and assertions of the other.

Vietnam and India upgraded their relationship to a strategic partnership in 2007 and have been deepening their cooperative relationship in a broad range of areas, including security and economy. In 2010, the two countries agreed to expand defense cooperation through the provision of Indian support for capacity building to develop the military equipment of Vietnamese military forces. It is pointed out that Indian Armed Forces supported the training of submarine personnel of the Vietnam People's Navy. In addition, Indian Navy vessels made a friendly visit to Vietnam. Cooperation in the area of energy between India and Vietnam is also deepening, with a joint development program for oil and natural gas in the South China Sea.

See ► Part I, Chapter 1, Section 5-4 (Trends Concerning the South China Sea)

See ► Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-6 (Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries [2 Vietnam])

3 Military Modernization in the Region

In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have been modernizing their militaries against the backdrop of economic development and other factors, focusing on introducing major equipment such as submarines and fighters including a fourth-generation modern fighter. These initiatives are considered to be the results of factors such as increases in defense expenditures, the

relationship between Southeast Asian countries in the sense of their reaction to the development of military strength in neighboring states, response to the expansion of China's influence, and inadequacies in the role of regional security organizations to nurture relationships of trust²³. Moreover, many Southeast Asian countries procure much of their defense equipment from a wide range of countries. As such, there are perceived difficulties in achieving consistent operations and maintenance in the respective countries.

Indonesia had introduced a total of 16 Russian-made Su-27 fighters and Su-30 fighters by 2013. In 2011, it agreed to receive 24 F-16 fighters from the United States, and to purchase eight AH-64 attack helicopters in 2013. In July 2012 it agreed to receive four C-130 transport aircraft from Australia, and in July 2013 signed a memorandum of understanding to accept the sale of five decommissioned C-130 transport aircraft. In December 2011, Indonesia concluded agreements to purchase three 209-class submarines from the Republic of Korea (ROK), and began to engage in the joint development of the next-generation fighter KF-X in cooperation with the country. Furthermore, there are reports that it plans to replace its existing F-5 fighters in January 2014.

In 2009, Malaysia introduced two Scorpène-class submarines (jointly developed by France and Spain) as its first submarines. It also introduced 18 Russian-made Su-30 fighters by the same year and is selecting a successor to its Mig-29 fighters that are scheduled to be decommissioned in 2015.

The Philippines has taken steps in recent years to modernize its defense equipment against a backdrop of conflicts over territorial rights in the South China Sea. As it does not currently own any submarines or fighters it concluded an agreement with the ROK to purchase 12 FA-50 light combat aircraft in 2014. As for naval forces, the Philippines received two Hamilton-class frigates from the United States, the first one in May 2011 and the second one in May 2012. In 2013, it also introduced three Italian AW109 multi-purpose helicopters, and has announced plans to procure fighter helicopters, transport ships, amphibious vehicles, and other equipment.

Singapore has the largest defense budget among Southeast Asian countries and is actively striving to modernize its forces. By December 2012, Singapore introduced two Archer-class (Västergötland class) submarines from Sweden, and concluded an agreement to purchase two German 218SG-class submarines in December 2013. Singapore also introduced 24 US-made F-15 fighters and participates in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program.

²³ Based on the Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), etc.

Thailand is the only country that operates an aircraft carrier in Southeast Asia, but it does not possess any submarines. The purchase of two frigates was approved by the Cabinet in September 2012, and it has introduced twelve Swedish-made JAS-39 fighters in 2013.

In December 2009, Vietnam concluded a contract to purchase six Russian-made Kilo-class submarines and had introduced two of them by March 2014. It has also been reported that Vietnam has concluded a contract to purchase two Dutch-made Sigma-class Corvettes in 2013. In addition, Vietnam is reported to have concluded a contract to purchase a total of 20 Russian-made Su-30 fighters from Russia during the years 2009 through 2011, and that it has concluded a contract in August 2013 to purchase 12 additional fighters of the same make.

4 Trends concerning the South China Sea

In the South China Sea, there are territorial²⁴ disputes between ASEAN countries and China over such areas as the Spratly Islands²⁵ and the Paracel Islands. In addition, there has been growing concern among the international community over issues such as the freedom of navigation in the Sea.

With the desire to promote the peaceful resolution of maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)²⁶ in 2002. This declaration is a political statement with a reference to principles of dispute resolution, but with no legally binding obligations. At the ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in July 2011, the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC of Parties in the South China Sea was adopted to pave the way for effective implementation of the Declaration. Currently the concerned countries have confirmed their commitment to the formulation of the Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), which will provide more specific guidance with legally binding obligations. In September 2013, the first official consultation toward formulating the COC was held in Suzhou, China²⁷.

²⁴ China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei claim sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, and China, Taiwan and Vietnam claims sovereignty over the Paracel Islands.

²⁵ The Areas surrounding the Spratly Islands are promising treasure troves of offshore resources such as oil and natural gas. In addition, the area is a maritime transport hub and is blessed with rich fishing resources.

²⁶ Includes provisions that all concerned parties should resolve the territorial disputes in a peaceful manner in accordance with the principles of international law that the adoption of the Code of Conduct will further promote peace and stability of the region, and that initiatives should be made to achieve the goals.

²⁷ In order to back up an official consultation, it was agreed to establish a "wise men's committee" by experts

Subsequently, the same consultations have been conducted in Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia in 2014.

In the meantime, activities in the South China Sea by the related countries aimed at territorial claims are increasing. China enacted the Act on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Republic of China in 1992, in which it made clear claims to the territorial rights of the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. It attached the so-called “nine-dotted line” map in a verbal note addressed to the United Nations in 2009, in which it made claims to the parts of the South China Sea that purportedly came under China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction. There were objections to the ambiguity behind the justifications to this “nine-dash line” under international law, giving rise to territorial conflicts over the South China Sea between Southeast Asian countries.

In recent years, Chinese naval vessels and public vessels affiliated to maritime law enforcement agencies have been operating around the Scarborough Shoal and the Second Thomas Shoal, close to the Philippines, as well as the James Shoal and the South Luconia Shoal areas close to Malaysia. Furthermore, in June 2012, China announced the establishment of Sansha City in Hainan Province, which it claims to have jurisdiction over the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and their surrounding waters. In November 2013, Hainan Province amended its regulations on the implementation of China’s fishing law to stipulate that foreign fishing vessels that wish to carry out fishing activities in waters under the jurisdiction of Hainan Province are required to obtain permission from the relevant departments under China’s State Council.

From April to June 2012, Chinese law enforcement vessels and Philippines vessels, including a Philippine Navy vessel faced off against each other in the sea area surrounding the Scarborough Shoal. In June 2012, Vietnam adopted its Maritime Law (effective January 2013), which asserts its sovereignty over the Spratly and the Paracel Islands. In March 2013, there were reports that Chinese vessels had fired at Vietnamese fishing vessels. Furthermore, there were reports that in May 2014, China’s unilateral commencement of oil drilling in waters near the Paracel Islands triggered confrontations between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels, and many vessels sustained damages due to collisions. As such, it has been reported that the countries involved have resorted to the use of force on one another’s vessels, including seizing vessels and firing warning shots²⁸, and the concerned countries have expressed their objections against these

²⁸ It is reported that in 2010, Indonesia captured a Chinese fishing vessel, and in the same year, the Malaysia navy fleet and aircraft pursued a Chinese patrol ship. It has been reported that a Chinese

actions. Most recently, in January 2014, Chinese public vessels fired water cannons at Philippines fishing vessels and chased these vessels out of the waters they were in the sea area surrounding the Scarborough Shoal. In response, the government of the Philippines lodged a protest with the Chinese government.

On top of that, in January 2013, the Philippines filed an arbitration procedure based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, concerning China's claims and activities in the South China Sea, but China notified the Philippines that it would not accept the Philippines' request for arbitration and proposed bilateral negotiations instead²⁹.

In addition, in November 2013, a spokesman from the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China declared that China would be setting up other air identification zones in the future, in addition to the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone that it had already established. In relation to this, in December of the same year, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated that China should refrain from taking unilateral measures, including the establishment of air defense identification zones in Asia and particularly in the airspace above the South China Sea.

Peaceful solutions to the South China Sea disputes have been discussed at the various ASEAN meetings. However, with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in July 2012 failing to adopt a joint statement, some lack of consensus among the member states was observed. However, there were also instances in which ASEAN adopted a unified response. For example, ASEAN expressed "serious concerns" over the confrontations between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Summit and Foreign Ministers' Meeting in May 2014.

The issue of territorial disputes in the South China Sea is a common matter of concern for the whole international community, and is directly related to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. As such attention will continue to be paid to trends in the countries concerned, as well as the direction of dialogues aimed at resolution of the issue.

See ► Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Promoting Multilateral Security Cooperation and Dialogue in Areas Including

authorities ship and a Chinese fishing boat cut an investigation cable of a Vietnamese resource exploration vessel in May 2011 and November 2012, respectively. It has also been reported that in February 2011, a Chinese naval vessel fired warnings shots at a Philippine fishing boat. Moreover, reports also indicate that a Chinese authorities ship in May 2011 and Chinese naval vessels in February 2012 and March 2013 fired upon a Vietnamese fishing boat in separate incidents.

²⁹ An arbitral tribunal can make an arbitral process and decision at a request from one party, even if the opponent refuses the request.

5 Regional Cooperation

ASEAN member states, seeking to establish the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015, utilize ASEAN as a multilateral security framework for the region. ASEAN holds the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a dialogue forum on security and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM). Furthermore, efforts for improving the security environment in the region and promoting mutual trust have been made: for example, the holding of the ASEAN Militaries' Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise (AHR) in July 2011, the ASEAN's first military exercise.

The ASEAN places importance on developing relations with non-ASEAN member states. The ADMM Plus, an expanded version of the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting, comprising ADMM members and eight non-ASEAN countries, including Japan, was established in 2010³⁰. The second ADMM Plus meeting was held in Brunei in August 2013. In addition, in June of the same year the first field exercise, the ADMM Plus Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief/Military Medicine Exercises, and in September of the same year, and the first Counter Terrorism Exercise and maritime security field exercises were held. In November 2011, the U.S. and Russia became official members of the East Asia Summit (EAS), comprising ASEAN members and six non-ASEAN countries, in November 2011.

In the Southeast Asian region, multilateral cooperation is also being promoted in frameworks other than ASEAN, in order to deal with a wide variety of security issues such as transnational problems including terrorism and piracy. The counter-piracy measures include the "Malacca Straits Patrols" carried out by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. In addition, based on the "Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia" (ReCAAP)³¹, advancements are being made toward the sharing of information related to piracy and the establishment of cooperative systems.

³⁰ In addition to the framework of the ADMM Plus, defense ministers' meetings are held between the U.S. and ASEAN and China and ASEAN. In April 2014, a U.S.-ASEAN defense ministers' meeting was held in the United States for the first time.

³¹ As of June 2014, 19 countries are party to the agreement: Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, the ROK, Laos, Myanmar, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the U.K., Vietnam and Australia.

Section 6 South Asia

1 India

1 General Situation

With a population of more than 1.2 billion on its vast land, India is the world's largest democratic country. It has achieved steady economic growth in recent years, and has significant influence in the South Asian region. Also, it is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which is of strategic and geographical importance in terms of maritime traffic, connecting the Asia-Pacific region with the Middle East and Europe.

India shares borders with many countries, and has unresolved border issues with China and Pakistan. India has multiple ethnic groups, religions, cultures and languages¹, and there are concerns about the activities of ultra-leftists and secession and independence movements, as well as the movements of Muslim radicals stationed across the India-Pakistan border.

In May 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Indian People's Party), which was the opposition party in the general election held due to the expiration of the term of the Lok Sabha (lower house), won 282 seats, more than a majority of the seats. As a result, Narendra Modi took office as the new Prime Minister. The BJP's election manifesto refers to policies, such as the promotion of military modernization, strengthening of cross-border counterterrorism measures, and the revision of India's nuclear doctrine. Therefore, the specific defense policies that India will adopt will be a point to watch out for.

2 Military Affairs

India's security environment is directly linked to its neighboring countries and the regions of West Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Indian Ocean; and India recognizes that strategic-economic factors impose upon them an increasingly larger responsibility. In view of the multifaceted security concerns and the global dimensions of the challenges, India has strengthened cooperative relations with other countries and has long been actively participating in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). In order to respond rapidly and effectively to diversified security issues, the government and defense forces remain fully prepared to tackle all challenges.

¹ The country has a Muslim population exceeding 100 million, although the majority of the country's population is Hindu.

Based on the nuclear doctrine of 2003, India adheres to the following policies: minimum nuclear deterrence, the non-first-use obligation, no use against non-nuclear weapon nations, and maintaining the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test in 1998. India promotes the development and deployment of various ballistic missiles. Launch tests were successfully carried out of “Prithvi 2” (range about 250km) in August, October, and December 2013; “Agni 5” (range about 5,000-8,000km) in September 2013; “Agni 3” (range about 3,000-5,000km) in December 2013; and “Agni 4” (range about 3,500km) in January 2014. In addition, it is reported that India started developing “Agni 6” (range about 8,000-10,000km)², and aspires to improve the range of its ballistic missiles. In regard to ballistic missiles, India jointly develops “BrahMos” (range about 300km) with Russia, deploying these to the army and navy. India is also developing a ballistic missile defense system, and an interception test was successfully carried out in April 2014.

In recent years, India has been injecting efforts into modernizing its naval and air forces in particular. As a part of these efforts, it is expanding procurement of equipment from foreign countries as well as joint development with them, and has emerged as the world’s largest arms importer³. With respect to its naval capabilities, India has introduced one British-built aircraft carrier, *Viraat*, and in November 2013, the Russia-built aircraft carrier *INS Vikramaditya*. It is also building one domestic aircraft carrier *Vikrant*. With regard to submarines, India launched its first domestically made nuclear submarine *INS Arihant* in 2009. In April 2012, India acquired one Russian-built *Akula*-class nuclear submarine *Chakra* on a lease. Furthermore, in 2009, it concluded an agreement with the United States to purchase eight P-8 patrol aircraft. As for its air force, in addition to remodeling its existing fighters, in January 2012, India selected French *Rafale* for the 126 Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft deal; the selection process started in 2007. In 2010, it concluded an agreement with the United States to purchase 10 C-17 transport carriers. It is also strengthening military technological cooperation with Russia, concluding a contract in December 2012 to purchase 42 Su-30 fighters, as well as jointly developing the fifth-generation fighter PAK FA. India is also engaged in the development of indigenous light combat aircraft.

See ► *Figure I-1-6-1 (Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate))*

² The ranges of each missile are referred from “Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems (2013).” It has been reported that Prithvi 2 is a mobile ballistic missile, liquid-fuelled; Agni 3 is a mobile two-stage ballistic missile, solid-fuelled; Agni 4 is a mobile two-stage ballistic missile, solid-fuelled; Agni 5 is a mobile three-stage ballistic missile, solid-fuelled; Agni 6 is a three-stage ballistic missile, solid/liquid fuelled; and BrahMos is a mobile solid-fuelled supersonic cruise missile.

³ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2013” (March 2014)

3 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with Pakistan

India and Pakistan have disputes over the sovereignty of Kashmir⁴, and have had three armed conflicts of significant scope. The territorial dispute over Kashmir has long been in contention between India and Pakistan, with dialogues repeatedly resuming and suspending. Dialogue between the two countries was suspended due to the Mumbai terror attack in 2008, but it resumed following the February 2011 talks by their Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In 2011, both countries affirmed the importance of peaceful solution to all outstanding issues between the two countries through dialogue. Pakistan granted India most-favored nation status. Subsequently in September 2013, a summit meeting was held, demonstrating that both countries are intent on improving their relations. However, the Kashmir issue still remains a concern for both countries, with frequent outbreaks of armed conflict in the Kashmir region in 2013, leading both countries to protest against each other.

(2) Relations with the United States

India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States. The United States is also promoting engagement with India in line with expansion of the relationship derived from the economic growth of India. The two countries conduct joint exercises, such as “Malabar”⁵, on a regular basis. India procures U.S. weapons and is also engaged in security consultations. In June 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited India, and held the 4th U.S.-India strategic dialogue with Salman Khurshid, Minister of External Affairs of India. The two sides affirmed the significance of the peaceful solution of maritime disputes, and discussed enhancing technological cooperation toward joint production and joint development of equipment, the situation in Afghanistan, among other matters. In addition, in September of the same year, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the United States and held a summit meeting with President Barack Obama. Discussions took place concerning security, with the two sides announcing a joint statement regarding enhancing defense procurement, India’s participation in the RIMPAC 2014, and intelligence exchange on terrorists.

(3) Relations with China

⁴ India has made assertions on the accession of Kashmir to India, based on the Instrument of Accession document whereby the ruler of Kashmir acceded to India at the time of Pakistan’s independence. On the other hand, Pakistan has declared that this should be decided through a referendum, in line with a 1948 UN resolution. The two countries have taken a significantly different fundamental stance toward the resolution of the dispute.

⁵ The “Malabar” was initially a bilateral exercise between the United States and India. Then Japan, Australia, and Singapore joined “Malabar 07-2,” and Japan participated in “Malabar 09.” “Malabar 10” and subsequent exercises have been conducted as bilateral exercises between the United States and India.

See ► *Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3-3, Paragraph 5 ([3] Relations with South Asian Countries)*

(4) Relations with Russia

See ► *Part I, Chapter 1, Section 4-5, Paragraph 2 (Relations with Asian Countries)*

2 Pakistan

1 General Situation

Wedged between the powerful South Asian nation of India and politically-unstable Afghanistan, and sharing borders with China and Iran, Pakistan lacks strategic depth, which places the country in a geopolitically significant and complex position. In particular, Muslim radicals conduct activities across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and Pakistan's attitude towards the war against terrorism draws much attention from the international community.

While supporting the U.S.'s war against terrorism in Afghanistan, the government of Pakistan has been struggling as its domestic security situation has worsened, with issues such as growing anti-U.S. sentiment and retaliatory terrorism by Muslim radicals. As a result of the 2013 general election conducted in May 2013 at the House of Parliament, Nawaz Sharif was elected Prime Minister, who holds up a policy of dialogue with armed forces. In February 2014, peace consultation with armed forces was conducted for the first time. However, since then, these forces committed a series of terrorist attacks, and in June of the same year, the Pakistan Armed Forces launched a military operation against these forces.

2 Military Affairs

Pakistan claims that maintaining nuclear deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is essential to ensure national security and self-defense. In the past, the so-called Khan network was involved in the proliferation of nuclear-related materials and technologies⁶.

Pakistan has been actively proceeding with development of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and cruise missiles, and has conducted a number of test launches in recent years. In 2013 and 2014, Pakistan conducted test launches of the ballistic missiles "Nasr," "Ghaznavi," and "Shaheen 1." It is deemed that Pakistan is steadily deploying ballistic and cruise missiles to its forces⁷.

⁶ Pakistan is believed to have started its nuclear program in the 1970s and conducted its first nuclear test near the Changai District of the Balochistan Province in 1998. In 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. Khan and other scientists, who had led the nuclear program in Pakistan.

⁷ Regarding missiles that Pakistan possesses, the following are indicated:

Pakistan is the world's third largest importer of weapons, importing most of its weapons from China and the United States⁸. Pakistan concluded a contract to purchase four Sword-class frigates from China, which have already been delivered; and is conducting a joint development of the JF-17 fighter aircraft. Pakistan has introduced 18 F-16C/D fighter jets by 2011 from the United States.

3 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with India

See ► Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6-1, Paragraph 3 ([1] Relations with Pakistan)

(2) Relations with the United States

Besides supporting the activities of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan cooperates with the war on terror by launching mop-up operations against Muslim radicals in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. Recognizing the efforts of Pakistan, the United States designated it as a "major non-NATO ally" in 2004.

The two countries conducted strategic dialogues since 2010, and the United States provided Pakistan with military support. However, these were suspended after U.S.-Pakistan relations deteriorated as a consequence of the Osama Bin Laden mop-up operation conducted by the U.S. Forces in the territory of Pakistan in May 2011. In October 2013, dialogue was resumed after summit meetings were held between U.S. President Obama and Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan. In January 2014, a strategic dialogue was held between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Advisor to the Prime Minister of Pakistan Sartaj Aziz for the first time in three years. Pakistan urges the United States to immediately end its drone attacks on Muslim radicals in Pakistani territory, and the Pakistan government has protested repeatedly⁹. Furthermore, it was reported that in an all-party conference organized by the leaders of the ruling and opposition parties in September 2013, the government adopted a resolution asserting that the U.S. drone

"Nasr" (Hatf 9): a mobile, solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 60km

"Ghaznavi" (Hatf 3): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 290km

"Shaheen 1" (Hatf 4): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 750km

"Raad" (Hatf 8): a cruise missile with a range of about 350km

"Babur" (Hatf 7): a cruise missile with a range of about 750km

⁸ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2013" (March 2014).

⁹ In November 2011, NATO forces conducted air attacks on border posts in Pakistan, causing casualties to Pakistan soldiers. Pakistan strongly condemned this action and retaliated by closing the ground supply route for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In response to the apology made by then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton about air strikes against Pakistani patrol posts, Pakistan decided to reopen the ground supply lines in June 2012.

attacks were a clear violation of international laws. The United States, on the other hand, blames Pakistan for providing safe zones to Muslim radicals in Afghanistan, which imposes threats to the United States. Thus, the relationship between the two countries, including their stance on the war on terror, continues to draw much scrutiny.

(3) Relations with China

See ► Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3-3, Paragraph 5 ([3] Relations with South Asian Countries)

Section 7 Australia

1 General Situation

Australia shares universal values with Japan, such as respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy; and is allied with the United States, as are Japan and the Republic of Korea. Based on the awareness that Australia's security environment will be significantly influenced by how the Indo-Pacific, connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans through Southeast Asia, and its architecture evolve, Australia is adjusting its main strategic focus to the region. As a result of elections in the Parliament of Australia held in September 2013, the administration changed from the Labor Party to the Coalition. The new Abbott administration expressed its stance, the same as that of the previous administration, to prioritize the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions. Regarding the defense policy of the new administration, it indicates that it would replace the current White Paper¹ with a new one within 18 months from the Parliament election, and review is accordingly underway. In the pledge it upheld at the election, the Abbott administration explained that national defense policy conforming to clear military strategy and financially feasible configuration of defense capabilities would be the essence of the new White Paper.

2 Security and Defense Policies

The Australian government launched Australia's first National Security Strategy (the Strategy) in January 2013². The Strategy provides a blueprint for national security over the next decade, presenting the recognition that responding to the economic and strategic changes in the Asia-Pacific region is vital to the national security of Australia³.

The Strategy defines four objectives for Australia's national security: (1) to ensure a safe and resilient population, (2) to protect and strengthen Australia's sovereignty, (3) to secure Australia's assets, infrastructure and institutions, and (4) to promote a favorable international environment. To that end, it is necessary to respond to national security challenges and threats, including instability in the region, conflicts or coercion affecting the national interests,

¹ Australia's Defence White Paper shows future plans and accomplished government measures, and was published in 1976, 1987, 1994, 2000, 2009, and 2013.

² This strategy is based on the National Security Statement, announced in December 2008, which articulated Australia's national security agenda and set in motion reforms to strengthen the National Security Community. A national security strategy is scheduled to be delivered every five years.

³ The Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, which was published in October 2012, sets out targets for the country over the years to 2025 to ensure Australia can fulfill its ambitions and compete effectively within Asia.

malicious cyber activity, terrorism, espionage, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, serious and organized crime⁴.

The Strategy analyzes that the most significant trends for the outlook of Australia's national security would be uncertainty in the global economy, a rebalancing of global power, the continuing importance of non-state actors, and low-level conflict in high-risk areas. The Strategy then identifies three priorities of Australia over the next five years as follows: (1) enhancing regional engagement in the Asia-Pacific region⁵, (2) integrating cyber policy and operations⁶, and (3) establishing effective partnerships⁷.

In May 2013, the Australian government announced a new Defence White Paper⁸ that addresses significant developments in Australia's international and domestic circumstances since the previous Defence White Paper was published in May 2009⁹, which influence Australia's national security and defense settings. The white paper states that the relation between the United States and China will, more than any other single factor, determine Australia's strategic environment over the coming decades; and the evolution of this relationship is being affected by the United States' commitment to the region and by the effects

⁴ The Strategy describes the pillars of Australia's national security as follows: (1) countering terrorism and espionage activities, etc., (2) deterring and defeating attacks on Australia and Australia's interests, (3) preserving Australia's border integrity, (4) preventing, detecting and disrupting serious and organized crime, (5) promoting a secure international environment conducive to advancing Australia's interests, (6) strengthening the resilience of Australia's people, assets, infrastructure and institutions, (7) the Australia-United States Alliance, and (8) further understanding and being influential in the world, particularly the Asia-Pacific

⁵ Strengthening the Australia-United States Alliance, expansion of bilateral cooperation with influential regional powers, such as China, Indonesia, Japan, ROK, and India, and promoting the primacy and effectiveness of specific multilateral forums, etc

⁶ Bringing together the capability of cyber sections of the Ministry of Defence, the Attorney-General and the Australian Federal Police, and cyber analysts from the Australian Crime Commission into the Australian Cyber Security Center (ACSC).

⁷ Secure and quick information-sharing with domestic and international partner agencies, and more information-sharing between government and business, etc

⁸ (1) The ongoing economic strategic and military shift to the Indo-Pacific; (2) the Australian Defence Force's operational drawdown from Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and the Solomon Islands; (3) the United States' rebalance to the Asia-Pacific; (4) Australia's substantially enhanced practical cooperation with the United States pursuant to the Australia-United States Alliance; and (5) the ongoing adverse effects of the global financial crisis, which have continued to have a significant deleterious impact on the global economy, domestic fiscal circumstances, and defense funding

⁹ The current Defence White Paper was originally due to be published in 2014, but at the time of the publication of the final report on the Australian Defence Force Posture Review in May 2012, it was announced that publication of the white paper would be brought forward to the first half of 2013, and the white paper was subsequently published in May 2013. The Defence White Paper complements the National Security Strategy and the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, and these three documents should be seen together as a statement of the priority the Australian Government places on the nation's security and prosperity, and on maintaining a strong Australian Defence Force to meet Australia's national security challenges.

of China's rise. Moreover, it points out the emergence of the Indo-Pacific, which is set forth as a new concept.

The new Defence White Paper defines Australia's strategic interests as follows: (1) a secure Australia; (2) a secure South Pacific and Timor-Leste; (3) a stable Indo-Pacific; and (4) a stable, rules-based global order. The white paper also sets out the principal tasks for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in order of priority as follows: (1) deter and defeat attacks on Australia; (2) contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste; (3) contribute to military contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region with priority to Southeast Asia; and (4) contribute to military contingencies in support of global security.

In addition, with regard to the ADF's defense capability-building, the white paper states that maintaining an appropriate mix of high-end ADF capabilities is essential, in order to defend Australia and its strategic interests. Moreover, maintaining credible high-end capabilities enables Australia to act decisively when required, deter would-be adversaries, and strengthen its regional influence; so while choices must be made to guide the allocation of finite resources, Australia remains committed to delivering core ADF capabilities, including future submarines, Air Warfare Destroyers, Landing Helicopter Dock amphibious ships, and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF)¹⁰. Furthermore, according to the white paper, the Australian Defence Force Posture Review concluded that although Australia's strategic environment does not necessitate widespread changes in the location of ADF bases, some ADF bases, facilities and training areas need to be upgraded to meet current and future needs. Nevertheless, these upgrades are largely long-term in nature¹¹.

3 Relations with Other Countries

The Defence White Paper states that seizing opportunities to build deeper partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region will be important for Australia, because competition for access and influence will be greater, and consideration of Australia's interests and views less assured.

¹⁰ The Defence White Paper discloses that the Government has decided to acquire 12 new-build EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft instead of converting 12 out of 24 Australia's existing F/A-18F aircraft into the Growler configuration, to assure Australia's air combat capability during the transition period to the F-35A.

¹¹ In June 2011, the Australian Department of Defence started to commission the ADF's Force Posture Review to assess whether the ADF is correctly geographically positioned to meet Australia's current and future strategic and security challenges, such as the rise of the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean rim as regions of global strategic significance, the growth of military power projection capabilities of countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and energy security and security issues associated with expanding offshore resource exploitation in the northwest and north. The final report of the expert panel released in May 2012 includes recommendations for improving the capability of base facilities and enhancing the ADF's presence in Northern Australia, and strengthening and expansion of naval and air force bases.

Moreover, it asserts that Australia's defense international engagement must work towards helping to build effective mechanisms to manage regional and transnational security issues, and risks arising from rivalries and the possibilities of miscalculation. Furthermore, it states that Australia's contribution to regional security is not restricted to deploying forces in a conflict or crisis. Rather, the nation's efforts are focused on reducing the risk of conflict through building trust and partnerships through regular interaction with other nations.

See ► Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-1 (Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation and Exchanges)

1 Relations with the United States

The Australia-United States Alliance based on the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America (ANZUS)¹² is Australia's most important defense relationship, and Australia attaches great importance to this alliance as a pillar of its national strategy and security arrangements. The Defence White Paper states that the United States will continue to be the world's strongest military power and the most influential strategic actor in Australia's region for the foreseeable future. Moreover, it asserts that a U.S. presence in the region will continue to be important amidst the Indo-Pacific's rapidly changing strategic environment, and that Australia welcomes the shift in U.S. strategic focus towards the region and the U.S. commitment to maintain its strong diplomatic, economic, and security presence.

Since 1985, the two countries have regularly held Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations and are making efforts to increase interoperability through joint military exercises, such as Exercise Talisman Saber¹³. In April 2012, the U.S. Marines' rotational deployments into northern Australia were launched¹⁴ in accordance with the Australia-United States Force Posture Initiatives, released in November 2011.

In addition to participating in the U.S.-led F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Project, Australia intends to cooperate in missile defence. Furthermore, they are promoting cooperation in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as in areas such as space¹⁵ and cyber¹⁶.

¹² A trilateral security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. The United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand since 1986 because of New Zealand's non-nuclear policy.

¹³ Exercise Talisman Saber, started in 2005, is a biennial combined Australia-United States training activity, designed to improve combat readiness and interoperability. About 21,000 U.S. Forces personnel and about 7,000 Australian Defence Force personnel participated in this training from July through August 2013.

¹⁴ See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1, 1-2

¹⁵ At the AUSMIN in November 2012, cooperation in the space field was strengthened by agreeing the relocation of a C-band ground-based radar system of the U.S. Forces to Australia. At the AUSMIN in November 2013, two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on the relocation of U.S. space surveillance telescope to Australia.

2 Relations with China

Australia's Defence White Paper states that China's economic growth is a major contributor to global strategic weight shifting to the Indo-Pacific. In addition, it asserts that Australia welcomes China's rise and does not approach China as an adversary; rather, its policy is aimed at encouraging China's peaceful rise and ensuring that strategic competition in the region does not lead to conflict. It also states that the growth of China's defense capabilities and the modernization of its military is a natural and legitimate outcome of its economic growth.

Moreover, Australia sees China as an important partner in the region, and is committed to developing strong and positive defense relations with China through dialogue and appropriate practical activities. Under these policies, Australia carries out dialogues with the Chinese defense authority regularly¹⁷ and conducts exchanges to develop cooperative relations between Australian and Chinese forces, through joint exercises and mutual visits of military ships, etc¹⁸.

Meanwhile, in a joint statement of the ministerial strategic dialogue by ministers of defense of Japan, the United States, and Australia in October 2013, and a joint communique of ministerial consultations by ministers of defense and ministers of foreign affairs of the United States and Australia in November 2013, the Abbott administration expressed its stance that it opposes any coercive or unilateral actions that could change the status quo in the East China Sea, and that it thinks it is necessary for ASEAN and China to agree on a Code of Conduct regarding the South China Sea. In addition, on China's announcement of the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea in November 2013, Minister for Foreign Affairs Bishop published a statement clearly stating Australia's stance to oppose any coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China Sea.

¹⁶ At the AUSMIN in September 2011, the two nations signed a joint statement on cyberspace and confirmed that, mindful of their longstanding defense relationship and the ANZUS Treaty, the two would consult together and determine appropriate options to address threats in the event of a cyber attack that threatens the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of either Australia or the United States.

¹⁷ In October 2013, General Zhao Keshi, Director of the General Logistics Department, People's Liberation Army, visited Australia and held a meeting with Australian government high-ranking officials including David Hurley, Chief of the Defence Force (CDF). The Australia-China Defence Strategic Dialogue has been held since 1997, and at the 16th Dialogue held in Australia in January 2014, the Australia-China Defence Engagement Action Plan was endorsed, which content includes initiatives for promoting cooperation in the fields of maritime cooperation, strategic policy dialogue, educational exchanges, exercises, and mutual visits by government high-ranking officials.

¹⁸ In August 2013, Australia, the United States, China, and New Zealand held the first quadrilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises in Christchurch, New Zealand. Moreover, Chinese navy ships participated in an international fleet review held in Sydney in October 2013.

3 Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

The Defence White Paper notes that Australia has an enduring strategic interest in the stability of the Indo-Pacific, particularly Southeast Asia and the maritime environment. Given that major sea lanes that are critical to Australian trade pass through Southeast Asia, which sit astride the northern approaches to the country, there would be cause for concern if potentially hostile powers established a presence in Southeast Asia that could be used to project military power against Australia. From this perspective, Australia perceives the stability and security of Indonesia, its largest neighbor, to be of singular importance, and believes that it benefits from having a strong and cohesive Indonesia as a partner. In addition, Australia strongly pursues enhancing security framework in the Indo-Pacific region, thus proactively supporting such frameworks as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus), etc.

Australia views its partnership with Indonesia as its most important defense relationship in the region, so it is committed to further broadening and deepening defense and security cooperation. Given the terrorist bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005, and the terrorist bombing in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, the relations between the two countries have been strengthened in areas including counterterrorism cooperation, and the two countries concluded an agreement on a security cooperation framework which described cooperation across a wide range of defense relationships in November 2006¹⁹. In March 2012, Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”) were held for the first time, and at a summit meeting held in July 2012, the two countries agreed that Australia would provide four C-130 transport aircraft for free to Indonesia²⁰. Moreover, in September 2012, the first annual defense minister’s meeting was held, and both defense ministers signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement to include enhancing cooperation in the fields of terrorism countermeasures and maritime security. They also agreed to expand support and cooperation in the fields of search and rescue²¹.

Under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) framework²², Australia carries out

¹⁹ The agreement, which is called the Lombok Agreement, took effect in February 2008.

²⁰ At the defense ministers’ meeting in line with the second Australia-Indonesia “2+2” meeting in April 2013, then Minister for Defence Smith expressed his intension to sell off five retired ADF C-130 transport aircraft to Indonesia and signed a memorandum of understanding for selling in July 2013.

²¹ After the start of the Abbott administration in September 2013, high level exchanges are underway as the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister for Defence visited Indonesia one after the other. However, there are existing issues between the two countries, such as responding to illegal immigrants heading to Australia by blockade runners and intelligence-gathering activities on Indonesia by Australia.

²² See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 5, Footnote 5

combined and joint exercises with Malaysia and Singapore²³.

See ► Part I, Chapter 1, Section 5-2 (Southeast Asia, Security and Defense Policies of Each Country)

4 Relationships with South Pacific States and Timor-Leste

The Defence White Paper positions a secure South Pacific and Timor-Leste as Australia's most important strategic interest after its own security, and notes that the nation is seeking to ensure that its neighborhood does not become a source of threat to Australia, and that no major power with hostile intentions establishes bases in its immediate neighborhood, from which that power could project force against Australia. From this perspective, Australia will continue to play a leading role in assisting South Pacific states and Timor-Leste to improve governance, security capacities, and responses to natural disasters, providing support for the stabilization of these nations through its Defence Cooperation Programs, among other initiatives²⁴. Moreover, Australia shares strategic and humanitarian interests in these regions with New Zealand, and perceives its defense and security relationship with the latter to be important to ensuring a secure immediate neighborhood.

5 Overseas Activities

Australia has deployed about 1,400 ADF personnel to operations overseas out of a total of 56,200 personnel on active duty²⁵ as of February 2014.

Under the Australia-United States Alliance, Australia expressed its support for the United States faster than any other country at the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, and dispatched troops to Afghanistan in October of the same year. In Afghanistan, about 1,550 Australian Defence Force personnel were engaged in supporting reconstruction activities under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and in training the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). As ISAF activities are to be terminated at the end of 2014, Australia withdrew most of its personnel in December 2013; however, Australia expressed its intention to contribute

²³ In November 2013, Exercise Bersama Lima was held in the South China Sea and the Malay Peninsula, and about 400 personnel, vessels and aircraft participated from the ADF. The Australian Air Force has had a permanent presence at the Malaysian Air Force base Butterworth, and the Malaysian military personnel receives training in Australia based on the Joint Defence Program, which formally commenced in 1992. The Singapore Armed Forces use training areas and pilot training facilities in Australia.

²⁴ Since 1999, when the independence of Timor-Leste gathered momentum, Australia has proactively provided support for the political and social stability of Timor-Leste. The ADF had led the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) since 2006 and completed the withdrawal in March 2013, as the security situation in Timor-Leste stabilized. The ADF also provided support for stabilizing the Solomon Islands through the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) since July 2003, then withdrew in August 2013, accompanied by the completion of the activities in the military sector.

²⁵ Based on the Military Balance 2014. The breakdown of the military forces is as follows: Army: about 28,600 personnel, Navy: about 13,550 personnel, and Air Force: about 14,050 personnel.

to the stability of Afghanistan in 2014 and beyond. Other than Afghanistan, about 800 ADF personnel are active in the United Arab Emirates, the Arabian Sea and other areas, in supporting operations in Afghanistan.

Section 8 Europe

1 General Situation

With the end of the Cold War, while many European countries now recognize that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries has disappeared, diverse security challenges have emerged, such as outbreaks of regional conflict within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and increasing numbers of cyberspace threats. In addition, in recent years, the financial situation, which is becoming increasingly severe, has had a great impact on the security and defense policy of each country.

To respond to such new and emerging threats and situations, Europe has sought to strengthen and expand the multilateral frameworks, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)¹. At the same time, it is working to contribute to the security and stability of the international community by proactively participating in activities outside the European region. Moreover, initiatives are made at the national level for reviewing security and defense strategies, reforming national defense systems, and strengthening bilateral² and multilateral³ defense and security cooperation.

See ► *Fig. I-1-8-1 (Expansion Situation of the NATO-EU Member States)*

2 Enhancement of Multinational Security Frameworks

1 Security and Defense Policy of NATO/EU

Founded for the primary purpose of collective defense among member countries, NATO has

¹ NATO has continued expanding toward Central and Eastern Europe with the aim of stabilizing the entire Europe and Atlantic regions. Currently, three countries—Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina—are approved to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is a program that provides support to future member states in their preparation to enter the Organization (conditionally for Bosnia and Herzegovina). The participation in the MAP for six other countries—Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova—has not been recognized as of the current point in time, as these countries support initiatives for integration into the Europe and Atlantic regions through frameworks such as the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which is a program offered to countries that have the intent to deepen political cooperative relationships with NATO.

² For example, the United Kingdom and France signed treaties relating to bilateral defense and security cooperation, and on the shared use of nuclear facilities, at a summit meeting held in November 2010. In these treaties they agreed to move forward on the establishment of joint troops, the joint deployment of equipment, training, and research and development initiatives. In addition, at a UK-France summit meeting held in January 2014, a declaration on security and defense was adopted, and the two countries agreed on conducting joint development of surface-to-surface missiles, joint research on unmanned attackers, as well as on aiming to begin deploying joint dispatch troops by 2016.

³ For example, in September 2010, the four European countries of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium established the European Air Transport Command (EATC) to jointly deploy transporters from the respective countries such as C-130 and A-310, as well as approximately 150 aerial refueling aircraft. In 2012, Luxemburg became a new member of this initiative.

expanded the scope of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War.

In the NATO Summit Meeting held in Lisbon in November 2010, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept⁴ for the first time in 11 years to propose a guideline for the next decade for the creation of a more effective and flexible alliance. The document created by NATO lists the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles, terrorism, instability and conflict beyond NATO borders, and cyber attacks as examples of major threats, defining three items as the core tasks of NATO: (1) collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which forms the basis for NATO, (2) management of developing crises before they escalate into conflicts and to help consolidate stability and reconstruction in post-conflict situations, and (3) cooperative security including active contribution to arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament.

NATO has recently been promoting the concept of Smart Defence, as the national defense budgets of member states are declining and gaps in military capacity are widening among member states, in particular between European countries and the United States⁵. This is the concept with the objective of building greater security with fewer resources through multinational coordination with the following three pillars: (1)⁶ Prioritization: selection of prioritized areas to be invested in: (2)⁷ Specialization: specialization in areas where members have strength and (3) Multinational cooperation: promotion of joint procurement and joint operations of equipment. As specific measures for realizing this concept, the Chicago NATO Summit, held in May 2012, declared that NATO has gained the Interim Capability⁸ for a missile defense system⁹ to protect the people and the territory of NATO from ballistic missile attacks

⁴ The Strategic Concept is an official document defining the objectives, characteristics, and basic security-related responsibilities of NATO. The document has so far been formulated seven times (1949, 1952, 1957, 1968, 1991, 1999, and 2010).

⁵ At present, the contribution of the United States accounts for 70% of the total defense budget of all NATO member states. In the deployment of military forces in Libya led by the EU in 2011, it became clear that EU countries lack operation execution capabilities, in particular, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, for which they had to depend on the United States.

⁶ At the NATO summit meeting held in Lisbon in November 2010, the allies committed to focus their investment on 11 prioritized areas, including missile defense, cyber defense, medical assistance, and intelligence activities.

⁷ It indicates that every member state does not necessarily need to possess all defense capabilities, but each nation specializes in areas where it has strength, and shares it among the Allied nations. As an example already in practice, the Baltic states depend on air policing operations by NATO allies and make certain contributions to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, instead of abandoning the investment in procurement and maintenance of expensive aircraft.

⁸ Although the details are not fully known, it seems to indicate that NATO acquired limited capability against missiles by installing command and control functions that link interceptors and radars.

⁹ NATO has continuously been developing its unique Theater Missile Defense system since 2005, called

by linking interceptor missiles and radars of the member states under NATO's command and control. At the same time, the 13 member states of NATO signed a procurement contract for five Global Hawk (RQ-4) unmanned aircraft, which will serve as a core of the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system¹⁰. In addition, at the Chicago NATO Summit, the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) was set up, which promotes enhancing mutual trainings conducted jointly among member states, and enhancing interoperability by sharing education training programs among member states. CFI is considered to aim at maintaining NATO's readiness and military capacity by combining the concepts of Smart Defence and CFI in reducing defense budgets in each country.

The EU tries to enhance its initiatives in security under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security Defense Policy (CSDP)¹¹. The first security document adopted in 2003, "A Secure Europe in a Better World," says that the EU aims to enhance its capabilities to deal with new threats, will make a contribution to its security through involvement in its immediate neighborhood, and will play a leading role in building an international order based on effective multilateralism by working with the United States, other partner countries, and international organizations including the United Nations.

Triggered by the reduction of defense budgets in EU countries and the capacity gap among members¹², the concept of "pooling and sharing" has been promoted, in which member states jointly manage and use more military capacities. In specific terms, cooperation has been promoted in the areas of air-to-air refueling, helicopter training, and field hospitals. The EU intends to make sure all the initiatives within this concept will complement, rather than interfere

Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD), to protect deployed NATO forces from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers. In the Lisbon Declaration of 2010, expansion of the area protected by this system was decided to all the NATO populations and territories. At present, NATO is promoting connection and integration with the MD system, which the U.S. deploys in a stage-wise manner, towards establishing a wide-ranged MD system based on ALTMID.

¹⁰ At the same Summit meeting, 22 multilateral projects were approved. These included the joint procurement of remote-controlled robots for clearing roadside bombs and the joint management of maritime patrol aircraft.

¹¹ The EU, although it has a property of non-binding multilateral cooperation, introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which covers all areas of foreign and security policy, based on the Treaty of Maastricht, which took effect in 1993. In June 1999, the European Council decided to implement the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to offer peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance activities in conflict areas, as a part of the CFSP framework. The Treaty of Lisbon, made effective in 2009, renamed the ESDP the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and clearly positioned it as an integral part of the CFSP.

¹² The European Defence Agency, an organization established to improve the EU's defense capabilities, reports that the military operations in Libya and elsewhere revealed the EU's lack of air-to-air refueling capability and precision-guided weapons, and its dependency on the United States.

with, the activities covered by the NATO framework, such as the Smart Defense initiative.

At the European Council Meeting (EU Summit) held in December 2013, CSDP was taken up as the main topic of discussion for the first time in five years, and a resolution about strengthening CSDP was adopted. Leaders agreed to take countermeasures against new security issues. These measures included the formulation of an EU cyber defense policy framework and EU maritime security strategy, promoting the joint development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) from 2008 to 2013 as a measure to cope with the insufficient capability that became evident in recent military combat, as well as the procurement of aerial refueling capabilities.

2 NATO/EU's Activities Outside the Region¹³

Since August 2003, NATO has been leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. At the Chicago NATO Summit held in May 2012, leaders agreed to complete transition of security responsibilities by the end of 2014, shifting International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)'s main role from security enforcement to training, advice, and support for the Afghanistan National Security Force (ANSF), while the ANSF takes the lead for security operations across the country after mid-2013. It was also affirmed that NATO will continue to provide support for Afghanistan after the end of 2014. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) has continued to be implementing its missions within its framework, such as maintaining security since June 1999 in Kosovo, which declared independence in February 2008¹⁴.

In 2003, the EU led peacekeeping operations in Macedonia by using NATO's equipment and capabilities for the first time. Since then, it has been actively committed to the operations in crisis management and maintenance of peace and order¹⁵ by, for example, sending troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, and Central Africa. Since February 2013, the EU has been implementing training mission to support training Malian troops and realignment in Mali, in which Islamic guerrillas and others pose serious threats. Also in January 2014, the EC decided to dispatch security forces to Central Africa, where the

¹³ While NATO has mainly focused on leading military operations, the EU has undertaken a number of civilian missions. Meanwhile, NATO asserts that a comprehensive approach, including police, civilian and military personnel, is required for crisis management. Thus, the EU keeps the EU Battle Groups on standby in order to take the initiative in peacekeeping missions when NATO is not involved. The division of roles between NATO and the EU is to be defined on a case-by-case basis. As the EU-NATO cooperative relationship, a permanent agreement between EU and NATO regarding EU's access to NATO assets and capabilities was established in December 2002.

¹⁴ In July 2013, NATO announced that the Kosovo Security Force possesses full operational capabilities in line with NATO standards to carry out their existing missions.

¹⁵ These are called Petersberg tasks. They consist of combat missions in crisis management, including 1) humanitarian assistance and rescue operations, 2) peacekeeping mission, and 3) combat mission in crisis management, including peacemaking.

situation has been of constant tumult. The forces commenced operations in April of the same year.

In addition, NATO and the EU have actively been engaged in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Since October 2008, NATO has deployed Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) ships in these waters for anti-piracy operations. It has also shouldered the responsibility to assist in the development of capacity to combat piracy activities for requesting countries since August 2009, based on Operation Ocean Shield. The EU has been engaged in Operation Atalanta against piracy in these waters, its first maritime mission, since December 2008, deploying vessels and aircraft. The vessels and aircraft dispatched from Allied countries are engaged in escorting ships and surveillance activities in the waters¹⁶.

3 Security / Defense Policies of European Countries

1 The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has maintained the perception that there is no direct military threat against the country after the end of the Cold War. In order to deal with new threats such as international terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs, the country has advanced national defense reform with particular focus on the improvement of its overseas deployment capability and readiness.

As it has been faced with the fatigue of its military organizations due to prolonged operations particularly in Afghanistan, and an increasing demand for reducing its defense budget¹⁷ due to the deteriorating financial situation, the Cameron administration, formed in May 2010, released the National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)¹⁸ in October 2010 under the newly-established National Security Council (NSC)¹⁹.

¹⁶ To tackle piracy in this area, the EU has undertaken “European Union Training Mission to Somalia” and “Regional Maritime Capacity Building Mission for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean” in addition to “Operation Atalanta.” Based on a comprehensive approach, the EU not only implements piracy countermeasures, but is also working to develop and strengthen its coastal policing and judicial system capabilities.

¹⁷ “Spending Review 2010,” published by the Treasury Department in October 2010 following the NSS and SDRS, plans to reduce the defense budget by 8% in real terms by 2014-2015, including saving at least 4.3 billion pounds for the country’s non-frontline activities costs, except for what is required for operations in Afghanistan.

¹⁸ The Council is chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by major ministers related to national security and, if required, by the Chief of the Defense Staff, heads of intelligence agencies, and other senior officials. The newly-created National Security Adviser (NSA) coordinates the whole proceedings. The Council will be responsible for coordinating responses to dangers the United Kingdom faces by integrating at the highest level the work of the foreign, defense, energy, and international development departments, and all other arms of government contributing to national security; and proposing high-level strategic guidelines to the departments involved.

¹⁹ The Cameron administration leveraged the new NSS to analyze the strategic background surrounding the United Kingdom and to define the strategic objectives of the country. In the SDRS, it defined policies

The NSS evaluated the full range of potential risks, which might materialize over a 5 to 20-year horizon, from the perspective of their probability and impact; and then defined four items, including international terrorism, attacks upon cyberspace, major accidents or natural hazards, and international military crises as risks of the highest priority²⁰. The SDSR would decrease the number of military personnel and major equipment, and review its procurement plan due to increasing pressure to reduce the defense budget. At the same time, it aims to convert the forces into specialized, flexible, and modernized war potential through preferential allocation of resources to new threats, such as attacks in cyberspace and terrorism²¹.

In July 2012, “Army 2020,” an army reorganization plan, was released. In this document, the United Kingdom seeks to promote the integration of active and reserve forces in view of the completion of combat missions in Afghanistan, assigning the reserve forces a wide range of tasks, such as overseas engagements, United Nations missions, and enduring stabilization operations. While the number of active personnel is to be reduced in this plan, the number and the role of reserves are to be expanded, and more attention should be paid to future developments²².

2 France

Since the end of the Cold War, France has focused on maintaining independence in its defense policies, while having led initiatives to enhance the defense structure and capability in Europe. It has worked on the development of its military capacity by reducing military personnel and integrating military bases, dealing with operational requirements to strengthen its defense capability, and also enhancing its intelligence capabilities and modernizing equipment required in the future.

and measures required to achieve the goals specified by the NSS, so that the comprehensive national strategy related to defense and security could be formed. It also stipulates that a new NSS and SDSR are to be produced and published every five years, based on periodical readjustments to be done by the NSC.

²⁰ Analyzing the strategic background in this way, the new NSS defined two strategic objectives comprising (1) ensuring a secure and resilient United Kingdom, and (2) shaping a stable world, and specified eight crosscutting National Security Tasks, including tackling the root causes of instability, and working in cooperation with alliances and partnerships as required.

²¹ The SDSR has decided to reduce the Royal Navy, the Army, and the Royal Air Force personnel by 5,000, 7,000, and 5,000 respectively by 2015. It also plans to reduce the Ministry of Defense Civil Service by 25,000; decommission the aircraft carrier, Ark Royal, immediately; reduce the holdings of main tanks by 40%; and reduce the planned number of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. In addition, the United Kingdom plans to withdraw half of the British forces stationed in Germany, currently estimated to number 20,000, by 2015 before they are completely withdrawn by 2020.

²² In “Army 2020,” a plan drawn up for the restructuring of the land forces, it is stated that there are plans to reduce the number of active soldiers in the land forces from 102,000 to 82,000 by 2020. On the other hand, there are plans to increase the number of soldiers on reserve duty from 15,000 to 30,000 by 2018.

In the White Paper on Defence and National Security published in April 2013 for the first time in five years, it was laid out that although the country does not face any direct military threats through direct and clear conventional war potential, there is growing diversity in the types of threats it faces as a result of globalization. These include international terrorism, cyber threats, organized crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It continued to position (1) intelligence, (2) nuclear deterrence, (3) protection, (4) prevention, and (5) deployment²³ as the five key mechanisms in the national security strategy, and states that France will use a combination of these mechanisms to respond to changes in the strategic environment over the coming 15 years. Regarding France's foreign relations, it positioned NATO'S functions as follows: (1) means of securing collective defense by member states; (2) an important means for strategic partnership in the Atlantic region; and (3) a common framework for military action in dealing with threats and crisis. On the other hand, with regard to the EU, the White Paper clearly stipulated France's leadership role in strengthening defense and security capabilities, and aimed to drive forward the CSDP in a practical and realistic manner. Furthermore, with regard to the Asia-Pacific region, it states that France holds overseas territories such as New Caledonia and French Polynesia, and that the country has maintained an important presence in these regions²⁴. Moreover, against the background of financial constraints, the White Paper stipulated that, in addition to the cuts announced previously, the government would cut a further 24,000 jobs by 2019, and achieve cost reductions via multilateral cooperation. In December 2013, the Parliament enacted a bill for military plans for 2014-2019, in order to implement plans laid out in the White Paper for realizing a national security strategy for the next 15 years. This bill stipulates a larger budget for equipment, the maintenance of defense industry capabilities, and a focus on the command and logistical departments in the 24,000-personnel cut.

3 Germany

While Germany has been implementing a large-scale reduction in its military personnel since the end of the Cold War, it has been gradually expanding the dispatch of its federal forces overseas. At the same time, Germany has advanced the reform of its defense forces to enable them to execute multiple responsibilities encompassing conflict prevention and risk management in the context of multilateral organizations, including NATO, the EU, and the

²³ In its White Paper on Defence and National Security released in April 2013, France defined the following regions as priority regions: (1) Europe and its surrounding areas; (2) the Mediterranean; (3) parts of Africa (from the Saharan Africa to equatorial Africa); (4) the Persian Gulf; and (5) the Indian Ocean. In these regions, France will maintain independent or multinational operational capabilities.

²⁴ France ranks second in the world for its Exclusive Economic Zones, and two-thirds of their Zones lie in the Pacific region. It has also stationed troops in Papeete, French Polynesia and Noumea, New Caledonia; and deploys frigates and amphibious tanks to these areas.

United Nations²⁵.

The Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien (VPR) (Defense Policy Guidelines), formulated in 2011 for the first time in eight years, states that the possibility of attacks on Germany by conventional forces remains low, but risks and threats come from failed states, international terrorism, natural disasters, cyber-attacks, and proliferation of WMDs. It then declares Germany's active participation in the prevention and containment of crisis and conflict, and takes cross-governmental measures. It also states that promotion of military collaboration, standardization, and mutual operability within the NATO and EU framework is essential, in addition to taking cross-government measures.

The amended Military Law, which entered into force in April 2011, stipulates the suspension of conscription for basic military service and the reduction of total personnel from the current 250,000 to 185,000, while it also aims for the sustainable deployment of military personnel by increasing the number of deployable personnel up to 10,000.

²⁵ Germany decreased its military personnel from more than 500,000 at the time of its reunification to 250,000 by 2010. In July 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court judged that dispatching the federal forces to international missions implemented under the multilateral framework such as the United Nations and NATO is constitutional, which has further prompted it to gradually expand the dispatch of its federal forces to participate in various international operations, including security maintenance and reconstruction activities in the Balkan Peninsula and Afghanistan, and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

Chapter 2 Issues in the International Community

Section 1 Disputes in the Middle East and Africa and the Response from the International Community

1 General Situation

Disputes recently observed in different parts of the world cannot always be characterized in the same way. They are derived from a variety of factors including ethnicity, religion, territory, and resources and it has also been pointed out that disputes can be triggered by such global issues as climate change¹. The forms disputes can take are also varied; from armed conflicts through to military standoffs. Furthermore, violations of human rights, refugees, famine, poverty, and terrorism occurring during disputes may further develop into international issues. This means that we face a greater risk in that problems and security issues that occur in one country or region immediately turn into security issues and instability factors impacting the overall international community.

In particular, the Middle East and Africa include a variety of destabilizing factors and see disputes in different areas. States with unstable political situations and insufficient governance capabilities cannot adequately control their national borders, which allows terrorists and weapons as well as narcotics that are the source of funds of terrorist organizations to trespass into their territory and causes regional threats. There are also cases in this region in which a dispute restarts after a ceasefire has been tentatively reached through a peace treaty or other arrangements between stakeholders. The “Arab Spring”², which grew into a full-fledged movement in 2011, prompted Middle Eastern and North African countries to shift into a democratic social structure. In some countries, political turmoil triggered by political change created chasms between different tribes as well as religious and political groups. These developments seem to have been backed by dissatisfaction among local citizens, especially

¹ The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released by the U.S. Department of Defense in March 2014 regards climate change as a key factor that will shape the future security environment. It claims that climate change may accelerate instability and conflict by causing water scarcity, the rise of food prices, and so on. In addition, the Summary for Policymakers in the Working Group II report on impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability of the Fifth Assessment Report which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published in the same month described that climate change could indirectly increase the risk of conflict by exacerbating poverty and other causes of conflict.

² The Arab Spring is a term generally used to refer to the series of democratization movements that were undertaken on a full-fledged basis in Middle Eastern and North African countries starting in early 2011, causing political regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. In 2011, Tunisia held National Constituent Assembly elections for creating a new constitution, which was adopted by the assembly in January 2014. Libya held National Assembly elections for the establishment of a new constitution in July 2012, but still faces a variety of issues through its democratization processes (e.g. formulation of a new constitution).

younger generations, with economic and social gaps as well as high unemployment rates. In such countries as Mali, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, conflicts are triggered by political and economic dissatisfaction of citizens under a fragile governance structure as well as confrontation over territories and resources.

It has become increasingly important for the international community to discern the character of such complex and diverse conflicts, to consider international frameworks and involvements in accordance with their particular circumstances, and then to seek out appropriate responses.

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by rising expectations for the peacekeeping effort as an alternative to collective security measures by the United Nations, which up to that time had not functioned adequately, and, as a result, many U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) were established. Their mission has recently come to include a wide range of activities including those by civilians and police, encompassing such traditional roles as the monitoring of a ceasefire or military withdrawal as well as the monitoring of demilitarization, the reform of security organizations, the monitoring of elections and administrative activities, and humanitarian support (e.g. return of refugees to their homeland). In this situation, the importance of roles related to the protection of civilians and peace-building increases, leading to activities with greater authorization granted by Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter³. U.N. PKO, on the other hand, faces challenges including the availability of required equipment, the protection of personnel safety, and the improvement of troop capabilities⁴.

See ► *Fig. I-2-1-1 (List of Presently Progressing Peacekeeping Operations)*

We also see scenarios where multinational forces and regional organizations authorized by the U.N. Security Council work on conflict prevention, peace-keeping, and peace-building, in addition to the PKO framework. In Africa, such regional organizations as the African Union (AU)⁵ roll out their activities based on resolutions by the U.N. Security Council and their activities are sometimes handed over to U.N. PKO later. The international community also

³ As of the end of May 2014, there are currently 16 PKOs globally, involving about 99,000 military and police personnel and about 17,000 civilian personnel from 122 countries. Out of these PKOs, there are 12 PKOs in the Middle East and Africa. Ten PKOs are granted robust authorization by Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. (See Fig. I-2-4-1)

⁴ “A New Partnership Agenda Charting a New Horizon For U.N. Peacekeeping” was published in July 2009 to evaluate major policy and strategic dilemmas faced by U.N. PKO and discuss solutions among stakeholders.

⁵ The largest regional organization involving 54 countries and regions in Africa. It was established in July 2002 as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in May 1963, was enhanced and reorganized. Its objectives include achieving the integration and solidarity of African nations and people, accelerating political, economic, and social integration of Africa, and promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa

offers recommendations and training assistance and supplies equipment from a long term perspective of prompting African nations to help themselves so that they can enhance local governance organizations and improve the capabilities of their military and security organizations⁶.

2 Present Situation of Regional Conflicts and the Response from the International Community

1 Situation in Afghanistan

The ongoing initiatives in Afghanistan include the operation to mop up the Taliban conducted as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and activities to maintain security conducted by the International Security Assistance Forces⁷ and the Afghan National Security Forces. The security situation in many parts of Afghanistan continues to remain unpredictable, and security in the eastern, southern and southwestern part, which borders with Pakistan, are still a matter of concern.

Although the Taliban's attack capability is diminishing because of the activities of the ISAF and ANSF, the group is presumed to have secured safe havens in Northwest Pakistan and other areas and to be crossing the border into Afghanistan to conduct terrorist activities there⁸.

At the NATO Summit Meeting in Lisbon in 2010, it was agreed that the responsibility for security should be transitioned from the ISAF to the ANSF by the end of 2014. The transition of the security authority has been implemented in five phases by region. The first phase commenced in July 2011. President Karzai announced the areas for the transition of the responsibility for security for the second phase in November 2011, the third phase in May 2012, the fourth phase in December 2012, and the fifth phase in June 2013, respectively. At present the transition of the responsibility for security from the ISAF to the ANSF is being implemented to ensure that the ANSF assumes full responsibility for maintaining the security of the whole of Afghanistan in 2015.

The ISAF will shift from a combat mission to a new training, advising and assistance mission for the ANSF, and it is scaling back its size gradually towards the end of 2014. In July 2011, the

⁶ For example, organizations such as the U.N. and the EU are implementing initiatives in countries including Somalia and Mali.

⁷ As of June 2014, around 50,000 personnel from 48 countries, mainly NATO members, were being deployed.

⁸ Based on the "Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan" (November 2013) by the U.S. Department of Defense, etc. As for the relationship between Pakistan and the United States with regard to the situation in Afghanistan, see Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6-2

U.S. Forces started withdrawing from Afghanistan, and by June 2014, around 67,000 troops withdrew⁹. Furthermore, in May 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama unveiled the withdrawal schedule of reducing the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan to around 9,800 by the beginning of 2015, to half this number by the end of 2015, and draw down to a normal embassy presence with a security assistance component by the end of 2016. Moreover, while Canada, France and Australia have already completed the withdrawal of their combat units, other major NATO countries also announced their policies for withdrawal of their combat units.

After the transition of the responsibility for security, the ANSF will have full security responsibility in Afghanistan. The ANSF is approaching its target size, and its capabilities are continuing to improve. However, there are many problems, including illiteracy, deficiency of logistical capabilities, and soldiers deserting their posts. The ISAF currently provides assistance focusing on these areas as the ANSF's capabilities for maintaining their forces on a long term basis are still limited. Moreover, while the cost of maintaining the ANSF is funded almost entirely through international donations, the ANSF is scheduled to reduce its size after the end of 2014¹⁰.

An agreement has been reached to continue the international community's support for Afghanistan beyond the end of 2014, and the United States and NATO decided to support the ANSF and continue to deploy troops in charge of education beyond 2015. At the NATO Chicago Summit held in May 2012, commitment to Afghan security beyond the end of 2014 was reaffirmed. In addition, at the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan in July 2012, the international community, including Japan, announced the provision of over 16 billion dollars in financial aid. Moreover, countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France concluded a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan¹¹, which called for continued support beyond 2014.

President Karzai has announced that he would not sign the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA)¹², which will provide the legal framework for the presence of the U.S. Forces

⁹ As of June 2014, the number of U.S. troops dispatched to ISAF was 32,800.

¹⁰ The current target size of ANSF is 352,000 personnel, with the cost of maintaining them estimated at approximately \$6 billion. At the NATO Summit Meeting in Chicago in May 2012, it was decided to reduce the size to 228,500 personnel and the cost of maintaining them to approximately \$4.1 billion by 2017 in order to continue fiscal support in the long term.

¹¹ The Afghan-U.S. Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement mentions the possibility that U.S. troops may stay in Afghanistan beyond 2014.

¹² The BSA defines how the U.S. Forces implement activities and use facilities in Afghanistan after 2014. This agreement has been discussed since 2012.

in Afghanistan after 2014, until the ongoing Presidential election is completed¹³. Meanwhile, U.S. President Barack Obama identifies the signing of the agreement as a condition for the presence of U.S. Forces after 2014. The success or failure of the agreement will likely have a considerable impact on the prospects of the presence of the U.S. Forces after the withdrawal of the ISAF.

This agreement is positioned as the foundation for the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) enabling the NATO forces to implement activities to support Afghanistan after 2014. The United States and NATO consider that they need to execute this agreement at an earliest convenience.

Afghanistan faces not only security problems but also a mountain of challenges related to reconstruction, including preventing corruption, enhancing the rule of law, strengthening the crackdown on narcotics trafficking and promoting regional development. Ensuring peace and stability in Afghanistan is a common challenge of the international community, which needs to continue engagement with the country.

2 Situation over the Middle East Peace Efforts

In the Middle East, there have been wars four times between Israel and Arab countries since the foundation of Israel in 1948. Between Israel and Palestine, the Oslo Agreement concluded in 1993 marked the beginning of a peace process through comprehensive negotiations. In 2003, the Israelis and the Palestinians agreed on a “Roadmap” that laid out a course leading to the establishment of a Middle East peace initiative based on the principle of the peaceful coexistence between the two nations. However, the Roadmap has yet to be implemented. In response to rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip against Israel, large-scale Israeli military operations, such as air strikes and deployment of ground forces to the Gaza Strip, took place from the end of 2008 through early 2009. Furthermore, in November 2012, the Israeli military conducted air strikes on the region. In both cases, they reached a cease-fire agreement through the mediation by Egypt, and others.

In July 2013, Israel and Palestine restarted Middle East peace negotiations for the first time in almost three years under strong guidance by the United States. However, in March to April 2014, while the deadline of the nine-month-long negotiations approaching, they had no choice but to

¹³ President Karzai attended the loya jirga (national assembly) in November 2013 and announced that he would not sign the agreement at least until after the coming Presidential election in April 2014. After this statement, he proposed conditions for the closure of this agreement to the U.S., including cessation of house searches targeting Afghani citizens, non-intervention into the Presidential election in April 2014, and return of Afghan citizens held in Guantanamo prison camp.

suspend peace negotiations due to several issues including the cancellation of prisoners release by Israel, Palestinian applications to international treaties, and agreements between the PLO¹⁴ dominated by Fatah and Hamas¹⁵, which is efficiently controlling Palestinian Gaza Strip, on the formation of a national unity government and a national reconciliation cabinet, and prospects on the resumption of talks remain unclear.

Israel has yet to sign peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon. Israel and Syria disagree on the return of the Golan Heights which Israel has occupied since the 1967 Arab-Israel War. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has been deployed in the Golan Heights region to observe the implementation of the ceasefire and military disengagement between the two parties¹⁶. Concerning Israel and Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) increased its presence following the 2006 clash between Israel and Hezbollah, a Shiite Muslim organization.

3 Situation in Syria

Since March 2011, anti-government demonstrations calling for democracy and the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad have taken place all over the country, leading to large casualties through clashes with security forces. The Syrian government, in response to this situation, deployed military and security forces in a number of cities, and conflicts between military forces and opposition forces continued in various areas¹⁷.

In August 2013, chemical weapons were used in the suburbs of the capital city Damascus, killing a large number of citizens. In response to this incident, U.S. President Obama, who had traditionally said that the use of chemical weapons crosses a red line, evaluated the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government¹⁸ and stated his decision to implement military actions against the Assad administration, which resulted in heightened military tension. However, Russia was opposed to military actions and advocated the transfer of Syrian chemical weapons to the control of the international community, which was accepted by the Syrian government. In September 2013, U.S. Secretary of State Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister

¹⁴ In these peace negotiations, Hamas, the dominant faction, conducted negotiations with Israel.

¹⁵ Hamas does not recognize Israel.

¹⁶ Military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) are also active within this region.

¹⁷ The U.N. Secretary-General announced on July 25, 2013 that the death toll resulting from fighting in Syria outnumbered 100,000. Some point out that the death toll as of February 2014 is greater than 140,000.

¹⁸ The U.S. analyzed all sources based on human intelligence, communication-based information, and published information and stated in August 2013 that the country had “high confidence” that the Assad administration had attacked using chemical weapons.

Lavrov had negotiations until the United States and Russia reached an agreement on a framework requiring the Syrian government to report its chemical weapon inventory and accept international inspections as a move toward scrapping of all of its chemical weapons. The Syrian government took measures based on the framework, including submitting the list of its chemical weapon inventory to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and joining the Chemical Weapons Convention, which averted military action against the Assad administration by the United States and others. International efforts are currently underway toward the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons based on the decision made by the OPCW and related U.N. resolutions¹⁹.

The United States, the European Union (EU), and other countries are requesting President Assad to step down and imposing successive sanctions against Syria, including an oil embargo. On the other hand, some anti-government groups involved in clashes with the Syrian forces do not participate in the "Syrian National Coalition," established in November 2012. Such groups include the "Al-Nusra Front," and the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)" specified by the United States as terrorist organizations due to its relations with Al-Qaeda. Western countries are hesitant towards offering weapons to anti-government groups since there is concern that weapons may proliferate in such organizations. Clashes among anti-government groups are also found such as attacks by the ISIL on the arsenals of other anti-government groups.

In the midst of this situation, in January 2014, while an international conference on Syria was held in Switzerland, offering the first opportunity for the Syrian government to engage in dialogue with anti-government groups since the situation deteriorated in Syria, both parties were unable to reach an agreement. In June of that year, a presidential election was held, and President Assad took overwhelming victory. Based on the election results, the Syrian government is expected to strengthen its attacks against anti-government groups, leaving the situation in Syria still unpredictable going forward.

¹⁹ In November 2013, the OPCW decided the following for Syria's chemical weapons. (1) Unloaded bombshells will be destroyed inside Syria by January 31, 2014. (2) Mustard agents and major binary substances (ingredients of chemical agents) including sarin and VX will be moved outside Syria by December 31, 2013. (3) Other chemical agents will be moved outside Syria by February 5, 2014. (4) Residual mustard located in the containers used for mustard agents will be destroyed by March 1, 2014. The OPCW also specified the schedule for destroying chemical weapons moved outside Syria as follows. (1) Mustard agents and major binary substances including sarin and VX will be processed for destruction at an earliest timing so that the process will be completed by March 31, 2014. Resulting compounds will be destroyed by the date approved by the Executive Committee based on the recommendation by the Director General. (2) Other chemical agents will be process for destruction at an earliest timing so that the process will be completed by June 30, 2014.

4 Situation in Egypt

In January 2011, democratization movements triggered by “the Arab Spring”²⁰ spread to Egypt, where large scale anti-government demonstrations occurred and President Mubarak, who had controlled the country as a despotic leader for 30 years, resigned. Mr. Mursi, who used to belong to the Muslim Brotherhood²¹, was elected as a new President through the Presidential election in June 2012, but large-scale demonstrations demanding that President Mursi resign occurred in June 2013 due to an economic impasse and the chasm between Islamic groups and liberal, secular groups, which resulted in a large number of victims from clashes between some demonstrators and groups supporting the President. While this sort of disorder spread in the country, the Egyptian forces intervened in July 2013 and dismissed President Mursi, establishing a provisional government by temporarily setting the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as the President. In May 2014, a presidential election was held in line with the comprehensive democratization roadmap created by the provisional government for national reconciliation²², and former Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi was elected.

As the democratically-elected Egyptian administration collapsed through the intervention of national forces, the United States prompted the provisional government to proceed further with democratization initiatives by freezing some military assistance to Egypt in October 2013.

In November 2013, the first “2+2” meeting was held between Egypt and Russia, which saw some movements to enhanced bilateral relations including a statement by the Egyptian foreign minister on the consideration of purchase of weapons from Russia.

5 Situation in Sudan and South Sudan

In Sudan, a North-South civil war has continued since 1983 between the government composed of Arab Muslims in the north and the anti-government group composed of African Christians in the south. In 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was reached under the mediation of neighboring countries, the U.S. and others which put an end to the civil war. In January 2011, a referendum on the separation and independence of South Sudan was held under the rules of the CPA, leading to the independence of the Republic of South Sudan on July 9, 2011. On the same day, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

²⁰ See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-1, footnote 2

²¹ A Sunni political organization established in Egypt in 1928 as an organization targeting the general public to “revive Islam.” In the 1950s, it became a target of a clampdown for plotting the assassination of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, by the 1970s, the organization became moderate to the extent of conducting political activities through parliament. Meanwhile, radical organizations were derived with Muslim Brotherhood serving as the parent organization.

²² Egypt plans to hold National Assembly elections in 2014.

was established based on the Resolution 1996 adopted by the U.N. Security Council in order to support the establishment of an environment contributing to maintaining peace and stability and helping South Sudan to develop further²³. After the independence of this state, negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan have been going on regarding unresolved issues between north and south, which include the definition of the national border (e.g. the treatment of the Abyei area²⁴) and the profit allocation of oil production²⁵, assisted by the mediation of the international community including the AU. Starting in late March 2012, military tension in the border area between north and south was heightened between the two countries, but both sides stopped hostile behavior based on the recommendation by the U.N. Security Council by August 2012. Both countries also signed a series of agreements regarding security measures in the border area, oil production, and other issues in September 2012 and a document specifying an agreement implementation schedule in March 2013.

The President of South Sudan dismissed the Vice President in July 2013, bringing to the surface a political conflict between the two groups. On December 15 of the same year, fighting broke out among the President's security forces in the capital city of Juba, which led to an intensification of factional struggles within the government's ruling party. Subsequently, following an outbreak of clashes between the South Sudanese government and the anti-government group, fighting and violent acts targeting specific ethnic groups spread to different areas, resulting in a large number of casualties, refugees, and internally displaced persons. On December 19, 2013, UNMISS facilities where civilians took refuge were attacked by insurgents in Akobo County of Jonglei State, killing two PKO personnel and resulting in some casualties. Under these situations, on December 24, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2132 and decided to enhance the UNMISS by increasing the maximum military

²³ The initial mandate period was one year with up to 7,000 military personnel and up to 900 police personnel. Specifically, the mandate of UNMISS is as follows: (1) support for peace consolidation and thereby fostering long-term state building and economic development, (2) support the government of the Republic of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution and protect civilians, and (3) support the government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish rule of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors.

²⁴ The Abyei area was one of the bloodiest battlefields during the North-South civil war. Both the North and the South claim sovereignty over the area due to its abundant oil resources. Whether the area belongs to the North or the South remains uncertain, as a referendum that will settle the territorial issue has not yet been held. In May 2011, immediately before the independence of South Sudan, a battle began between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which was a major military organization in Southern Sudan. In June 2011, the Security Council established under its Resolution 1990 the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in the region.

²⁵ A vast majority of oil wells are located in South Sudan, while most pipelines and ports for export are located in Sudan.

personnel by 5,500. In addition, the “Intergovernmental Authority on Development” (IGAD)²⁶ assisted by the U.N. and the AU initiated efforts to start dialogues among South Sudanese leaders and enable reconciliation. The IGAD helped both parties to sign an agreement in Ethiopia on January 23, 2014 on ceasing hostile activities in South Sudan. Furthermore, in March of the same year, the report of the U.N. Secretary-General proposed a shift in UNMISS activities from those dedicated to peacebuilding and government capacity-building, to those aimed at ensuring strict impartiality in its relations with both parties. Based on the report, on May 27 of the same year, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2155, which stipulated that the mandate of the UNMISS would be restricted to the four areas of the protection of civilians, monitoring and investigating human rights, creating the conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance, and supporting the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

Since around 2003, the Darfur region in the west of Sudan has experienced heightened conflicts between the Arab Sudanese government and African anti-government groups. In response to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) entered between the government and some anti-government groups in 2006, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 in order to establish the AU/UN Hybrid Operation Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007. In 2011, the government and an anti-government group, “Liberation and Justice Movement” (LJM), signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). However, other anti-government groups rejecting the implementation of this document still continue to fight against the government forces.

6 Situation in Somalia

Somalia has been in a state of anarchy since its government collapsed in 1991²⁷. In 2005, the “Transitional Federal Government” (TFG) was established based on the mediation of neighboring countries, but fighting was escalated with such groups as the “Union of Islamic Courts” (UIC) denying this framework. In 2006, Ethiopian forces intervened with assistance from the U.S. and drove away the UIC. In 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)²⁸ was established based on the approval of the U.N. On the other hand, radical insurgents derived from the UIC, “Al-Shabaab”²⁹, enhanced their activity levels in central and

²⁶ The IGAD was established in 1996. Its members are East African nations including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda.

²⁷ “Somaliland” located in the Northwest declared its independence in 1991. “Puntland” located in the Northeast declared the establishment of an autonomous government in 1998.

²⁸ Composed mainly of troops from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Sierra Leone, joined by Ethiopia in January 2013. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2124 decided to increase the number of troops from 17,731 to 22,126.

²⁹ See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3-2

southern parts of the country and resisted the TFG. In response to this, neighboring countries dispatched troops to the AMISOM and other organizations and seized Kismayo, a major stronghold of Al-Shabaab, but fighting still continues mainly in central and southern areas. The U.N. Security Council adopted the Resolution 2124 in November 2013 and decided to increase AMISOM troops and enhance logistic support by the U.N.

In addition, Somalia, especially its northeastern part of the country, is considered to include bases for pirates who are active off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The international community is implementing a series of initiatives to enhance the security capabilities of Somalia based on the perception that instability of Somalia triggers piracy issues³⁰.

Somalia saw the end of transitional governance period of the TFG as of August 2012 and convened a new federal assembly. A new President was elected in September 2012 and a new Cabinet was formed in November 2012. This newly-integrated government established for the first time in 21 years is working on stabilizing the situation in the country.

7 Situation in Mali

In Mali, an anti-government Tuareg³¹ insurgent group, the “National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad” (MNLA), triggered a riot in January 2012, joined by other groups including “Ansar al-Dine”³², an Islamic radical group. In March of the same year, some soldiers rioted in the capital city of Bamako, prompting the MNLA to conquer northern cities and announce the independence of the northern region in April 2012. Subsequently, radical Islamic groups including Ansar al-Dine that expelled the MNLA, “Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa” (MUJAO), and “al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM), governed the country based on Islamic laws, aggravating humanitarian and security situations in northern Mali.

In response to this situation, in December 2012 the U.N. Security Council adopted the Resolution 2085 to approve the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA)³³, which focuses on revitalizing the capabilities of Malian troops and security organizations and helping Malian authorities to seize the northern area and reduce threats from

³⁰ See Part III Section 3 for anti-piracy initiatives implemented by the MOD and the SDF and other countries

³¹ The Tuareg Tribe is a nomadic ethnic minority in the Sahara Desert. It is pointed out that the tribe has been in conflict with the government of Mali seeking for autonomy in the Northern Mali.

³² See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-2

³³ The AFISMA receive troops from member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), including Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, and Nigeria.

terrorist organizations. In January 2013, France dispatched its troops to the country based on the request from the Malian provisional government in order to respond to attacks into central and southern regions by terrorists including Ansar al-Dine. Subsequently, the Malian provisional government recaptured its major cities in the northern part of the country, assisted by the deployment of the AFISMA. While some cities are reported to have been attacked by suicide bombers, France started to withdraw its troops in April 2013 as most of its missions were completed, reducing its maximum 4,000-strong troops into around 1,600 as of March 2014. In April 2013, the U.N. Security Council adopted the Resolution 2100 to determine the deployment of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)³⁴, which works on the stabilization of densely-populated areas and the reconstruction of national capabilities. This resolution enabled the MINUSMA, which had its authority delegated by the AFISMA, to start its activities in July 2013. The MINUSMA helped Mali to hold a Presidential election in a peaceful manner and establish a new government in September of the same year³⁵. Furthermore, the EU decided to establish a 500-strong mission for training Malian troops in December 2012 so that it can offer training and education to Malian troops.

8 Situation in the Central African Republic

The Central African Republic has been facing political turmoil since its independence in 1960, afflicted by successive military coups and activities by anti-government insurgents. In December 2012, Seleka³⁶, an anti-government Islamic insurgent group, conquered several cities in the northeastern part of the country, based on their dissatisfaction over the execution status of an agreement signed in 2008 with the government. In January 2013, the Economic Community of Central African State (ECCAS)³⁷ and other organizations helped the Central African Republic government and Seleka to reach a peace agreement. However, Seleka recommenced their attacks in March 2013 based on its assertion that the government failed in conforming to the agreement, and conquered the capital city of Bangui. Subsequently, the country's security

³⁴ The initial mandate period of MINUSMA is one year from July 2013. The mission is implemented by a maximum of 11,200 military personnel and a maximum of 1,440 policing personnel. In case the MINUSMA is exposed to imminent danger, based on a request from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, French forces are given authorization to intervene for the purpose of assisting the mission.

³⁵ In June 2013, the provisional government and the MNLA reached an agreement on such issues as allowing the northern area to participate in the presidential election and approving the dispatch of Mali troops to northern cities.

³⁶ Seleka means "alliance" in the local language. The organization was created by combining two major anti-government groups and other anti-government groups in December 2012. Its stronghold is located in the northeastern part of the country where diamond mines are concentrated.

³⁷ The ECCAS was established in December 1981. Its member states are Angola, Gabon, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Burundi.

and humanitarian situations were rapidly aggravated, as murders and looting of citizens by multiple insurgent groups, including Seleka and “Anti-balaka,” a mostly Christian vigilante group established to counter Seleka, became widespread.

To respond to these situations, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2127 in December 2013 to approve the dispatch of “African-led International Support Mission” (MISCA) led by the AU and the enhancement of French troops supporting this mission. This resolution also requested the authority of the “Mission for the consolidation of peace in Central African Republic” (MICOPAX), a mission implemented in the country by the leadership of the ECCAS, to be transferred to the MISCA, and suggested that the MISCA could eventually develop into a U.N. PKO. In April 2014, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2149 to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which focuses on the protection of civilians³⁸. Moreover, the EU decided to dispatch its security forces in January 2014, and the forces commenced operations in April of the same year. The forces are expected to have a maximum of 1,000 personnel.

³⁸ The initial mandate period was set to one year, with the maximum dispatch level set for 10,000 military personnel and 1,800 police personnel. The MINUSCA is set to have its authority regarding military and police activities delegated from the MISCA on September 15, 2014.

Section 2 Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, or of ballistic missiles carrying such weapons, has been recognized as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In particular, there still remain strong concerns that non-state actors, including terrorists, against whom traditional deterrence works less effectively, could acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.

1 Nuclear Weapons

During the Cold War period, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 raised awareness of the danger of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that took effect in 1970 prohibited countries other than those that had conducted nuclear tests in or before 1966¹ from having nuclear weapons, and required nuclear-armed countries to control and reduce nuclear weapons through bilateral negotiations².

The NPT is currently signed by 190 countries³. While some countries that had previously possessed nuclear weapons became signatories of this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states by abandoning these weapons⁴, India, Israel, and Pakistan still refuse to sign this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. There are other countries that have declared the development and possession of nuclear weapons, such as North Korea, which announced it had conducted nuclear tests in October 2006, May 2009 and February 2013⁵.

U.S. President Obama's speech for a world without nuclear weapons in April 2009 promoted initiatives in the international community for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, showing the United States' resolution to take concrete steps towards the goal: specifically, the

¹ The United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. France and China signed the NPT in 1992

² Article 6 of the NPT sets out the obligation of signatory countries to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith

³ As of April 2012

⁴ South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus

⁵ After North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, it promised to remain as a contracting state, but it again declared its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. In the Joint Statement adopted after the Six-Party Talks in September 2005, North Korea promised to return to the NPT soon, but after that it announced three nuclear tests. North Korea's nuclear tests constitute a major challenge to the NPT.

reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security while maintaining nuclear deterrence, the signing of a new treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) between the United States and Russia, and pursuit of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)⁶ by the U.S. government.

In April 2010, the presidents of the U.S. and Russia signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty to replace START I, which was put into effect in February 2011⁷. In addition, the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C. in April 2010 adopted measures to ensure thorough control of all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, the NPT Review Conference held in May 2010 adopted the final document, which includes specific future action plans consisting of three pillars: nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The second Nuclear Security Summit convened in Seoul in March 2012 adopted the Seoul Communiqué, which incorporates nuclear security issues to be addressed by the international community, such as management, transportation and illicit trade of nuclear materials, as well as nuclear forensics⁸.

President Obama made a speech in Berlin in June 2013 and said that he will discuss with Russia so that the number of strategic nuclear weapons already deployed by the U.S. will be reduced by up to one-third⁹. The United Kingdom also said in October 2010 that the country will decrease the number of its nuclear warheads through the Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR).

The international community has begun to take steady and major steps toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This direction is welcome, as it contributes to improving the international security environment. In contrast, China is said to have been increasing its

⁶ Adopted in 1996, this treaty bans all nuclear test explosions regardless of location. Of the 44 nations that are required to ratify it for the treaty to enter into force, 8 nations have not yet done so (United States, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, and North Korea). Indonesia ratified the CTBT in February 2012. The United States participated in the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in September 2011, following 2009 which marked the first time in 10 years that the United States participated in the Conference.

⁷ The treaty stipulates that both countries are to reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and the number of deployed delivery vehicles to 700 by seven years following the treaty's enactment. In April 2014, the U.S. reported that the country had deployed 1,585 strategic nuclear warheads and 778 transportation units, while Russia reported that it had deployed 1,512 strategic nuclear warheads and 498 transportation units. These numbers show data as of March 1, 2013.

⁸ Nuclear forensics aims to provide evidence for prosecution of perpetrators of illicit trade or malicious use through identification of the source of detected nuclear materials and other radioactive substances

⁹ Regarding this proposal, Russia explained its position by saying that it needs to consider all elements impacting strategic stability including missile defense, space weapons and non-nuclear strategic weapons and that negotiations concerning the further reduction of nuclear weapons require a multilateral framework involving all countries that have nuclear weapons.

inventory of nuclear warheads, developing their transportation methods, and actually deploying them¹⁰ so that it will continue to enhance its capability toward nuclear wars. It has been pointed out that a framework for reducing nuclear weapons involving China will be needed in the future.

2 Biological and Chemical Weapons

Biological and chemical weapons are easy to manufacture at a relatively low cost and easy to disguise because most materials, equipment and technology needed to manufacture these weapons can be used for both military and civilian purposes. For example, water purification equipment used to desalinate sea water can be exploited to extract bacteria for the production of biological weapons and sodium cyanide used for the process of metal coating can be abused for the production of chemical weapons¹¹. Accordingly, biological and chemical weapons are attractive to states or non-state actors, such as terrorists, who seek asymmetric means of attack¹².

Biological weapons have the following characteristics: (1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive, (2) there is usually an incubation period of a few days between exposure and onset, (3) their use is hard to detect, (4) even the threat of use can create great psychological effects, and (5) they can cause heavy casualties depending on the circumstances and the type of weapons¹³.

Concerning the response to biological weapons, it has also been pointed out that there is a possibility that advancements in life sciences will be misused or abused. With these concerns, in November 2009, the United States decided on a policy¹⁴ to respond to the proliferation of biological weapons and the use of these weapons by terrorists, and took measures to thoroughly manage pathogens and toxins as well¹⁵.

As for chemical weapons, Iraq repeatedly used mustard gas, tabun, and sarin¹⁶ in the Iran-Iraq

¹⁰ See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3-2 for China's ballistic missile development

¹¹ The exportation of related general products and technologies that can be used to develop and produce these chemical and biological weapons is controlled by an agreement based on the Australia Group, a framework for international export control. Member states including Japan control their export through domestic laws.

¹² A means of attacking the counterpart's most vulnerable points other than by conventional weapons of war (e.g., weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, and cyber-attacks)

¹³ Then Japan Defense Agency, "Basic Concept for Dealing with Biological Weapons" (January 2002)

¹⁴ In November 2009, the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats was released in order to dictate a response to the proliferation of biological weapons and their use by terrorists. At the State of the Union Address in January 2010, President Obama said that the United States was launching a new initiative to promptly and effectively respond to bioterrorism and infectious diseases.

¹⁵ U.S. Presidential order (July 2, 2010)

¹⁶ Mustard gas is a slow-acting erosion agent. Tabun and sarin are fast-acting nerve agents

War. In the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress Iraqi Kurds¹⁷. It is believed that other chemical weapons¹⁸ that were used included VX, a highly toxic nerve agent, and easy-to-manage binary rounds¹⁹. In August 2013, sarin was used in the suburbs of Damascus, Syria, where Syrian troops clashed with anti-government groups²⁰. The Syrian Government denied using chemical weapons, but entered into the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in line with an agreement between the U.S. and Russia. Subsequently, international efforts have been underway²¹ for the overseas transfer of chemical agents and other measures based on the decision made by the OPCW²² and a U.N. Security Council resolution²³.

North Korea is one example of a country that is still presumed to own these chemical weapons and which has not entered into the CWC. Furthermore, the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995, as well as incidents of bacillus anthracis being contained in mail items in the United States in 2001 and that of ricin being contained in a mail item in February 2004, have shown that the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage if used in cities.

3 Ballistic Missiles

Ballistic missiles enable the projection of heavy payloads over long distances and can be used as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Once launched, ballistic missiles follow an orbital flight trajectory and fall at a steep angle at high speed. As such, effectively countering them requires a highly advanced interceptor missile system.

If ballistic missiles are deployed in a region where military confrontation is underway, the conflict could intensify or expand, and tension in a region where armed antagonism exists could be further exacerbated, leading to the destabilization of that region. Furthermore, a country may use ballistic missiles as a means of attacking or threatening another country that is superior in

¹⁷ It was reported that a Kurdish village was attacked with chemical weapons in 1988, killing several thousand people at once.

¹⁸ A weapon in which two types of relatively harmless chemicals contained separately provide the ingredients for a chemical agent, devised so that the materials are mixed by the impact of an explosive discharge in the warhead, causing a chemical reaction and thereby synthesis of the chemical agent. The handling and storage of this weapon is relatively easy compared to one that is filled from the outset with a chemical agent.

¹⁹ Iraq joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in February 2009.

²⁰ The final report from a United Nations investigation that confirms that Syria used chemical weapons (December 12, 2013)

²¹ See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-2 for Syria situation

²² (The 33rd and 34th) special meetings of the Executive Council of OPCW.

²³ U.N. Security Council Resolution 2118.

terms of conventional forces.

In recent years, in addition to the threat of ballistic missiles, attention has been increasingly paid to the threat of cruise missiles as a weapon with the potential for proliferation because they are comparatively easy for terrorists and other non-state actors to acquire²⁴. Because cruise missiles are cheaper to produce compared to ballistic missiles and easy to maintain and train with, many countries either produce or modify cruise missiles. At the same time, it is said that cruise missiles have a higher degree of target accuracy and that they are difficult to detect while in flight²⁵. Moreover, because they are smaller than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be concealed on a ship to secretly approach a target, and if they carry weapons of mass destruction in their warheads, they present an enormous threat²⁶.

4 Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs

Even weapons that were purchased or developed for self-defense purposes could easily be exported or transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes successful. For example, certain states that do not heed political risks have transferred weapons of mass destruction and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces and instead intend to compensate for this with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these states seeking weapons of mass destruction do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and allow terrorist organizations to be active due to their poor governance. Therefore, in general, the possibility of actual use of weapons of mass destruction may increase in these cases.

In addition, since there is a concern that such states may not be able to effectively manage the related technology and materials, the high possibility that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states has become a cause for concern. For example, because there is a danger that even terrorists who do not possess related technologies can use a dirty bomb²⁷ as a means of attack once they acquire a radioactive substance, nations across the world share concerns regarding the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-state entities²⁸.

²⁴ In the July 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon, it is believed that Hezbollah used a cruise missile to attack an Israeli naval vessel. Israel announced in March 2011 that it had uncovered six anti-ship cruise missiles among other things on cargo ships subject to inspection.

²⁵ United States Congressional Research Service, "Cruise Missile Proliferation" (July 28, 2005)

²⁶ The United States is concerned about the possibility of a threat to its forward-deployed forces from the development and deployment of ballistic and cruise missiles by countries including China and Iran.

²⁷ Dirty bombs are intended to cause radioactive contamination by spreading radioactive substances.

²⁸ With these concerns, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, which provided to make decisions regarding adoption and enforcement of laws that are adequate and effective in making all states refrain from providing any form of support to non-state entities that attempt to develop,

Pakistan is suspected to have started its nuclear program in the 1970s. In February 2004, it became clear that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred from Pakistan to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists.

When then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kerry visited North Korea in October 2002, the United States announced that North Korea had admitted the existence of a project to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons, which indicated the possibility that North Korea had pursued development not only of plutonium-based weapons but also of uranium-based nuclear weapons. In November 2010, North Korea revealed a uranium enrichment facility to U.S. experts visiting the country²⁹. North Korea also announced that a uranium enrichment plant equipped with several thousand centrifuges for fueling light-water reactors was in operation. In addition, it was also pointed out that North Korea had given support to secret Syrian nuclear activities³⁰.

See ▶ Part I, Chapter 1, Section 2-1 (North Korea)

The international community's uncompromising and decisive stance against the transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has put enormous pressure on countries engaged in related activities, leading to some of them accepting inspections by international institutions or abandoning their WMD programs altogether³¹.

Ballistic missiles have been significantly proliferated or transferred as well. The former Soviet

acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism also entered into force in July 2007.

²⁹ In January 2012, the "Worldwide Threat Assessment" by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) pointed out that the North's disclosure (of uranium enrichment facilities) supports the United States' longstanding assessment that North Korea has pursued uranium enrichment capability. North Korea also mentioned its implementation of uranium enrichment in a June 2009 Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, a September 2009 letter sent from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations to the President of the United Nations Security Council, news reports made November 2010, and in other ways.

³⁰ DNI "Worldwide Threat Assessment" by the DNI January 2014 states "North Korea's assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor (destroyed in 2007) illustrates the reach of the North's proliferation activities." The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report of May 2011 states that the destroyed reactor was very likely a nuclear reactor that Syria should have declared.

³¹ Extensive behind-the-scenes negotiations began in March 2003 between Libya and the United States and the United Kingdom, and in December 2003, Libya agreed to dismantle all of its weapons of mass destruction and to allow an international organization to carry out inspections. Later, in August 2006, Libya ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol. However, after the military activity against Libya by multilateral force, in March 2011, North Korea denounced the military attacks against Libya saying that attacking after disarmament was an "armed invasion."

Union exported Scud-Bs to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries now possess ballistic missiles. In particular, Pakistan's Ghauri and Iran's Shahab-3 missiles are believed to be based on North Korea's Nodong missiles.

5 Iran's Nuclear Issues

Since the 1970s, Iran has been pursuing a nuclear power plant construction project with cooperation from abroad, claiming that its nuclear-related activities are for peaceful purposes in accordance with the NPT. In 2002, however, Iran's covert construction of facilities including a large-scale uranium enrichment plant was exposed by a group of dissidents. Subsequent IAEA inspection revealed that Iran, without notifying the IAEA, had been engaged for a long time in uranium enrichment and other activities potentially leading to the development of nuclear weapons. In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors recognized Iran's breach of compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement.

In September 2009, it became clear that Iran had failed to abide by reporting duties based on the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and was constructing a new uranium enrichment plant near Qom in central Iran. Moreover, in February 2010, Iran began enriching uranium to increase the enrichment level from below 5% to up to around 20%, saying that it is to supply fuel to a research reactor for medical isotope production. And in December 2011, Iran started the enrichment process at the above-mentioned new enrichment plant³². The IAEA has expressed concerns that these Iranian nuclear activities may have military dimensions including those related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile³³, and they point out that they have been unable to obtain confirmation that the objectives are peaceful since Iran has not permitted the IAEA personnel to access military sites, which could be relevant to experiments using high explosives, and other necessary cooperation to clear up the concerns stated above.

The international community expressed strong concerns about the lack of concrete proof

³² The IAEA Director General estimated in a report published in February 2014 that Iran had so far produced total 447 kg of enriched uranium with a concentration of around 20%, out of which the country had stored 160 kg in the form of uranium hexafluoride. Furthermore, the IAEA Report by the Director General released in May of the same year contend that in accordance with the first step measures elaborated later, Iran diluted to less than 5%, or converted into oxide, a total of approximately 409 kg of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 20%. Uranium 235 with a concentration of 20% or more is defined as high-enriched uranium, which is generally used for research purposes. If this substance is used for weapons, a concentration ratio is usually 90% or greater.

³³ In November 2011, the IAEA published a report describing possible military aspects of Iran's nuclear program in detail by referring to information regarding the explosion of highly-functional explosives.

regarding Iran's claim that it had no intent to develop nuclear weapons and that all of its nuclear activities were for peaceful purposes, and has demanded that Iran suspend all of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities through a series of Security Council Resolutions³⁴ and IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions.

Regarding this issue, the United States and the European Union (EU) have taken individual measures to tighten sanctions against Iran. The United States enacted a bill that would prohibit foreign financial institutions, which conduct significant transactions with the Central Bank of Iran or other Iranian financial institutions, from opening or maintaining bank accounts in the U.S., and these provisions became effective in June 2012. The EU started to ban imports of Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products in January 2012. Iran, meanwhile, started negotiations with the IAEA toward resolving pending problems. In April 2012, Iran resumed talks with the EU3+3 (U.K., France, Germany, U.S., China, and Russia) on its nuclear program, but no major progress was made under the former Aḥmadī-nezhād administration.

However, the Presidential election in Iran in June 2013 elected Hassan Rouhani and the new administration proceeded with discussions with the EU3+3 under the support from the supreme leader, Ali Hosseini Khamenei. This move resulted in an agreement on the Joint Plan of Action towards the comprehensive resolution of nuclear issues in November 2013, and the execution of the first step measures of the Plan commenced in January 2014³⁵.

In response, Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel has been strongly opposed to the relaxation of sanctions against Iran, stating in November 2013 that the agreement allowing Iran to continue to enrich uranium is a "historic mistake."

Although there is no significant sign of military escalation in Iran and the surrounding region, it is necessary to continue paying close attention to this issue, because Japan imports around 80% of its crude oil from the region.

³⁴ U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1696 adopted in July 2006, UNSCR 1737 in December 2006, UNSCR 1747 in March 2007, UNSCR 1803 in March 2008, and UNSCR 1929 in June 2010

³⁵ First step measures include the limited relaxation of sanctions by the EU3+3, provided that for six months, Iran (1) retains half of its current inventory of enriched uranium with a concentration of approximately 20% as oxide and dilutes the remaining half to less than 5%, (2) does not enrich uranium to a level of 5% or greater, (3) does not progress activities conducted in uranium enrichment facilities and heavy-water reactors, and (4) accepts enhanced monitoring by the IAEA.

Section 3 International Terrorism

1 General Situation

As a result of the ongoing globalization, it has become easier than before for terrorist organizations operating across national borders to share information and cooperate internally and with other organizations, secure geographic access and acquire weapons. In this situation, terrorist organizations, including Islamic radical groups, are conducting acts of terrorism mainly in countries and regions where the political situation is unstable and governance is weak. However, it is said that the objective of activities and the capabilities differ from organization to organization¹. Some of those organizations are presumed to be securing funds through crimes such as illegal trades and abductions.

Regarding Al-Qaeda, which is believed to have directed the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Osama Bin Laden, the group's leader who was hiding in Pakistan, was killed in an operation conducted by the United States. The killing of Bin Laden, however, has not eradicated the possibility of Al-Qaeda attacks. While the command and control capabilities of the Al-Qaeda leadership have been declining, it has been pointed out that Al-Qaeda affiliates that include "Al-Qaeda" in their name are increasing their force and perpetrating terrorism mainly in North Africa and the Middle East².

Organizations which are said to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda and other Islamic radical terrorist organizations are conducting acts of terrorism mainly in North Africa and the Middle East but also in various locations in South Asia and Southeast Asia. In Algeria, Libya, Mali, Iraq, Egypt and Syria in particular, those organizations are said to have the capability to cross national borders which are not sufficiently controlled and to conduct acts of terrorism in countries other than those where they have bases of activity. Regarding those organizations, it has been pointed out that they have acquired a large amount of weapons which proliferated when the Gadhafi regime of Libya collapsed.

In recent years, we have also seen cases where radical individuals and groups who have had no official relations at all with Al-Qaeda or its affiliates have been inspired by Al-Qaeda's ideology and have become so called "home-grown terrorists".

¹ The U.S. State of Department "Country Reports on Terrorism 2012" (May 2013)

² Director of National Intelligence (DNI) "Worldwide Threat Assessment" (January 2014)

The United States and countries in Europe share concern³ that their own people participate in the combats in the conflict-affected regions such as Syria⁴ or Somalia⁵ and get indoctrinated into radical thoughts and conduct acts of terrorism upon returning home.

Due to the threats of terrorism proliferated in this way, and the fact that those involved in terrorism are becoming more diversified, it is becoming increasingly difficult to prevent international terrorism, and the importance of international cooperation on counterterrorism has further increased.

2 Global terrorist attacks

Iraq has seen successive terrorist attacks targeting high ranking government officials, foreign citizens, security authorities, and the like since the U.S. Forces left the country in December 2011. It has continued to face terrorist threats, as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an organization specified by the U.S. Department of State as a terrorist organization and also considered to be active in neighboring Syria, has controlled western cities of Iraq. These situations prompted the U.S. to announce in January 2014 that it will sell gunships and surface-to-air missiles to the Iraqi government so that the country will be able to enhance its anti-terrorism capabilities⁶. However, in June of the same year, insurgents such as ISIL, attacked Mosul, in northern Iraq, and seized control of the city. In addition, they began to move southward towards Baghdad. The government of Iraq is responding by conducting military air strikes and mobilizing militias to prevent insurgents from going into Baghdad. While the U.S. denies dispatching combat troops, it deploys the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush in the Persian Gulf, and is expanding its assistance to the Iraqi government, including the dispatch of a military advisory group to Iraq.

Terrorist attacks have recently been on the rise targeted at diplomatic delegates, security authorities and other groups in Yemen. In October 2010, some explosive materials were discovered in multiple air cargoes bound for the U.S., which were revealed to have originated in Yemen. It is thought that these attacks were conducted by groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda. In addition, it has been pointed out that activities by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are continuing⁷.

³ Statement of the Director of the U.S. Office of Homeland Security February 7, 2014

⁴ See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-2 for Syrian situation

⁵ See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-2 for Somali situation

⁶ In January 2014, the U.S. Office of Homeland Security notified Congress of the export of 24 AH-64E attack helicopters

⁷ Director of National Intelligence “Worldwide Threat Assessment” (January 2014)

In Libya, Islamic insurgents attacked the U.S. General Consulate in Benghazi in September 2012, killing four U.S. citizens including the ambassador. In January 2014, the U.S. Secretary of State designated Ansar al-Shari'a, which is considered responsible for the incident, as a terrorist organization. Furthermore, the U.S. and the NATO have announced their intention to enhance the security capabilities of Libya by offering training to its armed forces and dispatching military consultants⁸.

In January 2013, an Algerian natural gas plant in the Southeastern city of In Amenas was the subject of a terrorist attack by an Islamic radical group presumably derived from "al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM), which had been kidnapping Algerian and western citizens. The group killed many citizens including 10 Japanese citizens during the incident. The country continues to be exposed to terrorist threats, as Algerian troops and insurgents were engaged in gunfight near the borders of Mali and Libya in June 2013.

In Mali, French troops dispatched based on a request from the provisional Mali government launched an assault upon insurgents including Ansar al-Dine, an organization that controls the northern area of the country and is considered to have relations with Al Qaeda, and in response the group announced its intention for retaliatory terrorist attacks. This exemplifies the continuation of terrorist threats in the country.

Somalia established a newly unified government in November 2012. The country, however, includes many areas where collisions between "Al-Shabaab" controlling part of Somalia, Somali government forces, and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are still underway. In September 2013, terrorists attacked commercial facilities in the capital city of Nairobi in neighboring Kenya after the country dispatched its troops to Somalia, killing many citizens including foreigners. Furthermore, in May 2014, a suicide bombing took place in the capital city of Djibouti in Djibouti that dispatched its troops to Somalia. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the bombing and is still a significant threat in the region.

In Nigeria, Boko Haram, which aims to build an Islamic nation, has stepped up its activities since 2010, carrying out acts of terrorism repeatedly in retaliation against a crackdown by police and other authorities. In addition, in August 2011, Boko Haram claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing targeting a United Nations building in Nigerian capital of Abuja. It is reported that the Nigerian government declared the state of emergency in three northeastern regions in

⁸ NATO Secretary General Rasmussen announced in October 2013 that he will dispatch military consultants to Libya. The U.S. Department of Defense announced that it will train 5,000-8,000 personnel of Libyan forces in Bulgaria in November 2013

May 2013 and started counter-terrorism campaigns using its armed forces. Under these circumstances, in April 2014, Boko Haram abducted over 200 female students in Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. In response, the United States dispatched equipment, including an unmanned aerial vehicle, to assist with the search efforts of the Nigerian government. The Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council added Boko Haram to its sanctions list. The international community is taking these and other measures to deal with the situation⁹.

South Asia has long been suffering frequent terrorist attacks. In particular, Pakistan has experienced a number of terrorist attacks targeting religious facilities and government organizations masterminded by Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or Al-Qaeda¹⁰.

In Southeast Asia, some progress has been made in countering terrorist organizations. In the Philippines, it is pointed out that terrorist organizations such as the Islamic extremist terrorist group Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which have been the biggest source of domestic public security concerns, have now significantly weakened¹¹.

In the United States, there was an incident where a bomb exploded during the Boston Marathon in April 2013, leaving three dead and numerous people injured. This was considered to be a crime committed by typical home-grown terrorists.

See ► *Fig. I-2-3-1 (Major Terrorist Groups Based in Africa and the Middle East Regions)*

⁹ In November 2013, the U.S. Department of State designated Boko Haram as a terrorist organization

¹⁰ See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6-2 for Pakistan situation

¹¹ See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 5-2 for Philippines situation

Section 4 Outer Space and Security

1 Outer Space and Security

Nearly 60 years have passed since a satellite was launched into space for the first time in the history of mankind. Technology leveraging outer space has recently been applied into different areas. Regarding outer space, no state is allowed to own and freely available for all nations, which prompts major countries to aggressively work on leveraging space¹. For example, meteorological and observation satellites are used to observe weather as well as land and waters; communication and broadcasting satellites are used for the Internet and broadcasting; and positioning satellites are used to navigate aircrafts and ships. These satellites have widely prevailed in social, economic, scientific, and other areas as essential infrastructure for the public and private sectors.

In major countries also allow their armed forces are actively involved in outer space activities and utilize a variety of satellites. There is no concept of national borders in outer space, meaning that the utilization of satellites enables them to observe, communicate to, and position any area on Earth. Thus, major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C⁴ISR functions², among others. Such satellites include image reconnaissance satellites reconnoitering military facilities and targets, satellites gathering radio wave information for military communications and radio wave gathering, communication satellites for military communication, and positioning satellites for navigating naval vessels and aircraft and enhancing the precision of weapons systems.

On the other hand, in January 2007, China conducted an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test to destroy its aging satellite with a missile launched from the Earth's surface. The resulting space debris³ was spread across the satellite's orbit, which was noted as a threat against space assets such as satellites owned by countries. Since existing frameworks, including the "Outer Space Treaty"

¹ The Outer Space Treaty that came into force in October 1967 (The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) defines such matters as the freedom of exploration and use in outer space, the prohibition of territorial ownership, and principles of the peaceful use of outer space. However, no clear international agreement has been reached on the definition of outer space, though it is generally considered as space located 100 km or further away from the Earth's surface.

² The term "C⁴ISR" stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The 1991 Gulf War is defined as "the first high-tech war conducted in outer space in the history of mankind."

³ Unnecessary artifacts orbiting around the Earth, including satellites no longer in use, upper stages of rockets, parts, and fragments

that prescribed the peaceful use of outer space, do not have provisions on avoiding the destruction of space objects and actions triggering debris, among others, international efforts have been under way recently for the creation of the “International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities”⁴ proposed by the European Union (EU) and the guidelines for “Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities”⁵ of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) which address such matters. In addition, countries are working on the Space Situational Awareness (SSA)⁶ by monitoring the impact of accelerated solar activity on satellites and electronic equipment on Earth and threats caused by meteors reaching the Earth, in addition to threats posed by anti-satellite weapons and space debris on space assets.

All of this shows that the risk toward the stable use of outer space has become one of the critical security challenges facing countries.

See ▶ Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-4 (Responses in Airspace)

2 Trends in the Use of Space by Countries for Security Objectives

1 United States

The United States launched its first satellite, Explorer 1, in January 1958, following the former Soviet Union. The country has since then proceeded with a variety of space activities in fields including military, science, and resource exploration, such as launching the world’s first reconnaissance satellite and landing on the Moon, reaching the status of No. 1 superpower for space activities today. Its activities cover a wide spectrum of areas including military, social, and economic aspects, benefiting the United States as well as the entire world⁷. In addition, U.S. forces clearly recognize the importance of outer space in their actions, aggressively utilizing outer space for security purposes.

In June 2010, the United States published the “National Space Policy” defining the country’s basic guidelines for space policy, including its objectives and principles. It specified basic

⁴ In 2008, the EU formulated a draft and started bilateral discussions with major countries. Discussions have been made multilateral since 2012, targeting adoption

⁵ In 2007, the chairperson for the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (U.N.COPUOS) proposed to discuss “the long-term sustainability of outer space activities” in relation to civil space activities, for the purpose of defining the risk reduction for long-term sustainable activities and equal access to outer space. This enabled the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of U.N. COPUOS to set up a working group, which currently continues discussions for defining guidelines

⁶ In May 2014, Gen. William L. Shelton, Commander of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, stated, “Currently, we track more than 23,000 objects in space—10 centimeters in size and larger. However, our sensors cannot see the estimated 500,000 pieces of debris between 1 and 10 centimeters in size,” and contends that space monitoring capabilities need to be strengthened.

⁷ For example, the United States offers its GPS to the public sector.

principles for security, civil use, commercial use, and international cooperation; among others. The country also published the “National Security Space Strategy” (NSSS) as the security guideline regarding outer space in February 2011, explaining that current and future space environments include three trends, such as (1) the congestion of artificial objects including satellites, (2) the challenges contested by potential adversaries, and (3) accelerated competitions with other countries. Based on this understanding, the strategic objectives of the United States in outer space are (1) safety, stability, and security in space, (2) maintaining and enhancing the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by space, and (3) energizing the space industrial base that support U.S. national security. To meet these objectives, the NSSS states that the country will pursue strategic approaches of (1) promoting responsible, peaceful, and safe use of outer space, (2) providing improved U.S. space capabilities, (3) partnering with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms, (4) preventing and deterring aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security, and (5) preparing to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment.

From an organizational perspective, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) shoulders non-military space development for the United States, while the U.S. Department of Defense works on space development from a national security perspective. Recently, NASA and the U.S. Air Force announced that they will work together to design aircraft and develop materials, among others.

Major satellites used for military purposes are used for multiple operations, including image reconnaissance, early warning, electronic reconnaissance, communication, and navigation and positioning.

2 Russia

Russia’s space activities have been continuing since the Soviet Union era. The former Soviet Union successively launched multiple satellites after it had launched the first satellite in the history of mankind, “Sputnik 1,” in October 1957, and had the largest number of launched satellites in the world by the end of the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Many military satellites were included, which enabled the country to compete against the U.S. for military expansion in outer space. Russia’s space activities have declined since the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. However, the country has recently started to expand its activities once again in the backdrop of its economic recovery.

Regarding the country’s trends in security, “the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy

to 2020,” approved in May 2009, states that threats against its military security include policies by developed countries aiming for the militarization of outer space, interference with Russia’s space control systems, and others. “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” a document created in February 2010 to specifically define the principles of the “National Security Strategy” in the military field, says that ensuring superiority in outer space is one of the critical factors allowing its armed forces to achieve their objectives. It also refers to the necessity in a military mission to alert the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in a timely manner in case of aerospace attacks, and deploying and maintaining space systems supporting the activities of Russian forces, as well as establishing aerospace defense organizations.

From an organizational perspective, the Russian Federal Space Agency (FSA, commonly called “Roscosmos”) works on space activities related to Russia’s scientific and economic areas, while the Russian Ministry of Defense is involved in space activities for security purposes, and the Russian Aerospace Defense Forces conduct actual space activities for military purposes, manage facilities for launching satellites, and other activities.

Major satellites launched by Russia include satellites for image reconnaissance, early warnings, electronic reconnaissance, communication, and positioning, all of which are presumed to be used for security purposes.

3 Europe

Regarding European space activities, France and the United Kingdom succeeded in launching their own satellites for the first time in 1965 and 1971 respectively, following the former Soviet Union and the U.S., and Italy and Germany used rockets developed by the U.S. to own satellites in December 1964 and July 1965, respectively. On the other hand, the European Space Agency (ESA)⁸ Convention signed in April 1975 established the ESA, which launched a satellite in 1979.

In Europe, the EU, the ESA, and European countries are promoting their own unique space activities and are also helping each other to implement space activities⁹.

⁸ The ESA was established in April 1975 based on the ESA Convention targeting to establish a single European space organization focusing on the peaceful use of space research, technology, and application areas. The organization was formally established in October 1981

⁹ In the past, the European Commission (EC) and the ESA created the European Space Strategy in September 2000 to progress Europe’s integrated, effective space activities. The strategy specified that the EC makes political and strategic decisions on space policies and that the ESA functions as an implementation organization, among other directions.

The ESA signed a “framework agreement” with the EU in May 2004 to specify that they will collaborate to proceed with space development and hold regular minister-level council meetings. The joint council meeting held by the ESA and the EU in May 2007 approved the “European Space Policy” to improve synergy effects between civil and defense space activities, implement space activities based on coordinated efforts among member states, and ensure an internationally-competitive space industry.

The ESA has so far focused on Earth observation satellites used mainly for civil purposes, among others, based on the contribution of funds made by ESA member states. France also provided a launch site for rockets to the ESA.

On the other hand, European countries including France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K. have their own outer space policy and space development organizations to launch their unique reconnaissance and communication satellites for security purposes.

It is thought that in the future, “Galileo,” a satellite positioning system planned by the EU and the ESA; “Copernicus,” a global-level environment and security monitoring program; and the Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS)¹⁰, a reconnaissance satellite project implemented by the European Defence Agency¹¹, will be utilized for security in Europe.

4 China

China began work on space development since the 1950s. In April 1970, the country launched its first satellite “Dong Fang Hong I,” mounted on the transportation rocket “Long March 1,” using technology enhanced through its missile development.

China has so far has conducted manned spaceflight and launched satellites orbiting around the Moon¹². China’s space development is said to intend to realize manned spaceflight and develop

¹⁰ The MUSIS was started by Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, and Spain. The organization was joined later by Poland in December 2010. This is a joint project succeeding such projects as Helios 2 (a French military reconnaissance satellite), Pleiades (a French Earth imaging satellite used for military and civilian purposes), SAR-Lupe (a German group of military radar satellites), and COSMO-SkyMed (an Italian constellation of Earth observation satellites)

¹¹ The EDA was established in 2004 to improve Europe’s defense capabilities for crisis management purposes and to execute and maintain security and defense policies

¹² China recently launched “Tiangong-1,” a space laboratory, in September 2011 and succeeded in docking it with an unmanned spacecraft, “Shenzhou 8” in November 2011; and manned spacecraft “Shenzhou 9” and “Shenzhou 10” in June 2012 and June 2013 respectively. This shows how the country is promoting its plan with a view to constructing a space station in the future. In addition, the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System officially started its services targeting most of the Asia-Pacific region in

space resources.

China's space development is also referred to in "China's Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development"¹³ to be reviewed every five years. The latest "12th Five-Year Plan" mentions enhanced military-civilian collaboration in the aviation and space area. In addition, "the National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development" published by the State Council positions manned spaceflight, moon exploration, high-resolution Earth observation systems as specific critical projects in the aerospace area. Along with these medium- and long-term plans, "China's Space Activities in 2011," a space white paper published by China in December 2011, clarifies the country's major challenges, policies, and international cooperation projects for the coming five years and emphasizes the peaceful use of space.

From an organizational perspective, the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the State Council, oversees industries related to space, nuclear technology, aviation, ships, and weapons. The China National Space Administration enforces the administrative control of the space area for civil and commercial purposes and represents the Chinese Government externally.

On the other hand, it is presumed that China also uses space for information gathering, communication, and navigation for military purposes. Several Chinese Air Force officials recently mentioned that the Air Force plans to aggressively work on the use of space¹⁴, and "China's National Defense in 2010," a national defense white paper published by China in March 2011, specifies that the country protects its security interests in outer space in addition to its marine interests and electromagnetic space, developing its aviation and spaceflight areas as a peaceful use of military industry technology.

December 2012, and it is reported that the BeiDou system started to be mounted on navy vessels, government vessels belonging to maritime law enforcement agencies, and fishing boats, among others. BeiDou offers navigation services as well as interactive short message features. It is thought that these features make it possible to centrally capture and share in real time the position and other data related to vessels from other countries that were confirmed by Chinese navy vessels, and improve information gathering capabilities on the ocean and other areas. Furthermore, the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense succeeded in having "Chang'e 3," a lunar exploration satellite, land on the Moon in December 2013.

¹³ The latest plan is the 12th Five-Year Plan targeting the period between 2011 and 2015 (published in March 2011)

¹⁴ For example, Xu Qiliang, then-commander of the Chinese Air Force, reportedly stated, "The Chinese Air Force has established its air force strategy combining aviation and space capabilities, and enabling both offensive and defense operations."

In addition, transportation rockets, including the “Long March” series and other equipment, are developed and manufactured by Chinese state-owned corporations, which are also thought to develop and manufacture ballistic missiles. Thus, it is believed that China works on space development through close collaboration between the government, military, and private sectors.

China also continues to develop anti-satellite weapons. The country conducted a test in January 2007 to destroy one of its satellites using ballistic missile technology. It is also pointed out that the country is developing equipment that interferes with satellites capable of using lasers.

5 India

India’s space development promotes space programs targeting its social and economic development in line with its 5-year national plan. The country’s latest 12th Five-Year Plan¹⁵ focuses on non-military projects including communication, positioning, Earth observation (e.g. disaster monitoring, resource exploration, and weather observation), transportation systems, space science, and spinoff promotions.

The Indian Space Commission (ISC) determines the country’s space policy under the leadership of the Prime Minister and shoulders the responsibilities of preparing for space development budgets and implementing space development programs. The Department of Space, managed by the ISC, oversees the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), which implements space development policy, develops and launches rockets, and develops and manufactures satellites.

It has been pointed out that India is launching remote sensing¹⁶ satellites for security purposes as well. The country also plans to launch positioning satellites, implement planetary explorations targeting the Moon and the Mars, and conduct manned spaceflight.

6 Republic of Korea (ROK)

The Republic of Korea is considered to have started full-scale space development by creating the first “Mid- and Long-Term Basic Plan for Space Development (1996-2015)” in 1996. The country has recently been promoting its space development projects through the Space Development Promotion Act (enacted in May 2005)¹⁷. In January 2013, the country succeeded

¹⁵ The 12th Five-Year Plan covers the period between April 2012 and March 2017

¹⁶ Technology enabling the observation of the size, shape, and quality of targets from a distance without directly touching them

¹⁷ The Act stipulates that the country creates a mid- and long-term basic plan every five years and an execution plan for each fiscal year, and establishes the National Space Committee. Based on this Act, the

in launching “Naro (KSVL-1),” a rocket developed through a technology cooperation agreement signed with Russia. In November 2013, the country also created three key plans, including the “Mid- and Long-Term Plan for Space Development (2014-2040)”¹⁸, which plans to move up the first launch of rockets manufactured by the ROK to June 2020; the “Space Technology Industrialization Strategy,” which prompts the whole industry to lead space development; and the “Modification of Korean-made rocket development plan,” which leverages Korean-made rockets and develops planetary and space exploration satellites and high orbit satellites on its own.

Regarding the country’s trends in security, the ROK published a national defense white paper in December 2012 to state that it plans to secure space monitoring systems and other mechanisms allowing its Air Force to develop into the Aerospace Force and to create satellite monitoring control troops in order to ensure its capabilities to conduct aerospace operations.

From an organizational perspective, the ROK has put in place the National Space Committee, which deliberates major issues related to space development under the leadership of the President; and the Korea Aerospace Research Institute, which leads research and development as an implementation agency. Furthermore, the Korea Agency for Defense Development is engaged in the development and use of various satellites.

Major satellites launched by the country include image reconnaissance and communication satellites by using foreign rockets.

See ▶ Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-4

country stipulated the “1st Basic Space Development Promotion Plan” and the “2nd Basic Space Development Promotion Plan” in June 2007 and December 2011, respectively

¹⁸ This is the modified version of the “2nd Basic Space Development Promotion Plan”

Section 5 Trends Concerning Cyberspace

1 Cyberspace and Security

Owing to the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) advancement in recent years, information and communication networks such as the Internet have become essential components across all facets of life. On the other hand, cyber attacks, especially against information and communication networks, which are critical infrastructures, have the potential to seriously impact lives of individuals.

Types of cyber attacks include the functional obstruction of information and communication networks, data falsification or theft of information via unauthorized access to information and communication networks or through the insertion of viruses via email, as well as functional impairment of the networks through simultaneous transmission of large quantities of data, and so on. Internet-related technologies are constantly evolving, with cyber attacks growing more sophisticated and complicated by the day. The characteristics of cyber attacks¹ are listed as follows.

- 1) Diversity: Diversity of attackers, methods, purposes, and circumstances of attacks
- 2) Anonymity: Easiness for attackers to hide or disguise their identity
- 3) Stealth: Difficulty of detecting the presence of attacks or even recognizing the occurrence of damage
- 4) Advantage for attackers: Easiness to obtain means of attack and difficulty of completely eliminating software vulnerabilities
- 5) Difficulty of deterrence: Limited deterrence effects gained through the threat of retaliatory attacks and defense measures

For armed forces, information and communications form the foundation for command and control which extends all the way from central command to ground-level forces, and the ICT advancement is further enhancing the dependence of units on information and communication networks. Given the dependence of armed forces on information and communication networks, cyber attacks are being regarded as an asymmetrical strategy capable of mitigating the strengths of enemies by exploiting weak points in enemy armed forces, and it is said that many foreign militaries are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace. It has also been pointed out that

¹ "Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace," published in September 2012 by the MOD and the SDF.

intrusions into information and communication networks by other countries are carried out for the purpose of gathering intelligence.

As such, cyber security has become one of the most important issues concerning national security for countries.

2 Threats in Cyberspace

Under such circumstances, cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against the information and communication networks of governmental organizations and armed forces of various countries².

With regard to some of those attacks, it has been pointed out that Chinese organizations, including the People's Liberation Army (PLA), intelligence and security agencies, private hackers' groups and companies have been involved³. China is presumed to be strongly interested in cyberspace⁴, and it has been pointed out that the PLA has organized a cyber unit and is conducting training and that the PLA and the security agencies are hiring IT companies' employees and hackers⁵. For example, a report published in February 2013 by a U.S. information security company concluded that a unit belonging to the PLA had been carrying out cyber attacks on companies in the United States and other countries since 2006⁶. In May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it indicted officers in Unit 61398, the Chinese

² In its Annual Report of November 2012, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (a bi-partisan advisory body created by the Congress with the aim of monitoring, investigating and submitting reports on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship with China) indicated that during 2011, there was a total of 50,097 counts of malicious cyber activities carried out on the United States Department of Defense.

³ An annual report released in November 2012 by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission stated that the PLA and the Chinese intelligence and security agencies were involved in cyber attacks originating in China. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Defense published an annual report entitled "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China" in May 2013, stating that part of the cyber attacks targeting the U.S. Government in 2012 are considered to be directly attributable to the Chinese Government and armed forces. In June 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel made a statement at the Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) that a part of cyber attacks are related to the Chinese Government and armed forces.

⁴ In a report at the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, then President Hu Jintao remarked that China would pay serious consideration to maritime, outer space and cyber space security.

⁵ An annual report released in 2009 by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission stated that the PLA was hiring personnel with expert skills concerning computers from among private companies and the academic circles, established an information warfare militia, and was conducting exercises using cyberspace. The report also pointed out the possibility that the PLA was hiring personnel from the hacker community.

⁶ "APT 1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units," released in February 2013 by Mandiant, a U.S. information security company, concluded that the most active cyber attack group targeting the United States and other countries was Unit 61398 under the PLA General Staff Department Third Department.

PLA's cyber attack unit, and others for conducting cyber attacks against U.S. companies⁷.

In 2008, removable memory devices were used to insert a computer virus into networks that handled classified and other information for the U.S. Central Command. This spawned a grave situation where there was a possibility that information could be transferred externally. Regarding this incident, there have been allegations of Russian involvement⁸. It has been pointed out that the Russian military, intelligence and security agencies, and other organizations are involved in cyber attacks⁹; and the Russian military is presumed to be considering the creation of a cyber command and job offers to hackers¹⁰.

In March 2013, cyber attacks hit broadcasting stations and financial institutions in the Republic of Korea (ROK). In June and July of 2013, cyber attacks once again hit the ROK President's Office, government agencies, broadcasting stations, and newspaper companies. The ROK Government says that these events show the same characteristics related to cyber attacks triggered by North Korea in the past¹¹. It has been pointed out that North Korean government organizations are involved in cyber attacks and that North Korea is training personnel on a national scale¹².

⁷ On May 19, 2014, James Comey, FBI Director, stated that, "For too long, the Chinese government has blatantly sought to use cyber-espionage to obtain economic advantage for its state-owned industries." On the same day, the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China announced that the United States "fabricated facts" and that China has decided to suspend the activities of the Cyber Working Group established under the framework of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.

⁸ In 2013, the online version of the Russian newspaper Izvestia quoted a senior Russian military official as saying that the Minister of Defense had issued an order for preparing to establish a cyber command. In October 2012, the Voice of Russia reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense had started offering jobs to hackers.

⁹ An article carried by the Los Angeles Times (online version) in November 2008 reported that senior military U.S. officials made an extraordinary report to the President regarding cyber attacks on the Department of Defense that appeared to be originating in Russia. News agency Reuters reported in June 2011 that although the Department of Defense refused to make any comments concerning the origin of those attacks, experts inside and outside the U.S. government suspected involvement by the Russian intelligence agency.

¹⁰ "Cyberwarfare: An Analysis of the Means and Motivations of Selected Nation States," released in November 2004 by Dartmouth College's Institute for Security, Technology, and Society (Currently the Institute for Security, Technology, and Society), pointed out the possible involvement of the Russian military and intelligence and security agencies in cyber attacks.

¹¹ The ROK Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIP) announced in its press releases in April and July 2013 the result of an investigation made by the joint response team of public-private-military collaboration (composed of 18 organizations including the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, the Ministry of National Defense, the National Intelligence Service, and domestic security companies). MSIP is a central government agency overseeing administration related to science and technology policies and Information and Communication Technology (ICT). This agency was established in March 2013 by transferring science and technology tasks handled by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, and part of the tasks handled by the Korea Communications Commission and the Ministry of Knowledge Economy.

¹² For example, a North Korean defector association in the Republic of Korea, "NK Intellectual

Stuxnet, an advanced computer virus with a complex structure, was discovered in June 2010¹³, followed by discoveries of the advanced computer virus on multiple occasions.

Moreover, supply chain risks, such as the risk that products in which deliberately and illegally altered programs are embedded may be supplied by companies, have been also pointed out¹⁴.

Cyber attacks on the information and communications networks of governments and militaries, as well as on critical infrastructure significantly affect national security. As there have been allegations of involvement of government organizations, Japan must continue to pay close attention to developments in threats in cyberspace.

In September 2011, computers at Japanese private companies producing defense equipment were found to be infected with malware. According to the National Police Agency, after the Japanese government made a cabinet decision concerning the acquisition of the three Senkaku Islands in September 2012, cyber attacks occurred and caused damage to at least 19 websites of Japanese courts, administrative organizations, and university hospitals for several days.

3 Initiatives against Cyber Attacks

Given these growing threats in cyberspace, various initiatives are under way on the overall

Solidarity,” held a seminar entitled “Emergency seminar on cyber terrorism by North Korea 2011” in June 2011, and presented a material entitled “North Korea’s Cyber terrorism capabilities,” explaining that North Korean organizations conducting cyber attacks were supported by the government agencies employing superior human resources from all over the country, giving them special training to develop their cyber attack capabilities. In November 2013, many ROK newspapers reported that the National Intelligence Service clarified North Korean cyber attack capabilities in the national audit at the Information Committee of the National Assembly, and that Kim Jong-un, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea, said, “Cyber attacks are omnipotent swords with their power paralleled with nuclear power and missiles.”

¹³ Stuxnet was the first virus program confirmed to target control systems with specific software and hardware incorporated. It is also pointed out that it has abilities to access targeted systems without being detected and steal information or alter systems. The discovery of various computer worms was also reported: “Duqu,” discovered in October 2011; “Flame” in May 2012, “Gauss” in June 2012; and “Shamoon” in August 2012.

¹⁴ In October 2012, the U.S. House Information Special Committee published an investigation report, entitled “Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE.” The report advised that products manufactured by Huawei Technologies and Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment (ZTE) (major Chinese communications equipment manufacturers) should not be used, due to their threats to national security based on strong concerns over China’s cyber attack capabilities and intentions targeting critical U.S. infrastructure, as well as opaque relations between Chinese major IT companies and the Central Government, the Communist Party, and the People’s Liberation Army augmenting supply chain risks. A similar move was taken by other countries including France, Australia, Canada, India, and Taiwan, and some countries, including the U.K. and the Republic of Korea, issued warnings.

government level and the ministry level, including defense ministries¹⁵.

Attention has been drawn to issues which must be debated in order to allow for an effective response to cyber attacks, which have become a new security challenge in recent years. For instance, there is still no wide consensus on norms covering the conduct of states and international cooperation in cyberspace. In consideration of these problems, debate has been taking place with the aim of promoting new initiatives, such as formulating certain norms of conduct within cyberspace based on international consensus¹⁶.

See ► Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-5 (Response to Cyber Attacks)

1 The United States

The International Strategy for Cyberspace released in May 2011 outlines the U.S. vision for the future of cyberspace, and sets an agenda for partnering with other nations and peoples to realize this vision. The Strategy also points out seven policy priorities. These priorities are the economy, protection of national networks, law enforcement, military, Internet governance, international development, and Internet freedom.

In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security is in charge of protecting Federal government networks and critical infrastructure, and the National Cyber Security Division (NCSA) of the Department is in charge of overall coordination.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published by the Department of Defense in March 2014 describes that cyber threats, which pose risks to U.S. national interests, are composed of activities of a variety of entities, including individuals, organizations, and countries, and that unauthorized access to the Department of Defense and industry networks and infrastructure threatens critical infrastructure of the United States, its allies and partners. Based on these understandings, the report designated the cyber warfare capabilities of the U.S. forces as a critical element to be maintained for the defense of the homeland, and spells out that the United

¹⁵ Generally speaking, at the governmental level there seem to be some trends, including: (1) organizations related to cyber security that are spread over multiple departments and agencies are being integrated, and their operational units centralized; (2) policy and research units are being enhanced by establishing specialized posts, creating new research divisions and enhancing such functions; (3) the roles of intelligence agencies in responding to cyber attacks are being expanded; and (4) more emphasis is being allotted to international cooperation. At the level of the defense department, various measures have been taken, such as establishing a new agency to supervise cyberspace military operations and positioning the effort to deal with cyber attacks as an important strategic objective.

¹⁶ The U.N., NATO, and international conferences in cyberspace are working on discussions for the creation of international rules by studying the positioning of cyber attacks in international law including whether they can be interpreted as armed attacks.

States continues to retain and develop required human resources and enhance cyber forces.

The Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace released in July 2011 indicates that cybersecurity threats include internal threats imposed by insiders, in addition to external threats such as cyber attacks from foreign countries, and that potential U.S. adversaries may seek to disrupt the networks and systems that the Department of Defense depends on. The report then advocates the following five strategic initiatives to respond to cyber threats: (1) taking full advantage of cyberspace's potential by treating cyberspace as one of the operational domains just like domains of land, sea, air, and space; (2) employing new defense operating concepts to protect the Department's networks and systems; (3) partnering with other U.S. government departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a government-wide cybersecurity strategy; (4) building robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen cybersecurity; and (5) leveraging the nation's ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation.

From an organizational perspective, U.S. Cyber Command, a sub-unified command of U.S. Strategic Command, oversees cyber forces in the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and manages operations in cyber space. The Cyber Command has been enhancing its organization in response to an increase of its tasks and already established the "Cyber Protection Force" that operates and defends information infrastructure of the Department of Defense. In addition, the "Cyber National Mission Force" to support U.S. defense against national-level threats, and the "Cyber Combat Mission Force" that supports planning process of offensive cyber capabilities by the Unified Command, are planned to be established by September 2015¹⁷. Moreover, U.S. Ground Force headquarters announced a doctrine named "Cyber Electromagnetic Activity" in February 2014 to prepare for the creation of guidelines.

2 NATO

The new NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Policy on Cyber Defence, and its action plan, which were adopted in June 2011, clarifies the political and operational mechanisms of NATO's response to cyber attacks, and the framework for NATO assistance to member states in their own cyber defense initiatives and provision of assistance in the event of a cyber attack against one of its member states, as well setting out principles on cooperation with partners.

As for its organization, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) provides political oversight on

¹⁷ Based on a statement made, and a report submitted, in March 2013 by the U.S. Cyber Command Commander in the U.S. Senate and House Committees on Armed Services

policies and operations concerned with NATO's cyber defense. In addition, the Emerging Security Challenges Division formulates policy and action plans concerning cyber defense. Furthermore, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) was authorized to serve as NATO's cyber defense-related research and training institution¹⁸.

Since 2008, NATO has been conducting cyber defense exercises on an annual basis with the aim of boosting cyber defense capabilities.

3 The United Kingdom

In November 2011, the United Kingdom announced a new Cyber Security Strategy, which set goals for the period until 2015 and specified actions plans for capability enhancement, establishment of norms, cooperation with other countries, and personnel training.

In terms of organization, the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA) was established within the Cabinet Office to form and coordinate cyber security strategy for the overall government, as well as the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) under the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to monitor cyberspace.

The Defence Cyber Operations Group (DCOG), which unifies cyber activities within the Ministry of Defence, was established in April 2012 as a provisional measure. It is scheduled to acquire full operational capability by March 2015¹⁹.

4 Australia

In January 2013, Australia published its first National Security Strategy, which positions integrated cyber policies and operations as one of the top priorities concerning national security.

In terms of organization, the Cyber Policy Group (CPG), which coordinates and supervises cyber security policies for the overall government, was established under the Cyber Policy Coordinator (CPC). The Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) of the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) provides the government with analyses on advanced threats in cyberspace, and coordinates and supports response to major cybersecurity issues on governmental agencies

¹⁸ In June 2013, the NATO Defense Ministers' Meeting placed cyber attacks top on the agenda for the first time. They agreed to establish an emergency response team and to implement a cyber defense mechanism on a full scale by October 2013.

¹⁹ In addition, the U.K. Ministry of Defence announced in September 2013 to hire hundreds of computer experts as reserves working on the front line of British cyber defence, and approved the establishment of the Joint Cyber Reserves.

and critical infrastructures²⁰.

5 Republic of Korea

The ROK formulated the National Cyber Security Master Plan in August 2011, which clarifies the supervisory functions of the National Intelligence Service²¹ in responsive actions against cyber attacks. It places particular emphasis on strengthening the following five areas: prevention, detection, response, systems, and security base. In the national defense sector, the Cyberspace Command was established in January 2010 to carry out planning, implementation, training, and research and development for its cyberspace operations, and currently serves as the division under the direct control of the Ministry of National Defense²².

See ▶ Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-5; Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2-4

²⁰ In January 2013, Australia announced the establishment of the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), in which cyber security officers from various government agencies are concentrated in order to strengthen the national capability to deal with cyber attacks.

²¹ Under the Director of the National Intelligence Service, the National Cybersecurity Strategy Council has been established to deliberate on important issues, including establishing and improving a national cybersecurity structure, coordinating related policies and roles among institutions, and deliberating measures and policies related to presidential orders.

²² The basic plan for national defense reform (2012-2030) that was submitted to the president in August 2012 by the Ministry of National Defense proposed significant enhancement of cyber warfare capability as a future military reform.

Section 6 Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology as well as Defense Production and Technological Bases

1. Military Science and Technological Trends

Recent developments in science and technology, in particular the dramatic advancement of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), has impacted a variety of areas, triggering significant, revolutionary changes in many areas such as economy, society, and lifestyle.

The military is no exception. Advanced countries, including the U.S., take the transformation triggered by the development of ICT as a factor enabling the dramatic improvement of combat and other capabilities, and continue to engage in a variety of research and policies.

In particular, the U.S. focuses on Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) as the direction for transformation of its armed forces. NCW captures information on enemy troops using information-gathering systems, including reconnaissance satellites and unmanned aircraft. The information is then shared on networks, enabling immediate command and control, even from remote headquarters; and enforces fast, precise, and flexible attacks against targets. This ensures further superiority in combat recognition capabilities in war space, as well as achieving more efficient combat operations.

The development of various media encompassing television, newspapers, and the Internet including social media, has enabled combat and damage situations to be broadcast across the world in real time, tending to make casualties caused by fighting and other events greatly impact society. This has required countries to minimize casualties of citizens and their own forces. In response to these social trends, precise and effective attacks dedicated to military targets are required, and countries maintaining high-tech troops, including the U.S., work on improving the destructive capabilities of their weapons, precision guidance technology, information-related technology including C⁴ISR, and unmanned technology (e.g. drones) to be able to carry out more precise and effective attacks. They also make emphasis on research and development activities on improved stealth capacity to increase opportunities for preemptive attacks, stealth technology for reducing risks for attrition of combat capabilities through improved survivability, and nanotechnology used for parts and materials related to these technologies. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), published by the U.S. Department of

Defense in March 2014, states that the proliferation of state-of-the-art technologies¹ will transform the mode of warfare.

Recent advancements in military science and technology are also largely attributed to the advancement of civil technology. In recent years, as the capabilities of existing equipment are improved and new equipment is developed, spin-on and dual-use technology² based on civil technology have recently been leveraged frequently. In particular, ICT-related civil technology has been applied to a variety of equipment on a larger scale. The U.S. has a significant edge in the area of these state-of-the-art technologies, and it is being pointed out that the gap in military capabilities with its allies could constrain any joint operations.

On the other hand, countries having difficulty in possessing high-tech troops for technological and economic reasons, and non-state entities including terrorist organizations, will work on research and development on weapons and other equipment that will enable them to gain superiority in fighting against countries with state-of-the-art technology, and to illegitimately obtain technology through ICT or other means. In short, these countries and organizations tend to focus on asymmetrical combat measures that can be developed or obtained with relatively less cost, enabling them to attack their opponents' vulnerability without using conventional military capabilities. These asymmetrical means of attack include weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; ballistic missiles; terrorist attacks; and cyber attacks.

Going forward, advanced countries, including the United States, are likely to continue to further develop their state-of-the-art military science and technology. In contrast, countries and non-state entities pursuing asymmetrical combat measures will leverage civil technology and obtain technology in an illegitimate manner, to advance their level of military science and technology.

As asymmetrical combat measures may be spreading throughout the world, the research and

¹ The QDR describes that such technologies include “counter-stealth technology” that used to require large budgets, “automated and autonomous systems as well as robotics” that already have a wide range of commercial and military applications, “low-cost three-dimensional printers” that could revolutionize weapons manufacturing and logistics related to warfare, and “biotechnology breakthroughs” that could make new ways of developing weapons of mass destruction possible. The report notes that it remains unclear how these technologies will manifest on the battlefield.

² In the field of military technology, generally speaking, “spin-on” means applying civil technology into military technology, “spin-off” means technology application in the opposite direction, and “dual-use technology” means technology available for use in both areas.

development of technology³ that responds to these asymmetrical threats is also recognized as an important challenge.

2 Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technological Bases

Recently, Western countries have in particular been facing difficulty in significantly increasing their defense budgets. On the other hand, the sophistication of military science and technology and the greater complexity of equipment, as explained by 1 above, have escalated development and production costs and raised unit prices for procurement, resulting in a reduced number of procured units. Under these situations, many foreign countries are working on a variety of initiatives in order to maintain and enhance their national defense production and technological bases.

Western countries have targeted for greater competitiveness, through realignment of their defense industry in response to the aforementioned situation related to national defense budgets. The U.S. has seen repeated mergers and integrations among domestic corporations, while Europe has experienced cross-border mergers and integrations of the defense industry, especially in Germany, France, the U.K., and Italy⁴.

In response to escalating development and production costs, Western countries are also promoting joint development and production and technological collaboration related to defense equipment among their allies and partners. This move can be attributed to such factors as (1) splitting development and production costs, (2) expanding demands in all countries participating in joint development and production, (3) mutual complementarity of technologies, and (4) raising domestic technology levels by obtaining the latest technology.

Furthermore, an international logistic support system called “Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment” (ALGS) was adopted for the maintenance of the F-35 fighter aircraft, reflecting the international collaboration for its development. This system enables all F-35 user countries to share its components globally. It is important to pay close attention to the establishment of such international frameworks for logistic support, and the progress of international joint development and production.

See ▶ Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 4-3 (Technological Cooperation with Institutions Overseas and Within Japan)

³ They include BMD as well as technologies for countering ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, cyber attacks, etc. as well as ICT.

⁴ Large corporations involved with the defense industry of Western countries have high defense business ratios in their total revenues. In particular, the U.S. and the U.K. have large corporations with most of their revenues attributed to the defense business.

See ► *Fig. I-2-6-1 (Examples of International Joint Development)*

Many foreign countries have been exporting defense equipment overseas since the Cold War era, and many countries have recently been promoting a policy of overseas exporting. As defense equipment has faced a dramatic increase in its development and production costs, countries intend to maintain and strengthen their domestic defense industry by expanding demands in foreign markets through overseas exports, and seem to leverage this as a certain diplomatic tool for expanding their influence in the export destination countries. In addition, countries such as China and the Republic of Korea have established the infrastructure required to manufacture weapons through their past imports of defense equipment and their improved capabilities in science and technology, enabling them to attain the status of an export country of affordable defense equipment and to increase their export volumes.

We have recently seen an increase of defense equipment exports targeting the Asia-Pacific region. It is pointed out that this is due to the economic growth of the Asia-Pacific region as well as the greater influence of China, disputes over territorial issues, response to enhanced military capabilities of neighboring countries, and so on.

See ► *Fig. I-2-6-2 (Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional Arms Export (2008–2012))*

Part II Japan's Security and Defense Policy

Chapter 1 Basic Concepts of Japan's Security and Defense

Section 1 Measures to Ensure Japan's Security

The independent state of a nation must be protected in order for it to determine its own direction in politics, economy, and society, as well as maintaining its culture, tradition, and sense of values. However, peace, safety, and independence cannot be secured by simply wishing for them. The essence of national security can be found in creating an international environment that is stable and predictable, while preventing the emergence of threats before they occur, through diplomacy. The reality of the current international community suggests that it is not necessarily possible to prevent invasions from the outside by employing only nonmilitary means such as diplomatic efforts, and in the event that the nation were to be invaded it would not be able to remove such a threat. Defense capabilities are the nation's ultimate guarantee of security, expressing its will and capacity to eliminate foreign invasions, and they cannot be replaced by any other means.

For this reason, Japan is striving to develop appropriate defense capabilities to protect the life and properties of its nationals and to defend the territorial land, sea, and airspace of Japan. At the same time, it is strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance¹ with the United States, which shares basic values and interests with Japan. The peace and security of Japan is ensured through developing seamless defense measures by coupling Japan's own defense capabilities with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

In addition, Japan also works domestically to enrich the backbone of the people, which is characterized by ensuring stable lives of the people and protecting the country, while also working to establish a security foundation by implementing various measures in such sectors as the economy and education so as not to allow the chance of an invasion.

Moreover, from the perspective of improving the security environment surrounding Japan and preventing the emergence of threats to Japan, the importance of the role played by defense

¹ In general, this refers to the relationship, based on the Japan-U.S. Security System, whereby both nations, as countries sharing fundamental values and interests, coordinate and cooperate closely in a range of areas in security, politics, and economics.

capabilities is increasing in cooperative efforts as a member of the Asia-Pacific region and the international community.

Upon recognizing the role of defense capabilities, Japan aims to ensure national security as well as bringing peace and safety to the Asia-Pacific region, and eventually to the entire world through making its utmost efforts in a variety of fields.

Section 2 Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy

1 Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

Since the end of World War II, Japan made a decision not to repeat the ravages of war and has worked hard, aiming to build a peace-loving nation. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifism is enshrined in the Constitution, of which Article 9 prescribes the renunciation of war, the possession of war potential, and the right of belligerency by the state. Of course, since Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not deny Japan's inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign state. Since the right of self-defense is not denied, the Japanese Government interprets this to mean that the Constitution allows Japan to possess the minimum level of armed force needed to exercise that right. Therefore, Japan, under the Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, holding its exclusively national defense-oriented policy as its basic strategy of defense, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations.

2 The Government's View on Article 9 of the Constitution

1 Permitted Self-Defense Capability

Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the minimum necessary level of self-defense capability. The specific limit is subject to change relative to the prevailing international situation, the level of military technologies, and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided through annual budget deliberations and other factors by the Diet on behalf of the people. Whether such capability constitutes a "war potential" that is prohibited by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered within the context of Japan's overall military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on whether such possession would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit.

The possession of armaments deemed to be offensive weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country, which would, by definition, exceed the minimum necessary level, is not permissible under any circumstances. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers.

2 Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution

In the cabinet decision (which will be described in the next section) made on July 1st 2014, measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution were defined as follows.

The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit “use of force” in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival. Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where the people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, “use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or so-called the basic logic, of the view consistently expressed by the Government to date with regard to “use of force” exceptionally permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown in the document “Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted by the Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councillors on October 14, 1972.

This basic logic must be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution.

To date, the Government has considered that “use of force” under this basic logic is permitted only when an “armed attack” against Japan occurs. However, in light of the situation in which the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continuously evolving by shifts in the global power balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation, and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc., in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a foreign country could actually threaten Japan’s survival, depending on its purpose, scale and manner, etc.

Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost diplomatic efforts, should a dispute occur, for its peaceful settlement and take all necessary responses in accordance with the existing domestic laws and regulations developed based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is still required, however, to make all necessary preparations in order to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.

Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, the Government has reached a conclusion that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan's survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government's view to date.

As a matter of course, Japan's "use of force" must be carried out while observing international law. At the same time, a legal basis in international law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood separately. In certain situations, the aforementioned "use of force" permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. Although this "use of force" includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan's survival and protecting its people, in other words, for defending Japan.

See ▶ Fig. II-1-2-1 (Newly determined three conditions for the "use of force" as measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution)

3 Geographic Boundaries within which the Right of Self-Defense may be Exercised

The use of the minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters, and airspace. However, it is difficult to give a general definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation.

Nevertheless, the Government interprets that the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level of self-defense.

4 Right of Belligerency

Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes that "the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." However, the "right of belligerency" does not mean the right to engage in battle; rather, it is a general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has under

international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy's military force and to occupy enemy territory. On the other hand, Japan may of course use the minimum level of force necessary to defend itself. For example, if Japan inflicts casualties and damage upon the enemy's military force in exercising its right of self-defense, this is conceptually distinguished from the exercise of the right of belligerency, even though those actions do not appear to be different. Occupation of enemy territory, however, would exceed the minimum necessary level of self-defense and is not permissible.

3 Basic policy

Under the Constitution, Japan will efficiently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy of not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military, observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

1 Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy

The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for the self-defense. The policy including these matters refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution.

2 Not Becoming a Military Power

There is no established definition for the concept of a military power. For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that could threaten other countries means that Japan will not possess and maintain a military capability strong enough to pose a threat to other countries, beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense.

3 Three Non-Nuclear Principles

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles refers to those of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not allowing them to be brought into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed line of national policy.

Japan is also prohibited from manufacturing and possessing nuclear weapons under the Atomic Energy Basic Law¹. In addition, Japan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and as a non-nuclear weapons state, has an obligation not to manufacture and acquire nuclear weapons².

4 Securing Civilian Control

Civilian control refers to the priority of politics to the military or democratic political control of military strength in a democratic state. Japan has, by giving serious reflection to the regrettable state of affairs that happened until the end of World War II, adopted the following strict civilian control system that is entirely different from the one under the former Constitution³. Civilian control aims to ensure that the SDF is maintained and operated in accordance with the will of the people.

The Diet, which represents Japanese nationals, makes legislative and budgetary decisions on such matters as the allotted number of the SDF personnel and main organizations of the MOD and the SDF. It also issues approval for defense operations of the SDF. The function of national defense, as a general administrative function, entirely falls under the executive power of the Cabinet. The Constitution requires that the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State who constitute the Cabinet be civilians. The Prime Minister, on behalf of the whole Cabinet, holds the authority of supreme command and supervision of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control and supervision over the SDF duties. In addition, the National Security Council of Japan under the Cabinet deliberates important matters on national security.

At the Ministry of Defense, the Minister of Defense is responsible for issues concerning national defense, and as the head of the Ministry of Defense also controls and manages the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in policy planning and political affairs by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Ministers (two) and Senior Advisers to the Minister of Defense⁴.

¹ Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that “The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management.”

² Article 2 of the NPT states that “Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes....not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...”

³ The Cabinet’s control over military matters was limited.

⁴ As a part of Reform of National Public Officers’ Systems, Senior Adviser was newly established in each ministry, for which one official may be assigned, when particularly necessary. Simultaneously, existing Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense is renamed as Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense.

In addition, Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense provide the Minister of Defense with advice on important issues under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense based on their expertise and experience. The Defense Council consisting of political appointees, civil servants and uniformed SDF personnel of the Ministry of Defense deliberates on basic principles concerning administrative affairs under the Ministry's jurisdiction. Through these ways, the Ministry of Defense aims to further enhance the operation of the civilian control system.

As mentioned above, the civilian control system is well established. However, it is necessary to continue making operational efforts in both political and administrative aspects, along with a deep interest in defense taken by the people, to ensure the system achieve good results.

Section 3 Basic Policy for the Development of New Security Legislation

1 Report by the “Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security”

In May 2007, the “Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security” was held by the first Abe Administration. The Advisory Panel submitted its report, which summarizes the recommendations regarding four patterns proposed by the then Prime Minister Abe¹, to the then Prime Minister Fukuda in June 2008.

Following this, as the security environment around Japan is becoming increasingly severe, Prime Minister Abe resumed the Advisory Panel in February 2013. Considering what must be done, including the most effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, in order to maintain the peace and security of Japan, he instructed for there to be a re-examination of the legal basis for security, bearing in mind the changes occurred over the past four and half years as well as keeping in mind possible changes in the security environment in the foreseeable future. Following a total of seven meetings, on May 15, 2014, the report was submitted to Prime Minister Abe.

See ▶ Fig. II-1-3-1 (Outline of the report)

2 Basic orientation for further deliberation

On May 15, 2014, following the receipt of the submitted report by the Advisory Panel, at a press conference Prime Minister Abe, presented the basic orientation regarding the ways in which further deliberation would take place as follows.

The government and the ruling parties will be further examining this matter based on specific cases, and will develop national legislation that will allow for seamless responses to secure the lives and livelihood of the Japanese nationals. As legislative measures that are also permissible under the constitution interpretation to date, for example, the following points will be examined:

1. Further strengthening of our responses to an infringement that does not amount to an armed

¹ The Panel examined four cases ((1) the U.S. protection in the high seas; (2) interception of ballistic missiles that may be targeting the U.S.; (3) use of weapons in international peace support operations; and (4) logistic support for the activities by other countries that participate such as in the same PKO), he proposed, for example, the view that the previous official interpretation of the Article 9 of the Constitution was becoming no longer applicable in light of the radically changed international situation and the international status of Japan, and that the Article 9 of the Constitution should rather be interpreted as it would not only prohibit the right of individual self-defense but also the exercise of the right of collective self-defense and participation in the United Nation’s Collective Security.

attack (so-called “grey-zone situations”²), 2. Further contribution to the peace and stability of the international community, including through PKOs and logistics support. In addition to such measures we must be fully ready for situations that could happen in reality. We must hold further reviews to judge whether the legislation could be developed sufficiently to secure the lives and livelihood of its nationals under constitutional interpretation to date.

Among the views expressed in the report, the two below do not make logical consistency with the Government’s constitutional interpretation to date, and thus, the Government cannot adopt them: (1) Regardless of whether it is the right of individual or collective self-defense, the Constitution does not prohibit the use of force for the purpose of self-defense, and (2) The Constitution does not impose any restrictions on activities that are consistent with international law such as participation in collective security measures of the U.N. On the other hand, regarding the view that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is permissible in such limited situation which has the potential to significantly affect the security of Japan, this view bears in mind the existing basic position of the Government as follows, and the Government will proceed with further examinations of this view: “The Government must give supreme consideration to the people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. If the purpose of the Preamble and Article 13 of the Constitution is considered, the Constitution does not prohibit the Government from taking measures of self-defense necessary to maintain Japan’s peace and security and to ensure its survival. The constitution permits the use of force to the minimum extent necessary to this end.”

In proceeding with the measures to develop a legal system which enables seamless responses, we will examine review whether it will be possible to develop the necessary domestic legislation under the constitutional interpretation to date or if constitutional interpretation must be changed for the development of certain pieces of domestic legislation, and will consider what constitutional interpretation would be appropriate. The Government will proceed with these reviews while taking into account the opinions of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau and begin consultations among the ruling parties. If based on the result of consultations, we judge that it is necessary to change the constitutional interpretation, then we will make a Cabinet Decision on the basic orientation on the legislative amendments as well as on the matter of constitutional interpretation.

3 Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People (Cabinet decision)

² See Part I, Overview, Chapter 1, footnote 1

In accordance with the basic orientation for the ways in which further deliberation will take place as presented by Prime Minister Abe, discussions had been repeatedly held in the ruling parties and examination had also been conducted by the Government. Following this, on July 1st 2014, a cabinet decision was made on “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People”

See ▶ Reference 5 (Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People)

This cabinet decision shows the basic policy for the development of new security legislation based on the viewpoint as to what should be done in order to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people at all costs within the current situation where the security environment surrounding Japan has fundamentally transformed and is continuing to evolve. It has a historical significance in further ensuring the peace and security of Japan through enhancing the deterrence and making more proactive contributions to the peace and stability of the region and the international community.

On making this cabinet decision, Prime Minister Abe provided the following instruction: “Without developing relevant legislation, we are unable to conduct any concrete activities, and thus deterrence is not enhanced. In this sense, legislative work to be completed from now on is extremely important. For the development of the security legislation, which will enable seamless responses to any situations, the work must be undertaken immediately.” In addition to launching a legislation drafting team under the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF established “The Study Committee on the Development of Security Legislation” with the Minister of Defense as its Chairman, in order for us to firmly play the role expected by Japanese nationals as well as currently conducting the deliberation towards the development of security legislation based on the following instructions from the Minister of Defense: (1) Prepare legislation which is workable for SDF personnel in the field, and is operationally practical so that it facilitates their decision-making in a clear manner, (2) Develop proper procedures for SDF personnel engaging in a mission, and (3) Work in a timely manner.

Chapter 2 Organizations Responsible for Japan's Security and Defense

Defense capabilities are the final bastion in protecting a nation's security and they cannot be replaced by any other means. In December 2013, Japan established the National Security Council, which today functions as the control tower of its foreign and defense policies. In addition, the MOD and the SDF, which are charged with Japan's defense capabilities development, comprise a host of different organizations.

Section 1 Establishment of National Security Council

1 Background

With the inauguration of the Second Abe Cabinet in December 2012, Prime Minister Abe expressed, in his inaugural press conference, his willingness to strengthen the foreign affairs and the security system, such as the establishment of the National Security Council.

Following this, the first meeting of the Advisory Council on the Establishment of a National Security Council, with the Prime Minister serving as the chair, that is comprised of the Chief Cabinet Secretary (also the Minister in charge of Strengthening National Security), Special Adviser to the Prime Minister (in charge of the National Security Council), and other experts, was held in February 2013. The advisory council, through six meetings in total, examined how the NSC should be, including its jurisdiction, purpose, use/policy judgment of intelligence, and form of the National Security Council. In light of these discussions, the government created a bill "the Act of Partial Revision of the Establishment of the Security Council (the NSC Establishment Act)." in "The Division for Preparing for the Establishment of the NSC" set in the Cabinet Secretariat. The bill was enacted by the Diet on November 27, 2013 and put in force on December 4, 2013. On January 7, 2014, the National Security Secretariat was established in the Cabinet Secretariat to execute administrative works of the National Security Council.

2 Structure of the National Security Council

Established within the Cabinet, the National Security Council comprises three formats of meetings. At the heart of the organization stands the 4-Minister Meeting, which was newly established as the control tower for foreign and defense policies concerning national security. The 4-Minister Meeting is held regularly and flexibly under normal circumstances to carry out substantive deliberations. The MOD and other related administrative organs provide the

National Security Council with data and information pertaining to national security in a timely manner.

The National Security Council is charged with deliberating Japan's basic foreign and defense policies with regards to national security. In December 2013, the National Security Council deliberated and approved the National Security Strategy, National Defense Program Guidelines, and Medium Term Defense Program.

The National Security Secretariat established within the Cabinet Secretary provides constant support to the National Security Council. The National Security Secretariat is dedicated to the planning and coordination of basic direction and important matters of foreign and defense policies concerning Japan's national security, using its general coordination authority. During emergency situations, the National Security Secretariat provides necessary recommendations from the perspective of foreign and defense policies concerning national security. Some MOD members, including regular uniform members, are working at additional posts at the National Security Secretariat.

See ▶ Fig. II-2-1-1 (Organization of National Security Council); Fig. II-2-1-2 (Conceptual Image of Holding Meetings)

3 Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets

As the security environment surrounding Japan is extremely severe, Japan must further encourage the collection and utilization of information on security in order to ensure the security of the nation and the people. For this purpose, Japan must enhance the reliability of its management of highly confidential information related to national security and seek to further share information among countries concerned.

Additionally, to make National Security Council deliberations effective and efficient, Japan must also develop common rules within the government for the protection of secrets and establish a uniform framework for handling national security secrets.

Based on this awareness, the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets was passed on December 6, 2013 and promulgated on December 13, 2013. In order to protect information on Japan's defense and foreign affairs, as well as the prevention of designated harmful activities (e.g. Counter-Intelligence) and terrorism, which requires special secrecy, the act stipulates:

- (1) designation of Specially Designated Secrets by the heads of administrative organs;
- (2) security clearance for personnel that handle Specially Designated Secrets in duty;

(3) establishment of a framework for providing or sharing Specially Designated Secrets within and outside administrative organs; and (4) penalties for unauthorized disclosure of Specially Designated Secrets. Excluding certain provisions, the Act is expected to take effect within one-year of its promulgation date. Once enforced, Defense Secrets will be integrated with Specially Designated Secrets and managed in a uniform manner.

Section 2 Organization of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces

1 Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability

1 Organization of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces

To fulfill their mission of defending Japan, the MOD and the SDF¹ consist of various organizations, mainly the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces as armed forces, but also a number of other organizations including the National Defense Academy, National Defense Medical College, National Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI), Equipment Procurement and Construction Office, and the Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance.

See ► *Fig. II-2-2-1 (Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense); Fig. II-2-2-2 (Outline of the Ministry of Defense)*

2 Systems to Support the Minister of Defense

The Minister of Defense is responsible for issues related to the defense of Japan as the head of the Ministry of Defense, and is in overall charge of the SDF duties in accordance with the provisions of the SDF Act. The Minister is supported by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and a Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense. There are also Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense, who advise the Minister of Defense, and the Defense Council in which deliberations concerning general policies related to the MOD take place. Furthermore, there is an Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense who organizes and supervises administrative affairs of each bureau and organization to support the Minister of Defense. In addition, the bill for partial amendments to the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense, was passed on June 6, 2014, and a Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, who will be responsible for the overall coordination of important duties such as those related to international affairs, will be newly established in order to ensure the support system for political appointees, including the Minister of Defense, is in place.

Moreover, the Internal Bureau, Joint Staff, the Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office and Air Staff Office have been established as organizations to support the Minister of Defense. The

¹ The Ministry of Defense and the SDF form a single organization for national defense. Whereas the term "Ministry of Defense" refers to the administrative aspects of the organization, which manages and operates the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, the term "SDF" refers to the operational aspects of the organizations whose mission is the defense of Japan.

Internal Bureau is responsible for basic policies relating to the work of the SDF. The Directors-General of each Bureau within the Internal Bureau, as part of their own responsibilities, support the Minister of Defense when the Minister of Defense gives instructions and authorization to the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of the Ground Staff, the Maritime Staff, and the Air Staff. The Joint Staff is a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF. The Chief of Joint Staff provides centralized support on the operation of the SDF for the Minister of Defense from a military expert's perspective. The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, and Air Staff are the staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning their respective services except operations of the SDF, with the Chiefs of Staff for the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF acting as the top-ranking expert advisors to the Minister of Defense regarding these services.

3 Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas

The Ministry of Defense has Regional Defense Bureaus in eight locations across the country (Sapporo City, Sendai City, Saitama City, Yokohama City, Osaka City, Hiroshima City, Fukuoka City, and Kadena Town) as its local branch offices in charge of comprehensive defense administration.

In addition to implementing measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting the U.S. bases in Japan and inspecting equipment, Regional Defense Bureaus carry out various activities to obtain the understanding and cooperation of both local public entities and local residents in relation to the MOD's and SDF's activities.

See ▶ Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Interaction between the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, and Local Communities and Japanese Citizens)

2 Joint Operations System of the Self-Defense Forces

In order to rapidly and effectively fulfill the duties of the SDF that are expanding and diversifying, the MOD and the SDF have adopted the joint operation system in which the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF are operated uniformly. As the joint operations system should continue to be strengthened in light of the current security environment, the MOD and the SDF are making efforts to strengthen the foundation of the joint operations, as well as enhancing the functions of the Joint Staff.

1 Outline of Joint Operations System

(1) Role of the Chief of Staff

- a. The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff develops a joint operations concept for SDF operations, and centrally supports the Minister of Defense on SDF operations from a military expert's perspective.
- b. The Minister's commands concerning the operations of the SDF shall be delivered through the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and orders concerning operations of the SDF shall be executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this, the Minister's commands and orders shall be delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force² is organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is employed to respond.

(2) Relationship between Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, and Other Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Staff Office undertakes the functions relating to the operation of the SDF that was transferred and consolidated from the Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Offices, while the Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Offices undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel affairs, building-up defense capability, and education and training.

See ▶ Fig. II-2-2-3 (Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces)

2 Establishment of Foundation to Enhance the Joint Operations Structure

Within the joint operations structure, communication of accurate commands and prompt information sharing between the units in GSDF, MSDF and ASDF are crucial. As the foundation to support these essential requirements, the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII), which is the common network of the MOD and the SDF, and the Central Command System (CCS), which supports Defense Minister's command and supervision, collecting intelligence by connecting with the primary command systems of each SDF Staff Office and other systems, have been developed. The MOD and the SDF are required to maintain a command and control function utilizing an advanced communication network that includes satellite communications and a system for sharing intelligence³ in order to strengthen the joint operational foundation. Thus, they continue to develop a flexible and wide-ranging communications system, which uses advanced communications technology available both within and outside Japan.

² This applies to the case in which a special unit is organized to carry out a specific duty, or the required troops are placed partly under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command structure based on Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the SDF Act, and refers to units, which are made up of more than two units of the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF.

³ Satellite communications are used for communication with destroyers and aircraft engaged in warning and surveillance operations in nearby seas, and for communications between Japan and units deployed in disaster areas and overseas, by taking advantage of its features of broad coverage and immediacy.

At the unit level, they are always required to create plans to be able to respond to various situations, while at the same time they are also required to maintain conditions to be ready for executing duties through joint training and other means. For this purpose, personnel from other SDF branches are stationed at major command headquarters under normal circumstances, and the number of staff personnel will be increased as necessary.

Based on the achievement to date, topics such as the improvement of education and training, the SDF Headquarter structure, and the human resources development, and standardization of equipment will continue to be reviewed, aiming for a more effective joint operations system, and necessary measures will be taken to realize this.

Chapter 3 National Security Strategy

In December 2013, the Cabinet approved the National Security Strategy (NSS), which marks the country's first-ever document defining a basic policy on national security. The NSS stipulates how Japan as a whole will ensure its future national security, and allows Japan's powerful political leadership, based on the Government's strategy and under the direction of the National Security Council, to be leveraged to create a more government-wide strategic and systematic approach to national security policy. The NSS replaces the Basic Policy on National Defense, which served as the basis for Japan's defense policies to date.

See ▶ Reference 6 (Basic Policy for National Defense)

Section 1 Japan's National Security Policy Framework

The NSS represents Japan's first-ever basic policy on national security. The NSS defines approaches that Japan should follow based on a long-term view of its national interests. Based on the NSS, the Government of Japan established the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which defines basic policies for Japan's future defense, the role of its defense capabilities, and objectives for specific SDF equipment. The NDPG was prepared with a medium- to long-term outlook for building up defense capabilities because the acquisition of defense equipment, such as naval vessels or aircraft, and establishment of troop operational systems, cannot be accomplished overnight and requires many years of planning. The NSS and NDPG are mainly designed for the next decade or so.

The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) specifies a maximum budget and the amount of mainstay defense equipment to be acquired over the subsequent five-year period in order to achieve the defense capability targets defined in the NDPG. The fiscal year budget is drawn on the MTDP substantiated as projects, and the necessary expenses for each fiscal year will be appropriated based on relevant situations.

Previous NDPG contained mention of nation-wide basic security policies to a certain extent, but mainly focused on defense policy. The establishment of the NSS, which supersedes the NDPG, carries with it great meaning as the definitive statement of the Government's basic policy on national security, with a focus on diplomatic affairs and defense policy.

See ▶ Fig. II-3-1-1 (Relations among NSS, NDPG, MTDP and Annual Budget)

Section 2 Outline of the National Security Strategy

1 Background and Overview

The security environment surrounding Japan is becoming even more service. Therefore, to continually foster an affluent and peaceful society, it is more important than ever for the entire government to address national security policy in a uniform manner by defining Japan's desired track within the international community based on a long-term vision of its national interests. This is what embodies Prime Minister Abe's order in September 2013 to draw up the National Security Strategy (NSS) with a focus on foreign and defense policies.

The NSS was formulated concurrently with the revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). To facilitate this process, in September 2013 the Government convened the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, comprising experts and other officials. The council met on seven occasions and vigorous discussions were held. The completed NSS which was deliberated on by the National Security Council, which was established on December 4, 2013, and was approved by the National Security Council and Cabinet on December 17, 2013.

The NSS focuses over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will regularly and systematically evaluate and update the NSS as appropriate through the government's implementation process.

2 Fundamental Principle of National Security

1 Principles Japan Upholds - Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the Principle of International Cooperation

Japan is a major economic power with a rich culture and tradition. Japan upholds the universal values of freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law. At the same time, Japan is also a major maritime state. Since the end of World War II, Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation and maintained an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

Japan is committed to continuing its path as a peace-loving nation and, as a major player in international politics and business, it also seeks its own security as well as peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region from its stance as a proactive contributor to peace based on the principle

of international cooperation. Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace, security and prosperity of the international community.

2 Japan's National Interests and National Security Objectives

To achieve the fundamental principle of national security by implementation of concrete policies, Japan needs to clearly define its national interest and national security objectives.

Japan's national interests are defined as:

- To maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity, to ensure the safety of life, person and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security grounded in freedom and democracy and preserving its rich culture and tradition;
- To achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security; and
- To maintain and protect international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.

In order to safeguard these national interests and to fulfill Japan's responsibilities in the international community, Japan will work to achieve the following national security objectives.

- Strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining Japan's peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan, and to defeat such threats and to minimize damage if by chance such threats should reach Japan.
- Improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia Pacific region, and promoting practical security cooperation.
- Improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes.

See ▶ Fig. II-3-2-1 (Layout of the NSS and the New NDPG)

3 Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges

1 Global Security Environment and Challenges

The balance of power between countries continues to change with the rise of China, India, and other developing nations. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains the country that has the world's largest

power as a whole and has manifested its policy to shift its emphasis of national security and economic policy towards the Asia-Pacific region.

Rapid advancements in globalization and technological innovation have increased relative influence of non-state-actors, and at the same time, they have led to an increase in terrorism and criminal threats from non-state actors.

The issue of the transfer, proliferation, and performance improvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles, and in particular, North Korea's nuclear and missile development and Iranian nuclear program remain major threats to Japan and the international community.

Advancements in globalization have caused the proliferation and diversification of international terrorism. In fact, acts of terrorism have injured Japanese nationals living abroad and damaged Japan's national interests. This means that Japan and its people are directly exposed to the threat of international terrorism at home and abroad.

In recent years, there has been an increase in unilateral attempts to change the current status quo of the maritime aspect of the global commons by force for the purpose of securing resources or a country's own national interests. This trend and the issue of piracy on the high seas contribute to greater threats posed to stable sea lanes and the freedom of navigation. With regards to outer space, there are risks inhibiting the continual and stable use of space caused by testing of anti-satellite weapons and an increase in space debris resulting from collisions of satellites in orbit. As for cyber space, the risks of cyber attacks that seek to hinder military systems and destroy social infrastructure are becoming more and more serious.

Global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country – namely, poverty, global health challenges, climate change and other environmental issues, food security as well as humanitarian crises caused by civil wars and natural disasters – are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security, threatening the very survival and dignity of individuals. Additionally, there is a growing risk that one country's economic crisis can expand to involve the entire global economy.

2 National Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region

Characteristics of the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region is that there are various political systems and a concentration of nation states that possess large-scale military force,

including nuclear weapons. However, regional cooperation frameworks on national security have yet to be fully legislated.

North Korea has enhanced the capability of its WMDs including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as well as repeatedly carried out provocative military actions and issued provocative rhetoric directed at Japan, increasing tension in the region. In particular, North Korea's ballistic missile development, including those with the range to reach the U.S. mainland, along with its attempts to miniaturize nuclear weapons and mount them to ballistic missiles, substantially aggravates the threat to the region's security, including Japan.

There is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues. On the other hand, China has been rapidly strengthening and expanding its military capabilities without sufficient transparency. China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the current status quo in the maritime and aerial domains of the East China Sea and South China Sea by coercion based on its own assertions that are incompatible with the existing order of international law. The relationship between the sides of the Taiwan Strait has deepened, primarily in economic areas, but the military balance has been changing. This indicates the mutual existence of stability and potential instability.

4 Japan's Strategic Approach to National Security

1 Strengthening and Expanding Japan's Capabilities and Roles

(1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment

The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats. Japan will play a more proactive role in achieving peace, stability and prosperity for the international community and will carry out dynamic diplomacy to achieve an international order and security environment desirable for Japan.

(2) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan

Given the severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective and joint defense force, adapting to changes in strategic environment and its national power, and strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. Japan will strive to broaden coordination with government institutions, local governments, and the private sector, and Japan will continue to build, in peacetime, a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters. In developing the structure of the SDF, which plays a central role in the above

initiatives, Japan will reinforce its defense structure for deterrence and response to various situations, prioritizing important functions from a joint and comprehensive perspective.

With regards to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence of the U.S., with nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable. To maintain and enhance the credibility of this extended deterrence, Japan will work closely with the U.S. and take appropriate measures through its own initiatives, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of its people.

(3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan's Territorial Integrity

Japan will enhance the capabilities of law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrols and reinforce its maritime surveillance capabilities. Japan will also strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations. Japan will make a constant review on issues that are relevant to ensuring the security of its territories, and take effective measures. Additionally, Japan will proactively engage in the protection, management and development of remote islands near its national borders as well as study land use on remote islands near national borders and areas surrounding defense facilities, from the standpoint of national security.

(4) Ensuring Maritime Security

As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role in maintaining and developing "Open and Stable Seas," which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law and ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight. In addition, Japan will strengthen its maritime surveillance capabilities, which are essential for the above-mentioned measures, in a comprehensive manner, including the use of outer space. In particular, sea lanes from the Middle East to the surrounding waters of Japan are critical to Japan due to its dependence on maritime transport from the Middle East for the majority of its natural and energy resources. As a result, Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states along these sea lanes and other states to enhance their maritime security capabilities, and will strengthen cooperation with partners that share the same strategic interests.

(5) Strengthening Cyber Security

Japan will help ensure the free and secure use of cyber space by protecting it from malicious activities and will reinforce its national capabilities for protection and response in order to guard critical social infrastructure systems against cyber attacks. In peacetime, Japan will strengthen public-private partnerships and comprehensively consider expanding the pool of human resources in the security field and take necessary measures. To promote these measures, Japan

will take measures to strengthen international cooperation at both technical and operational levels as well as promote cyber defense cooperation.

(6) Strengthening Measures against International Terrorism

Japan will first and foremost strengthen its domestic measures against international terrorism such as ensuring the security of nuclear facilities in Japan. Moreover, in order to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals living abroad, Japan will reinforce measures against international terrorism including information gathering and analysis of intelligence relating to the situation of international terrorism.

(7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities

Japan will fundamentally strengthen its information-collecting capabilities from a diverse range of sources, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGNINT, and IMINT. Additionally, Japan will promote the utilization of geospatial intelligence with which various types of intelligence are combined. Moreover, Japan will enhance its intelligence analysis, consolidating, and sharing capabilities by developing highly-skilled intelligence experts. Japan will promote comprehensive analysis of intelligence using the array of intelligence means at the disposal of its government.

(8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

Japan needs to become more proactively involved in contributions to peace and international cooperation through the utilization and provision of heavy machinery and other defense equipment carried to disaster-stricken countries and sites by the SDF, and to participate in the joint development and production of defense equipment. Given this, while giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles of Arms Exports have played thus far, Japan will define clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms suited to the new security environment¹.

See ▶ Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology)

(9) Ensuring the Stable Use of Outer Space and Promoting Its Use for Security Purposes

In addition to enhancing and reinforcing the functions of information-gathering satellites, Japan will make effective use of satellites and enhance a system for space situational awareness. Furthermore, Japan will promote the development and utilization of outer space in a manner that

¹ Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology were approved by the Cabinet on April 1, 2014.

contributes to national security over the medium to long term, including technologies that support the development and utilization of outer space.

(10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities

Japan must strengthen its technological capabilities by encouraging the further promotion of technologies, including dual use technologies. Japan will strive to grasp science and technology trends in peacetime and make effective use of technology in the area of national security by combining the efforts of industries, academia, and the government.

2 Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Japan will work with the U.S. to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, through discussions on concrete defense cooperation and approaches to bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities (RMC), while ensuring consistency with various policies in line with the Strategy. Japan will work closely with the U.S. on operational cooperation and policy coordination as well as strive to enhance the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by strengthening cooperation in a wide range of areas, including BMD, maritime affairs, outer space, cyber space, and large-scale disaster response operations.

In addition to measures to reduce the cost burden of the U.S. Forces in Japan, it is also important for Japan to steadily implement measures following Japan-U.S. agreements on the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan in order to reduce impacts placed on local communities, including in Okinawa, while continually maintaining and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

3 Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan's Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community

Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries with which it shares universal values and strategic interests, such as the ROK, Australia, the countries of ASEAN, and India.

As for China, Japan will strive to construct and strengthen a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests in all areas and from a medium- to long-term perspective. Japan will encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, security and prosperity. Japan will also respond to China's attempts to change the current status quo by coercion firmly but in a calm manner.

With regard to the issue of North Korea, Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution to outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction of Japanese nationals as well as nuclear and missile issues based on the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, joint announcements of the Six-Party Talks and U.N. Security Council Resolutions.

As for Russia, Japan will advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, including security and energy, and work together toward peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

In promoting the initiatives mentioned above, Japan will actively utilize multilateral and trilateral frameworks for cooperation.

Japan will also cooperate with other partners of the Asia-Pacific region toward ensuring stability in the region. These partners include Mongolia, Central Asian countries, Southwest Asian countries, the Pacific Island Countries, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile.

Furthermore, Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with European countries, emerging countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Argentina and South Africa, Middle Eastern countries, as well as African countries to ensure the peace and stability of the international community.

4 Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community

Japan will strengthen its U.N. diplomacy by proactively contributing through efforts aimed at maintaining and recovering international peace and security at the U.N.

Japan will proactively participate in international rule-making and provide active support to international justice organs in terms of both human capital and finances. In particular, Japan will proactively involve itself in realizing and strengthening the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space, and cyberspace.

Japan will continue with its vigorous initiatives to seek a world free of nuclear weapons. Japan will lead international initiatives on disarmament and non-proliferation, including toward the resolution of North Korea's nuclear and missile development issues, while maintaining credibility and consistency with the extended deterrence under the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other activities. Japan will also proactively engage in training for peacebuilding experts and PKO personnel in various countries under close coordination with related countries and actors.

Japan will promote consultations and exchanges of views with other countries on the situation of international terrorism and international counter-terrorism cooperation and assist with the reinforcement of the international legal framework to punish terrorists.

5 Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues

In order to strengthen the foundation for peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, Japan will endeavor to share universal values, respond to global development and global issues and realizing human security, cooperate with human resource development initiatives in developing countries, maintain and strengthen the free trade system, respond to energy and environmental issues, and enhance people-to-people exchanges.

6 Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding

Japan will endeavor to efficiently and effectively procure defense equipment and will maintain and enhance defense production and technological bases, including enhancing international competitiveness.

With the Prime Minister's Office serving as the control tower, Japan will take a government-wide approach to uniformly and strategically disseminate information and, while maximizing various information technologies, Japan will also strengthen its information dissemination in foreign languages through various media.

In order to reinforce the social base, Japan will foster respect for other countries and their people, as well as love for the country and region. Japan will also raise awareness with regard to security on such issues as territory and sovereignty as well as make initiatives to broaden understanding of the activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan.

In order to enhance its intellectual base, Japan will seek to strengthen education on security-related subjects at institutions of higher education and deepen exchanges between the government and higher education institutions and think tanks. Through these initiatives, Japan will promote the development of private sector experts and government officials.

Chapter 4 New National Defense Program Guidelines

For appropriate execution of various SDF missions, it is necessary to acquire equipment such as destroyers and aircraft, and to establish a unit operation posture. However, building up defense capability cannot be achieved overtime and takes time, and therefore it needs to be planned and carried out on the basis of the medium- to long-term outlook.

For this reason, since FY1977, the Government has developed the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which set forth the basic policies for Japan's security, the security environment surrounding Japan, the significance and role of Japan's defense capabilities, and basic guidelines for the building up of Japan's defense capabilities, including the specific organization of the SDF, and the deployment targets for major equipment.

Section 1 Features of the past NDPGs

To date, in light of security environment of the time, the National Defense Program Guidelines were formulated in 1976, 1995, 2004 and 2010.

See ▶ Fig. II-4-1-1 (Developments in the Upgrading of Defense Capability to Date)

1 1976 NDPG

Formulated against the backdrop of the détente¹ of the 1970s, the 1976 NDPG were based on awareness that (1) in general, a full-scale military clash between East and West would be unlikely to occur, and (2) in the vicinity of Japan, the balanced relationship between the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union, and the existence of the Japan-U.S. security alliance would continue to play a substantial role in preventing a serious invasion of Japan.

In addition, with regard to Japan's defense capabilities, the NDPG stipulated that it should give considerations so that it can (1) be furnished with the various functions required for defense and (2) be in a balanced posture in organization and deployment, including logistic support, (3) take adequate surveillance posture in peacetime, (4) effectively cope with situations up to limited and small-scale aggression, and (5) be capable of shifting smoothly to a new setup when an important change occurs in the situation and a new posture is necessary with regard to defense

¹ This refers to the process of the easing of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that were in a confrontational relationship called the Cold War, triggered by the Cuban Crisis of 1962. This situation ended by Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979.

capability. The Basic Defense Force Concept introduced by the 1976 NDPG attached importance to deterrence, emphasizing measures to prevent an invasion of Japan.

2 1995 NDPG

The 1995 NDPG were formulated with consideration to the change of the international situation such as the end of the Cold War, and increasing public expectations for the SDF in the wake of the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and response to the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.

The 1995 NDPG pointed out that previous Defense Programs of Japan were based on the Basic Defense Force Concept that aimed to possess a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation in order to prevent the country itself from becoming a power vacuum that becomes a factor of instability for the neighboring region, rather than directly coping with a military threat to Japan, and basically followed the same approach.

At the same time, in terms of the content of Japan's defense capabilities, the Guidelines were characterized by their emphasis on the further utilization of SDF capabilities not only in the defense of Japan, but also in response to large-scale disasters and various other situations, and in contributions to a more stable security environment, as well as reviewing the scale and function of the defense force.

3 2004 NDPG

Amid the emergence of new threats and the challenges of diverse situations such as the progress in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and the activities of international terrorist activities, the 2004 NDPG were formulated on the decision that new guidelines for the approach to Japan's national security and defense capabilities were necessary.

The 2004 NDPG established two security goals: (1) preventing direct threats from reaching Japan and, in the event that one does, repel it and minimize any damage, and (2) improving the international security environment, so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. To this end, the Guidelines set an integrated combination of three approaches, (1) Japan's own effort, (2) Japan-U.S. Arrangements, and (3) Cooperation with the international community. Accordingly, in terms of the concept of defense capabilities, the Guidelines stipulated that a "multifunctional, flexible, effective defense force" was necessary to address new threats and diverse situations, with emphasis on response capabilities, while maintaining effective aspects of the Basic Defense Force Concept.

4 2010 NDPG

The 2010 NDPG were formulated in light of the recognition that (1) large-scale military capacity, including nuclear capabilities, still exists in the surrounding region, with many countries modernizing their military forces and intensifying various activities; (2) dramatic progress in such fields as military science and technology has shortened the time between the first signs of a contingency and its development making a seamless response necessary; and (3) many security issues extend across national borders, making partnership and cooperation between countries important from times of peace, so the role of military forces is diversifying and it is becoming common to continuously operate military forces from peacetime.

Accordingly, the 2010 NDPG focus on SDF operations, rather than the Basic Defense Force Concept, which emphasized the existence of the defense force; as such, the Guidelines stipulate that it is necessary to ensure that future defense capabilities be dynamic and proactively conduct the various activities required to be fulfilled. Therefore, the 2010 NDPG prescribe the development of a Dynamic Defense Force that demonstrates readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility, underpinned by advanced technical capabilities and intelligence skills, in light of trends in the level of military technology.

See ▶ Fig. II-4-1-2 (Changes in the Views regarding Defense Capability)

Section 2 Background to the New National Defense Program Guidelines

1 Process for Reviewing the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond

1 Reviews within the Ministry of Defense (Defense Posture Review Board)

Given the requirement stated in the “On the Defense Program for FY2013” (approved by the Cabinet on January 25, 2013) to revise the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond (2010 NDPG) and reach a conclusion before the end of 2013, the MOD established the Defense Posture Review Board in January 2013 chaired by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Board convened on 25 occasions, during which time it deliberated on international affairs and the role of defense capabilities, among other topics. On July 26, 2013, the Board made an interim report to the Defense Council with regards to the direction of its reviews and points of discussion.

The interim report pointed out that the security environment surrounding Japan has grown more serious since the 2010 NDPG, due to various security challenges and destabilizing factors that are emerging and becoming more tangible and acute. Additionally, it noted that domestically Japan once again recognized the importance of preparedness for large-scale disasters and other emergencies.

The Board derived the functions and capabilities to be emphasized for a defense program for the building up of more effective defense capabilities by carrying out an assessment of capabilities based on joint operations. The interim report, pursuant to this assessment of capabilities, indicated the following eight areas of focus: (1) reinforcement of information, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; (2) response to attacks on remote islands; (3) response to ballistic missile attacks and guerilla/special forces; (4) response to cyber attacks; (5) response to major disasters and other emergencies; (6) reinforcement of joint operations; (7) strengthening of intelligence capabilities; and (8) promotion of the utilization of outer space.

2 Council on Security and Defense Capabilities and Reviews within the National Security Council

The new NDPG were closely examined together with the National Security Strategy by the aforementioned Council on Security and Defense Capabilities. In addition, the new NDPG was deliberated on by the National Security Council, which was established on December 4, 2013.

Finally, on December 17, 2013, the NDPG was approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet.

2 A New Security Environment

1 The Global Security Environment

As interdependence among countries expands and deepens, there is a growing risk that unrest in the global security environment or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a security challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The multi-polarization of the world continues as a result of shifts in the balance of power due to the further development of countries such as China and India and the relative change of influence of the United States (U.S.). At the same time, the U.S. is expected to continue to play the role in maintaining world peace and stability.

There is an increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests.

In the maritime domain, there have been cases of undue infringement upon freedom of the high seas due to piracy acts as well as coastal states unilaterally asserting their rights and taking actions. In addition, securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace is becoming a significant security challenge for the international community against the backdrop of rapid technology innovation.

2 The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region

Countries are enhancing and strengthening their cooperative relationships to resolve security challenges. In the meantime, gray-zone situations tend to linger, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations.

North Korea has repeatedly taken actions that heighten tension in the region, which constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but of the entire region and the international community. In particular, North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, pose a serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security.

As for China, while it is greatly expected to play an active role in a more cooperative manner in the region and the world, it has been continuously increasing its defense expenditures and has been rapidly reinforcing its military in a wide range of areas without sufficient transparency. In

addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains. In particular, China has taken assertive actions with regard to issues of conflicts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplified by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion. As Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities, it will need to continue to pay utmost attention to them. Such trends in China has also caused security concerns for the Asia-Pacific region and the international community.

As for Russia, it is observed that the country is proceeding to reform and modernize its military forces. The activities of Russian armed forces have been active.

The U.S. has clearly manifested its decision on the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, and is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region despite fiscal and various other constraints while enhancing its relationships with its allies, among other efforts.

See ▶ Fig. II-4-2-1 (Recent Security Related Issues around Japan)

3 Japan's Geographical Characteristics

For the maritime state of Japan, securing the safety of maritime and air traffic through strengthening an “Open and Stable Seas” order constitutes the basis of peace and prosperity. Japan also faces security vulnerabilities resulting from frequent natural disasters and other factors. In the event of another massive earthquake like the Great East Japan Earthquake, its impact may spread to the international community. The possibility of future huge earthquakes such as a Nankai Trough earthquake makes it increasingly necessary to take every possible measure to prepare for such disasters.

4 Issues to be Tackled by Japan

In light of the above, while the probability of a large-scale military conflict between major countries, which was a concern during the Cold War era, presumably remains low, various security challenges and destabilizing factors are emerging and becoming more tangible and acute. As a result, the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe since the formulation of 2010 NDPG. As the security challenges and destabilizing factors are diverse and wide-ranging, it is difficult for a single country to deal with them on its own. Therefore, it is increasingly necessary that countries which share interests in responding to shared security challenges, among others, cooperate and actively respond to maintain regional and global stability.

Section 3 Details of the New National Defense Program Guidelines

1 Basic Approach - Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

The new NDPG call for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, in place of the Dynamic Defense Force from the 2010 NDPG, as the cornerstone for the protection of Japan's peace and security.

The concept of a Dynamic Defense Force focused more attention on operations when compared with the Basic Defense Force Concept carried on since the 1976 NDPG. For example, it emphasized not only a static deterrent, but also a dynamic deterrent, from the standpoint of having a defense force that is not completely dependent on the Basic Defense Force Concept.

However, with the security environment surrounding Japan growing more challenging, the number of situations, including "gray zone" situations, requiring the SDF's response is on the rise and becoming more protracted, in addition to activities during peacetime. Nevertheless, the quality and quantity of the defence force underpinning the SDF activities were not necessarily sufficient. At the same time, a wide-ranging logistical support foundation has become essential for the effective execution of various SDF activities.

The new NDPG, fully mindful of these needs, calls for the enhancement of deterrent and response capabilities by pursuing further joint operations, improving the operational standards of defense equipment, and further increasing defense activities, as well as ensuring the necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of defense capabilities underpinning various activities. Additionally, it requires the building of the most effectively operational posture, which will be accomplished through further enhancing the logistical support foundation on a broader scope.

Capability assessments were carried out from the perspective of joint operations as a specific measure for securing the necessary quality and quantity of the defence capabilities. SDF operations are carried out using joint operations, but as for the build-up of defense capability, the method of capability assessments has not fully reflected the perspective of joint operations, as most of the assessments have been conducted individually for the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces. This indicates that the optimal defense capabilities buildup has not been carried out for the SDF as a whole.

As a result, the new NDPG carry with it great significance because it identifies functions and capabilities of particular emphasis from a comprehensive viewpoint based on capability assessments focused on the functions and capacities of the entire SDF, strictly focusing on the basic approach of responding to various situations by joint operations. By advancing defense capability buildup based on the results of these capability assessments, it has become possible to realize a more prioritized and efficient defense capability buildup, overcoming the boundaries of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces more easily than ever.

Compared to the 2010 NDPG, the new NDPG calls for the establishment of a wider-ranging logistical support foundation. For example, SDF camps and bases will become important deployment staging grounds for the dispatch for disaster relief, and to minimize damages to these camps and bases, it is essential to improve survivability¹ including recovery capabilities. Additionally, failure to provide adequate accommodations for personnel or family support measures will make it impossible to respond immediately during a situation and fully ensure readiness. In addition, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including “skills,” “experience,” “physical strength,” and “morale,” it is necessary to ensure the edge of SDF troops. As such, it is important to carry out rigorous training and exercises in peacetime as well as comprehensively carry out personnel education measures, such as recruitment and support for re-employment, including the further utilization of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel. Furthermore, the collaboration and cooperation with local governments and relevant organizations as well as understanding and cooperation of the general public is indispensable to enabling the SDF to respond appropriately to various situations. As a result, it is extremely critical to actively strengthen collaboration with local communities and boost communication capabilities. Given the vital importance of fundamentally enhancing the wide-ranging logistical support foundation compared to the 2010 NDPG to effectively carry out various activities, as explained above, the new NDPG calls for the strengthening of infrastructure for enabling a broad range of defense capabilities to be exhibited, such as training, exercise and operational infrastructure, personnel and education, defense production and technological bases, efficient acquisition of equipment, research and development, collaboration with local communities, boosting of communication capabilities, enhancing of intellectual base, and promotion of reform of the Ministry of Defense.

2 Japan’s Basic Defense Policy

¹ The ability to maintain organizational functions in the event of an enemy attack on bases or facilities.

1 Basic policy and three approaches

The new NDPG clearly states Japan's basic policy on defense from the standpoint of highlighting the most fundamental matters essential to the Japan's defense, as explained below.

First, in light of the National Security Strategy, Japan will strengthen its diplomatic and defense capabilities along the policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, thereby expanding the role it can play. At the same time, Japan will contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by expanding and deepening cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone.

Under this basic principle, Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture and strengthen its posture for preventing and responding to various situations. In addition, Japan will strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries, while closely coordinating defense and diplomatic policies. Japan will also seek to establish an infrastructure necessary for its defense capabilities to fully exercise their capabilities.

Under the Constitution, Japan will efficiently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

Additionally, with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the U.S. In addition, Japan will take appropriate responses through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people. At the same time, Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

Based on this, the new NDPG defines the following three approaches as key pillars for Japan's defense within today's increasingly severe security environment.

- (1) Japan's own efforts;
- (2) Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and
- (3) Active promotion of security cooperation

Each of these approaches is explained in further detail below.

2 Japan's Own Efforts

(1) Building a comprehensive defense architecture

Given the increasingly severe security environment, the new NDPG calls for Japan to efficiently develop highly effective joint defense force and make efforts to employ it with a high level of flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. It also states that in the event of various situations, Japan will appropriately and promptly make decisions and seamlessly respond to situations as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government approach, in coordination with local governments, private sectors, and others.

Furthermore, the new NDPG states Japan will continue to develop various systems to respond to a variety of disasters and protect its people, and will enhance the capability to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals in foreign countries in an emergency situation.

In order to take such approaches appropriately, the new NDPG requires that Japan increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster response posture by systemizing various related plans and expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive training, and exercises.

(2) Japan's Defense Forces – Building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

The new NDPG declares that Japan's defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of national security, and in the times of an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, defense forces need to be constantly reviewed to adapt to the environment. To this aim, Japan needs to allocate limited resources in a focused and flexible way to prioritize the functions and capabilities from a comprehensive perspective, identified through joint operation-based capability assessments against various situations.

In addition, the new NDPG states that Japan will regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and swiftly build a response posture in accordance with the development of the situation to prevent further escalation of a situation. At the same time, new NDPG states that minimizing damage in dealing with situations by effective response through achieving necessary maritime supremacy² and air superiority³ is essential.

² Maritime supremacy refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force in seas and can carry out maritime operations without suffering extensive damages by the opposing force.

³ Air superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force in skies and can carry out airborne operations without suffering extensive damages by the opposing force.

Therefore, Japan will attempt to enhance its deterrence and response capability by improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct tailored activities swiftly and sustainably based on joint operations, as well as by developing defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality that underpin various activities to realize a more robust defense force.

From these view points, the new NDPG states that defense force needs to prioritize particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation as a whole, and the defense force also must be an effective one which enables conducting a diverse range of activities to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they demand. To that end, the new NDPG states Japan will build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for C3I, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF's operation.

In this regard, characteristics prioritized by the Dynamic Joint Defense Force, “resiliency” and “connectivity” which had not been expressed in the previous NDPG, are newly pointed out. This is based on the result of reviewing functions and capability to be especially prioritized from a comprehensive perspective after implementing capability assessments based on joint operations. Specifically, “resiliency” refers to necessary and sufficient securing of “quality” and “quantity” of defense capabilities that underpin various activities, and further strengthen the basic foundation for SDF. “Connectivity” refers to the strengthening of posture to collaborate with relevant ministries and offices, local governments, private sector, and to cooperate with the U.S., to seamlessly respond to various situations, from peacetime to contingencies.

3 Strengthening on the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The new NDPG stands firmly footed on the recognition that Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan's own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan's national security, and that the Japan-U.S. Alliance functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan, but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. From this perspective, the new NDPG places emphasis on the following efforts.

(1) Strengthening Deterrence and Response Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Japan will revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, further enhance Japan-U.S. defense cooperation and reinforce the deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S.

Alliance and the alliance's contingency response capabilities. At the same time, while increasing the presence of Japan and the U.S. in the western Pacific region, Japan will build seamless cooperation with the U.S. ranging from situations on a day-to-day basis to various situations, including cooperation in responding to "gray-zone" situations. To that end, Japan will expand joint training and exercises, joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas with the U.S. It will also tighten the Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination.

(2) Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Broad Range of Fields

The Japan-U.S. Alliance will contribute to the peace and stability of the international community, by strengthening cooperation not only in anti-piracy efforts, capacity building assistance, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, peacekeeping and counter terrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace, among others. As for disaster response, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. forces within and outside Japan in light of the fact that the U.S. forces greatly contributed to the safety of the Japanese people during the Great East Japan Earthquake. In addition, Japan will constantly strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including efforts for intelligence cooperation and information security, and cooperation in the field of defense equipment and technology.

(3) Steady Implementation of Measures Relating to the Stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan

Japan will provide stable support for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan and mitigate the impact on local communities while maintaining the deterrence provided by U.S. forces. In addition, Japan will seek to mitigate the impact on Okinawa by realignment, consolidation and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas including through the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, as well as the dispersion of the impact and other measures.

4 Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region

The new NDPG cites the following initiatives as part of Japan's initiatives to promote a variety of cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner to ease the atmosphere of confrontation and the sense of curiosity toward one another in the region.

- Japan will promote close cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK), and make efforts to establish a foundation for further cooperation with the ROK, for example, by concluding an

agreement on security information protection and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement.

- Japan will further deepen its relationship with Australia, and strengthen cooperation in fields such as international peacekeeping activities. Japan will also actively conduct joint training and other activities so as to improve interoperability with Australia.
- Japan will promote security dialogue and exchanges with China, and develop confidence-building measures to prevent and avoid unexpected situations. Japan will maintain a calm and firm stance in dealing with the rapid expansion and intensification of Chinese activities on the sea and in the air surrounding Japan.
- Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia, high-level exchanges, and unit-to-unit exchange, and enhance bilateral training and exercises in order to develop mutual trust with Russia.
- Japan will strengthen its relationship with India in a broad range of fields, including maritime security, through joint training and exercises, as well as joint implementation of international peacekeeping activities.

Additionally, the new NDPG cites capacity building assistance as an effective means in stabilizing the security environment and strengthening bilateral defense cooperation, and as such, Japan will promote and carry it out in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including Official Development Assistance, and based on this, Japan will expand the range of countries receiving support as well as its scope.

In addition, the new NDPG states that in multilateral security cooperation and dialogue, Japan in cooperation with the United States and Australia will proactively contribute to building cooperative relationships in the region, and Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint training and exercises.

(2) Cooperation with the International Community

It is very difficult for a single country to respond to global security challenges on its own. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have diversified, such forces play an important role in building peace and promoting confidence-building. Based on this, the new NDPG calls for Japan to promote various initiatives to improve the global security environment on a regular basis in cooperation with the international community.

Specifically, Japan will continue and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and capacity building assistance, and, Japan is strengthening its

cooperation with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and with the United Kingdom, France and other European countries.

Furthermore, the new NDPG states that Japan will actively promote various international peace cooperation activities in a multi-layered manner, and in particular, will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the SDF's capabilities.

3 Future Defense Forces

1 Role of the Defense Forces

Under the new NDPG, Japan's future defense forces will be developed based on the concept of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force and will be capable of effectively fulfilling the expected roles in the following fields, and will maintain the necessary posture.

(1) Effective Deterrent of and Response to Various Situations

Japan will achieve intelligence superiority⁴ through persistent ISR activities in an extensive surrounding area to detect any signs of development at an early stage. Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to tolerate the change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various situations from occurring.

At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations from the stage of provocation, including gray zone situations, and establish the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation.

Moreover, Japan will implement an effective response tailored to each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a consecutive or concurrent manner.

In particular, the following points will be emphasized: (1) ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan; (2) response to an attack on remote islands; (3) response to ballistic missile attacks; (4) responses in outer space and cyberspace; and (5) responses to major disasters.

(2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environment

⁴ To have an advantage over the other party in terms of quickly and correctly identifying, collecting, processing and conveying intelligence.

Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan, and the timely and appropriate implementation of training, exercises, and various other activities, Japan will ensure the stability of the security environment in the region.

Moreover, working in partnership with its allies and partners, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance.

In order to respond appropriately to global security issues, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building assistance.

Japan will attach importance to the following in particular: (1) holding training and exercises; (2) promoting defense cooperation and exchange; (3) promoting capacity building assistance; (4) ensuring maritime security; (5) implementing international peace cooperation activities; and (6) cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

2 Priorities in Strengthening Architecture of the SDF

(1) Basic Approach

The SDF, from the standpoint of maintaining an appropriate structure to effectively fulfill the abovementioned roles of defense capabilities, has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to various potential contingencies, to identify the functions and capabilities that should be prioritized in order to pursue more effective build-up of the defense force.

The new NDPG states that based on the results of the capability assessments, in the defense capability buildup, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistical support foundation.

At the same time, the new NDPG states that in terms of preparation for an invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of

expertise and skills, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization.

(2) Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized

The new NDPG calls for the SDF to selectively strengthen the following functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions with interoperability with the U.S. forces.

○ISR capabilities

Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR in the seas and airspace surrounding it, and adopt a flexible approach to boosting its ISR posture according to the developments of situations.

○Intelligence capabilities

Japan will strengthen its system for intelligence collection, processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so that the SDF can promptly detect signs of various situations, and take other actions.

In doing so, the SDF will seek to augment its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, the SDF will strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to establish a framework for the integrated and systematic nurturing of personnel in information gathering and analysis.

See ▶ Fig. II-4-3-1 (Geospatial Information (Conceptual image))

○ Transport Capability

In order to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen its integrated transport capacity, while seeking collaboration with the civilian transport sector on a regular basis.

○ Command and Control, and Information and Communication Capabilities

In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint and integrated manner, a new central headquarters to control all regional armies will be established within the GSDF, among other measures. The SDF will also strive to enhance and strengthen its capabilities for supporting communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link functions among the three services, along with other capabilities.

○Response to an Attack on Remote Islands

In order to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, the SDF will strengthen its ability to deal with attacks by aircraft, naval vessels, and missiles, etc. The SDF will newly develop sufficient amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture, and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands.

Furthermore, the SDF will enhance its logistical support capabilities, so that its units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the southwestern region.

In addition, the SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.

○Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

To counter North Korea's improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will pursue comprehensive improvement of its response capability against ballistic missiles.

With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability, and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory.

Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan's own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take means as necessary.

○Response in Outer Space and Cyberspace

While strengthening information collection capability using satellites, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, the SDF will enhance the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness.

As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities as well as continuously strengthen and secure personnel with expertise and the latest equipment.

○Responses to major disasters, etc.

The SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for long-term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of appropriately size units.

○Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities

The SDF will strengthen protective capabilities to ensure the safety of personnel and units. The SDF will work on enhancing transport and deployment capability, information communication capability, and on strengthening logistics and medical service structure. The SDF will enhance intelligence gathering capability as well as its education, training and personnel management systems.

3 Architecture of Each Service of the Self-Defense Forces

The new NDPG states that the architecture of each service of the SDF will be established as outlined in (1) to (3) below, based on the functions and capabilities that should be prioritized that were identified in “2. Priorities in strengthening architecture of the Self Defense Forces.”

See ▶ Fig. II-4-3-2 (Annex Table of the NEW NDPG); II-4-3-3 (NDPG Comparison Tables)

(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

The GSDF needs to be able to respond swiftly and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on offshore islands and various other situations. Therefore, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades, and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain mobile operating units sustaining specialized functions in order to effectively perform amphibious and other operations. The GSDF will maintain half of these units in Hokkaido, given its excellent training environment there.

The GSDF will review the organization and equipment with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and rockets. Following thorough rationalization and streamlining, these units will be deployed appropriately, according to geographical characteristics.

The number of GSDF personnel will be maintained at around 159,000, which was the same level as at the end of FY2013, in order to ensure sufficient personnel available to respond to major disasters or other situations.

(2) Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF)

The MSDF will increase the number of destroyers from 48 in the 2010 NDPG (12 escort divisions) to 54 (14 escort divisions) by using new destroyers that offer improved response

capabilities for various missions and have more compact designs and will maintain ship-based patrol helicopter units in order to secure the defense of surrounding waters and ensure the safety of maritime traffic. Furthermore, two Aegis-equipped destroyers⁵ will be added, bringing the fleet to eight.

The MSDF regularly carry out information gathering and warning and surveillance activities undersea and at sea. It will also maintain the augmented submarine fleet as well as patrol aircraft units in order to patrol surrounding waters⁶ and carry out defense operations effectively.

(3) Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF)

The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units in order to provide persistent ISR in most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas. By consolidating warning and control operations at air defense command centers, the ASDF will gradually change warning groups into warning squadrons as well as establish one new squadron in the air warning unit⁷.

As for Fighter Aircraft Units, the 13th squadron will be newly established, and Air Reconnaissance Unit will be abolished. In addition, one squadron will be added to the Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit, making it a two-squadron architecture.

The ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units providing multi-layered defense for Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with the Aegis destroyers, as well as protecting key areas in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units of the GSDF.

See ▶ Fig. II-4-3-4 (Fighter Unit Architecture)

4 Basic Foundation for SDF

To ensure that the diverse activities required of the SDF are carried out in a timely and appropriate manner, it is not sufficient simply to upgrade the main elements of the organization and its equipment; but it is also imperative to strengthen the various foundations underpinning the defense force, in order to ensure that it can function as effectively as possible. The new NDPG first states the above recognition, followed by the following efforts to be prioritized.

1 Training and Exercises

⁵ Destroyers equipped the Aegis Weapon System that uses high performance computers to process target search, detection, identification and attack operations.

⁶ The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.

⁷ The Airborne Early Warning Group was reorganized on April 20, 2014 and the 603rd Squadron with E-2C early warning aircraft was newly established at Naha Air Base.

Through routine SDF training and exercises, the SDF will ceaselessly review and examine various plans, as well as strive to enhance and strengthen its training and exercises in order to improve tactical skills. In doing so, as well as making more effective use of the excellent training environment in Hokkaido, the SDF will work in partnership with relevant organizations and the civilian sector, in order to ensure systematic implementation of more practical training and exercises.

In the southwest region, the SDF will secure a favorable training environment through the joint use of U.S. military facilities and areas, while remaining sensitive to relationships with the local community.

2 Operations Infrastructure

The SDF will improve survivability, including the recovery capabilities of military camps and bases, in order to maintain the support functions so that units can be deployed swiftly and respond to various situations effectively. Moreover, the SDF will implement a steady repair and maintenance program for each service, as well as expansion of the necessary quarters in order to ensure an emergency call-up of personnel in the in the event of various situations, thereby enhancing readiness.

The SDF will undertake deliberations concerning civilian airports and ports, including approaches to the various systems on a day-to-day basis, in order to ensure that such facilities can be used as part of the operational infrastructure for the SDF, etc. from an early stage, depending on the situation. Furthermore, it will implement various family support measures, in order to alleviate the anxieties both of troops serving away from home and of their families while they are away.

In addition, the SDF will enhance and strengthen the operational infrastructure in terms of equipment and materials (securing and stockpiling the necessary ammunition, and maintaining and upgrading SDF equipment).

3 Personnel Education

The SDF will implement measures to reform the personnel management system, in order to ensure the edge of its troops and the effective use of human resources amid a severe fiscal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale. Accordingly, the SDF will implement measures to ensure an appropriate

composition of ranks and age distribution, taking into account the various missions and characteristics of each branch of the SDF.

The SDF will implement measures to make effective use of human resources, such as more effective use of female SDF personnel and expansion of reappointment, and measures related to honors and privileges. In order to strengthen the integrated operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, and, through secondments to the Joint Staff and relevant ministries and agencies, retain personnel who can respond flexibly and rapidly to various situations.

In light of the deterioration of the recruiting environment, the SDF will promote a diverse range of recruitment measures to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option. Furthermore, as it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan to secure the livelihoods of the SDF personnel, who are compelled to retire at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, the SDF will promote support for re-employment by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations. Furthermore, in order to support sustainable operation of units, the SDF will promote utilization of reserve personnel in broad areas, including those with professional skills, and take measures to improve the sufficiency of reserve personnel.

4 Medical

The SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. The SDF will also attach greater importance to securing and training of such medical staff as medical officers, nurses, and emergency medical technicians. The SDF will improve first aid capabilities on the frontline, and put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation.

5 Defense Production and Technological Bases

The MOD will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan's defense production and technological bases as a whole, and will promote participation in international joint development and production and adapting defense equipment to civilian use, in order to maintain and reinforce such bases without delay.

Additionally, Japan is required to engage more proactively in peacebuilding efforts and international cooperation by utilizing defense equipment in various ways, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items. Against this

backdrop, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In doing so, while giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer⁸.

See ▶ Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology)

6 Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

In order to achieve effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, the MOD will strengthen project management throughout the life-cycle through introducing a project manager system. The MOD will also aim to improve cost-effectiveness throughout the life-cycle through considering the possibility of further introducing long-term contracts.

The MOD will try to improve readiness and response capabilities through reforms of the logistics posture through effective use of capacity in the private sector. Furthermore, it will ceaselessly pursue greater transparency in the acquisition process and increased rationalization of the contract system.

See ▶ Fig. II-4-3-5 (The Project Manager System)

7 Research and Development

The MOD will ensure consistency with the priorities for upgrading defense capability when commencing research and development, in order to guarantee that research and development that meets the operational needs of the SDF is prioritized in view of the severe fiscal situation.

In conjunction with this, the MOD will promote research and development based on a medium- to long-term perspective, taking into account the latest trends in science and technology, changes in combat modality, cost-effectiveness and the potential for international joint research and development, with a view to implementing research and development that can ensure Japan's technological superiority against new threats in strategically important areas.

The MOD will strive to make effective use of dual-use technologies, by enhancing partnerships with universities and research institutes, while strengthening technology control functions to

⁸ Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology were approved by the Cabinet on April 1, 2014.

prevent the outflow of advanced technologies, in order to utilize this effectively in the field of security.

The MOD will examine its research and development initiative for achieving the aforementioned objectives.

8 Collaboration with Local Communities

The MOD and the SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations, including local governments, the police and the fire service, in order to enable the SDF to provide accurate response to various situations. Accordingly, as well as continuing to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, the MOD and the SDF will routinely engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities.

The MOD and the SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units, and in operating the military camps, etc., the MOD will pay attention to the contribution of the operation to the local economy.

9 Boosting Communication Capabilities

The MOD and the SDF will strengthen strategic public relations and communication to enhance the dissemination of information via a diverse range of media, in order to secure domestic and overseas understanding which is vital to effectively conduct SDF duties.

10 Enhancing the Intellectual Base

The MOD will promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions, in order to enhance understanding of security and crisis management among the populace. Moreover, in addition to strengthening research systems, with a particular focus on the National Institute for Defense Studies, the MOD will promote various partnerships with other research and educational institutions within the government, as well as universities and think-tanks both within Japan and overseas.

11 Promoting reform of the Ministry of Defense

The MOD will further promote reforms by constantly reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, total optimization in building up defense capability, strengthening SDF's integrated operation functions, and enhancing policy-making and communication functions.

5 Additional Points

These new NDPG set out the form of Japan's defense capabilities over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular, systematic review over the course of implementation of the various measures and programs. Smooth, swift and accurate transition to the future defense capabilities will be facilitated through validations based on joint operational capability assessment. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and verification process, necessary examination of the security environment at that time will be taken into account and these guidelines revised adequately.

In light of the increasingly tough fiscal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup to curb costs, and harmonize with other initiatives in other fields to ensure that Japan's defense capabilities as a whole can smoothly fulfill its expected function.

Chapter 5 Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

In December 2013 the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) (new MTDP) was approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in order to systemically make a transition towards the defense architecture laid out in the new National Defense Program Guidelines (new NDPG). The new MTDP, the first MTDP under the new NDPG, paves the way for the realization of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force that follows the philosophy laid out in the new NDPG.

In addition, the Ministry of Defense is currently in the middle of vigorously examining ways to build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force laid out in the new NDPG and new MTDP.

Section 1 New Medium Term Defense Program

1 Background for the Formulation of the New Medium Term Defense Program

The Medium Term Defense Program for FY2011 to FY2015 (previous MTDP) was a plan that defined major programs and policies for the buildup of defense capabilities during the five-year period spanning from FY2011, based on the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and beyond (2010 NDPG). With the start of the review process for the 2010 NDPG, the previous MTDP was terminated in January 2013 and necessary measures were to be taken based on a study carried out together with the review of the 2010 NDPG with regards to the medium term defense buildup.

Given this approach, both the new NDPG and new MTDP were reviewed alongside one another and following deliberations by the National Security Council, the new MTDP was approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013.

2 Purpose of the New MTDP

Japan's Build-Up of Defense Capability is ultimately carried out based on the budget of each individual fiscal year. However, given the fact that the nation's defense is the basis of its existence and that a long-term time period is needed for defense equipment R&D and implementation, facility improvements, personnel development and unit training, the Build-Up of Defense Capability requires a sustained and systematic approach based on a specific mid-term outlook.

Therefore, the government has formulated the MTDP covering a period of every five years since 1986. Japan's defense buildup for each fiscal year is closely tied to this plan.

The new MTDP represents the first MTDP under the new NDPG and contains the defense buildup plan defining Japan's main programs and policies for the next five years in order to build the Dynamic Joint Defense Force outlined in the new NDPG.

3 Program Guidelines

Following the new NDPG, Japan is working to achieve an appropriate defense buildup through the new MTDP under the following six basic guidelines.

1 Particularly Important Functions and Capabilities

To seamlessly and dynamically fulfill the responsibilities outlined in the new NDPG, with a focus on enhancement of joint operability, emphasis will be placed on the following functions and capabilities in particular: (1) ISR capabilities; (2) intelligence capabilities; (3) transport capabilities; (4) C3I capabilities (5) response to an attack on remote islands; (6) response to ballistic missile attacks; (7) response to outer space and cyber space threats; (8) large-scale disasters; and (9) international peace cooperation efforts.

2 Development of Capacities to Ensure Maritime Supremacy and Air Superiority as well as Rapid Deployment Capabilities

The SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority as well as rapid deployment capabilities, so as to effectively deter and respond to various situations. At the same time, regarding preparations for invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground force, the SDF will establish the minimum necessary level of expertise and skill required to respond to unforeseen changes in its security situation in the future and to maintain, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization of its activities.

3 Efficiently Secure Defense Capabilities Adequate Both in Quantity and Quality

Regarding equipment acquisition and maintenance, by properly combining the introduction of new equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment etc., the SDF will efficiently secure defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality. In this effort, the MOD will strive to improve cost effectiveness by reducing life cycle costs through the strengthening of project management and other means.

4 Promote Measures to Reform the Personnel System

Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent years, to ensure SDF's strength and the effective use of defense force personnel, the SDF will implement measures, including the more effective use of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel, in order to reform its personnel management system.

5 Strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Initiatives for the smoother, more effective stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan will be promoted proactively by further expanding various cooperation and discussions, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

6 Achieve Greater Efficiencies and Streamline the Buildup of the Defense Forces

Considering the increasingly difficult situation in Japan's public finance, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiencies and streamline the buildup of its defense forces, while harmonizing these efforts with other measures taken by the Government.

4 Reorganization of the Major SDF Units

1 Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

For the purpose of carrying out swift and flexible nation-wide operations of basic GSDF units under the joint operations, the GSDF will promote efficiency and rationalize the command and control function of each regional army headquarters as well as review other functions of some regional army headquarters. The GSDF will also establish the Ground Central Command. As part of such efforts the Central Readiness Force will be disbanded and its subsidiary units will be integrated into the Ground Central Command.

In order to respond swiftly to and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on remote islands and various other situations, the GSDF will transform two divisions and two brigades into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades. By establishing a coast observation unit and area security units, the defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region will be strengthened. In order to enable the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade will be established.

From the perspective of enabling swift and flexible operations, while thoroughly facilitating efficiencies and rationalization, the GSDF will deploy mobile combat vehicles and remove

tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. It will also concentrate tanks located in Kyushu into newly organized tank units under the direct command of the Western Army. In addition, howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido will be concentrated into field artillery units to be newly organized under the direct command of the respective regional armies.

See ▶ Fig. II-5-5-1 (Operations of the Ground Central Command); Fig. II-5-1-2 (Changes in Tank and Howitzer Deployment)

2 Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)

For the purpose of defending the seas surrounding Japan and ensuring the security of maritime traffic in the region, through the effective conduct of various operations such as persistent ISR operations and anti-submarine operations, as well as for agile response in international peace cooperation activities, the MSDF will retain four escort flotillas mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH), and two Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG) and five escort divisions consisting of other destroyers. Necessary measures to increase the number of submarines will also be continued.

3 Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

To enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the ASDF will relocate one fighter squadron to Naha Air Base, and newly organize and deploy one airborne early warning squadron at Naha Air Base. To prevent the relative decline of Japan's air defense capabilities and ensure stationed air superiority, ASDF units equipped with training support functions will be integrated for further effective enhancement of advanced tactical skills.

4 Authorized Number of SDF Personnel

The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY2018 will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being active-duty personnel, and approximately 8,000 being reserve-ready personnel. The authorized number of active-duty personnel of the MSDF and ASDF through FY2018 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of FY2013.

5 Major Programs Regarding SDF's Capabilities

1 Effective Deterrence and Response to Various Situations

The SDF is carrying out various programs, including the buildup of defense equipment, to address each of the important situations described in the role of defense capabilities set forth in the new NDPG.

See ▶ Fig. II-5-1-3 (Programs Related to Providing Effective Deterrent and Response to Various Situations)

(1) Ensuring Security of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan

Strengthen the posture to conduct persistent ISR in broad areas and to detect any signs of significant development at an early stage.

(2) Response to an Attack on Remote Islands

a. Development of a Persistent ISR Structure

Organize the structure required to carry out regular and persistent ISR activities which enable an immediate response in the case of various contingencies.

b. Obtaining and Securing Air Superiority

Improve overall air defense capabilities including cruise missile defense capability.

c. Obtaining and Securing Maritime Superiority

In defense of the seas surrounding Japan, the SDF will effectively conduct various activities including holding persistent ISR and anti-submarine operations.

d. Improvement of Capabilities for Rapid Deployment and Response

Secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment operations and improve effective response capabilities.

See ▶ Fig. II-5-1-4 (Example of Rapid Deployment to the Southwest Area)

e. Development of C3I

From the perspective of improving joint force capabilities, a command and control system will be established, so as to immediately concentrate necessary units into the area to be dealt with, such as remote islands. In addition, with regards to the information and communications capabilities which serve as a foundation for nation-wide operations, communications infrastructure on remote islands will be strengthened.

(3) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Given North Korea's improved ballistic missile capabilities, the SDF will pursue the comprehensive improvement of its response capabilities against the threat of ballistic missiles.

The MOD will conduct studies on the best mix of the overall posture of its future BMD system, including the new BMD equipment.

In preparations for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, the SDF will continue to procure necessary equipment, etc., in order to improve its ISR posture, ability to protect key facilities such as nuclear power plants as well as search and destroy infiltrating units.

(4) Response in Outer Space and Cyberspace

a. Promoting Utilization of Outer Space

The SDF will continue to enhance information gathering capabilities through the use of various space satellites equipped with diverse sensors, and strengthen C3I capabilities by continuing to develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system. In addition, the SDF will actively promote space situational awareness efforts, and research on satellite protection, and work to enhance the resiliency of its satellites.

b. Response to Cyber Attacks

The SDF will establish the necessary system by such measures as to enhance the survivability of the command and control systems and information communication networks of the three services, to strengthen capabilities against for information gathering and research analysis, and to develop a practical training environment where response capabilities against cyber attacks can be tested. Through its efforts to secure response capabilities in cyberspace where attackers have an overwhelming advantage, the SDF may consider the acquisition of capabilities to prevent them from using cyberspace.

(5) Response to Large-scale Disasters

In the event of various large-scale natural disasters, the SDF will respond by immediately transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF units, as well as establishing a rotating staff posture based on joint operational approach. In these efforts, the SDF will leverage lessons of vital importance learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake.

(6) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

Given that advanced intelligence capabilities lay the foundation for the MOD/SDF to sufficiently fulfill their roles, the MOD will comprehensively strengthen all stages of its intelligence capabilities, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing intelligence.

The MOD will promote the development and improvement of its intelligence gathering facilities, and actively utilize the outer space and unmanned aerial vehicles so as to drastically reinforce its capability to gather intelligence from the diverse sources including SIGINT and IMINT. In a

related move, the MOD will develop the ability to utilize sophisticated GEOINT by such means as visualization and prediction of situations with a variety of information and intelligence overlaid on a map of image, while promoting the comprehensive and efficient geospatial database development. The MOD will take measures to enhance its HUMINT gathering capabilities including by increasing the number of personnel to be newly dispatched as Defense Attaches. It will also reinforce its posture for gathering and analyzing information from overseas through cooperation with the ally and partners, and use of advanced system for collecting public information.

2 Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments

The new MTDP cites the following specific initiatives: (1) Holding training and exercises; (2) Promoting defense cooperation and exchanges; (3) Promoting capacity building assistance; (4) Ensuring maritime security; (5) Implementing international peace cooperation activities; and (6) Cooperating to promote arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

See ▶ Fig. II-5-1-5 (Programs for the Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environment)

3 Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability

(1) Training and Exercises

The SDF will expand the use of the good training environment in *Hokkaido*, by SDF units across the country, to conduct effective training and exercises. In addition, the SDF will facilitate active use of LSTs and transport capabilities of the civilian sector, and improve unit mobility. Seeking to respond to various situations with a whole-of-government approach, coordination with relevant agencies including police and firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. In addition, the government will conduct various simulation exercise and comprehensive training and exercises regarding various situations on a regular basis in a tailored manner.

(2) Operations Infrastructure

The SDF will enhance the resiliency of military camps and bases, and in particular, strengthen its capabilities to immediately rebuild various camp and base support functions such as the maintenance of runways and information-communication infrastructure. For the SDF to immediately utilize civilian airports and ports in contingency situations, necessary measures will be promoted.

(3) Personnel and Education

The SDF will, from a long-standing perspective, promote feasible measures to ensure the strength of its troops and effective use of personnel amid the severe fiscal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale.

a. Composition of Ranks and Age Distribution

For the purpose of achieving a composition of ranks that consider the characteristics of respective units, the SDF will promote measures to secure and nurture appropriate-numbers of officers, warrant officers and sergeants/petty officers equipped with necessary capabilities, as well as recruit in a planned manner high-quality privates/seaman/airman.

To ensure an appropriate age distribution, in addition to reviewing the retirement age of 60, the SDF will work to adjust the age distribution in the respective officer, warrant officer, sergeant/petty officer, and private/seaman/airman ranks as well as conduct research on new systems for early retirement. In addition, the SDF will take measures to allow airplane pilots to be re-employed in the private sector (reemployment).

b. Effective Utilization of Human Resources

The SDF will work to advance further utilization of its female personnel, and actively reappoint retiring personnel possessing advanced knowledge, skills and experience where such personnel prove beneficial to the overall SDF's strength. In addition, to enable SDF personnel to pursue their missions with high morale and a strong feeling of pride, the SDF will promote measures related to honors and privileges including expansion of the Defense Meritorious Badge program.

c. Recruitment and Re-employment Support

The SDF will work to improve the environment to enhance public understanding of national defense and security issues, effectively engage in public relations to adjust to the changing times, and coordinate and cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies and local governments, among others, so as to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option.

In addition, from the standpoint of returning the knowledge, skills and experience of retired SDF personnel to society, while strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations, the GOJ will facilitate such efforts as the consideration of measures to provide more incentives for companies to employ retired SDF personnel, and encouraging the

employment of retired SDF personnel in the public sector, so as to improve their re-employment environment.

d. Utilization of Personnel including Reserve Staff

In order to support sustainable unit operations in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broad areas. The SDF will facilitate the appointment of reserve personnel including possible opportunities to work at headquarters, and will also improve training for call-ups. Aiming at active use of the private sector's transport capabilities, the SDF will take necessary measures, considering the utilization of reserve personnel including those who have experience as ship crew, and encourage the appointment of reserve personnel equipped with specialized skills, including airplane pilots who the SDF releases to the private sector for re-employment. Other necessary measures will be taken as well to increase public awareness of the reserve program, and provide more incentives for reserve personnel themselves and companies to employ reserve personnel.

(4) Medical

The SDF will upgrade its hospitals to hubs with enhanced functions, and promote the formation of networks across hospitals and medical treatment rooms. Along with contributions to medical services in local communities, the SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, including improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. In addition, the SDF will consider such matters as revision of regulations of emergency medical treatment on situation responses, and establish a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into account the improvement of frontline first aid capabilities, and the enhancement of joint service capabilities.

(5) Defense Production and Technology Base

The MOD will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan's defense production and technology base as a whole. Japan will actively promote measures such as international joint development and production with other countries, utilizing the technological fields where Japan enjoys an advantage. The MOD will also promote adapting defense equipment developed by the MOD/SDF to civilian uses. As part of these efforts, Japan will consider approaches that will benefit both the government and private sector businesses.

(6) Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

A project manager system will be introduced so as to enhance consistent project management throughout the life-cycle from equipment design to disposal. In addition, while utilizing the private sector's knowledge, the MOD will actively train and appoint personnel to positions that require specialized knowledge, skills and experience in the acquisition of equipment. In addition, the MOD will develop a system that allows for reconsideration, including review of specifications and project plans, when there is a certain discrepancy between the estimated and actual value of the life-cycle cost.

To allow for prompt and efficient acquisitions, while ensuring transparency and fairness, parties available for negotiated contracts will be sorted and ranked as necessary so as to be useful. The government will take necessary measures after considering further development of its contract system, to incentivize companies to lower prices, possibility of introducing longer-term contracts, and establishing a flexible system for accepting orders such as the use of a consortium that enables convergence of technologies from globally competitive companies.

(7) Research and Development (R&D)

Taking cost-effectiveness into account under Japan's severe fiscal situation, the MOD will prioritize R&D projects that best meet the operational needs of the SDF.

In order to strengthen its air defense capabilities, the MOD will promote technical review of next-generation surface-to-air guided missiles. In addition, the MOD will promote strategic studies including empirical research to accumulate and enhance fighter aircraft-related technologies in Japan so as to keep an option for development of next-generation fighter aircraft including the possibility of international joint development of an aircraft to replace the F-2 when it is time to retire it. Based on the findings, the MOD will take necessary measures. In an effort to improve ISR capability, the MOD will promote development of SIGINT aircraft as well as research on new fixed air defense radar, and sonars with higher detecting capabilities through simultaneous use of multiple sonars. In addition, the MOD will conduct research on unmanned equipment available for flexible operations in case of various contingencies including large-scale natural disasters, and promote R&D to improve existing equipment.

The MOD will set a vision of future equipment which shows a direction of medium-and long-term R&D for each major equipment, in order to systematically conduct advanced research from medium and long term perspectives. The MOD will also make an effort to actively utilize civilian technologies applicable to defense needs (dual-use technologies) by such means as enhancement of coordination with universities and research institutions, while strengthening the

function of technology control to prevent outflow of advanced technologies, and promote to have defense technologies employed in the civilian sector.

(8) Collaboration with Local Communities

The MOD will continue to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, as well as engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities regarding the policies and activities of the MOD and SDF, in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities.

Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, and supports medical services in communities through emergency patient transport by SDF search and rescue aircraft, etc., the MOD/SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units, and deployment and administration of SDF camps and bases, etc. in order to secure the understanding of local governments and residents.

In these efforts, while considering efficiencies, the MOD will promote various measures conducive to local economies such as securing opportunities for local SMEs to receive orders.

(9) Boosting Communication Capabilities

The MOD will strive to provide information actively and effectively via various media sources such as social media networks. Efforts to provide information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF activities abroad will be facilitated by such means as improvement of its English website.

(10) Enhancing its Intellectual Base

To enhance understanding among Japanese citizens on security and crisis management, the MOD will contribute to the promotion of education on security-related matters at educational institutions, including by MOD personnel presenting academic papers and sending MOD lecturers as experts in security and crisis management. The role of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) as a think tank associated with the MOD will be strengthened, through such efforts as facilitating coordination with policy-making divisions by relocating the institute to the *Ichigaya* district (where the MOD's headquarters is located), and by promoting academic exchanges with foreign research institutions.

(11) Promoting Reform of the MOD

The MOD will further promote its reforms by regularly reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, and to optimize the overall build-up of defense capabilities, promote SDF joint operation functions and enhance policy-making and communication functions. In doing so, the MOD will establish a planning system for defense build-up, and take measures to facilitate efficiency and optimization in acquisition of equipment, keeping in mind an option to establish a new agency in the MOD. Also, by such effort as integration of duties related to actual unit operations into the Joint Staff Office, the MOD will eliminate overlapping duties in the Internal Bureau and the Joint Staff Office, and conduct an organizational review including the reorganization or disbanding of the Bureau of Operational Policy.

6 Measures for the Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

In order to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region and to ensure Japan's national security, Japan will continue the revision of and revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Meanwhile, Japan will expand bilateral training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas by the SDF and the U.S. forces. In addition, Japan will further deepen various Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination in areas such as BMD, bilateral planning, and bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue.

Japan will also strengthen cooperation not only in the fields of counter-piracy, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter-terrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace. Furthermore, Japan will strengthen and expand Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including intelligence cooperation and information security, and defense equipment and technology cooperation.

From the perspective of making the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily ensure the Host Nation Support (HNS).

7 Quantities of Major Procurement

The appendix shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in Section 5. Japan will aim to develop the defense forces described in the Annex Table of the new NDPG over 10-year time frame.

See ▶ Fig. II-5-1-6 (Annex from the New Medium Term Defense Program)

8 Expenditures

The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments described in this program amount to approximately ¥24,670 billion in FY2013 prices. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, approximately ¥700 billion will be secured by means of further streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement reform. The annual defense budgets for the implementation of this program will be allocated within a limit of approximately ¥23,970 billion over the next five years.

This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology, and fiscal conditions.

9 Other

While maintaining the deterrence of U.S. Forces, Japan will steadily implement specific measures including the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa.

Section 2 Dynamic Joint Defense Force Committee

1 Background

The new NDPG calls for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for C31 (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support operations by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). This Dynamic Joint Defense Force must be proactively built while adequately managing the progress of the various measures laid out in the new NDPG and new MTDP.

With this in mind, based on the order of the Minister of Defense issued on December 24, 2013, the Ministry of Defense established the Dynamic Joint Defense Force Committee, chaired by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, and has been carrying out these reviews.

2 Status of the Committee's Reviews

The Dynamic Joint Defense Force Committee, under the direction of the Minister of Defense, carries out essential initiatives for proactively developing the Dynamic Joint Defense Force, while assessing and verifying the progress of various measures laid out in the new NDPG and new MTDP. This Committee is charged with reviewing the most efficient systematic approaches to defense planning from the standpoint of achieving total optimization in the buildup of defense capabilities. Reviews carried out by the Committee are to be closely coordinated with various frameworks, including existing committees within the Ministry of Defense, namely the Cyber Policy Review Committee, Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Committee, and Ministry of Defense Reform Review Committee.

See ▶ Fig. II-5-2-1 (Structure of Committees)

Section 3 Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2014

Japan will steadily build up its defense capability during FY2014, which serves as the first fiscal year under the new NDPG and new MTDP, to establish a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, based on these programs.

As part of this build-up, Japan will particularly prioritize the following measures in order to seamlessly and dynamically fulfill its responsibilities including (1) providing an effective deterrence and response to a variety of security situations and (2) supporting stability in the Asia-Pacific, and improving the global security environment.

- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
- Intelligence capabilities
- Transport capabilities
- Command, control, communication, intelligence (C3I) capabilities
- Response to attacks on remote islands
- Response to ballistic missile attacks
- Response in outer space and cyberspace threats
- Response to large-scale disasters
- International peace cooperation efforts

Furthermore, considering the increasingly difficult situation in Japan's public finance, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiencies and streamline, while harmonizing these efforts with other measures taken by the Government.

See ▶ *Fig. II-5-3-1 (Main Aspects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities for FY 2014)*

Section 4 Defense-Related Expenditures

1 Defense-Related Expenditures and Changes

Defense-related expenditures include spending for maintaining and managing the SDF, improving living conditions in the neighborhoods of defense facilities, and supporting U.S. forces in Japan.

In FY2014, in light of the increasingly harsh security environment, defense-related expenditures were increased for the second consecutive year in a row in order to reinforce preparedness aimed at protecting the lives and property of the populace and the nation's land, sea, and airspace.

In comparison with the previous fiscal year, defense-related expenditures including expenses related to SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for reducing the burden on local communities), defense-related expenditures increased by 131 billion yen to 4.8848 trillion yen. If the SACO-related expenses and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for reducing the burden on local communities) are excluded from the above amount, defense-related expenditures increased by 103.5 billion yen from the previous fiscal year to 4.7838 trillion yen.

Additionally the supplementary budget for FY2013 contains an appropriation of 119.7 billion yen for improving SDF's disaster response capabilities, securing stable operations of the SDF, and necessary expenses for SDF operations.

See ► Fig. II-5-4-1 (Comparison Between FY2013 Budget and FY2014 Budget); Fig. II-5-4-2 (Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years)

2 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures

Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into "personnel and food provisions expenses," which cover such items as pay and meals for SDF personnel, and "material expenses," which finance the repair and maintenance of equipment, purchase of oil, education and training of SDF personnel, procurement of equipment, and others. Material expenses are further classified into "obligatory outlay expenses¹," which are paid under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years,

¹ In the build-up of defense capabilities, some things span multiple years. In these cases, the fiscal year in which the contract is concluded is different from the fiscal year in which the payment to the contractor is made. Then, based on such budgeting, in principle, in the fiscal year that construction is completed or that equipment is procured, expenses necessary for payment are allocated as budget expenditure (budget

and “general material expenses,” which are paid under current-year contracts. Material expenses are also referred to as “operating expenses,” and since general material expenses include repair costs for equipment, education and training expenses for personnel, and the purchase of oil, they are referred to also as “activity expenses.” The MOD terms this classification method as “classification by expenses.”

See ▶ Fig. II-5-4-3 (Structure of Defense-Related Expenditures); Fig. II-5-4-4 (Relationship Between Annual Expenditure and Future Obligation Due to New Contracts)

Personnel and food provisions expenses and obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 80% of the total defense-related budget. A breakdown of general material expenses shows that mandatory costs account for a significant portion of the total, including cost-sharing for the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan².

Personnel and food provisions expenses increased by 103.4 billion yen (5.2%) from the previous fiscal year due to the end of the cut to the remunerations of national servants. Obligatory outlay expenses for the year increased by 56.2 billion yen (3.4%) from the previous year, while general material expenses decreased by 56.1 billion yen or (5.5%) from the previous year³.

Besides being classified by type of expense, the breakdown of FY2014 defense-related expenditures classified by organization, such as the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and also by use, such as maintenance costs and equipment and material purchase expenses, is shown in Fig. II-5-4-5.

See ▶ Reference 19 (Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis))

authority to incur obligations and make payment is granted, i.e., the MOD is able to conclude contracts and allocate budget expenditure). Budget expenditure for payments incurred under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years is called “obligatory outlay expenses,” while expenditure for which the payment period has yet to come is termed “future obligation.”

² A typical cost under this category is expenses for installation of soundproofing in residences.

³ The comparison with the previous year is made excluding the SACO-related expenses and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion for the reduction of burden on local communities). The same applies hereinafter in regard to this section.

In addition to the budget expenditure, the amount of new future obligation also indicates payments for the following year and beyond. In the build-up of defense capabilities, it is common for multiple years to be required from contract to delivery or completion, in areas such as the procurement of vessels, aircraft, and other primary equipment, as well as the construction of buildings such as aircraft hangars and barracks. However, the budget of Japan must gain Diet approval each fiscal year, and therefore, as a general rule, the spending of national expenditures prescribed in the budget is limited to the applicable fiscal year. Consequently, for the things which require multiple years between contract and delivery or completion, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple years is arranged, and it is promised in advance at the time of the agreement that payment will be made at a fixed time in the future (within five years, in principle). The sum of money to be paid in the following fiscal year and beyond, based on such contracts that extend for multiple years, is called the “future obligation.” The amount of new future obligation arising in FY2014 (future obligation concerning new contracts) increased from the previous fiscal year by 294.8 billion yen (17.8%).

Furthermore, if looked at on a contract basis⁴, which shows the scale of operations, there is an increase from the previous fiscal year of 238.6 billion yen (8.9%).

3 Comparison with Other Countries

Understanding the defense expenditures of each country using a single standard is not possible in view of differences in the socioeconomic and budgetary systems. There is not an internationally unified definition of defense expenditures, and breakdowns of defense expenditures are often unclear even in many countries where such data is publicly disclosed.

Furthermore, in comparing the defense expenditures of each country, though there exists the method of converting their defense expenditures into dollar for comparison by foreign exchange rate, their dollar-based defense spending calculated by this method does not necessarily reflect the precise value based on each country’s price levels. Consequently, there are limits to the comparisons that can be made simply by comparing Japan’s defense-related expenditures with those of other countries in dollar terms. Nevertheless, for reference, their official defense expenditures converted in dollar, using the purchasing power parity⁵ of each country as published

⁴ The sum total of general material expenses and future obligation concerning new contracts, which shows the amount of the material expenses (operating expenses) that are to be contracted in the applicable fiscal year and to be paid in the same fiscal year and beyond. The amount is 2.9199 trillion yen in FY2014.

⁵ A gauge that measures each country’s ability to purchase assets or services by taking into account their respective price levels.

by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), are shown in Figure II-5-4-6.

See ▶ Part I, Chapter 1 (Defense Policies of Countries); Reference 20 (Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries)

In addition, Fig. II-5-4-7 shows the changes in defense expenditures of Japan's neighboring countries over the past ten years.

Part III Initiatives of Defense of Japan

Chapter 1 Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People and Secure the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

In order to respond to a variety of situations in a timely and appropriate manner, and to assure the protection of the lives and property of the people as well as territorial land, water and airspace, it is important to ensure intelligence superiority through continuous surveillance over a wide region in peacetime encompassing the surroundings of Japan, and thereby both routinely ascertain the military trends in other countries, and detect any signs at an early stage. By engaging in such activities, Japan can make clear its intention not to tolerate attempts to change the status quo by coercion, and prevent the occurrence of a variety of situations before they arise.

If a situation does arise, then responding efficiently and minimizing damage, by ensuring an appropriate and timely response based on the defensive strategic position of our exclusively defense oriented policy, and ensuring sea and air superiority in our sea¹ and airspace², is important in the effort to protect the lives and property of the people as well as our territorial land, water and airspace.

Section 1 Efficient Deterrence and Response

This section will explain the seamless and agile response of the SDF to a variety of situations in peacetime, including routinely conducted information gathering, warning and surveillance in peacetime and incidents in the “gray-zone.”

Moreover, in addition to recent increase and intensification of activity in the surrounding waters and airspace of the Senkaku Islands by China in recent years, and the missile launches, nuclear tests and such actions by North Korea as well as concerns for large-scale natural disasters such as the Nankai Trough Mega quake, the MOD and the SDF are engaged in serious study in order to ensure an efficient response even in complex situations wherein various contingencies arise

¹ See Part II, Chapter 4, Section 3, footnote 4

² See Part II, Chapter 4, Section 3, footnote 2

consecutively or simultaneously.

1 Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan

Japan is composed of a little over 6,800 islands, and is surrounded by a wide region of sea, which includes the sixth largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The SDF are engaged in around-the-clock intelligence gathering, and warning and surveillance in Japan's territorial waters and airspace in peacetime, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace, so that it can respond in a timely and appropriate manner to a variety of situations. It also maintains a posture which enables it to respond seamlessly to changes in conditions.

1 Warning and Surveillance in Waters and Airspace Surrounding Japan

(1) Basic Concept

The SDF routinely and continuously engages in surveillance activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan in peacetime so that it can respond to various emergencies promptly and seamlessly.

(2) Response by the MOD, the SDF and Others

The MSDF patrols the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea in peacetime, using P-3C and other patrol aircraft to monitor the numerous vessels that sail through those waters.

The ASDF uses radar sites at 28 locations nationwide, E-2C early warning aircraft, and E-767 early warning and control aircraft, amongst others, to carry out warning and surveillance over Japan and its surrounding airspace 24 hours a day. It also conducts surveillance in major channels, to monitor MSDF guard posts, GSDF coastal surveillance units, and so forth. Furthermore, warning and surveillance activities are carried out with the flexible use of destroyers and aircraft as required. Thus, a state of readiness is maintained to enable a quick response to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-1 (Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan)

In 2013, for example, there were eight incidents of activity by Chinese Navy vessels involving the passage through the southwestern region and four incidents of such activity were also confirmed in waters south of Okinawa. Moreover, since the Japanese government's acquisition of the ownership of the Senkaku Islands in September 2012, Chinese governmental ships have intermittently intruded into Japanese territorial waters. In recent years, activities by Chinese Navy vessels or Chinese government ships are promptly being expanded and activated.

Due to this state of affairs, the Japan Coast Guard has strengthened its warning and surveillance operations through the use of patrol ships and aircraft, and demanded that the Chinese ships that intruded into Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands leave; the MOD and the SDF are routinely sharing information obtained through warning and surveillance activities with the Japan Coast Guard in peacetime, including that gained on the front line. Through these initiatives, all means necessary have been taken to ensure that no gap can be opened in our defense and protection.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-2 (Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands Performed by Chinese Government Ships)

2 Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

(1) Basic Concept

Under international law, nations have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their airspace. Scrambling against intruding aircraft is conducted as an act to exercise the right of policing intended to maintain public order. Unlike measures taken on land or in the seas, this measure can be taken only by the SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for conducting actions against intruding aircraft based on Article 84 of the SDF Act.

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22(Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

(2) Response by the MOD and the SDF

The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in the Japanese territorial and adjacent airspace using warning and surveillance, or E-767 airborne early warning and control system, E-2C airborne early warning aircraft. If any aircraft suspected of violating Japan's territorial airspace is detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them to confirm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. In the event that a territorial airspace violation does occur responses such as warning to withdraw will be issued.

On December 13, 2012, a fixed-wing aircraft (Y-12) of the Chinese State Oceanic Administration intruded into Japan's territorial airspace in the vicinity of Uotsuri-jima in the Senkaku Islands. The ASDF urgently scrambled fighters in response to these incidents.

In FY2012, the ASDF scrambled 810 times³, the first time the number has risen past 800 in 24 years in the Heisei era. The number of scrambles in FY2013 increased by a wide margin of 243 over the previous year, and like that year, the number of times these takeoffs were in response to Chinese aircraft exceeded those of Russian origin. In these instances, the E-2C early warning aircraft and E-767 early warning and control aircraft were used effectively, while through the reassignment of one air squadron comprised of E-2Cs to Naha Air Base, the warning and surveillance operations in the southwest region have been strengthened.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-3 (Number of Scrambles in the Last Decade and Its Breakdown); Fig.III-1-1-4 (Example Flight Patterns of Russian and Chinese Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded)

Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” by China in November of that year, the MOD and the SDF have been implementing surveillance activities as before, in the East China Sea, including the zone in question, and have continued to take all initiatives necessary to engage in surveillance in the sea and airspace around Japan. They have also decided to engage in strict anti-territory intrusion measures in accordance with international law and the SDF Act.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-5 (Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) for Japan and Neighboring Countries)

See ▶ Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Defense Policies of Other Countries and Regions: China)

3 Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan’s Territorial Waters

(1) Basic Concept

With respect to foreign national submarines navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters⁴, an order for maritime security operations⁵ will be issued promptly. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law, and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, it will be requested by the SDF to leave Japanese territorial waters.

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

(2) MOD and SDF Initiatives

The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities for detecting, identifying, and tracking foreign submarines navigating underwater in the territorial waters of Japan, as well as expressing its intention not to permit any navigation that violates international law, and

³ See Part II, Chapter 4, Section 3, Footnote 3

⁴ Break down by country of aircraft subject to scrambles: China, approximately 51%; Russia, approximately 44%; and others, approximately 5%

⁵ Including territorial waters and inland waters.

responding to them in shallow water areas. In November 2004, the MSDF P-3C observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating underwater in Japanese territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands. In response to this, an order for maritime security operations was issued, while MSDF vessels and aircraft continued to track the submarine until it entered the high seas.

In May 2013 and March 2014 although there was no intrusion into the territorial waters of Japan, the MSDF P-3C observed submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous zone in succession. Although international law does not forbid foreign submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous zone of coastal nations, Japan maintains a stance of properly dealing with such activities.

4 Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels

(1) Basic Concept

The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued promptly in a timely manner and the SDF will respond to the situation in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

In light of the lessons learned from the incident involving an unidentified vessel off Noto Peninsula in 1999 and the incident involving an unidentified vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001, the Japanese government has been taking all necessary precautionary measures while the MOD and the SDF have strengthened cooperation with other relevant ministries and agencies.

(2) MOD and SDF Initiatives

The MSDF is taking the following steps: (1) deployment of missile boats; (2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit⁶; (3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns; (4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells)⁷; and (5) improving the sufficiency ratio of essential military vessel personnel.

⁶ A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of onboard inspections under maritime security operations.

⁷ The flat front edge of the destroyer prevents a non-bursting shell from scattering when launched from the 76-mm gun equipped on the ship.

In addition, the MOD and the Japan Coast Guard carry out regular mutual training, information exchange, joint exercises, etc. Based on the “Manual on Joint Strategies concerning Unidentified Vessels,” which was prepared jointly by the Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard in 1999, the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard carry out joint exercises involving pursuit and capture guidelines for unidentified vessels and communications, etc., strengthening cooperation between the two organizations.

2 Defense of Japan’s Offshore Islands

Given Japan’s geographical characteristics – that the country is surrounded by seas on all sides and has numerous islands – invasion of offshore islands can be anticipated as one form of armed attack against Japan.

1 Basic Concept

In order to respond to attacks on islands, it is important to both position units and so forth on the basis of the security environment, and to detect signs at an early stage through activities routinely conducted by the SDF in peacetime including continuous intelligence gathering, warning and surveillance activities. If signs of attack are detected in advance, troops will be expeditiously deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be attacked ahead of the deployment of enemy units and try, through the integrated application involving the ground, sea and air, to deter and remove enemy attacks. If, by some chance, islands are captured without any signs detected in advance, then the enemy will be brought under control by ground fire from aircraft and vessels, after which tactical operations will be implemented to regain the islands by the landing of SDF forces and other initiatives.

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22(Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

Of particular importance in the defense of Japan’s offshore islands are superiority over the enemy in terms of sea and air potential in the surrounding sea and airspace, and a situation wherein strategic operations can be accomplished without sustaining substantial losses from the enemy.

A clear response will be taken to attacks using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and so forth.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-6 (Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Offshore Islands)

2 Initiatives of the MOD and the SDF

Since there are many islands in the southwest region that are vacuum regions for SDF deployment, the GSDF will deploy coast observation units and introduce area security units in charge of initial responses. At the same time, the ASDF will strengthen its defense bases, through initiatives such as increasing one squadron of its fighting units at Naha Air Base. Through these initiatives, Japan will continue a routine posture for around-the-clock intelligence gathering and surveillance posture, and develop a structure which enables an immediate response in the case of contingencies.

In order to swiftly and gradually deploy units responding to changes in the situation, and to prevent or remove an invasion, in the new National Defense Program Guidelines and the Medium-Term Defense Program, the GSDF will reorganize its rapid deployment divisions and brigades by newly introducing rapidly deployable basic operational units possessing mobile combat vehicles transportable by the ASDF's C-2 transport aircraft, and thereby strengthen its air operation capacity.

Furthermore, in order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, initiatives are underway to enhance the maneuver deployment capabilities, through the improvement of transport vessels and introduction of tilt-rotor aircraft.

In order to land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, the GSDF will possess amphibious vehicles, and would introduce amphibious rapid deployment brigades (provisional name) with sufficient amphibious operational capabilities. As well as increasing the capacity to direct precision-guided bombs and improving surface-to-surface missiles, the GSDF will advance its initiatives in development to increase the capabilities of surface-to-ship missiles, in areas such as increasing their range.

In addition, in the southwest and other regions, the SDF conducts various training and exercises with the objective of improving the joint operation capabilities of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and of deterring and dealing with attacks aimed at the island region, and is also actively involved in field training exercises with U.S. Forces aimed at developing the capability to efficiently execute operations and establishing mutual coordination procedures. The GSDF began implementing this in 2006. In February 2014, in California, the GSDF and US Marines conducted a field training exercise (Iron Fist) and have been working to improve amphibious operational capability. From May through June 2013, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF participated for the first time in a joint exercise that has been held for some time on the western coast of the United States, called "Dawn Blitz." As a part of the first joint U.S.-Japan training overseas

(Dawn Blitz 13), they practiced a series of tactical activities relating to working with the U.S. Forces, and responding to island invasions. In particular, they performed a series of exercises, from planning to landing, in dual ocean and land operations under joint Ground, Maritime and Air command, as well as implemented firing practice using live rounds, including mortars, and strengthened cooperation with the U.S. Forces.

Furthermore, in May 2014, in the Amami Islands, the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces took part in field training, during which there was a demonstration of an overview of joint operations by the SDF regarding landing tactics.

3 Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Japan began establishing the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in FY2004 to effectively respond to ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Act in 2005, and in the same year, the Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor.

Japan is steadily building up its own multi-tiered defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to the Aegis-equipped destroyers⁸ and deploying the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)⁹.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-7 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan)

1 Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense

(1) Basic Concept

Japan's BMD is an effective multi-tier defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis-equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE), an indigenous command, control battle management, and communication system. To establish this multi-tier defense structure, the MOD and the SDF have upgraded the capability of existing Aegis-equipped destroyers and Patriot systems and further promoting BMD system development.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-8 (Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD)

(2) Development Status of the BMD System

Going forward, the MOD and the SDF plan to maintain initiatives to install BMD capability to

⁸ See Part II, Chapter 4, footnote 5

⁹ The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly target the interception of aircraft, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.

two “Atago” class Aegis destroyers, and increase the number of Aegis BMD destroyers by 2, to a total of 8. All 6 air defense missile groups will be equipped with PATRIOT PAC-3 by FY2015. In addition, to reinforce its ballistic missile detecting and training capabilities, the SDF will promote the improvement of its automated warning and control system (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment), as well as procurement and improvement of its fixed air defense radar (FPS-7) ¹⁰ systems. The SDF will pursue further improvement of its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system so as to equip it with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE {Missile Segment Enhancement}) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for BMD.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-9 (Enhanced PAC-3 Missile (PAC-3 MSE))

2 Improvement in Legislation and Operations

(1) Legal Measures regarding Response to Ballistic Missiles

In case ballistic missiles or other objects¹¹ are launched toward Japan and if the situation is recognized as an armed attack, a defense operation order for armed attack situations will be issued to respond.

On the other hand, if ballistic missiles are launched towards Japan and if the situation is not acknowledged as an armed attack, the following measures will be taken with sufficient consideration to (1) carrying out prompt and appropriate response and (2) ensuring civilian control:

a. When the Minister of Defense determines that there is a possibility that ballistic missiles or other objects will fly toward Japan, the Minister of Defense orders SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles upon approval of the Prime Minister¹².

b. In addition to the case above, there may be cases where almost no information is available concerning missile launch, or that suddenly the situation changes due to accidents or failure in launch, allowing no time for the Minister of Defense to obtain the approval of the Prime Minister in peacetime. In case of such contingencies, the Minister of Defense may prepare

¹⁰ Improved as of FY2014 as fixed warning and control radars capable of responding to both conventional threats such as aircraft and ballistic missiles.

¹¹ Objects other than aircraft such as ballistic missiles which could cause grave damage to human life and property when they fall to the ground.

¹² A specific example of SDF activity is deploying PAC-3 units by the ASDF and Aegis destroyers by the MSDF, upon receipt of an appropriate order from the Minister of Defense in preparation for incoming ballistic missiles and other objects. In the case where missiles actually fly toward Japan, based on the aforementioned order, SDF units would destroy them.

emergency response procedures in advance that are to be preapproved by the Prime Minister. Subsequently, in accordance with these emergency response procedures, the Minister of Defense may issue an order in advance to SDF units with a specified period of validity to take the necessary measures to destroy ballistic missiles and other objects when they actually fly toward Japan.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-10 (Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles)

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22(Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

(2) Concept of Ensuring Civilian Control of the Military

Response against ballistic missiles requires the government to assess the possibility of missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specific situation and international circumstances. In addition to the SDF destroying the missile, interagency actions are required, for example, measures for civil protection such as alert and evacuation, diplomatic activities, information gathering by related agencies, and enhancement of readiness for emergencies.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-10 (Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles)

In view of the importance of the matter and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, the Cabinet and Minister of Defense can sufficiently fulfill their responsibilities upon the Prime Minister's approval (Cabinet decision) and orders by the Minister of Defense. Furthermore, the supervision of the Diet is also defined with a provision in the law stipulating reporting to the Diet.

(3) Operational Initiatives

a. Responses to Ballistic Missiles through Joint Operations

Responding to ballistic missiles flying toward Japan, when the Joint Task Force-BMD is formed, the Commander of the Air Defense Command is to serve as the Commander of the task force, and various postures for effective defense are to be taken under a unified command through JADGE.

Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of ballistic missiles.

b. Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Further cooperation with the U.S. Forces in Japan as well as with the U.S. government is

required for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures, such as constant real-time sharing of information on BMD operation and relevant information, were agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meetings in 2005, 2006, and 2007. Also, at the 2+2 meeting in October 2013, the two countries confirmed that BMD cooperation will further be expanded.

See ▶ Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2 Japan-U.S. (“2+2” Meeting)

Furthermore, Japan has developed close cooperation with the United States by means such as receiving early warning information¹³ (Shared Early Warning; SEW), and sharing intelligence gathered by forward deployed assets including Aegis-equipped destroyers and transportable BMD radar (AN/TPY-2).

In addition, maintenance, development and validation of Japan-U.S. bilateral response capability have been conducted actively through training and other activities. In February 2014, following on from the previous year, a special BMD exercise was held between the MSDF and the U.S. Navy, connecting their ships via a network and conducting a simulation of response to ballistic missiles, to improve tactical capabilities and strengthen bilateral coordination.

3 Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation

(1) Missile Defense of the United States

The United States is developing a multi-tier missile defense system consisting of mutually complementary defense systems suited for each of (1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase, and (3) the terminal phase of the ballistic missile flight path.

Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system of the United States has been deployed in our country in a step-by-step manner.

Specifically, a TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-band radar”) for BMD has been deployed at the U.S. Shariki Communication Site¹⁴. Also, BMD-capable Aegis ships have been forward deployed in

¹³ This is information conveyed by the United States to the SDF after the U.S. Forces analyze data relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan; the analysis takes place within a short period immediately after the launch and the information provided to the SDF includes the area where the launch took place, the time of the launch, the area where debris is expected to fall and the anticipated time when it is likely to fall. Under the security arrangements between Japan and the United States, the SDF has exchanged various kinds of information with the U.S. Forces, and the SEW is one example of such information (since in April 1996). It cannot be denied that there are limits to the accuracy of this kind of information due to its nature, but it is valuable enough as an “initial report” of any ballistic missile launches in the direction of Japan.

¹⁴ The radar was installed at the ASDF “Shariki” Sub Base, but was later transferred to the U.S. Shariki

Japan and surrounding areas since December 2006. Furthermore, in October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 units were deployed at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS)¹⁵ was deployed at Misawa Air Base in Aomori Prefecture. Furthermore, ASDF Kyogamisaki sub-base was designated as the deployment site for the 2nd TPY-2 radar in Japan, and necessary facilities and areas were furnished to the U.S. in December 2013.

(2) Japan–U.S. Cooperative Development of Advanced Ballistic Missile Interceptor and Other Initiatives

In 1998, the government decided to commence a Japan–U.S. cooperative research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999.

The purpose of the Japan-U.S. cooperative research project was to improve future interceptor missile capability, and it conducted design, prototype production and necessary testing for four main components¹⁶.

In December 2005, the Security Council and the Cabinet decided to start Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor by using the results of the project as a technical basis, because the results showed good prospects for resolving initial technical challenges. The joint development started in June 2006 with a view to expanding the coverage of protection and dealing with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missiles and is planned to be completed by around 2017.

See ▶ *Fig. III-1-1-11 (Outline of the Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development of advanced ballistic missile interceptor)*

(3) Relationship to the Three Principles on Arms Exports

With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, which is aimed at improved future BMD capability, it is necessary to export BMD related arms from Japan to the United States as part of development. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary's statement issued in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based on these circumstances, third party transfer was discussed, and it was decided that transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA could be approved in advance in accordance with the Exchange of Notes concerning transfer of arms and military technologies to the United States, in the case

Communication Site.

¹⁵ One of the information processing systems for ballistic missiles.

¹⁶ The four components are the nose cone, second-stage rocket motor, kinetic warhead, and infrared seeker.

where the transfer supports the national security of Japan and/or contributes to international peace and stability, and when the third party has sufficient policies to prevent the future transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA. This decision was formally announced in the Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) on June 21, 2011.

Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles), which received Cabinet approval on April 1, 2014, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before the Three Principles were decided upon, overseas transfers will continue to be organized in the guidelines for the principles (decided upon by the National Security Council on the same day) as allowable under the Three Principles.

See ▶ Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology);

See ▶ Reference 62 (The Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.); Reference 63(Three Principles on Transfer of defense Equipment and technology(April 1,2014))

4 Response to North Korea's Missile Launch

On March 12, 2009, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) informed member countries that it had received warning in advance from North Korea of an intended test launch of an “experimental communication satellite.” In response to this, based on Article 82 Section 2 of the SDF Act (currently Article 82 Section 3), the Minister of Defense issued the “Order for destruction measures against ballistic missiles.” The SDF organized the Joint Task Force BMD and deployed two Aegis Destroyers equipped with SM-3 to the central area of the Sea of Japan as well as Patriot PAC-3 units to SDF bases in the Tohoku region and the Tokyo metropolitan area. On April 5, one missile was launched from North Korea toward the east, and the MOD and the SDF swiftly transmitted information to the Prime Minister's Office and other agencies, collected from Shared Early Warning (SEW) and the various SDF radar Units¹⁷. Further, aerial reconnaissance was carried out to confirm whether any harm was caused in the Tohoku region. On April 6, the Minister of Defense issued an order to terminate the destruction measures against ballistic missiles.

On March 19, 2012, a notification was sent from the IMO that it had received warning in advance from North Korea concerning a launch of an “earth observation satellite.” In response to this notification, on March 27, in accordance with an order for preparations for destruction measures against ballistic missiles (preparation order), the MOD and the SDF started preparations. Moreover, on March 30, the Minister of Defense issued an order for the

¹⁷ On the day before the actual launch, false information related to the launch was distributed due to mishandling of information by the MOD and the SDF. At the time of the actual launch, information was properly collected and transmitted.

implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles (implementation order) based on Article 82-3, Paragraph 3 of the SDF Act, and the SDF deployed Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and Patriot PAC-3 units on the islands of Okinawa Prefecture and within the Tokyo metropolitan area. Also in case of missiles falling, the requisite GSDF units were dispatched to the Southwestern Islands to protect Japanese territory. Around 07:40 on April 13, the MOD (the SDF) confirmed receiving information from SEW concerning a launch of a flying object from the west coast of North Korea. Since the missile flew for over a minute and then broke up into several pieces which fell into the Yellow Sea, the same evening, the Minister of Defense issued an order to terminate the destruction measures against ballistic missiles (termination order).

Furthermore, on December 1, 2012, North Korea announced it would launch a “satellite” during the period between December 10 and 22 (later extended to December 29). In light of these circumstances, the Minister of Defense issued a preparation order on December 1, and the MOD and the SDF deployed Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and Patriot PAC-3 units to Okinawa Prefecture and within the Tokyo metropolitan area. Additionally, in case of missiles falling in Japan’s territory, GSDF units were dispatched to the Southwestern Islands. On December 7, the Minister of Defense issued an implementation order. At 9:49 am on the same day, a so-called “satellite” was launched from the west coast of North Korea, and it passed through the airspace of Okinawa Prefecture toward the Pacific. Upon this occurrence, the Minister of Defense issued a termination order in the evening of the same day.

Similarly, in the first half of 2013, North Korea repeatedly engaged in a variety of provocative acts, including the implication of missile launch toward Japan, while on March 3 and 26, and June 29, 2014, it launched ballistic missiles. Due to this stance, the MOD and the SDF took every necessary measure including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities, to protect the lives and properties of Japanese people in any potential situation, closely cooperating with related agencies and the U.S.

See ▶ Part I, Chapter 1, Section 2-1 (North Korea)

4 Responses in Airspace

As Japan maintains an exclusively defense-oriented policy, it is extremely important to use outer space, which does not belong to any nation’s territories and which is not constrained by conditions such as surface topography, in order to strengthen information gathering to detect any

indications of various situations in advance, and enforce warning and surveillance functions in Japan's surrounding sea areas and airspace, as well as ensuring means of communication in activities such as the international peace cooperation activities of the SDF.

In July 2012, the Space Strategy Office was established by the Cabinet Office, to engage in the planning, drafting, coordination and other policy matters relating to the use of space development. Furthermore, the Basic Plan for Space Policy for the five years from the current year, was decided upon in the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development established by the Cabinet based on the Basic Space Law in January 2013. One of the important challenges it addresses is "national security and disaster management."

The new National Defense Program Guidelines have determined that Japan will strengthen intelligence gathering capacity, command, control, and information communication capacity, and increase the resilience of satellites, as well as ensure the effective and stable use of outer space. On this basis, in FY2014, initiatives will be made in (1) investigation into successors for the currently-used x-band communications satellites, (2) increase x-band satellite communication functions, (3) research into countermeasures to the jamming of satellite communications systems, (4) dispatch of personnel to U.S. Air Force foundation courses on space, (5) investigation into the introduction of surveillance systems for the situation in outer space, (6) research into the best format of satellite protection, and other such operations.

5 Response to Cyber Attacks

1 Whole-of-Government Approach

Information and communications technology has developed and been widely adopted at great speed and, as a result, it is now an essential infrastructure for socioeconomic activity. On the other hand, there is a possibility that people's lives and economic activities will be severely affected if the computer systems or networks fail.

This is the same for both the MOD and the SDF. If the critical functions of the SDF are intercepted by a cyber attack, then it is possible that problems may arise at the core of Japan's defense.

In Japan, various initiatives have been undertaken by public and private sector entities, with the National Information Security Center (NISC) playing the leading role.

In June 2013, at the Information Security Policy Council¹⁸, decisions were made on the “Cyber Security Strategy” to focus on the period until 2015, and the plan for the subsequent year “Cyber Security 2013” which was based on the above strategy. The strategy and plan incorporate many initiatives concerning the security of Japan, including the advancement of information security measures by businesses and other bodies which deal with important national information, implementation of exercises for the purpose of an initial response at the government level, and new assignment of a “Cyber Defense Group” in the SDF to defend cyberspace, and other such measures. In addition, because it is vital to press ahead with initiatives in the international community in order to ensure the stable use of cyberspace, which continues to grow on a global scale, in October 2013, the “International Strategy on Cybersecurity Cooperation –j-initiative for Cybersecurity” was formulated at the Information Security Policy Council. Clearly specified within the “j-initiative” were important efforts including proactive participation in the development of international standards, strengthened cooperation with other relevant nations, such as Japan’s ally, the United States, and support in building the capabilities of developing countries.

Along with the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MOD is designated as one of the five government agencies which must cooperate particularly closely with the NISC. Therefore, the Ministry contributes to the cross-sector initiatives led by the NISC by providing it with the knowledge and skills of the MOD and the SDF. For example, the Ministry participates in cyber attack response training and personnel exchanges, and provides information about cyber attacks, etc. In light of such incidents as the cyber attacks on defense industry companies reported in 2011, the NISC established the Cyber Incident Mobile Assistant Team (CYMAT) to provide agile support, forming cross-cutting partnerships among ministries and agencies. The MOD sends personnel to CYMAT, thereby actively contributing to improving the security of the government as a whole.

2 Initiatives of the MOD and the SDF

Based on this situation and government initiatives, the MOD and the SDF are engaged in the following efforts in order to deal with cyber attacks.

(1) Basic Concept

¹⁸ Established in May 2005, under the chairmanship of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, this serves as a parent body for deciding on matters associated with the fundamental problems faced in information security in Japan.

For the MOD and the SDF to execute missions, it is necessary to maximize its opportunities for the use of cyberspace while limiting any risks. For that purpose, the MOD and the SDF must secure the stable use of cyberspace as their “infrastructure” and strengthen the capabilities to better operate in cyberspace as a new “domain” that is equivalent to land, sea, airspace and outer space. In such initiatives, the MOD and the SDF will accomplish necessary programs based on the following policy directions:

- (1) Enhancement of capabilities and systems of the MOD and the SDF.
- (2) Contribution to nationwide initiatives including the private sector.
- (3) Cooperation with the international community, including allied nations.

(2) Specific Initiatives

As for response to cyber attacks, the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command is continuously monitoring SDF communications networks. Along with introduction of intrusion prevention systems in order to increase the safety of information and communications systems, and development of defense systems such as the security and analysis device for cyber defense, the MOD and the SDF are engaged in holistic measures including enactment of regulations¹⁹, stipulating postures and procedures for responding to cyber attacks, and improving the human resources and technological bases, as well as conducting research on cutting-edge technology.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-12 (MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks)

The Cyber Policy Committee, chaired by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, was established in February 2013. The committee is conducting integrated deliberations regarding cooperation with other countries and relevant organizations, the programs to train and acquire personnel capable of responding to cyber attacks, cooperation with the defense industry and response to supply chain risks²⁰.

In March 2014, a “Cyber Defense Group” was established under the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command, in order to appropriately deal with the threat posed by cyber attacks which are growing increasingly sophisticated and complicated, and the relevant systems were enhanced and strengthened. In addition, going forward, efforts will also be made to enhance and strengthen the operation platform, through the early detection of cyber attacks signals, improvement in the cyber information gathering equipment that aids in

¹⁹ There are directives relating to information assurance of the MOD (MOD Directive No. 160, 2007).

²⁰ Supply chain risks refers to the risks that malicious software, including computer viruses, may be inserted in the components of equipment during the design, manufacturing, procuring or installation of equipment.

the prevention of attacks before they occur, and development of a practical training environment so that it can verify the capacity to deal with such attacks.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-13 (Conceptual Image of a Cyber Defense Group)

The MOD and the SDF also continue to implement initiatives for the development of human resources with sophisticated knowledge, including establishing education and research in the field of network security at the National Defense Academy, and dispatching officials to study at graduate schools in Japan and abroad.

At the same time, it is difficult for the MOD and the SDF alone to achieve the stable use of cyberspace. In particular, since comprehensive defense cooperation between Japan and its ally the United States, including joint response, is vital, in October 2013, under the direction of Minister of Defense Onodera and Secretary of Defense Hagel, the “Cyber Defense Policy Working Group” (CDPWG) was set up with the objective of deepening comprehensive cooperation between the defense authorities of the U.S. and Japan in terms of security. They aim under this framework are (1) promotion of policy discussions, (2) closer sharing of information, (3) promotion of joint exercises incorporating response to cyber attacks, and (4) discussion about matters such as cooperation for training and maintaining experts; in February 2014, the first working group meeting was held in the Ministry of Defense. Going forward, there will be efforts toward further defense cooperation between the U.S. and Japan in the field of cyber activity. In addition, through participation in the “Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialog,” which is a whole-of-government approach by both nations, and the “Japan-U.S. IT Forum,” which is a framework between the defense authorities that has been discussed repeatedly since 2002, Japan’s cooperation with the United States will be strengthened further still. Furthermore, the IT Forum will also be implemented with the defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia, while cyber conferences are being held between the authorities of the U.K., NATO, Republic of Korea and others, in order to exchange views on threat awareness and each of the relevant initiatives.

In addition, a framework for discussion with each country on entire policies, and the dispatch of employees to meetings by government experts relating to international standards in the U.N. are being proactively implemented, and going forward, collaboration and cooperation with the international community will be further advanced.

In July 2013 as well, the “Cyber Defense Council” (CDC) was set up, having around ten companies in the defense industry with a strong interest in cyber security as its core members.

Efforts are being made to improve the capacity to counter cyber attacks by both the MOD and the SDF and the defense industry.

6 Response to Various Disasters

When disasters such as natural disasters occur in any part of the country, the SDF works in collaboration with municipal governments, engaging in the search for and rescue of disaster victims or missing ships or aircraft, controlling floods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods. In particular, over 100,000 SDF personnel were dispatched at a peak time for relief operations for the large-scale earthquake and nuclear disaster experienced during the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011.

1 Outline of Disaster Relief Dispatches

(1) Types and Frameworks of Disaster Relief Dispatches

In principle, disaster dispatch is carried out at the request of prefectural governors and other officials when there has been a freak weather incident or other natural disaster; in cases where it is deemed necessary to protect the lives or property of citizens, or where a request has been made to the Minister of Defense or other designated officer, who then determines that the situation warrants such action²¹. This is because prefectural governors and other officials grasp the overall conditions of the disaster, and it is considered most appropriate for dispatches to be made upon their request in consideration of disaster relief capabilities within the prefecture or municipality including police and firefighting.

Municipal mayors can ask prefectural governors to request a disaster relief dispatch by the SDF. In the event that mayors are unable to make such a request, they can inform the Minister of Defense. After receiving such requests from governors, the Minister of Defense or other personnel designated by the Minister can immediately dispatch units as necessary according to the disaster situation.

When a freak weather incident or other disaster occurs, under circumstances of particular urgency when there is no time to wait for a request, the Minister of Defense or those designated

²¹ The Director General of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters, and the Director of Airport Administrative Office may request disaster dispatch. With regard to disaster dispatch, earthquake prevention dispatch, nuclear disaster relief dispatches, (1) SDF personnel requested dispatch may exercise authority based on the SDF Act; (2) SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of disaster dispatch, and SDF Ready Personnel in the event of earthquake prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster dispatch; and (3) special units may be temporarily formed as necessary.

by the Minister may authorize an exceptional dispatch without waiting.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-14 (Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal)

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22(Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

When an alert is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Large-Scale Earthquakes Countermeasures²², the Minister of Defense is authorized to order an earthquake disaster relief dispatch based on the request of the Director of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (the Prime Minister).

Based on the lessons learned after the incident of criticality which occurred at a uranium processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture, the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness was enacted, according to which, the SDF Law was amended and nuclear disaster dispatch established. the Minister of Defense is authorized to order a nuclear disaster dispatch upon request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister).

(2) Initial Response to Disasters

The SDF has put in place arrangements for an initial response, as shown in Fig. III-1-1-15, to ensure that disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. This is called “FAST-Force.”

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-15 (State of Readiness for Disaster Dispatches (Standard))

2 Response to Disasters

(1) Transportation of Emergency Patients

The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2013, out of a total of 555 cases of disaster relief operations, 401 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients, with dispatches to the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures), the Goto Islands (Nagasaki Prefecture), the Izu Islands, and the Ogasawara Islands representing the majority of such cases.

Furthermore, in addition to aiding in the transport of emergency patients from vessels navigating areas of ocean far from the mainland where the aircraft of other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons including a short flight range, in the event that urgent action is

²² The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake has been predicted and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement emergency earthquake disaster prevention measures.

required due to incidents such as fire, flooding or capsizing, the SDF carries out sea rescues when requested to do so by the Japan Coast Guard.

Furthermore, it conducts wide-ranging medical transport operations, using the Mobile Medical Unit to move serious-case patients by C-130H transport aircraft.

(2) Firefighting Support

In FY2013, there were 93 dispatches of firefighting support, the second largest number of dispatches after transportation of emergency patients. Within this category, responses to fires in areas near SDF facilities were the largest in number, with 85 cases in FY2013. Furthermore, upon the request of prefectural governors for disaster relief dispatches, the SDF also conducts aerial firefighting activities in locations where mountain and forest firefighting conditions are difficult, such as mountain and forest areas.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-16 (Performance in disaster dispatch (2013); Reference 23 (Performance in disaster dispatch (past five years))

(3) Response to Natural Disasters

From the rainy season through summer of 2013, weather conditions were unstable due to the fact that the seasonal rain front was stationary, leading to a succession of record-breaking downpours of heavy rain in all regions. Due to the unprecedented rain in Yamaguchi and Shimane Prefectures from July 26 until August 2, the SDF received requests for disaster dispatch from the governors of both prefectures on July 28, and conducted searches for people whose whereabouts were unknown and rescues of individuals who became isolated. Then on the 29th, a request was received from the Governor of Ishikawa Prefecture, to which the SDF responded by implementing activities to prevent flooding caused by the increase in river levels. The large-scale dispatch involved in these activities amounted to a total of around 600 personnel, 180 vehicles and four aircraft. Furthermore, in August 9 of the same year, record-breaking heavy rain focused in Akita and Iwate Prefectures resulted in mudslides in locations such as Semboku City in Akita. The SDF received a request for disaster dispatch from the governors of these two prefectures on the 9th of the month, and responded with rescue and various other operations in Shizukuishi-cho in Iwate Prefecture and Semboku City in Akita Prefecture. The scale of this dispatch operation amounted to a total of around 900 personnel, 280 vehicles and 7 aircraft.

Furthermore, as the large, powerful Typhoon No. 26 drew close on October 16, 2013, a large-scale landslide occurred on Oshima-machi, Tokyo (Izu Oshima). On the same day, the

SDF received a request for disaster dispatch from the Governor of Tokyo, and started disaster relief activities. Then on the 20th of the month, a joint task force composed of units from all three SDF, commanded by the Headquarters of the Eastern Army, was organized, which carried out activities such as searching for lost individuals on the island, air transportation of patients and support for the transport of personnel and goods until November 8 of that year. The scale of this disaster dispatch operation amounted to a total of 64,000 personnel, 5,120 vehicles, 50 ships and 340 aircraft.

Due to the heavy snow in February 2014, roads were seriously damaged from the Kanto-Koshin through Tohoku regions, and there were regions where families became isolated. Requests were therefore received from the governors of the stricken prefectures, to which the GSDF and the ASDF responded by rescuing individuals, transporting goods, airlifting patients, checking safety and removing snow to help in relief initiatives for the period from February 15 to 23 of that year. The scale of this disaster dispatch operation amounted to a total of around 12,000 personnel, 1,300 vehicles and 220 aircraft.

(4) Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake and other Disasters

The Great East Japan Earthquake, which occurred on March 11, 2011, caused destructive damage, mainly in coastal areas in the Tohoku region. Since immediately after the earthquake, the MOD and the SDF have done their utmost to rescue disaster victims. The SDF's disaster relief activity ended on December 26, 2011, when the dispatch for nuclear disaster relief expired. During the period, a total of around 10,660,000 SDF personnel engaged in such activities as supporting disaster victims' everyday life, searching for missing people and dealing with the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The MOD and the SDF worked together in responding to this unprecedented emergency.

Furthermore, based on the lessons learned in response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster which occurred on March 11, 2011, the Act for Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority was enacted, and the Nuclear Regulation Authority was established, while the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and other matters were amended. The MOD and the SDF assigned two GSDF regular personnel to the Nuclear Regulation Authority in September 2012, in addition to which, after a review of the related plans and participation in nuclear disaster prevention exercises, they have engaged in support for transportation, resident evacuation, radiation measurement (monitoring) and other measures, and are working to increase efficiency by considering the format of collaboration with the relevant organizations, and so forth.

Furthermore, initiatives are being made to improve capabilities for responding to nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons in order to deal not only with nuclear disasters, but also with other special disasters²³.

(5) Other

On April 12, 2014, there was an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza at a chicken meat farm in Kumamoto Prefecture, which resulted in the culling and disposal (by burial) of birds by the local government. On the 14th of the month, after a request for disaster relief was made by the Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture, the Self-Defense Forces commenced activities such as the transportation of hydrated lime (to prevent dispersal of the virus) and culling of birds on the farm, which it continued until the 16th. The scale of the disaster relief effort was approximately 880 personnel, and a total of around 180 vehicles.

3 Initiatives for Preparation for Disaster Relief in Peacetime

(1) SDF Plans for Responding to Various Disasters and Operational Plans

The SDF has formulated various contingency plans for responses to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration at the Central Disaster Management Council.

In May 2013, the Central Disaster Management Council Working Group to Examine Countermeasures against Nankai Trough Mega Earthquakes compiled its final report on countermeasures to a mega earthquake in the Nankai Trough²⁴. Then in December, the Central Disaster Management Council Working Group to Examine Countermeasures against Nankai Trough Mega Earthquakes compiles its final report on countermeasures to earthquakes directly below the capital. Based on these, the MOD and the SDF established the “Self-Defense Forces Plan for Countermeasures against Nankai Trough Earthquakes” in December of that year.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-17 (Outline of Self-Defense Forces Plan for Countermeasures against Nankai Trough Earthquakes)

(2) Exercises Involving SDF

In order to respond to various disasters large-scale earthquakes – with speed and accuracy, the

²³ Special-type disasters may be caused by terrorist or armed attacks using weapons of mass destruction.

²⁴ This is an ocean-trench mega quake expected to occur in the Nankai Trough formed at the border between the Philippine Sea Plate in a Pacific Ocean area off a region extending from the Bay of Suruga to Kyushu and the Eurasia Plate on the Japanese Archipelago side. Once the plates are strained to the breaking point due to the Philippine Sea Plate sliding under the Eurasia Plate and causing the edge of the continental plate to be dragged, they will return to their original positions. Such movement will cause an ocean-trench mega quake.

SDF carries out various disaster prevention drills including joint exercises for rescue in peacetime, in addition to formulating disaster relief plans. The SDF also actively participates in local government disaster prevention drills and is seeking to ensure cooperation with various ministries and agencies, and local governments.

In FY2013, the SDF organized and participated in various emergency drills with the objective of maintaining and improving the ability to carry out disaster relief missions swiftly and accurately in times of disaster, such as major earthquakes, and many of the issues relating to the response in the event of a disaster that arose due to the Great East Japan Earthquake were actively incorporated into disaster prevention exercises.

See ▶ Reference25 (Implementation and participation record of major drills concerning disaster dispatch (FY2013))

In July 2013 and June 2014, with the assistance of concerned organizations, “SDF joint disaster-prevention exercises” were implemented which envisioned Nankai Trough earthquakes, to verify the response at command posts and operation of the MOD Disaster Operations Headquarters.

On August 31, 2013, the SDF participated in wide-ranging medical transport exercises organized by the Cabinet Office, and tested a wide-range of transport using SDF aircraft, bases and so forth. In addition, the GSDF’s Field Medical Surgery System was installed in the MSDF transport vessel “Shimokita” which participated in drills for verifying the installation of medical bases on the ocean. On “Disaster Drill Day,” September 1 of that year, as well as participating in operational exercises by the Government’s Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters, the operational exercises were also implemented for the MOD Disaster Operations Headquarters.

As the first comprehensive Government nuclear disaster prevention exercise after the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, in October of that year, a field exercise was implemented which envisioned an incident at the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant in Kagoshima Prefecture. The MOD and the SDF practiced coordinating initiatives from the Prime Minister’s Office, the Nuclear Regulation Authority and offsite centers. They also implemented a response through the transport of Nuclear Regulation Authority personnel to the site by aircraft, resident evacuation support in areas surrounding the nuclear facility and so forth, and verified the system for responding to nuclear disasters, while working to improve efficiency overall. In addition to all this, the SDF have been holding a range of training exercises and participating in various exercises such as drills by local governments and striving to ensure the efficiency of disaster countermeasure capacity.

ASDF Personnel and Firefighters conducting transporting an emergency patient at Disaster Prevention Exercise in Omitama City, Ibaraki Prefecture

(3) Coordination with Local Governments

It is also important for the SDF to strengthen coordination with local governments in peacetime in order to conduct disaster relief operations smoothly.

For this reason, the SDF participates in a number of disaster prevention drills and is proceeding with the strengthening of cooperation with local governments including enhancing information liaison systems and consistency with disaster control plans.

Specifically, (1) the post of Liaison and Coordination Officer for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Operation Countermeasures was created at the SDF Provincial Cooperation Headquarters to work at ensuring coordination with local governments in peacetime.

When personnel were dispatched in the event of the disaster resulting from heavy snow from the Tohoku through Tokai regions in February 2014, coordination with the relevant prefectural offices was.

Also, (2) in addition to assigning an SDF officer to the department in charge of disaster prevention for Tokyo, mutual exchange is being carried out between administrative officials of both the GSDF Middle Army Headquarters and Hyogo Prefectural Government. Furthermore, (3) in response to requests from local governments, retired SDF personnel with knowledge in disaster prevention are being sought. As of the end of April 2014, the total number of retired SDF personnel working in disaster prevention in local governments was 304 individuals in 46 prefectures and 196 municipalities throughout the country. Personnel-related cooperation with local governments and the MOD and the SDF is a very effective method of improving cooperation with those governments, and its efficacy was confirmed during the Great East Japan Earthquake.

See ▶ Reference 26 (Retired SDF Personnel Working at Disaster Prevention-Related Departments of Local Governments (As of April 30,))

At the same time, the MOD and the SDF believe that carrying out initiatives such as the following are important in order to carry out operations more effectively during disaster dispatch in local governments as well.

○ Securing Staging Areas and Heliports

Securing the staging areas which serve as bases for command posts for various disaster agencies, sites for the accumulation of equipment, and other activities, as well as helipads for transport, etc.

○ Marking to Identify Buildings

Marking of names and numbers on roofs, so that public facilities like schools and prefectural offices that are important in disaster prevention can be identified easily from mid air.

○ Securing Facilities for Liaison and Coordination

Securing areas and parking sites at local government and other official buildings, in order that communications personnel can liaise and coordinate matters smoothly.

○ Arrangements for Materials and Equipment

Ensuring that disaster prevention maps for communal use are up to date, equipment and materials are maintained for use in aerial firefighting, and water sources are available.

Furthermore, they have concluded agreements relating to collaboration at times of disaster with private-sector organizations such as various power companies, and are striving for smooth mutual cooperation when various disaster dispatch is implemented, through disaster prevention drills.

7 Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others

In the urbanized Japan, even small-scale infiltrations and attacks in the form of covert action by guerrillas or special forces and illegal acts by armed agents which have infiltrated the country²⁵ can pose a serious threat to peace and security.

1 Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

(1) Basic Concept

In the event of an armed attack on Japan by guerilla or special forces, such as destruction of critical private infrastructure and other facilities, attacks on people and assassinations, Japan will respond under a defense operations order.

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22(Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

(2) Operations to Respond to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

²⁵ Refers to persons engaging in illegal acts such as subversive activities in Japan while possessing weapons with significant killing power, those cooperating with such persons, etc.

In operations, an intelligence gathering posture is established to detect the attacks at the earliest possible time and to respond in a swift and flexible manner. Particular importance is given to warning and surveillance to prevent invasion in coastal areas, safeguarding of key facilities, and search and defeat of invading units. It is important at this time to quickly gain control of the situation to minimize damage.

a. Warning and Surveillance

Initiatives toward early detection will be made through surveillance in surrounding waters by escort ships or aircraft, and warning and surveillance by GSDF reconnaissance units in coastal areas. When the possibility of infiltration into Japanese territory by guerillas and special operations forces is suspected, GSDF patrol units will engage in warning and surveillance activities in coastal areas.

b. Protection of Significant Facilities

Furthermore, as required, a guarding posture will be established for the prompt deployment of guarding units to secure key facilities, such as a nuclear power plant.

c. Search and Destruction of Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces

In the event of an infiltration of our territorial land by guerrillas or special operations forces, they will be searched for and found by reconnaissance units, aviation units or others.

In case of detecting guerillas or special operation forces, combat units will rapidly deploy, develop and defeat.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-18 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces)

2 Response to Armed Agents

(1) Basic Concept

While the police assume primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments.

(2) Measures for Strengthening Cooperation with the Police Organizations, etc.

For the SDF to deal with armed agents it is important to cooperate with the police agency. Accordingly, in 2000, the Basic Agreement concluded in 1954 between the JDA and the National Public Safety Commission with regard to cooperation procedures in the case of public

security operations was revised to enable its application to illegal activities by armed agents²⁶. In addition, local agreements were concluded in 2002 regarding public security operations between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces.

Furthermore, guidelines were jointly formulated with the National Police Agency in 2004 for dealing jointly with public security dispatches in the event of armed agent concerns.

Also the GSDF continues to implement combined field exercises at each area nationwide with the police of each prefecture, and intends to strengthen collaboration. It conducted exercises at the Ikata Nuclear Power Plant (Ehime Prefecture) in 2012, at the Tomari Nuclear Power Plant (Hokkaido) and the Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2013, and at the site of the Shimane Nuclear Power Plant (Shimane Prefecture) in 2014. Furthermore, combined exercises in dealing with unidentified vessels continued to be implemented between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard.

3 Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons proliferation and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and scattered rogue states. In the event that such weapons of mass destruction are used, it is likely there will be indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area. The sarin gas attack²⁷ on the Tokyo subway in 1995 and the incidents of mail in the United States containing anthrax²⁸ in 2001 are evidence of the fact that these weapons have already been used.

(1) Basic Concept

In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to abate the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed attack and assist victims in

²⁶ The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations which was concluded between the former Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission.

²⁷ An incident in which members of Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people (the number refers to the number of deaths indicated in the judgment rendered to Chizuo Matsumoto (commonly known as Shoko Asahara, a guru of Aum Shinrikyo). The SDF conducted decontamination operations on the trains and stations as well as supported police forensics.

²⁸ Since September 2001, postal mail containing anthrax was delivered to individuals including members of the U.S. Senate and those related to the mass media.

cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical protection units of the GSDF and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will cooperate with relative organizations in intelligence gathering concerning the extent of the damage, decontamination activities, transport of the sick and injured, and medical activities through disaster relief dispatches and civilian protection dispatches.

(2) Initiatives of the MOD and the SDF in Response to NBC Weapons

The MOD and the SDF have improved the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Specifically, the Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit, GSDF and NBC protection units or NBC counter medical units in each division or brigade were formed under the Central Readiness Force, and each division and brigade has. In addition, there has been an increase of chemical protection unit personnel, improvement of NBC reconnaissance vehicles, chemical surveillance devices, decontamination vehicles, personnel protection equipment, portable automatic biological sensors, chemical protection clothing, and research and development for decontamination kits is ongoing. Also, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of special-type disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour. The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases. Furthermore the SDF is working to strengthen collaboration for NBC weapon attacks, including through establishing partnerships with relevant external institutions, such as local authorities, the police, and fire departments through combined exercises.

8 Security of the Oceans

Consisting of a multitude of islands, numbering more than 6,800, Japan is a maritime nation whose territorial waters and EEZ covers, in total, approximately 4.47 million km² about 12 times its 380,000 km² land area, which places it sixth in the world in terms of the oceanic area that it controls. As is stipulated in the Basic Act on Ocean Policy, the Government promotes policies concerning the oceans intensively and comprehensively based on the view that it is critical for Japan to establish itself anew as a maritime nation that achieves a balance between peaceful and proactive development and use of the ocean, and the preservation of the marine environment.

Based on changes in the situation regarding the ocean, the new Basic Plan on Ocean Policy given Cabinet approval on April 26, 2013 specified the following targets for Japan as an Oceanic State: (1) international cooperation and contribution to the international community, (2)

wealth and prosperity through ocean development and use, (3) shift from a country protected by the ocean to a country that protects the ocean, and (4) challenge unexplored frontiers, and has set out initiatives to pursue intensively in the next 5 years or so. Among these initiatives are the following for ensuring the safety at sea: reinforcement of the wide-range routine system of surveillance, systematic improvement of warships, aircraft and other vehicles, strengthening of the system of collaboration between the SDF and Japan Coast Guard, and development of a system of collaboration to ensure order and safety on the coasts and isolated islands.

In addition, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy states that in order to contribute to the creation and development of order on the ocean, it will ensure international collaboration and promote international cooperation and will make use of fora such as multilateral and bilateral ocean conferences to contribute to international rules and consensus-building. As a result, the SDF is making initiatives to cooperate for the purpose of ocean security within the framework of the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) Plus regional security dialog known as the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM-MS).

Moreover, within the framework of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the SDF has been engaged in initiatives such as cooperation in the establishment of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) which was adopted at the 14th meeting in April 2014²⁹.

See ▶ Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2 (“Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework and through Dialogue”)

9 Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.

In the event of disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense is authorized to transport Japanese nationals and other people overseas upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and subsequent consultations with the Foreign Minister, on the basis of Article 84 (3) of the SDF Law (transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.). In such cases, the SDF will protect the Japanese nationals or other parties in the country in question, and safely guide them to transport by aircraft, ships and vehicles. To this end, the SDF maintains operational readiness, with the GSDF designating helicopter unit and leading transport unit³⁰

²⁹ This specifies the procedures for ensuring safety, communications methods and other factors when there is an unexpected encounter at sea by the naval vessels and aircraft of the participating nations in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). (It is not legal binding force, and does not supersede international aviation rules, international treaties and so forth.)

³⁰ Units temporarily organized and dispatched together with transport units (SDF aircraft or ships) in

personnel, the MSDF designating vessels such as transport ships (including boarded aircraft), and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel.

The revision of the SDF Law in November 1994, positioned the transport of Japanese nationals overseas as the duty of the SDF. At the time of the Terrorist Incident involving Japanese Nationals in Algeria in January 2013, a dedicated Government aircraft from the Special Airlift Group (belonging to Chitose Air Base) was dispatched to Algeria, from where it transported seven Japanese nationals and the bodies of nine deceased Japanese nationals back to Japan. Based on the lessons learned from this incident, a reform bill for the SDF Act was approved by the Diet on November 15 of that year, containing matters such as the addition of vehicles as a means of ground transport; this was put into force on the 22nd of the month. As a result, it was decided that transport protection vehicles with superior performance against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) would be introduced from the perspective of further enhancing the protective capabilities against unforeseen contingencies when engaging in ground transport, and expanding the range of incidents with which the SDF can cope.

See ▶ Fig.III-1-1-19 (Ordering Procedure and Image Regarding Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.), Fig.III-1-1-20(Main Details of Revision of the SDF Act)

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 22(Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

Since the transport of Japanese nationals overseas requires close coordination among the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, collaborated exercises are carried out in peacetime. The MOD participates in the exercise for the transport of Japanese nationals overseas in the annual multinational joint exercise “Cobra Gold” in Thailand in cooperation with the Japanese Embassy in Thailand, with local Japanese Embassy staff, and their family members. C-130H transport aircraft was dispatched from the ASDF for the first time. Such exercises improve our coordination procedures with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SDF’s skills in operations overseas.

10 Readiness against Invasions

The new National Defense Program Guidelines indicate the recognition that the potential for a large-scale conflict between major nations, of the kind that was feared during the Cold War era, remains low. It also details that only the necessary level of readiness against land invasions involving the mobilization of large ground forces (as was expected primarily during the Cold War) will be retained to maintain and pass on the minimum specialist knowledge and skill required to respond to uncertain future changes in the situation.

order to guide and protect Japanese nationals and other people onsite.

In case Japan faces a full-scale invasion, the SDF will respond to the situation in an aligned and systematic manner based on their integrated operations. Their operations are categorized into (1) air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the land, and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime communication, based on the characteristic of their purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and deploy operations to complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.

The following explains how the SDF will typically implement operations.

See ▶ Chapter 2, Section 1(Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations)

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

1 Air Defense Operations

Based on the geographic features of Japan in that it is surrounded by the sea and the features of modern wars³¹, it is expected that Japan will be hit by repeated rapid aerial attacks by aircraft and missiles in the case where a full-scale invasion against Japan occurs.

Operations for aerial defense are characterized by the importance of initial response influencing the whole operations. Thus, Japan needs to maintain its readiness for quick initial response on an ongoing basis in peacetime, regularly collect information, and rapidly and comprehensively exert combat capabilities from the onset of operations.

Operations for aerial defense can be categorized into comprehensive aerial defense mainly conducted by the ASDF and individual aerial defense conducted by the GSDF, MSDF or ASDF for their bases or troops. Comprehensive aerial defense aims to deal with enemy aerial attacks at the farthest point from our territory, prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-21 (Example of Air Defense Operations)

2 Defense Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan

As the islands of Japan are attacked with arms, aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could

³¹ Aerial attacks are important elements influencing the results of modern wars. It is vital to obtain air superiority before or at the same time as implementing ground or maritime operations.

be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory.

Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We need to protect the waters around our country by combining the results of these multiple operations, blocking the invasion of our enemies, and attacking and depleting their combat capabilities.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-22 (Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas Surrounding Japan)

3 Operations Protecting the Land

As enemies try to invade the islands of Japan, they are expected to obtain sea and air superiority by attacking our country head on, following the move by landing ground troops from the sea and airborne troops from the air.

Invading ground and airborne troops find it difficult to exert systematic combat capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, we need to take note of this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points as much as possible and attack them at an early stage.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-1-23 (Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces)

4 Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime Transportation

Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much of its resources and food, making maritime transportation routes the lifeblood for securing the existence of our country and the foundation of our prosperity. Furthermore, in case our country comes under armed attack, maritime transportation routes set the foundation to maintain continuous warfare capabilities and enable the U.S. Forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan. As such, operations to ensure the safety of our maritime transportation are important.

Our operations ensuring security in maritime transportation can be done in waters several hundred nautical miles around Japan or in sea lanes³².

In the case where we implement operations in several hundred nautical mile waters around our

³² Relatively safe marine areas defined to enable the transportation of ships. The locations and width of sea lanes change depending on the situation of a specific threat.

country, we combine anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine operations to patrol³³ and defend our ships and protect our straits and ports for the security of our maritime transportation.

In the case where we implement our operations based on sea lanes, we define them in waters covering around 1,000 nautical miles, periodically patrol the defined areas, detect and address attacks by enemy vessels or submarines at an early stage, and directly defend Japanese ships as required. Escort vessels engage in aerial defense for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes (anti-air warfare), with support provided by fighter jets and other aircraft as required.

11 Response to Other Events

1 Improvement in Guard Postures for SDF Facilities

(1) Operations for Guarding SDF Facilities

When there is a danger of a terrorist attack within Japan on facilities and areas of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan and in the event that it is deemed particularly necessary to prevent damage, the Prime Minister may order SDF units to conduct operations to guard facilities and areas (guarding operations).

Part of the authority given to police officials under the Act Concerning Execution of Duties of Police Officials is applied correspondingly to SDF personnel dispatched for guarding operations³⁴. Further, the amended Self-Defense Forces Law provides that SDF personnel have authority to use weapons beyond the limitations of Article 7 of this Act.

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 22(Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

The MOD and the SDF conducted exchanges of views concerning guarding operations with the police and Japan Coast Guard in order to ensure the effectiveness of such operations, in addition to conducting exercises for guarding operations throughout Japan at the facilities and areas of the U.S. Forces in Japan since 2003.

(2) Use of Arms to Protect SDF Facilities in Peacetime

Rules have been defined³⁵ for SDF personnel to use arms for the protection of domestic SDF

³³ See Part II, Chapter 4, Section 3, footnote 6

³⁴ Limited to cases where there are no police officers at the scene, SDF personnel on duty are authorized to make enquiries, undertake evacuation measures and enter property in addition to their authorized duties of preventing and controlling crimes and usage of weapons.

³⁵ SDF personnel may use weapons to the extent deemed to be reasonably necessary in situations within

facilities³⁶ based on their specified purposes.

2 Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

In the event of situations in areas surrounding Japan, the MOD and the SDF will provide materials and services as rear area support and conduct rear area search and rescue activities or ship inspection activities as stipulated in the Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspections Operations Act.

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22(Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

3 Military Intelligence Collection

For the effective operation of defense force to respond to various situations, it is necessary to detect the signs of such situations at an early stage and comprehensively strengthen the intelligence capabilities at all stages, that is, prompt and appropriate collecting, processing, analyzing and sharing of intelligence.

In doing so, the MOD and the SDF will strengthen their information-collecting capabilities from a diverse range of sources, ensuring the advanced application of geospatial information by means such as the fusion of various information and its visualization.

In addition to the strengthening of human intelligence collection capabilities, including the new posting of Defense Attachés, they will enhance comprehensive information collection and analysis-capabilities, through such efforts as the recruitment of intelligence analysts and integration of the curriculum for them, so that the intelligence sides can respond to complex and diverse needs in a timely and accurate manner.

Some examples of intelligence collection activities include

(1) collecting, processing and analyzing signals detected from military communications and electronic weapons, up in the air over Japanese territory; (2) collecting and analyzing high resolution commercial satellite imagery data; (3) warning and surveillance activities by ships and aircraft and so on; (4) collecting and organizing a variety of open source information; (5)

applicable facilities in the event that it is considered that the use of such weapons is required to execute duties or to protect themselves or others. Weapons must not be used to cause harm to other people except in cases of self-defense or acts of emergency evacuation.

³⁶ In order to enhance Japan's capabilities for gathering image intelligence, four intelligence-gathering satellites are currently operated at the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center. The MOD has properly utilized the information provided by these satellites.

information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and (6) intelligence activities conducted by Defense Attachés and other officials.

Moreover, it was decided newly to post Defense Attachés to Africa, Central and South America and other regions in FY2014.

Section 2 Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

It is of utmost importance for the national government to establish a national response framework as a basis for SDF operational structure¹ to deal with serious situations that threaten the peace and security of the country and its people, such as armed attacks against Japan. This establishment enables an effective response to armed attack situations and anticipated armed attack situations (both to armed attack situations² and to situations where armed attacks are anticipated³) and contributes to the deterrence of an armed attack.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-2-1 (Outline of the Emergency Legislation)

1 Framework for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

1 Responses to Armed Attack Situations

The Armed Attack Situation Response Act specifies items that should be stipulated as basic principles and basic policies (the Basic Response Plan) regarding response to armed attack situations and the responsibilities of national and local governments in the event of an armed attack situation. Moreover, in preparation for the outbreak of armed attacks, a framework is being developed which allows relevant organizations (designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions⁴) to implement response measures in a coordinated and cooperative fashion based on individual legislations dealing with military emergencies such as the Civil Protection Act, thereby the whole nation can fully prepare for armed attack situations.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-2-2 (Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations); Reference 21 (Main Operations of the

¹ Three pieces of legislation for responses to situations were enacted in 2003. Furthermore, seven pieces of legislation for responses to situations were enacted in 2004 and three related treaties were ratified in the same year. With this, a basis for emergency legislation was established. The development of these legal systems reflects many results of the “emergency legislation study,” which had been conducted by the former Defense Agency since 1977. Notes: a fixed concept has not necessarily been designated for the term “emergency legislation.” When used in this white paper, it refers to legislation for responses to situations that has been developed since 2003.

² Situation in which an external armed attack on Japan emerges, or an imminent danger is clearly acknowledged.

³ A situation where an armed attack has yet to emerge, but circumstances are growing increasingly strained and an armed attack is expected.

⁴ Independent administrative agencies, the Bank of Japan, the Japanese Red Cross Society, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), other public institutions, and corporations engaged in public service operations, including the provision of electricity, gas, transportation, communications, and other services.

Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

(1) Basic Response Plan, etc.

In situations such as an armed attack situation, the Cabinet must decide upon the following items for a Basic Response Plan and ask for approval by the Diet. In addition, when the Basic Response Plan has been decided, a temporary Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) is to be established within the Cabinet, and it will implement these measures:

- 1) Certification of the facts, and the premises to that certification supporting the armed attack situation or the situation where an armed attack situation is anticipated.
- 2) Overall plan to respond to the pertinent armed attack situation.
- 3) Important items related to the response measures.

(2) Response Measures

When responding to armed attack situations, the designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions will implement the required measures based on legal provisions between the period of formulation and termination of the Basic Response Plan.

See ▶ Fig.III-1-2-3 (Measures to be Implemented by Designated Administrative Organizations, Municipal Governments or Designated Public Organizations)

(3) Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments

The responsibilities of the national and local governments as defined in the Armed Attack Situation Response Act are as outlined below.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-2-4 (Responsibilities of the National and Municipal Governments)

(4) Authority of the Prime Minister for Response Measures

Following the stipulation of the Basic Response Plan, for overall promotion of response measures, the Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) will be established within the Cabinet, with the Prime Minister appointed as leader of the Task Force and appropriate Ministers of State as Deputy Chief and other members of the Task Force.

If the Prime Minister recognizes that there are obstacles to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, and to eliminating an armed attack, when necessary response measures under comprehensive coordination are not implemented, he may instruct the head of the local government concerned and other relevant persons to implement the necessary measures. In circumstances where necessary response measures are not implemented or if there is an obstacle

to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, in emergency response situations, the Prime Minister or the Minister of State responsible for operations relating to the relevant countermeasure may take responsibility for and implement the response measures that the local governments or designated public institutions have failed to implement, after notifying the relevant heads of local government or other relevant individuals.

(5) Report to the United Nations Security Council

In accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the government will immediately report measures it has implemented to terminate armed attacks on Japan to the U.N. Security Council.

2 Responses to Emergency Situations other than Armed Attack Situations

The Armed Attack Situation Response Act provides for appropriate and rapid response measures to be implemented in emergency situations⁵ other than armed attacks, in order for the government to ensure the peace and independence of the country, and to maintain the security of the country and its people.

3 Measures Based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Act

There were seven pieces of emergency legislation, and three treaties enacted and signed in June 2004 as a result of the Armed Attack Situation Response Act that was enacted in June 2003. Based on that, the framework to enable necessary measures for responding to armed attack situations, etc. to be taken was prepared.

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

2 Initiatives for Civil Protection

1 Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection and the Roles of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

In March 2005, the government established the Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection (hereinafter the “Basic Guidelines”), based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Act. The Basic Guidelines presumes four types of armed attack situations, including amphibious landing invasion, guerilla or special operations forces unit attacks, ballistic missile attacks, and air attacks, and prescribes matters requiring attention to implement civil protection measures in

⁵ An emergency response situation. (A situation arising due to actions that may kill or injure many people which uses methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack situation, or a situation where it is recognized that the relevant actions represent a clear and present threat that necessitate an emergency response by the state). Alternatively, a contingency situation other than an armed attack situation that may have a significant impact on the security of the nation and its people.

response to each of them.

The MOD and the SDF established the Civil Protection Plan based on the Civil Protection Act and the Basic Policy. The Plan included measures to be implemented in full force by the SDF to terminate armed attacks, which is a primary mission of the SDF. In addition, the Plan described civil protection measures to be implemented within a feasible range, relating to support for evacuation and rescue, and responses to armed attack disasters.

In the event of an armed attack situation and an emergency situation, the SDF has the authority to conduct such activities as protection and support of residents, including rescuing evacuees, and emergency recovery as a civil protection measure and emergency response protection measure based on the provision for civil protection.

See ▶ Fig. III-1-2-5 (Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches)

2 Activities by the MOD and the SDF to Facilitate the Civil Protection Measures

(1) Participation in Training for Civil Protection

In order to appropriately and promptly implement civil protection measures in armed attack situations, it is essential to jointly coordinate matters related to the implementation of civil protection measures in peacetime with other ministries and agencies, local governments, and other relevant organizations.

From this perspective, the MOD and the SDF have held civil protection training with cooperation from relevant government organizations, or local governments. In addition, the MOD and the SDF actively participate and cooperate in civil protection training implemented by relevant government organizations, or local governments.

In November 2013, the MOD participated in a field training exercise held in Aomori Prefecture by the Special Advisor to the Cabinet, Aomori Prefecture and Hirosaki City. At the event venue, exercises were conducted regarding matters such as the initial response, decontamination, emergency relief aid, transport and medical aid for afflicted people in the event that an explosive device containing radioactive material (dirty bomb) was detonated, based on the many fatalities expected to arise.

Furthermore, the site of the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Command Post Exercise held at Northern Army in 2013 was used for map exercises pertaining to the evacuation of civilians in situations where an armed attack is anticipated, and to strengthen collaboration. The participation of

relevant organizations such as local public authorities, of Hokkaido and other regions, was acquired and the exercises were conducted in cooperation with the Special Advisor to the Cabinet and concerned government ministries and agencies.

See ▶ Reference 27 (Record of Joint Exercises for Civil Protection Implemented by the National and Local Governments (FY 2013))

(2) Coordination with Local Governments in Peacetime

During peacetime, the MOD and the SDF closely coordinate with local governments. The Provincial Liaison & Coordination Division has been posted within the GSDF Regional Army Headquarters to achieve effective implementation for civil protection measures through close coordination. To strengthen functions relating to coordination and cooperation with local governments, etc., a Civil Protection and Disaster Countermeasures Liaison Coordination Officer post was established in each SDF Provincial Cooperation Office.

Civil Protection Councils were established in prefectures and municipalities as institutions to gather opinions from a wide range of citizens, and members of the Ground, Maritime or Air Self-Defense Force were assigned to be council members. In addition, in some cases, retired SDF personnel are employed by local governments as crisis management supervisors to facilitate cooperation with the MOD and the SDF and help to conceive and implement disaster response plans and training programs as experts on civil protection.

Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, and the United States, at the same time, maintains and strengthens its engagement and presence in the Asia-Pacific region, it has become more important than ever to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the security of Japan.

The military presence of U.S. Forces in Japan not only contributes to the defense of Japan, but also functions as deterrence against and response to contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region, and serves as a core element of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. On the other hand, since the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan impacts upon the living environment of local residents, efforts that correspond to the actual situation of each region must be made to mitigate the impact on regions such as Okinawa.

Section 1 Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

1 Significance of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

1 Maintenance of Japan’s Peace and Security

In the current international community, a watertight defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of armed attacks including the use of nuclear weapons to coercion or intimidation by the military power, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and sovereignty of the nation. It is impossible even for a superpower like the United States to guarantee its security on its own. Therefore, it would be practically impossible for Japan to ensure its national security solely through its unilateral efforts given its population, land, and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not necessarily contribute to regional stability.

Consequently, Japan has maintained its peace and security, centered on the Security Arrangements with the world’s dominant military superpower, the United States, with which it shares basic values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a capitalist economy as well as an interest in maintaining the peace and security of the world, and has strong economic ties.

Specifically, as well as providing facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces, based on Article 6 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, Article 5 of that treaty stipulates that Japan and the United States will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan. The U.S. obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed attack means that, if a country plans to attack Japan, the attacker must be prepared to confront not only the defense capability of the SDF, but also the overwhelming military strength of the United States when planning such an act. As a result, the opposing nation becomes aware that they will suffer grievously if they carry out an invasion and such desires are stopped at the planning stage. In other words, this serves to deter attacks.

Japan intends to effectively utilize the deterrence power of the U.S. military in addition to maintaining adequate Japanese defense forces in order to create a seamless posture and secure Japan's peace and security.

2 Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan

Article 6 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty states contributing to the security of Japan, and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East as the purpose of the use of facilities and areas by the U.S. Forces within Japan. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs.

In the regions surrounding Japan, there are many states and the like with massive military power and some states that retain nuclear weapons or continue nuclear development. In addition to issues or tension caused by changes in the balance of power, situations that we call “gray zones” over sovereignty of the territory or vested interests are likely to arise, and this risks further aggravation of the situation. In such a security environment, the military presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan provides deterrence against unexpected contingencies caused by various security issues or unstable factors, providing a great sense of security to the nations in the region and thus fulfilling a role as public goods. Also, the close bonds of cooperation based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements constitute the foundation of the United States' commitment to the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan. These arrangements, complemented by the alliances established between the United States and other countries in the region such as South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines and also by the friendly relations developed with other countries, play an indispensable role in maintaining the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

3 Further Stabilization of the International Security Environment

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, not only in defense but also in a wide range of areas, including political, economic, and social aspects. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with their security arrangements at its core, also forms the basis for Japan’s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to implement positive measures to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including promoting multinational security dialogue and cooperation, and cooperation in various activities of the United Nations.

Current security issues in the international community include responses to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and acts of piracy, as well as new risks concerning stable access to the seas, space, and cyberspace. It is extremely difficult for any single country to tackle such global security challenges alone, and it is important for countries involved to work together regularly in peacetime. In this international environment, the strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are also playing an important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to effectively respond to such issues.

In particular, under the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to strengthen their cooperation. This kind of close coordination forms the foundation for various forms of international collaboration, such as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF and the U.S. Forces, and leads to the heightened operational effectiveness of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements.

The peace and prosperity of the international community are closely linked to those of Japan. Accordingly, by cooperating with the United States, which possesses preeminent international operational capabilities, Japan is able to advance its measures to further stabilize the global security environment. This in turn is enhancing the security and prosperity of Japan.

2 Basic Framework Supporting the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty up to the present, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the cooperative relationship based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements with the afore-described significance, Japan and the United States have redefined their alliance in accordance with changes in the security environment at different times through persistent efforts. These efforts produced results in the form of various initiatives for bilateral defense cooperation under the framework of Japan-U.S. close policy consultations.

The representative example of such policy consultations is the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting), the framework for ministerial consultations among the top officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries. The SCC functions as an important consultative panel to discuss issues related to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of security.

As part of related efforts, the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) provide the basic framework and direction of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, including the respective roles of Japan and the United States in response to an armed attack on Japan or other situations. Furthermore, the SDF and the U.S. Forces conduct bilateral training and exercises in peacetime in an effort to enhance the interoperability and joint response capabilities, which greatly contribute to maintaining and increasing the credibility and deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Japan and the United States also have in place the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which enables the provision of goods and services between the SDF and the U.S. Forces during international peace cooperation activities or armed attack situations. In addition, Japan and the United States promote cooperation in areas of defense equipment and technology, such as Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) as well as cooperation in response to large-scale disasters, as seen in “Operation Tomodachi” to cope with the Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred on March 11, 2011.

In order to maintain and enhance the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, including the Asia-Pacific region, as well as Japan’s own security, Japan, based on the basic framework described above, is striving to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance by enhancing the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements through strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and strengthening and expanding cooperation in a broad range of fields.

3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan

1 Significance of the Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan

For the Japan-U.S. Alliance, based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements to adequately function as a deterrent that contributes to Japan’s defense as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, it is necessary to secure the presence of the U.S. military in Japan, and to maintain a posture in Japan and the surrounding areas in peacetime that enables the U.S. Forces in Japan to respond swiftly and expeditiously to emergencies.

For this purpose, based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, Japan allows the stationing of the U.S.

Forces in Japan.

See ▶ *Fig III-2-1-1 (Deployment Map of the U.S. Forces in Japan)*

As mentioned earlier, the U.S. Forces in Japan serve as deterrence against aggression towards Japan. Further, the realization of a stable U.S. military presence is necessary for a swift Japan–U.S. joint response based on Article 5 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty in the event of an armed attack on Japan. Additionally, the actions of the U.S. Forces in Japan in the defense of Japan will be assisted by the timely reinforcement of other U.S. Forces, and the U.S. Forces in Japan will serve as the basis of such support.

In order for the U.S. Forces in Japan to carry out the abovementioned role, it is necessary that all the services of the U.S. Forces, including those in Japan, are functionally integrated. For instance, the U.S. Forces hold a primarily offensive power as a “spear” when responding to armed aggression to Japan in cooperation with the SDF. When the U.S. Forces function as offensive power, it can be expected that the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marines stationed in Japan work in an integrated manner to fully exert their functions.

In addition, while Article 5 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty stipulates the obligation of the United States to defend Japan, Article 6 allows for the use by the United States of facilities and areas in Japan for maintaining the security of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East, and overall Japan–U.S. obligations are kept in balance. This point is different in contrast to the North Atlantic Treaty which stipulates only joint defense of member countries.

2 USFJ Facilities and Areas and the Local Communities

For USFJ facilities and areas to fully exert their capabilities, it is vital to gain the cooperation and understanding from the local communities. Meanwhile, the social conditions in the surrounding areas have changed significantly, including for example, through their urbanization over the past several decades since the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. In light of such changes, it is necessary to reduce the impact of the facilities and areas as much as possible in order to gain the acceptance and support from the public in the true sense as well as to allow them to perform to the best of their capabilities. Our national land is narrow with limited plains and there are many cases where USFJ facilities and areas are located close to urban and business areas. In such areas, factors including the existence of those facilities and areas and the takeoff and landing of the U.S. Forces aircraft have considerable impact on the residents’ living environment and local development. It is therefore necessary to make efforts to mitigate the impact with the realities of each area in mind.

3 U.S. Forces in Okinawa

In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Guam, Okinawa is located closer to East Asia. It is situated in an extremely important location with regard to security – located roughly in the center of the Southwestern Islands and is close to Japan’s sea lanes. Thus, the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa – including the U.S. Marine Corps, which has high mobility and readiness and is in charge of responding to various contingencies – with the above-mentioned geographical characteristics, further ensures the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and strengthens deterrence, contributing greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Meanwhile, many USFJ facilities and areas are located in Okinawa Prefecture, including airfields, maneuver areas, and logistics support facilities. As of January 2014, approximately 74% of the land area of the USFJ facilities and areas nationwide (for their exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa. Utmost efforts must therefore be given to mitigate the impact on Okinawa while keeping in mind the aforementioned security perspective.

See ▶ Fig. III-2-1-2 (The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa)

Section 2 Initiatives to Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Japan and the United States have maintained close coordination at multiple levels, including at the summit-level and ministerial level, and have uninterruptedly strengthened and expanded cooperative relations for the peace, stability and prosperity of not only the two countries but also the entire international community, including the Asia-Pacific region.

1 Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening the Alliance

1 Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels in the Governments of Japan and the United States through meetings such as the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC).

See ▶ Fig. III-2-2-1 (Major Consultations on Policies Held Between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials)

In addition, the Ministry of Defense organizes Japan–U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Japanese Defense Minister and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. Furthermore, Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Chiefs of Staff of SDFs, and other MOD officials have working level meetings when necessary and exchange information with the U.S. Department of Defense and others under the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. Furthermore, in recent years, the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the SDF and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held the strategic dialogue for the first time ever in April 2014. The importance of these opportunities has been further increased as Japan–U.S. defense cooperation has been enhanced.

The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to the increased credibility of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the MOD is proactively engaging in these initiatives.

See ▶ Reference 28 (Japan–U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2010))

2 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

(1) Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and Policies to Ensure Their Effectiveness

It is necessary for both Japan and the United States to discuss and decide the roles each will fulfill in case of an armed attack on Japan or other situation in advance in order to respond rapidly in such an event. There is a framework pertaining to those roles between Japan and the United States, the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) and the various policies for ensuring their effectiveness. Based on that framework and the changing security environment surrounding Japan, both Japan and the United States continuously study bilateral cooperation plans for the two countries, and hold consultations on them. In addition, they have been working on the revision of the Guidelines to adapt to the current situations.

A. Previous Guidelines (1978)

Following consultations between the two countries, the Japan-U.S. SCC (“2+2” Meeting) held in 1978 approved the previous Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. The previous Guidelines focused on responses to an armed attack against Japan. The outline of the previous Guidelines is given below:

a. Posture for Deterring Aggression

○ Japan, as its defense policy, will possess defense capability on an appropriate scale within the scope necessary for self-defense, and assure the stable and effective utilization of facilities and areas in Japan by the U.S. Forces. The United States will maintain a nuclear deterrent capability, and the forward deployments of combat-ready forces and other forces capable of reinforcing them.

○ In order to be able to take coordinated joint action smoothly in the event of an armed attack against Japan, Japan and the United States will endeavor to achieve a posture for cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces in such areas as operations, intelligence and logistics.

b. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

1) When an armed attack against Japan is imminent:

○ As deemed necessary, a coordination center will be established between the SDF and the U.S. Forces.

○ The SDF and U.S. Forces will establish in advance a common standard as regards preparations which will be respectively conducted by the two forces so that the two nations may select coordinated common readiness stages, and ensure that effective preparations for operations can be cooperatively undertaken by the SDF and the U.S. Forces respectively. The JSDF and the U.S. Forces will respectively conduct defense preparations considered necessary according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement between the two governments.

2) When an armed attack against Japan takes place:

- In principle, Japan by itself will repel limited, small-scale aggression. When it is difficult to repel aggression alone due to the scale, type and other factors of aggression, Japan will repel it with the cooperation of the United States.
- The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace. The U.S. Forces will support SDF operations and will also conduct operations to supplement functional areas which exceed the capacity of the SDF.

c. Japan-U.S. cooperation in the case of situations in the Far East outside of Japan which will have an important influence on the security of Japan:

- The Governments of Japan and the United States will consult together from time to time whenever changes in the circumstances so require. The Governments of Japan and the United States will conduct studies in advance on the scope and modalities of facilitative assistance to be extended to the U.S. Forces by Japan under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, its related arrangements, other relevant agreements between Japan and the United States, and the relevant laws and regulations of Japan.

B. Current Guidelines (1997)

After the development of the previous Guidelines, despite the end of the Cold War, the potential for instability and uncertainty persisted in the Asia-Pacific region. Accordingly, the maintenance of peace and stability in this region assumed greater importance for the security of Japan. and the maintenance of peace and stability in the region has become all the more important for Japan's security. Thus, Japan and the United States made a review of the previous Guidelines in order to further enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and the Japan-U.S. SCC ("2+2" Meeting) approved the current Guidelines in 1997. The current Guidelines extend the scope of Japan-U.S. cooperation to cover situations in areas surrounding Japan. The outline of the current Guidelines is shown below:

See ▶ Reference 29 (Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (September 23, 1997))

a. Objectives of the Guidelines

The Guidelines aim to create a solid basis for more effective and more credible Japan-U.S. cooperation in peacetime, as well as in the event of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan¹.

¹ Situations that will have a serious impact on Japan's peace and security, including situations that could develop into a direct armed attack against Japan if left unaddressed. (Article 1 of the Law Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

b. Cooperation Items Prescribed in the Guidelines

○ Cooperation in Peacetime

Both governments will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan and for the creation of a more stable international security environment, and will promote cooperation in various fields in peacetime. Such cooperation includes information sharing and policy consultations; security dialogues and defense exchanges; U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) and international humanitarian operations; bilateral defense planning, and mutual cooperation planning; enhancing bilateral exercises and training; and establishing a bilateral coordination mechanism.

○ Actions in Response to Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan–U.S. defense cooperation. The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations² while the U.S. Forces conduct operations to supplement and support the SDF's operations. Both parties will respond based on respective concepts of operations in a coordinated manner.

○ Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The Governments of both Japan and the United States will make every effort, including diplomatic means, to prevent situations in areas surrounding Japan from occurring.

See ▶ Reference 30 (Function and Fields and Examples of Items for Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

c. Bilateral Programs under the Guidelines

In order to promote Japan–U.S. cooperation under the Guidelines in an effective manner and to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation, the two countries need to conduct consultative dialogue in peacetime throughout the spectrum of security conditions, including the event of an armed attack against Japan and situations in areas surrounding Japan. In addition, both sides must share information adequately at multiple levels to accomplish such objectives.

To that end, the two governments will strengthen their information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, and will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and operational functions.

² Operations conducted to interdict an enemy's offensive and to prevent their purpose from being achieved. Offensive operations mean aggressive forms of operations to search for and defeat enemies.

○ Comprehensive Mechanism

The comprehensive mechanism has been created so that not only the SDF and the U.S. Forces but also the relevant agencies of the respective governments conduct bilateral work under the Guidelines in peacetime. In the comprehensive mechanism, bilateral work such as bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will be conducted so as to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to armed attacks against Japan and to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

○ Coordination Mechanism

The coordination mechanism is set up in peacetime so that the two countries may coordinate their respective activities in the event of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

See ▶ Fig. III-2-2-3 (Framework of Coordination Mechanism)

C. Policies for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

a. Measures for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines, it is important to properly take necessary measures, including legal ones, regarding Japan–U.S. cooperation from peacetime to armed attack situations and situations in areas surrounding Japan. From this perspective, it is necessary for the Government of Japan as a whole from peacetime to collaborate in advancing bilateral work between Japan and the United States, including examination of bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning of the Guidelines.

Based on this, laws such as the Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (1999) and the Ship Inspection Operations Act (2000) were established from the standpoint of Japan–U.S. cooperation in areas surrounding Japan.

Also, measures are being taken to facilitate the U.S. Force operations as part of the strengthening of security cooperation legislation for situations such as armed attacks.

See ▶ Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 (Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations)

b. Outline of the Law Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspections Operations Law

The Law Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan establishes the measures (response measures)³ that Japan will implement in

³ Law stipulating ship inspection operations and other necessary measures to respond to situations in

response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and the actual implementation procedures. The Ship Inspection Operations Law provides for the types, measures, and other matters of ship inspection operations implemented by Japan in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

○ The Prime Minister, facing a situation in areas surrounding Japan and deeming it necessary to adopt measures including such SDF activities as rear area support⁴, rear area search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations, must request a Cabinet decision on such measures and on a draft basic plan of response measures. The Prime Minister must obtain prior approval, or ex post facto approval in case of emergency, from the Diet in order for the SDF to conduct response measures. Furthermore, the Prime Minister reports to the Diet without delay when the Cabinet has made a decision or approved a revision, or when the response measures have been completed.

○ In accordance with the basic plan, the Minister of Defense will draw up an implementation guideline (including designation of implementation areas), obtain approval for the guideline from the Prime Minister, and give the SDF orders to conduct rear area support, rear area search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations.

○ Heads of relevant administrative organizations will implement response measures and may request the heads of local governments to provide the necessary cooperation for the organizations to exercise their authorities in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan. In addition, the heads of relevant administrative organizations may ask persons other than those from the national government to cooperate as necessary in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan⁵.

c. Rear Area Support

Rear area support means support measures, including the provision of goods, services, and conveniences, given by Japan in rear areas to the U.S. Forces conducting activities that

areas surrounding Japan to implement rear area support, rear area search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations conducted in relation to situations in surrounding areas (Article 2 of the Law Concerning the Measures for Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

⁴ The term “rear area” refers to Japan’s territorial waters and international waters surrounding Japan (including the exclusive economic zone up to 200 nautical miles, or approximately 370 km, from the baseline of the territorial waters) in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and no combat operations are expected to be conducted throughout the period when the rear activities are carried out, and the space over these international waters.

⁵ If any person other than the central government who had been requested to cooperate suffers a loss as a result of such cooperation, the Government shall take necessary fiscal measures for the loss.

contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty in situations in areas surrounding Japan. As rear area support, the SDF provides goods and services, including supplies, transportation, repair, maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport activities, and base activities.

d. Rear Area Search and Rescue Operations

Rear area search and rescue operations mean operations conducted by the SDF in situations in areas surrounding Japan to search and rescue those who were engaged in combat and were stranded in rear areas (including transporting those rescued)⁶. If there are non-combatants who face a mishap, he/she will be also rescued. In addition, if there is anyone in the territorial waters of a foreign country adjacent to the area in which the SDF is conducting activities, the SDF will also rescue that person, after having obtained approval from that foreign country. However, this is limited to cases in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and are expected to be conducted in those waters throughout the period during which the SDF conducts rescue activities.

e. Ship Inspection Operations

Ship inspection operations mean operations conducted by Japan in situations in areas surrounding Japan to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others⁷) and to request, if necessary, a change of sea route, or destination port or place, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade or other economic activities to which Japan is a party. These activities are conducted based on the U.N. Security Council Resolution or the consent of the flag state⁸ in the territorial waters of Japan or in the surrounding high seas (including the EEZ⁹)¹⁰.

(2) Revision of the Current Guidelines

A. Background to the Revision

The current Guidelines were developed in 1997 in light of changes in the security environment, including the end of the Cold War, by reviewing the previous guidelines formulated in 1978. The current Guidelines define the roles of Japan and the United States, and the cooperation of

⁶ Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Law Concerning the Measures for Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

⁷ Warships and such vessels that are possessed or operated by foreign governments that are exclusively used for non-commercial purposes

⁸ The state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

⁹ Article 1 of the Act Concerning Exclusive Economic Zones and the Continental Shelf.

¹⁰ Article 2 of the Ship Inspection Operations Act

the two countries under three categories: (1) in peacetime, (2) in response to an armed attack against Japan, and (3) in situations in areas surrounding Japan. They also stipulate that they will review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner.

More than 16 years have passed since the establishment of the current Guidelines. During these years various issues and destabilizing factors have emerged, and become more visible and aggravated in the security environment surrounding Japan; such as more active military activities of neighboring countries, new threats including international terrorist organizations and risks against stable use of global commons such as oceans, space and cyber space. In addition, the activities of the SDF have expanded to a global scale, as exemplified by anti-piracy activities, PKO, and international disaster relief activities. As a result, it is now necessary for the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation to adapt to these changes in the security environment and the expansion of the SDF's activities and missions.

Against the backdrop of these changes in the security environment, Prime Minister Abe ordered Minister of Defense Onodera at the end of 2012 to work on the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and others in order to strengthen the role of the SDF and enhance deterrence.” In addition, at the Japan-U.S. Summit held in February 2013, as Prime Minister Abe and U.S. President Obama exchanged views on security and the situations in the Asia-Pacific region, the Prime Minister stated to the President that, “in response to the evolving security environment, Japan would like to start reviewing the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation through discussions on the two countries' ideas of the roles, missions and capabilities (RMC).”

Against the background described above, at the Japan-U.S. SCC (“2+2” Meeting) in October 2013, Ministers directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the current Guidelines, and the review is to be completed by the end of 2014. Based on this, the MOD in October 2013 established a study preparatory committee regarding the revision of the Guidelines within the Ministry.

B. The Direction of the Review

The Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting identified the following seven objectives of the review of the Guidelines:

- 1) Ensuring the Alliance's capacity to respond to an armed attack against Japan, as a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation;
- 2) Expanding the scope of cooperation, to reflect the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance,

encompassing such areas as counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, capacity building, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and equipment and technology enhancement;

- 3) Promoting deeper security cooperation with other regional partners to advance shared objectives and values;
- 4) Enhancing Alliance mechanisms for consultation and coordination to make them more flexible, timely, and responsive and to enable seamless bilateral cooperation in all situations;
- 5) Describing appropriate role-sharing of bilateral defense cooperation based on the enhancement of mutual capabilities;
- 6) Evaluating the concepts that guide bilateral defense cooperation in contingencies to ensure effective, efficient, and seamless Alliance response in a dynamic security environment that includes challenges in emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace; and
- 7) Exploring additional ways in which we can strengthen the Alliance in the future to meet shared objectives.

Based on this and in line with the new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the basic approach shown in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the United States, Japan and the United States will continue intensive discussions.

3 Japan–U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises

The SDF and the U.S. Forces have been conducting various bilateral training and exercises in peacetime to strengthen Japan- U.S. joint response capabilities while improving interoperability and facilitating mutual understanding in regard to tactical aspects and closer communication. Since FY1985, mostly on an annual basis, command post exercise and field training exercise have been conducted alternately as the Japan–U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise; the command post exercise held in January 2014 was the 20th of its kind.

Such joint training and exercises in peacetime not only greatly contribute to maintaining and enhancing the Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities by deepening mutual understanding of capabilities and tactics, but also are effective for improving tactical skills on each side. In particular, the knowledge and techniques that the Japanese side can learn from the U.S. Forces, which have vast experience in actual fighting, are invaluable and greatly contribute to improving the JSDF's capabilities. In addition, holding bilateral exercises at effective times, places, and scales demonstrates the unified commitment and capabilities of Japan and the United States, which has a deterrent effect. In light of these perspectives, the MOD and the SDF are continuing their initiatives to enrich the contents of bilateral training and exercises.

See ▶ Reference 31 (Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY 2013)

4 The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States

The basic principle of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)¹¹ between Japan and the United States is that if either of the SDF and the U.S. Forces requests the provision of goods or services, the other side can provide them¹².

The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation under the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and to initiatives for international peace made under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief activities, U.N. peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief activities¹³, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations.

See ▶ *Fig. III-2-2-4 (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between Japan and the United States)*

5 Cooperation in the Areas of Defense Equipment and Technology

Japan proactively promotes cooperation in areas of defense equipment and technology while bearing in mind the maintenance of Japan’s technology and production base and the mutual cooperation principle based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

In view of the progress in technological cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the provisions of the Three Principles on Armed Exports and related guidelines. In 1983, Japan concluded the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America¹⁴. In June 2006, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America¹⁵ was concluded to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes.

¹¹ The official title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America.”

¹² The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance; airport and seaport services; and ammunition (only in armed attack situations and anticipated situations). (Provision of weapons is not included.)

¹³ The amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law on November 26, 2012, enabled the provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Forces by the SDF units engaging in international disaster relief activities.

¹⁴ The official title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America

¹⁵ The official title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies

Under these frameworks, the Government of Japan decided to provide the United States with 20 items of arms and military technology, including military technologies related to joint technological research on BMD.

Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF), which provides opportunities for exchanging opinions about military equipment and technology, and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at the forums.

See ▶ Reference 32 (Japan–U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects)

6 Cooperation in Response to Large-Scale Disasters

In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred on March 11, 2011, the SDF and the U.S. Forces demonstrated their high joint response capabilities based on the strong ties they had developed.

The success of the joint response in which the U.S. Forces provided large-scale support in disaster-afflicted areas in partnership with the SDF in “Operation Tomodachi” was the result of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises over many years, and will lead to the Alliance being deepened further in the future. “Operation Tomodachi,” as the U.S. Forces named its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief rescue operation following the Great East Japan Earthquake, involved the deployment of a large-scale force, at its peak including troops of approximately 16,000 personnel, around 15 ships, and around 140 aircraft; resulting in relief activities that were unprecedented in scale, contributing greatly to Japan’s restoration and reconstruction . Not only those affected but numerous Japanese at large were filled with a deepened sense of appreciation and trust for the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.

The main factors behind the success of the joint Japan-U.S. response to the Great East Japan Earthquake were the cooperation between the two countries that has been taking place even in peacetime, the swift and thorough implementation of coordination between them, and the presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan. In addition, the success of these endeavors was also due not only to the ongoing policy discussions and bilateral exercises carried out between the two countries in peacetime, but also to the fact that the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan means that their troops here are well-acquainted with the geography and culture of the country. On the

to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America

other hand, some issues have emerged; such as clarifying the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan and the United States in the event of a disaster within Japan, as well as stipulating more concrete joint guidelines to facilitate greater participation by the U.S. Forces in disaster prevention drills, and examining mechanisms for the sharing of information and more effective coordination mechanism.

2 Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance

Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human rights, the rule of law and common interests. During the Cold War era, the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country with a liberal ideology. It also contributed to peace and stability in the region.

Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaffirming the importance of the Japan–U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the final report was compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) at the end of that year, and as part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, at the Japan-U.S. SCC (“2+2” Meeting) held the following year (1997), current Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) were approved, revising the previous Guidelines.

Afterwards, in light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, following the “2+2” Meeting in December 2002, Japan and the United States held working-level and other consultations as part of bilateral strategic dialogue on security from the perspective of how to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s capacity more effective to adapt to changing times. As a result of a number of these Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (first stage) in February 2005; the announcement of the results of the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage) in October 2005; and the formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, a program for implementing specific measures for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, in May 2006.

See ▶ Reference 33 (United States – Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation)

Furthermore, Japan and the United States at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2007 reconfirmed and updated their common strategic objectives and reaffirmed their resolve to steadily implement the realignment plan set forth in the Roadmap. In February 2009, the two countries signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam (the Guam International Agreement), which entered into force in May 2009.

In 2010, Japan and the United States marked the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and in the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in January 2010, they reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring that the Japan-U.S. Alliance continues to be effective in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century.

In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011, the two countries revalidated and updated their common strategic objectives set forth in the Joint Statements of the previous “2+2” Meetings, including maintenance of maritime security domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation and maintenance of bilateral cooperation with respect to protection of and access to space, and cyberspace, and covered a diverse range of areas regarding the strengthening of alliance security and defense cooperation, including an expansion of information sharing and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities.

In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, Japan and the United States announced that they decided to adjust the plans outlined in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (Realignment Roadmap) of May 2006, considering significant progress on the realignment of the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan since the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 as well as the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

See ▶ Fig. III-2-2-5 (Major Milestones in Security Cooperation Between Japan and the United States); Fig. III-2-2-6 (Overview of Japan–U.S. Consultations)

See ▶ Reference 34 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee)

In parallel with such bilateral political discussions, the two countries enhanced their cooperative relations in various aspects, including operations, and services in response to specific issues. For instance, as part of the cooperation in peacetime stipulated in the aforementioned Guidelines, in addition to Japan- U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises, Japan also participates in trilateral training exercises with the armed forces of the U.S. and Australia, and in multinational exercises

such as Cobra Gold. As a result, the cooperative arrangements between Japan and the U.S. have made significant progress in a variety of fields. In recent years the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan have also participated in emergency training organized by local governments, thereby deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and local governments.

Regarding the response to ballistic missiles, bilateral response capabilities have improved, such as operational information sharing and establishing the guidelines for responding to an attack. Accordingly, Japan and the U.S. closely cooperated and coordinated in responding to the missile launches carried out by North Korea respectively in April 2009, and April and December 2012, which were purported to be a “satellite.” Also, in the systems and technology field, the cooperative development of a new ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptor with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA) is steadily in progress.

Concerning initiatives to improve the global security environment, through activities pursuant to the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act, international disaster relief activities and international peace-keeping operations in the Philippines and Haiti, and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, Japan is conducting activities in close cooperation with the U.S. Moreover, Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistical support based on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed in 1996, as a result of increased opportunities for cooperation between the two countries.

3 “2+2” Meeting (October 3, 2013)

On October 3, 2013, Japan and the United States held the “2+2” Meeting in Tokyo. This “2+2” Meeting was the historic meeting where all the four Ministers in charge of foreign affairs and defense of Japan and the United States got together in Tokyo for the first time and demonstrated the direction of strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance at home and overseas. At the meeting, while sharing anew the perception of the changing security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan and the United States, with shared values, set forth a strategic vision from the medium- to long-term perspectives in order to achieve a more robust Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The major achievement in the Joint Statement of the latest “2+2” Meeting includes (1) the agreement to complete the review of the current Guidelines by the end of 2014; (2) the agreement to further enhance and deepen bilateral security and defense cooperation, including in such areas as cyberspace and space, and to strengthen regional cooperation, including trilateral cooperation with Australia and the Republic of Korea; and (3) regarding the realignment of the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan, the underscoring of the strong determination

toward the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab and the agreement to steadily implement the previous agreements as early as possible and also to address a variety of new measures from the perspective of mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

The outline of the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting is given below:

1 Overview

(1) Strategic Vision of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

○The United States and Japan resolve to be full partners in a more balanced and effective Alliance

○Reflecting our shared values of democracy, the rule of law, free and open markets, and respect for human rights, the Strategic Vision will effectively promote peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region

○Initiatives providing the basis for such a vision: 1) revising the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation; 2) expanding security and defense cooperation; and 3) approving new measures to support the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

(2) The United States continues to implement its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, and the two countries reiterated the ongoing mutual commitment to complete the agreements on the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan.

(3) Japan’s Security Policy

○Make more proactive contributions to addressing the challenges faced by the international community

○Continue close coordination with the United States to expand its role within the framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

○Specific initiatives: (1) preparations to establish the National Security Council and to develop the National Security Strategy; (2) reexamination of the legal basis for its security, including the matter of exercising its right of collective self-defense; (3) expansion of its defense budget; (4) review of the National Defense Program Guidelines; (5) strengthening of its capability to defend its sovereign territory; and (6) broadening of regional contributions

○The United States welcomed these initiatives and reiterated its commitment to close collaboration with Japan

(4) Recognition of the Regional Situation

○Threats to peace and security, as well as challenges to international norms: (1) North Korea’s

nuclear and missile programs and humanitarian concerns; (2) coercive and destabilizing behaviors in the maritime domain; (3) disruptive activities in space and cyberspace; and (4) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Japan and the United States will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency in its military modernization with its rapidly expanding military investments.

2 Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

○ The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation: The revision of the Guidelines. The Ministers directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to complete the revision task before the end of 2014

See ▶ Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2-1-2 (Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation)

○ Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Cooperation: The Ministers confirmed their intention to designate the Air Self-Defense Force base at Kyogamisaki (Kyotango City, Kyoto Prefecture) as the deployment site for a second AN/TPY-2 radar (X-band radar) system

○ Cooperation in Cyberspace: The Ministers stressed the need for close coordination with the private sector, recognized the need to promote a whole-of-government approach to shared threats in cyberspace, and welcomed the signing of a Terms of Reference for a new Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG)

○ Cooperation in Space: The Ministers welcomed the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Sharing Agreement, and welcomed the commitment of both countries to an early realization of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency's (JAXA) provision of SSA information to the United States

○ Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities: The Ministers welcomed the establishment of a bilateral Defense ISR Working Group

○ Joint/Shared Use of Facilities: The Ministers welcomed the efforts of the Joint/Shared Use Working Group in order to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces posture in areas, including Japan's Southwestern Islands. Progress in realizing the joint/shared use of U.S. and Japanese facilities and areas strengthens the Alliance's deterrent capabilities while building a stronger relationship with local communities

○ Bilateral Planning: The Ministers welcomed progress on bilateral planning and reaffirmed initiatives toward refining bilateral plans

- Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation: The Ministers welcomed the new linkage established between bilateral discussions at the Systems and Technology Forum and dialogue on Roles, Missions, and Capabilities. Through collaboration such as the participation of Japanese industries in the production of the F-35 aircraft, bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology should deepen as Japan examines its Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines
- Extended Deterrence Dialogue¹⁶: The Ministers noted with satisfaction the meaningful outcome of bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogues. The Ministers also confirmed their Governments' continued commitment to holding the dialogue on a regular basis
- Information Security: The SCC members welcomed the serious initiatives by Japan in establishing a legal framework for further ensuring information security
- Joint Training and Exercises: The Ministers decided to take advantage of various opportunities to increase training outside of Okinawa, including in mainland Japan, which should reduce the amount of time located and training in Okinawa of MV-22 Osprey
- Host Nation Support: The Ministers affirmed the continuing importance of the Host Nation Support (HNS) provided by Japan

3 Regional Engagement

- Regional Capacity Building: The SCC members resolved to build on early initiatives to collaborate on partnership capacity building projects in the Asia Pacific region. The Ministers welcomed the strategic use of Official Development Assistance by Japan
- Maritime Security: The Ministers affirmed their intent to cooperate further in maritime security and counter-piracy
- Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief: the Ministers encouraged initiatives to extend bilateral cooperation as well as to promote trilateral and multilateral coordination
- Trilateral Cooperation: The Ministers noted the success of the trilateral dialogues carried out regularly with Australia and the ROK
- Multilateral Cooperation: The Ministers noted the importance of working together, along with other regional partners, to strengthen institutions that promote economic and security cooperation based on internationally accepted rules and norms

4 Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

¹⁶ The Extended Deterrence Dialogue is designed for a frank exchange of views on ways to ensure the Japan-U.S. Alliance's deterrence capability as part of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation, and functions as a forum for Japan, who is being provided with the U.S. deterrence capability, to deepen its understanding of the U.S. deterrence policy and to make policy adjustments necessary to secure Japan's security.

See ▶ Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-2 (Achievements of the “2+2” Meeting (October 3, 2013))

See ▶ Reference 35 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (October 3, 2013))

4 Direction of Strengthening the Alliance

As described in the previous section, the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 covered joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, joint training and exercises, joint/shared use of facilities, cooperation in cyberspace, etc. as the contents of bilateral security and defense cooperation in order to ensure the Alliance’s credibility into the future. The new National Defense Program Guidelines also incorporated many items of bilateral security and defense cooperation set forth in the Joint Statement as part of the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities as well as cooperating in a broad range of areas. It is important to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance through these initiatives not only for ensuring Japan’s security but also for the peace and stability of the international community, including the Asia-Pacific region.

1 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s Deterrence and Response Capabilities

The new National Defense Program Guidelines state that in order to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, Japan will build seamless cooperation with the United States ranging from situations in peacetime to various situations, including cooperation in responding to “gray-zone” situations, while increasing the presence of Japan and the United States in the western Pacific region. To that end, as part of specific cooperation measures in peacetime, Japan and the United States continue to promote joint training and exercises, and joint ISR activities, as well as joint/shared use of facilities and areas of the two countries as a basis for these activities. The synergy effects of these three elements of cooperative initiatives can further strengthen and improve the operational efficiency of the SDF and the U.S. Forces, including efficiency, interoperability, readiness, mobility, and sustainability.

See ▶ Fig. III-2-2-7 (The Enhancement of Joint/Shared Use, Joint Training/Exercises, and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities (conceptual image))

Joint training and exercises have been expanded not only within Japan but also to the United States by dispatching SDF units, and continuous initiatives are being made to improve interoperability and bilateral response capabilities at the military service and unit levels, including participation in exercises including the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army command post exercises, special anti-submarine exercises, and Japan-U.S. Bilateral Fighter combat training. Expanding joint training and exercises increases cooperative activities in peacetime,

thereby improving the readiness and operational capability of units as well as interoperability between the SDF and U.S. Forces. Moreover, conducting joint training and exercises at an effective time, venue, and scale demonstrates common intentions and unified capabilities between Japan and the U.S., and thereby serves as a deterrent.

In June 2013, the SDF sent participants from all three of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF to the U.S. Forces' joint exercise "Dawn Blitz 2013" (field training) in the United States. In the field training with U.S. Marine Corps, "Forest Light," conducted in Japan in October 2013, the joint heliborne training was carried out using MV-22 Osprey to improve the interoperability of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. Further, in February 2014, the GSDF and U.S. Marine Corps conducted the field training "Iron Fist 2014" in an effort to enhance the amphibian operation function.

With regard to joint ISR activities, from the perspective that it is important to implement ISR activities in a broad Asia-Pacific region in cooperation between Japan and the U.S. to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities between both countries, the two countries set up the Defense ISR Working Group in February 2013 consisting of director-level defense officials from Japan and the U.S., which is further deepening the cooperation between the two countries as well as expanding bilateral exercises and training.

Expanding such joint ISR activities not only ensures that the two countries gain information superiority over other countries but also functions as a deterrent.

Expanding joint/shared use of facilities and areas increases bases for the SDF's activities such as maneuver areas, ports, and airfields, which in turn enhances the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and expands the scope and raises the frequency of such activities as ISR. The SDF have only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urban areas, which results in operational limitations. The joint/shared use of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa will greatly improve the SDF's training environment in Okinawa, and facilitate training and interoperability between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. It will become possible to improve readiness and contribute to maintaining the safety of local people at a time of disaster. While taking enhancing of defense posture in the regions including Southwestern Islands into account, Japan and the U.S. are proactively engaged in deliberations. Furthermore, specific initiatives are steadily progressing. For example, GSDF has been using Camp Hansen since March 2008.

The relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota in April 2012 and the relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In addition, in December 2013, the MSDF conducted the training on the ocean and training utilizing facilities in Guam and the surrounding area in cooperation with the U.S. Navy and the development of training ranges as facilities for shared use by the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (Tinian Island, Pagan Island, etc.) is under consideration.

In other areas, Japan will also tighten the Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination, including ballistic missile defense (BMD), bilateral planning and Extended Deterrence Dialogue.

2 Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Broad Range of Fields

The new National Defense Program Guidelines seek to strengthen cooperation in anti-piracy initiatives, capacity building assistance, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, peacekeeping and counterterrorism as well as in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace, and Japan will also constantly strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including disaster response, intelligence cooperation and information security, and cooperation in the field of defense equipment and technology.

One of the latest examples of these initiatives is bilateral cooperation in cyberspace. In October 2013, under the instructions of Minister of Defense Onodera and U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel, the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) was established as a framework between Japanese and U.S. defense officials to discuss a broad range of issues, including the sharing of information at the policy level and human resources development and technical cooperation.

In the field of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, Japan and the United States closely coordinated their responses to the relief of the damage caused by a major typhoon in the Philippines in November 2013, with the two countries jointly undertaking coordination at a local multilateral coordination office. In addition, contingency plans to respond to the Nankai Trough Mega quake, etc. developed in January 2014 incorporated Japan-U.S. joint response procedures, and the SDF and the U.S. Forces in February 2014 conducted the joint integrated disaster drill assuming damage from the Nankai Trough Mega quake in Kochi Prefecture. As seen in these examples, Japan and the United States are striving to further strengthen cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces in disaster responses at home and abroad.

5 Recent Japan-U.S. Meetings

Regarding bilateral defense policy and defense cooperation, Minister Onodera and Secretary Hagel agreed to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by closely collaborating on bilateral efforts based on the new National Defense Program Guidelines of Japan and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the United States released in March 2014 and steadily make progress in bilateral defense cooperation, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, by the end of 2014 as described in the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting held in October 2013. In addition, Secretary Hagel stated that the United States continues its rebalance policy which is an Asia-Pacific region oriented policy, as shown in the QDR, and as part of that policy, the United States plans to deploy two additional BMD-equipped Aegis ships to Japan by 2017. Minister Onodera explained the gist of the “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” and Secretary Hagel welcomed Japan’s effort in this area. Minister Onodera and Secretary Hagel agreed to continue to deepen bilateral equipment and technology cooperation.

1 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (May 31, 2014)

Following the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting on April 6, 2014, Minister of Defense Onodera and U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel held another Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting on May 31, 2014, on the margins of the IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) held in Singapore June 1-3.

(1) Regional Situation

Minister of Defense Onodera and U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel exchanged views on the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. Minister of Defense Onodera stated that Chinese fighters made unusual approaches to SDF aircrafts in May and that such dangerous acts are extremely regrettable as they could lead to unexpected accidents. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that they would oppose any attempt to alter the status quo by force in any region, including the East China Sea. They also confirmed that Japan and the United States will continue close cooperation for regional peace and stability. In this regard, Minister of Defense Onodera welcomed the temporary deployment of U.S. Air Force’s Global Hawk to Misawa Air Base which began in May and the additional deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar system to Japan as they contribute to Japan’s security as well as to regional peace and stability. The Minister and the Secretary agreed to continue to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries.

See ▶ Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3-2-5 (Maritime Activities)

(2) Japan's Security Policy

Minister of Defense Onodera mentioned that with the submission of a report by the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security on May 15, and based on the basic direction of discussion process as instructed by Prime Minister Abe, the Government of Japan has begun domestic discussions. U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel welcomed and supported such efforts by Japan.

See ▶ Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Basic Policy for the Development of New Security Legal Systems)

(3) Bilateral Defense Cooperation

Minister of Defense Onodera and U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel agreed to continue promoting the revision of the current Guidelines, which is to be completed by the end of 2014 as described in the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) ("2+2" Meeting) held in October 2013, they also affirmed to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance's deterrence and response capabilities by steadily facilitating extensive bilateral defense cooperation.

(4) Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan

Minister of Defense Onodera and U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel agreed to promptly and steadily proceed with the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including construction of the MCAS Futenma Replacement Facility. Particularly in mitigating the impact on Okinawa, Minister of Defense Onodera explained again that the Government of Japan will make every possible effort in response to the requests from Okinawa Prefecture. The Minister and the Secretary confirmed that they continue close coordination to advance specific cooperation for mitigating the impact on Okinawa, including the increase of MV-22 Osprey training exercises outside of Okinawa, which should lead to strengthening of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation.

3 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (April 24, 2014)

Prime Minister Abe held the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with U.S. President Obama, who visited Japan as a state guest, to exchange views on Japan-U.S. relations, the regional situation and global issues, etc.

At the Summit Meeting, Prime Minister Abe explained that Japan recently formulated the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. Regarding the study on the relationship between the right of collective self-defense and the Constitution, he said the Japanese government will present its views upon receiving the panel report on the matter.

President Obama welcomed and expressed his support for Japan's efforts. The Prime Minister and the President confirmed that the two countries will continue to engage in a broad range of security and defense cooperation, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation by the end of 2014.

See ▶ Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Basic Policy for the Development of New Security Legal Systems)

Concerning the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, Prime Minister Abe explained that the Japanese Diet ratified the Protocol amending the 2009 Guam International Agreement and stated that Japan hopes to see steady progress in the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam. Regarding the relocation of MCAS Futenma, Prime Minister Abe said: (1) Japan will start construction for the relocation of MCAS Futenma in a prompt and steady manner with a strong will; (2) since the Japanese Government's position is to do anything it can to the requests from the Governor of Okinawa, including termination of use of MCAS Futenma within five years, Japan will examine such requests through thorough communication with the United States; and (3) the Japanese Government is making efforts to increase MV-22 Osprey training exercises in areas outside of Okinawa, and U.S. cooperation is essential in progressing such efforts. In addition, on the Agreement to Supplement the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement on Environmental Stewardship, Prime Minister said it is necessary to have an agreement with sufficient content suited for a mature Alliance and sought U.S. cooperation to that end. In response, President Obama said the United States will continue its efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa while ensuring the smooth operation of the U.S. Forces in Japan.

On the situation of the Asia-Pacific region, the Prime Minister and the President agreed that it is important to maintain a free and open Asia-Pacific region in cooperation with other countries concerned, with Japan and the United States at its core, and also to get China involved in the process. To that end, they confirmed that it is important to fully demonstrate the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the continuation of the U.S. rebalance policy. Regarding North Korea, Prime Minister Abe mentioned to continue the pressure on North Korea to stop them from developing nuclear weapons, and the Prime Minister and the President confirmed that Japan, the United States and the ROK will maintain close cooperation. On Japan-ROK relations, Prime Minister Abe stated that amicable Japan-ROK relations are essential for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and Japan will seek to communication with the ROK at various levels from a broader perspective and strive to build a future-oriented bilateral cooperative relations. Regarding China's continuing attempts to alter the status quo by force, Prime Minister Abe noted that Japan continues to respond to the situation of the Senkaku Islands in an unemotional manner and with a resolute attitude, and stated that it is important to

categorically oppose such coercive attempts by China including those in the South China Sea and demonstrate robust Japan-U.S. Alliance and strong U.S. commitment to Asia. U.S. President Obama stated to the effect that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty covers the territories under the administration of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands. It was confirmed that the United States opposes any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of the Senkaku Islands. The Prime Minister and the President confirmed that Japan and the United States will continue to closely exchange views at multiple levels and maintain bilateral coordination regarding their policies toward China. Prime Minister Abe also mentioned that while centering on the Japan-U.S. Alliance, he would like to promote trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and the ROK; among Japan, the United States and Australia; and among Japan, the United States and India.

Section 3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan

Measures such as force posture realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan are extremely important in mitigating the impact on local communities, such as those in Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces. The Ministry of Defense will steadily advance the U.S. Forces realignment set forth in the Roadmap while making continuous initiatives to gain the understanding and cooperation of local communities accommodating USFJ facilities and areas.

1 Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan

The stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan forms the core of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and also demonstrates the deep commitment of the United States to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, the Government of Japan has been actively taking various measures to enhance the credibility of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements in order to ensure the smooth stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan.

1 Measures in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement

The Status of Forces Agreement¹ (SOFA) stipulates matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the status of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including provisions of facilities and areas for the use by the U.S. Forces (USFJ facilities and areas), and satisfying the labor requirements of the U.S. Forces in Japan.

(1) Provision of USFJ Facilities and Areas

Japan provides USFJ facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces under the provisions of SOFA, in accordance with agreements reached through the Joint Committee between the governments of Japan and the United States.

The Government of Japan has entered into agreements and concluded lease contracts with owners of private and public land on which these facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of USFJ facilities and areas. However, should the Government be unable to obtain the approval of landowners, it will acquire title under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release², while compensating the landowners for any loss they may have suffered in the

¹ The official title is the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.

² The official title is the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, Incidental to the Agreement

process³.

(2) Satisfying Labor Requirements of the USFJ

The USFJ require manpower (labor) to maintain its forces, and SOFA stipulates that the requirements of the USFJ shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Government of Japan.

As of the end of FY2013, approximately 25,000 USFJ local employees (hereinafter referred to as the “employees”) work at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as office workers at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/supply facilities, members of security guards and fire departments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational facilities. They perform functions essential for the smooth operations of the USFJ, and support its activities.

The Government of Japan hires these employees in accordance with the provisions of SOFA. The MOD supports the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan by performing administrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, health care, and welfare, etc.

2 Host Nation Support (HNS)

HNS plays an important role to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economy, the Government of Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs in FY1978. Then in FY1979, Japan began to bear the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) respectively.

Furthermore, as the labor costs soared due to changes in economic conditions that affected both countries, the employment stability of the employees was adversely influenced, and there was even concern that it would affect the activities of the U.S. Forces in Japan. Therefore in 1987 the Governments of Japan and the United States agreed on a special measure in Article 24 of SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement)⁴ as a provisional measure for an exception to the cost principle in SOFA.

Based on this agreement, the Government of Japan started to bear labor costs of eight categories

Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.

³ The term “title” means a legal cause that justifies a certain act.

⁴ The official title is the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.

such as the adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional allowance). As the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was revised later on, the costs borne by the Government of Japan expanded to cover labor costs for base pay, etc., and utilities costs from FY1991. The financial responsibility of the Japanese Government was further expanded to cover training relocation costs from FY1996.

Japan has been reviewing HNS with careful consideration to its own difficult financial situation. The amount of Japan's HNS budget peaked in FY1999 (annual expenditure base), and has since been declining.

According to the comprehensive review conducted in 2010, the Japanese and U.S. Governments agreed that the overall expense borne by Japan to support the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan during the period in which the SMA is in effect (for five years from FY2011 to FY2015), was determined to be maintained at the same level of FY 2010 (approximately 188.1 billion yen).

3 Special Measures Agreement (SMA)

The key points of the SMA that took effect in April 2011 are as follows:

- (1) Effective period: Five years
- (2) Cost sharing: Japan shall bear labor costs, utilities costs, and all or part of the costs incurred in training relocation. With regard to training relocation costs, on top of the additional costs incurred on domestic training relocations, costs incurred in training relocation to areas under the control of the U.S. Government, such as Guam, have also been added.

- Operational Guidelines (Exchange of Notes)

Labor costs: The upper limit of the number of workers to be funded by Japan will be reduced from 23,055 to 22,625⁵. The adjustment will be phased in over the new SMA period.

Utilities costs: The upper limit for utilities costs is set at 24.9 billion yen for each fiscal year. At the same time, the share of costs to be borne by Japan is reduced from the current 76% (approximate) to 72% (approximate). The adjustment will be phased in over the new SMA period.

- (3) Cost-saving initiatives: It is clearly stipulated that the United States shall make further efforts to reduce these expenditures⁶.

⁵ The Security Consultative Committee Document issued on June 21, 2011: "The Ministers shared the view to continue to exert maximum effort to maintain stable employment of the employees of the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan while reducing labor costs."

⁶ Any amount of reduction in the labor costs and the utilities costs resulting from the measures described

See ► *Reference 36 (Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ)*

4 Costs Associated with the U.S. Forces Stationed in Japan

In addition to costs of stationing the U.S. Forces in Japan, the various costs associated with the U.S. Forces in Japan include costs for implementing the stipulations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report for alleviating the impact on the people of Okinawa, as well as costs for implementing measures that will contribute to mitigating the impact on local communities associated with the initiatives for the realignment of the U.S. Armed Forces.

See ► *Part III Chapter 2 Section 3-3-1 (Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas)*

See ► *Fig. III-2-3-1 (U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY 2014))*

2 Background to the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

Progress of the force posture realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, set forth in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation of May 2006, is shown in Fig. III-2-3-2.

See ► *Fig. III-2-3-2 (Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”)*

1. Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting (April 27, 2012)

As to the USFJ realignment, Japan continued to hold discussions with the U.S. at various levels. Following these discussions, the Governments of Japan and the U.S. decided to conduct full-scale bilateral discussions concerning the plan for USFJ realignment, in view of factors including the following: 1) The necessity of implementing measures to promptly and steadily enable visible mitigation of impact on Okinawa; 2) The necessity of coordinating the realignment package and strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, which was set out in the U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance released in January 2012; and 3) The fact that a reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps to Guam has been demanded by the U.S. Congress. The discussions led to the release of the “2+2” Joint Statement on April 27, 2012.

As described above, this “2+2” Joint Statement on April 27, 2012, stated that, in light of important progress made in regard to the plan for USFJ realignment since the “2+2” Joint Statement in June 2011, it had been decided to adjust the plans outlined in the 2006 Roadmap.

above will be added to the current level of FIP funding.

Originally, the 2006 Roadmap stated that, among the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) stationed in Okinawa, the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the command elements, but the U.S. decided to alter the composition of the units in line with the basic approach detailed above. As a result, the U.S. Government decided to continue to retain the U.S. Forces in Okinawa, and deploy Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF)—consisting of command, ground, aviation and logistic support elements—in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a rotational unit, in order to continue to ensure the presence of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa. This reflects the U.S. review of the composition of the units of the U.S. Marine Corps following the evolving security environment in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years. As a result, the Governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF).

An outline of the “2+2” Joint Statement of April 2012 is given below:

(1) Preamble

- 1) The Ministers decided to adjust the plan set forth in the May 2006 Roadmap for Realignment.
- 2) The Ministers decided to delink the progress in regard to the Futenma Replacement Facility from both the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam, and the return of land south of Kadena that would arise as a result.
- 3) The Ministers confirmed that the overall deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance would be reinforced by strengthening Japan's defense posture and promoting dynamic defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S., as well as through the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps.

(2) Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa (The personnel numbers shown are authorized strength)

- 1) As well as stationing MAGTF in Okinawa, Guam and Hawaii, a rotational presence will be established in Australia
- 2) Approximately 9,000 U.S. Marines, along with their associated dependents, are to be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan
- 3) The final Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels envisioned in the Realignment Roadmap.
- 4) The number of Marine Corps personnel in Guam will be approximately 5,000
- 5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation of the Marine Corps

to Guam is \$8.6 billion (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars). Japan's financial commitment will consist of direct cash contribution up to the amount of \$2.8 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), as stipulated in Article 1 of the 2009 Guam International Agreement. Other forms of financial support such as loans or equity investment will not be utilized. Even if Japan makes a contribution through cooperation with Item (3) 2) below, it shall be included in this commitment

(3) New Initiatives Aimed at Promoting Regional Peace, Stability and Prosperity

1) The Ministers confirmed the importance of promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese Government will take various measures, including the strategic use of ODA (e.g. provision of patrol boats to coastal states)

2) The Governments of Japan and the U.S. will consider cooperation aimed at developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for shared use by Japanese and the U.S. Forces, and will identify fields for cooperation by the end of 2012

(4) Land Returns in Okinawa

1) 1. Areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of procedures: Part of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) (West Futenma Housing area and part of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound), part of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (the north access road, area near Gate 5)

2. Areas eligible for return after relocation within the prefecture: Part of the Makiminato Service Area (the majority of the storage area), part of Camp Zukeran (the Industrial Corridor, etc.), Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester), Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1

3. Areas eligible for return after relocation of the Marine Corps overseas: Additional elements of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service Area

2) A consolidation plan for facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa will be jointly developed by Japan and the U.S. by the end of 2012

(5) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma

1) The Ministers reaffirmed that the existing relocation proposal is the only viable solution.

2) Japan and the U.S. will both contribute to any refurbishment projects required at MCAS Futenma in order to protect the environment and ensure that the air station can be run safely until the FRF is fully operational.

See ► Reference 34 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee)

2. Achievements of the “2+2” Meeting (October 3, 2013)

The Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 cited the achievements in bilateral consultations on the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan since the release of the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012. Japan and the United States renewed their strong determination to complete the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab, and agreed to continue to consult on other possible measures while implementing the previous agreements as early as possible and steadily from the perspective of mitigating the impact on Okinawa. The following is a description of the realignment of the U.S. Forces in the Joint Statement;

○Realignment on Okinawa

- Returns of land: The Ministers welcomed the progress on land returns based on the Consolidation Plan of April 2013
- Relocation of MCAS Futenma: the Ministers confirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. They reaffirmed the strong commitment of both Governments to the plan
- Hotel-Hotel training area: The Ministers directed the Joint Committee to reach an arrangement in principle for the partial lifting of restrictions for a portion of the Hotel-Hotel training area by the end of November 2013. The two sides committed to continue to consult on other possible measures
- Environment: The Ministers decided to reach a substantial understanding by the end of November 2013 on a framework for access to U.S. facilities and areas slated for return, for the purpose of facilitating local authorities’ planning of land use prior to its return

○Iwakuni

- The Ministers confirmed that the bilateral consultations on the relocation of a KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni would be accelerated
- The Ministers affirmed that the MSDF would continue to have a presence at MCAS Iwakuni
- The Ministers acknowledged that the relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni should be completed by around 2017.

○Guam

- The Ministers confirmed the importance of the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan (as it mitigates the impact of Okinawa, contributes to sustaining the forward presence of the U.S. Forces and facilitates the development of Guam as a strategic hub)
- The Ministers announced the signing of a Protocol to amend the 2009 Guam International

Agreement

- The Ministers noted the significance of Japanese cash contributions to the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, which benefit the Alliance by supporting the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units to Guam and by enabling the shared use of these training areas by the U.S. Forces and the SDF
- The Ministers completed work reflecting the breakdown of costs associated with developing facilities, including training areas, and infrastructure.
- The Ministers announced U.S. Marine Corps units are to begin to relocate from Okinawa to Guam in the first half of the 2020s.

○Advanced Capabilities

- The Ministers confirmed that deployment of more advanced capabilities in Japan has strategic significance: 1) MV-22; 2) P-8 maritime patrol aircraft (beginning in December 2013); 3) Global Hawk unmanned aircraft (beginning in spring 2014); and 4) F-35B aircraft (in 2017).
- The Ministers confirmed their intention to designate the Air Self-Defense Force Kyogamisaki sub-base as the deployment site for a second AN/TPY-2 radar (X-band radar) system.

See ▶ Reference 35 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (October 3, 2013))

3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa

As of January 2014, approximately 74% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 10% of the land area of the prefecture and 18% of the main island of Okinawa. The Government of Japan recognizes that the current situation in which USFJ facilities and areas are concentrated in Okinawa imposes a major impact on the local people. The Government of Japan has been making the maximum initiatives to implement a range of measures in light of the security perspective in order to mitigate the impact as much as possible.

1 Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas

When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km² for exclusive use by the U.S. Forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment, consolidation and reduction on the grounds that they seriously affect the lives of people in Okinawa Prefecture.

Both countries have continued their initiatives to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, and, in relation to the so-called 23 issues, it was agreed in 1990 that both sides would

proceed with the necessary adjustments and procedures for the return of land. Moreover, regarding the so-called Three Okinawa Issues such as the return of Naha Port⁷, it was agreed in 1995 that initiatives would be made to resolve these issues.

See ▶ Reference 37 (Outline of 23 Issues)

Subsequently, in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995, as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, the Government of Japan decided to devote even greater initiatives towards realignment, consolidation, and reduction, believing that the impact should be shared by the whole nation. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government of Japan established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, and the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) between Japan and the United States, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996.

2 SACO Final Report and Progress

The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the adjustment of training and operational procedures, the implementation of noise abatement initiatives, and the improvement of operational procedures regarding the Status of Forces Agreement, and also refers to the related facilities and areas covered. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km²) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa at that time, exceeding the amount of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is roughly 43 km².

See ▶ Fig. III-2-3-3 (Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report); Fig.III-2-3-4 (Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa)

See ▶ Reference 38 (The SACO Final Report); Reference 39 (State of Progress of the SACO Final Report)

3 History and Progress of the U.S. Forces Realignment in Okinawa

As well as initiatives relating to realignment of the U.S. Forces based on the Roadmap, measures have been taken to mitigate the impact on the local communities in Okinawa Prefecture.

(1) MCAS Futenma Replacement Facility, etc.

MCAS Futenma fulfills the following functions relating to the aviation capabilities of the U.S.

⁷ The return of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the relocation of artillery live fire training over Highway 104.

Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa:

- Transport of Marine ground forces by helicopter, etc.
- Operations of air refueling aircraft
- A base for accepting aircraft in emergency

However, since the MCAS Futenma is located in an urban area, its prompt return has been strongly desired by the local residents due to problems such as the safety of the community, noise, and traffic. Therefore, coordination has been made toward the goal of returning the air station by implementing the following steps:

a. Transport of Marine Ground Forces by Helicopter, etc.

(a) The Necessity of Locating the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) within Okinawa Prefecture

The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consists of air, ground, logistics, and command elements. The interaction of those elements in operations of the U.S. Marine Corps is necessary, so it has been determined that the FRF needs to be located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary-wing aircraft stationed at MCAS Futenma will be located near the elements with which they train or operate on a regular basis.

(b) Background Concerning the Futenma Replacement Facility

Considering the occurrence of the U.S. Forces helicopter crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, bilateral discussions on realignment have been made toward realizing the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma at the earliest possible date in order to resolve the unease of the residents living in the vicinity.

In the SCC document compiled in October 2005, the initiative to “locate the FRF in an ‘L’-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay” was approved. Then, based on negotiation and agreement with the local municipalities including Nago City, it was decided to stipulate in the Roadmap that the FRF be located in a configuration that “combines Henokosaki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays.” In regard to construction of this replacement facility, “a Memorandum of Basic Understanding” was exchanged between the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and then Minister of State for Defense in May 2006.

After the change of government in September 2009, the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was established. After reviews conducted by the Committee, both Governments, at the “2+2” Meeting held in May 2010, confirmed the intention to locate the FRF in the Camp

Schwab Henokosaki area and the adjacent waters, and also agreed to take concrete measures to mitigate the impact on Okinawa.

Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in June 2011, it was decided that the runway would take a “V” shape, and the Ministers confirmed their commitment to complete the relocation project at the earliest possible date after 2014 in order to avoid the indefinite use of MCAS Futenma and to remove the risks as early as possible.

During the deliberation process which led to these conclusions, first of all, it was determined that, from a security perspective, the deterrence of the U.S. Forces including that of the U.S. Marine Corps cannot be lessened while there remains instability and uncertainty in the East Asian security environment. Furthermore, there was concern that the functions of the U.S. Marine Corps would be weakened if the helicopter units stationed at MCAS Futenma were to be detached from the other Marine units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or out of the prefecture. Therefore, it was concluded that the FRF had to be within Okinawa Prefecture.

At the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, that followed the “2+2” Meeting of April 2012, the Governments of Japan and the United States also confirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma.

See ▶ Fig. III-2-3-5 (Background for the Futenma Airfield Replacement Facility)

See ▶ Reference 34 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee); Reference 35 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee); Reference 40 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena)

(c) Environmental Impact Assessment

Procedures for the environmental impact assessment had been proceeded with in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, since the scoping document was submitted to the Governor of Okinawa and other related local governments in August 2007. In response to the opinions expressed by the Governor of Okinawa on the environmental impact statement in February and March 2012, the MOD organized an expert working group and amended the statement based on the scientific and specialist advice provided by the external experts. Later, in December 18, the MOD sent the amended statement to the Governor of Okinawa and other related local governments and completed the procedure of environmental impact assessment by making the statement open for public inspection for the period from December 27, 2012, to January 29, 2013.

(d) Futenma Replacement Facility Construction Project, etc.

On March 22, 2013, an application was submitted to the Governor of Okinawa for approval of the reclamation of the public water body related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project. With the Governor of Okinawa approving the application on December 27, 2013, the construction project is being pushed forward steadily toward the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma.

As MCAS Futenma is located at the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa, surrounded by residents' houses and schools, it is imperative to avoid a permanent fixation of the air station in this location. Taking special notice of the approval of the application for the reclamation of the public water body by the Governor of Okinawa, the government will promptly embark on the construction project and continue to make all-out initiatives to achieve the return of MCAS Futenma at the earliest possible time.

b. Operations of Air Refueling Aircraft

Air refueling aircraft KC-130 are to be relocated from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni (in Yamaguchi Prefecture) between early July and late August 2014.

KC-130 will be regularly deployed on a rotational basis to MSDF Kanoya Base (in Kagoshima Prefecture) and Guam for training and operations. Consultations are being held between Japan and the United States pertaining to training and operations at Kanoya Base.

c. Accepting U.S. Aircraft in an Emergency

Contingency use of the JASDF bases at Nyutabaru (in Miyazaki Prefecture) and Tsuiki (in Fukuoka Prefecture) by the U.S. Forces will be strengthened. To support this, the facilities in those bases will be improved as required, after site surveys are completed, but the improvement work needs to follow an on-site survey, and will be conducted before MCAS Futenma is returned. After the facilities are improved, they are also expected to support Japan-U.S. joint exercises, which are to be expanded according to the study on roles, missions, and capabilities.

Furthermore, consideration will be given to improving the use of civilian facilities by the U.S. Forces in cases of emergency during the bilateral planning work, and appropriate measures will be taken in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.

(2) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

In conjunction with the realignment of the U.S. Marine Corps in the Asia-Pacific region, the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 and other agreements prescribe that approximately 8,000 personnel of the III MEF and approximately 9,000 dependents, will be relocated from Okinawa to Guam at the earliest possible date after 2014.

Regarding the costs of the relocation, the two sides reached an agreement that, of the estimated \$10.27 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs, Japan would provide \$6.09 billion, including \$2.8 billion in direct cash contribution, while the U.S. would fund the remaining \$4.18 billion. Of the costs to be borne by Japan, with regard to projects for which Japan takes measures in the form of direct cash contributions (so called Mamizu projects)⁸ in order to legally guarantee that actions taken by Japan and the United States such as funding over multiple years by Japan are on a more solid footing, the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government signed “the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III MEF personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam” (the Guam International Agreement) in February 2009. As part of the measures based on this Agreement, the transfer of funds to the U.S. Government in relation to the Mamizu projects has been taking place since FY2009⁹.

Subsequently, in the “2+2” Joint Statement of April 2012, the unit composition and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam were revised. More specifically, in the Joint Statement, it was stated that it is planned that Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) will be positioned and deployed in Guam. While approximately 9,000 U.S. Marine Corps personnel along with their associated dependents will be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan and the authorized strength of the U.S. Marine Corps forces in Guam is to be around 5,000 personnel, the end-state for the presence of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels envisioned in the Roadmap.

In this Joint Statement, the preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation is \$8.6 billion (in 2012 U.S. fiscal year dollars). With regard to Japan's financial commitment, it was reaffirmed that it was to be the direct cash contribution up to the amount of \$2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) as stipulated in Article 1 of the Guam International Agreement. It

⁸ With regard to Japanese Mamizu projects, for expenses relating to construction projects and design projects, approximately 34.6 billion yen, 46.8 billion yen and 14.9 billion yen in FY2009, FY2010, and FY2011 respectively, were budgeted. For design projects expenses, approximately 700 million yen and 200 million yen in FY2012 and FY2013 respectively, were budgeted.

⁹ Funds of approximately 34.6 billion yen in FY2009, approximately 46.8 billion yen in FY2010, and approximately 9.3 billion yen in FY2011 were provided to the United States.

was also confirmed that Japan's equity investment and loans for family housing projects and infrastructure projects would not be utilized. Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already been transferred to the U.S. Government under the Guam International Agreement would be counted as part of the Japanese contribution. Furthermore, as a new initiative, a portion of the direct cash contribution of \$ 2.8 billion mentioned above would be used to develop training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared use facilities for Japan and the U.S. In addition, it was agreed that the remaining costs and any additional costs would be borne by the U.S., and that the two governments were to complete a bilateral cost breakdown.

At the "2+2" Meeting in October 2013, the Ministers confirmed that the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa contributes to sustaining the forward presence of the U.S. Forces and promoting the development of Guam as the strategic strongpoint, while also mitigating the impact on Okinawa. On that occasion, a Protocol amending the Guam International Agreement, which forms the basis for the bilateral cooperation necessary to achieve these goals of the relocation, was signed. The amendment, which is in line with the "2+2" Joint Statement of 2012, confirmed the delinking of the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility, and added provisions concerning the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands and the shared use of these training areas by the U.S. Forces and the SDF. The limit on Japanese cash contributions remains unchanged at \$2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars).

Under the relocation plan described in the 2012 "2+2" Joint Statement, U.S. Marine Corps units are to begin to relocate from Okinawa to Guam in the first half of the 2020s. The plan is considered to promote the implementation of the consolidation plan on returning the land areas south of Kadena Air Base published in April 2013.

See ► Reference41 (Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam); Reference42 (Protocol amending agreement between the government of Japan and the government of the United States of America concerning the implementation of the relocation of III marine expeditionary force personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam)

(3) Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base

At the SCC Joint Statement in April 2012, it was decided to delink the progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility from both the relocation of the III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam,

and resulting land returns south of Kadena. In addition, with regard to the land to be returned, it was agreed to conduct consultations focusing on three stages, namely 1) land eligible for immediate return; 2) land eligible for return once the relocation of functions is completed; and 3) land eligible for return after the relocation abroad.

Since the change of administration at the end of 2012, Japan and the United States have continued consultation under the basic policy of the Abe administration to dedicate all its strength to mitigate the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa communities. Japan strongly requested an early return of lands south of Kadena, including Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), and as a result of coordination with the U.S. side, both countries announced the consolidation plan in April 2013, which stipulated the return schedule, including the specific years of return.

In the consolidation plan, both sides confirmed that they will implement the plan as early as possible. The Government of Japan needs to continue to work with all its strength so that lands south of Kadena would be returned at the earliest possible date. Furthermore, following the announcement of the consolidation plan, the consultations have been held since April 2013, involving Ginowan City, Ginowan City Military Land Owners Association, Okinawa Prefecture, Okinawa Defense Bureau, and Okinawa General Bureau¹⁰, in order to promote effective and adequate use of West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster). The Ministry of Defense has also been providing necessary cooperation.

As a result of initiatives put in following the announcement of the consolidation plan in April 2013 toward the early return of mainly “areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of necessary procedures” (areas boxed in red in Fig. III-2-3-6), the road has been paved toward the return of land of all the four locations involved, including the land return of the north access road of Makiminato Service Area completed in August 2013. As confirmed in the “2+2” Joint Statement in October 2013, these returns are ahead of schedule. On April 14, 2014, Kin Town agreed to accept the relocation of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) in the Shirahi River Area Zukeran to Camp Hansen in the town.

The Government of Japan will take every opportunity to hold consultations with the United States for the prompt development by the United States of a master plan for the return of land in the remaining areas, and support its development. So far, the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee has

¹⁰ In addition to the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Okinawa Office) and the Cabinet Office also participate in the consultations as observers.

agreed on a master plan for the Torii Communication Station that is to accept the relocation of U.S. Army warehouses located in Makiminato Service Area and other places. All-out initiatives are being continuously made to steadily implement the consolidation plan and mitigate the impact on Okinawa as early as possible, and also to realize the respective returns of land in the shortest possible time for more visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa.

See ▶ Fig. III-2-3-6 (Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base)

See ▶ Reference 40 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena)

4 MV-22 Osprey Deployment in Okinawa

(1) MV-22 Osprey Deployment in Okinawa

The MV-22 is an aircraft that combines vertical takeoff/landing and hovering functions of rotary-wing aircraft on one hand and the speed and range of fixed-wing aircraft on the other. As the main force of air components of the U.S. Marine Corps, MV-22 aircraft play an important role in engaging in a broad range of activities, including transportation of personnel and goods.

The U.S. Marine Corps is in the process of replacing rotary-wing airplanes (CH-46) with MV-22s, which have superior basic performance. In June 2011, the Department of Defense announced the replacement of CH-46s deployed at MCAS Futenma with MV-22s. On June 29, 2012, the U.S. Government made a Host Nation Notification that 12 CH-46s of one squadron in Futenma would be replaced by 12 MV-22s and that CH-46s of the second squadron would be replaced by MV-22s in the summer of 2013. Following the U.S. announcement and notification, the MOD officials explained measures to ensure safety to Okinawa Prefecture and Iwakuni City. The movement of the first and the second squadron to MCAS Futenma was completed in October 2012 and in September 2013, respectively.

The MV-22 is a highly capable aircraft; compared with the CH-46, it can fly twice as fast, can carry three times the payload, and has four times the range. Its deployment to Okinawa will strengthen the deterrence of the U.S. Forces in Japan as a whole and greatly contribute to the peace and stability of the region.

(2) Safety of the MV-22 Osprey

After the crash of an MV-22 in Morocco in April 2012 and the crash of a CV-22¹¹ in Florida in June 2012, concerns about its safety have grown among Japanese people. In response, the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States agreed to refrain from any flight

¹¹ The MV-22 is designed for the U.S. Marine Corps for assault landing transportation missions, while the CV-22 is designed for the U.S. Air Force aimed at special operations, etc.

operation in Japan until the results of the accident investigation are provided and the safety of flight operation is reconfirmed. Additionally, in order to confirm its safety, a Japanese analysis and assessment team was set up to validate the contents of the accident investigations of the U.S. government, based on Japan's own viewpoints and knowledge. The team examined the investigation results and confirmed that the accident in which the MV-22 crashed in Morocco and the CV-22 crashed in Florida were caused largely by human factors and that there were no safety problems with the aircraft itself.

Furthermore, to maximize the safety of MV-22 flight operations, the two governments discussed matters concerning operations and measures to prevent accident recurrence at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee and other occasions. At the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, both sides confirmed that measures have been taken to address these human factors in light of the lessons learned from the accidents and agreed to implement specific measures to ensure the safety of MV-22 operations in Japan.

Based on the above, considering that the safety of MV-22 operations in Japan is fully confirmed, the Government of Japan released "On MV-22 Osprey Deployment to Okinawa" on September 19, 2012, and then flight operation of the MV-22 Osprey was started in Japan. Since then, the Government of Japan recognizes that the U.S. has been in full compliance with the Joint Committee agreement concerning the MV-22 and is operating the MV-22 with maximum consideration for safety. Furthermore, in order to ensure that full consideration is given to local residents and the Joint Committee agreement is properly implemented, the Government of Japan has been continuously engaging with the U.S. side through various opportunities, including the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meetings.

See ▶ Fig. III-2-3-7 (Chronology of MV-22 Osprey Deployment to Okinawa)

(3) Usability of MV-22 Osprey in Case of Disaster

In the aftermath of the devastating typhoon that hit the central Philippines in November 2013, 14 MV-22 Osprey aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities to support "Operation Damayan". The MV-22 combines the vertical takeoff/landing and hovering functions of rotary-wing aircraft on the one hand, and the speed and range of fixed-wing aircraft on the other. Provided its unique capabilities, MV-22s were deployed promptly to affected areas that are difficult to access, and it can transport several hundred isolated victims and about six tons of support goods in a day. In April 2014, the MV-22, deployed in Okinawa, was dispatched for rescue activities in the wake of an accidental sinking of a passenger ship off the coast of Jindo, Republic of Korea. As such, going forward, it is

expected that the superior capabilities of the MV-22 can be showcased in a variety of operations.

5 Measures for Mitigating the Impact on Okinawa

Today, a number of USFJ facilities and areas still remain in Okinawa because of the U.S. occupation of Okinawa and the slower progress of USFJ facilities and areas returned compared to other areas of Japan even after the occupation ended. In order to mitigate the concentrated impact on Okinawa, the Government of Japan is making initiatives toward the realization of the SACO Final Report and the Roadmap. The MOD is committed to further mitigating the impact on Okinawa through the Okinawa Policy Council, its subcommittee and other means¹², while listening to the opinions of the local residents.

At the Okinawa Policy Council Meeting on December 17, 2013, the Governor of Okinawa presented a number of requests, including cessation of the operation of MCAS Futenma within five years and its early return, the re-deployment of about 12 MV-22 Osprey aircraft to bases outside of Okinawa, and the total return of Makiminato Service Area within seven years.

While fully understanding that these requests reflect the sentiments of all Okinawan people, the Government as a whole is addressing the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, including the establishment of the Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa, consisting of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Governor of Okinawa and the Mayor of Ginowan.

On January 22, 2014, the MOD established the Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa, headed by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, and is addressing the issue with the strong resolve to do everything it can in order to mitigate the impact on Okinawa.

At Team for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa, training exercises involving the use of Osprey such as Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training Exercises held at Aibano training area located in Shiga Prefecture in October 2013 will continue to be deliberated so that about half of Osprey training exercises can be held outside Okinawa Prefecture. The Team is also considering the development of “training infrastructure and bases,” including hangars and refueling facilities, while securing a budget item for research expenses, along with

¹² On March 19, 2013 a subcommittee was established under the Okinawa Policy Council in order to address issues concerning mitigation of the impact relating to U.S. bases and Okinawa development measures.

the consideration of the introduction of tilt-rotor aircraft for the SDF in the FY2014 budget, for the promotion of training at multiple training areas and airfields located on the mainland.

In addition, the Team for Promoting the Return of Makiminato Service Area, created under the Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa, is considering the facilitation of the development of a master plan by the U.S. Forces related to the return of Makiminato Service Area, and as one of the facilitation measures, is set to provide support for the development of the master plan.

See ▶ Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 2 (The initiatives for effective use of the sites previously occupied by the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan, etc.)

4 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa

In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to secure the stable presence of the U.S. Forces by maintaining its deterrence abilities and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities. This section will explain the current situation regarding measures of this kind, such as the realignment of the U.S. Forces, including the question of how they are being executed in each of the regions other than Okinawa.

1 Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture

The ideal state of USFJ facilities and areas in Kanagawa Prefecture has been discussed between Japan and the United States due to the strong desire from local public bodies and other organizations for their return. As a result, the basic concept pertaining to the return of six facilities and areas (including Kami Seya Communication Station in Yokohama City), as well as the construction of approximately 700 housing units for the U.S. Forces families in the Yokohama area of the “Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex” were agreed in October 2004, by the Joint Committee.

Subsequently, the Joint Committee in September 2010 agreed that the number of housing units to be constructed for the U.S. Forces families would be around 400, as an interim measure to facilitate the relocation of the Negishi Housing Area, instead of approximately 700 housing units as agreed in October 2004, and that part of land in the Zushi area of the “Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex” would be jointly used once the requirements are fulfilled, as a stopgap measure until the land is returned.

Up to now, two facilities and areas (Koshiha POL Depot and Tomioka Storage Area) were returned. After a round of bilateral consultations on the realization of the early return of the

remaining facilities and areas, the Joint Committee in April 2014 agreed on the specific timing of the return of the Fukaya Communication Site and the Kami Seya Communication Station. In addition, the Joint Committee also agreed to change the number of housing units to be constructed from approximately 400 to 171.

See ► Fig. III-2-3-8 (Facilities and Areas Related to the Reorganization of the USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture)

2 Current Situation Regarding the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan as Stipulated in the Roadmap

(1) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capability

To have enhanced mobility and readiness as well as to enable joint missions, the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama (in Kanagawa Prefecture) was reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJI Corps (Forward) in December 2007 and the reorganization took place at the end of September 2008.

With the aim of strengthening coordination with the reorganized USARJ headquarters so as to enable rapid responses to various contingencies, the JGSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters, which unilaterally controls mobile operation units and specialized units, was relocated from JGSDF Camp Asaka (in Saitama Prefecture) to Camp Zama, where the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) are located, at the end of FY2012. In accordance with the transformation of USARJ headquarters, a mission command training center and other support facilities were constructed within the U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot (SGD, in Kanagawa Prefecture) using U.S. funding. In addition, measures will be implemented for more effective and efficient use of Camp Zama and the SGD, including partial release of facilities and areas. The partial release of land (approx. 17 ha) at SGD was approved by the Joint Committee in June 2008, while the partial release of land (approx. 5.4ha) at Camp Zama, and the joint/shared use of a portion of land at SGD (approx. 35ha) were approved in October 2011 and June 2012, respectively, by the Joint Committee.

(2) Yokota Air Base and Airspace

a. Establishment of the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC)

Enhancement of coordination between headquarters, combined with the transition to joint operational posture, is quite important from the perspective of ensuring flexible and rapid responses of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. The headquarters of the U.S. Forces in Japan located at Yokota Air Base (in Tokyo) plays an important role in the various mechanisms under the Guidelines. Therefore, along with the relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command HQ as

mentioned below, the BJOCC¹³ was established and commenced operations at the end of FY2011.

See ▶Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-2 (Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchange)

b. Relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command HQ

The ASDF Air Defense Command HQ not only defends airspace, but also functions as a headquarters for BMD operations. In the case of air defense and BMD, the response time is very short. Therefore, it is important for the SDF and the U.S. Forces to immediately share the necessary information. Thus, at the end of FY2011, approximately 800 personnel from the ASDF Air Defense Command HQ, which was formerly located in Fuchu (Tokyo), and its relevant units were relocated to Yokota Air Base where the U.S. 5th Air Force, Headquarters is located. This arrangement and the establishment of the above-mentioned BJOCC have made it possible to enhance coordination between the headquarters of the SDF and the U.S. Forces, including the sharing of information concerning air defense and BMD.

c. Yokota Airspace

At Yokota Air Base, the U.S. Forces conduct radar approach control for the Yokota airspace spreading from the western part of the Tokyo Metropolitan area to Niigata Prefecture. Measures have been taken to facilitate the operation of civilian airplanes that enter the airspace.

Since September 2006, the temporary transfer of responsibility for air traffic control of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese authorities, when not required for military purposes, has been started. Moreover, the collocation of the U.S. Forces and ASDF air traffic controllers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON) facility started in May 2007. The area adjacent to the west side of Haneda Airport was cut by about 40% in September 2008 and the air traffic control operation was returned to Japan. In addition, the review of the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace was completed in May 2010.

d. Civilian-Military Dual Use of Yokota Air Base

At the Japan–U.S. Summit Meeting held in May 2003, it was agreed that the joint civilian-military use of Yokota Air Base would be studied, and a Liaison Conference was then established as a working panel attended by relevant government ministries and agencies and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, with discussions ongoing since then.

¹³ The BJOCC functions to contribute to providing a joint response for Japan's defense. To that end, it works to enhance information sharing between the Japanese and U.S. headquarters, close coordination, and interoperability.

The Governments of Japan and the United States have conducted a study, starting in October 2006, on the specific conditions and modalities, with the understanding that joint use will not compromise the military operations and safety of Yokota Air Base. Based on further coordination and the outcome of the study, both governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions.

(3) Measures relating to U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Atsugi Air Facility and MCAS Iwakuni
a. Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carrier

The nuclear aircraft carrier¹⁴ USS George Washington is currently forward deployed to Yokosuka (Kanagawa Prefecture). The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in ensuring maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region as well as regional peace and stability. The U.S. aircraft carrier provides the core capability of the Fleet.

In January 2014, the U.S. Navy announced that the aircraft carrier USS George Washington will proceed to the United States in preparation for fuel exchange, and in its place, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan will be forward deployed.

The U.S. Navy vows that it will continue to ensure that all of its nuclear-powered vessels (including the nuclear carrier USS George Washington) adhere to the relevant safety policies. For example, the nuclear reactor will normally be shut down while the aircraft carrier is anchored, and repair work and fuel changes will not be carried out in Japan. The Government of Japan intends to continue taking all possible measures to ensure safety.

b. Relocation of Carrier-Based Aircraft

Atsugi Air Facility (in Kanagawa Prefecture) is currently used as a base for carrier-based aircraft. Since Atsugi Air Facility is located at the center of an urban district, the noise of carrier jets taking off and landing in particular has been a problem for a long time. It is necessary to resolve such problems as soon as possible in order to stably maintain the operations of aircraft carriers.

On the other hand, after the completion of the runway relocation project¹⁵ at MCAS Iwakuni (the relocation of the runway approximately 1,000 meters offshore), safe aircraft operations

¹⁴ Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are driven by energy generated in a nuclear reactor, so there is no need to replenish their fuel and they are able to maintain the high speeds necessary for the operation of aircraft, giving them excellent combat and operational capabilities.

¹⁵ A project to relocate the runway of MCAS Iwakuni by approximately 1,000 meters to the east (offshore), in response to the requests from Iwakuni City and other local authorities. The new runway commenced its operations in May 2010. The project was completed at the end of FY2010.

have been realized with less impact on the living environment of the surrounding communities.

Taking these factors into consideration, CVW-5 squadrons will be relocated from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni. In order to mitigate impacts of the increased operations at MCAS Iwakuni due to the projected relocation, related measures will be taken, including: (1) conducting the relocation after the runway is moved offshore, (2) relocation of MSDF EP-3,etc. in MCAS Iwakuni to Atsugi Air Facility, and (3) deployment of KC- 130 (to be relocated from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni) on a regular rotational basis to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam, and (4) relocation of U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam.

As a result of these measures, it is expected that the noise around MCAS Iwakuni will be alleviated. For instance, the area requiring residential noise-abatement work (so-called first category area) will decrease from approximately 1,600 ha to 500 ha.

Subsequently, at the “2+2” held in October 2013, it was acknowledged that the relocation of CVW-5 from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni should be completed by around 2017. In addition, with regard to the relocation of MSDF EP-3,etc. to Atsugi Air Facility as stated in (2)above, upon the request of local public entities in the vicinity of MCAS Iwakuni, it was confirmed that, as a result of Japan-U.S. deliberation including defense posture review, MSDF EP-3,etc. would stay in MCAS Iwakuni.

Concerning the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam in (4) above, Japan and the United States confirmed that based on the Roadmap, etc., the unit, which has been dispatched to the Middle East from MCAS Iwakuni, will be relocated to Guam without returning to MCAS Iwakuni.

With regard to the site (Atagoyama) for constructing family housing required for the relocation of carrier-based aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni, the sales contract of the site was concluded in March 2012, and site development work for family housing and sports facilities, etc. is being undertaken now.

c. A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP

The 2006 Roadmap prescribes that a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at the earliest possible date. At the “2+2” Meeting of June 2011, it was stated that the Government of Japan will explain to local authorities that Mageshima is considered to be the candidate for the new

SDF facility. This SDF facility would be used to support operations in response to a variety of situations including large-scale disasters as well as regular exercises and other activities, including use by the U.S. Forces as a permanent site for FCLP. In addition, the 2005 SCC document confirmed that the U.S. Forces will continue to conduct FCLP at Iwo-To in accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a permanent FCLP training facility is identified.

d. Resumption of Commercial Aviation at MCAS Iwakuni

Considering that the local public entities, including Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, had been working together to request the resumption of commercial aviation operations, in October 2005, it was agreed that commercial aviation operations of four round trips per day would be allowed as long as such operations do not compromise U.S. military operational requirements.

It was then agreed in the Roadmap that portions of the future civilian air facility would be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni. Based on this agreement, Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport was opened on December 13, 2012, resuming regular flights of commercial aviation after 48 years.

(4) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

Japan and the United States are set to continue close coordination on BMD as the two countries improve their respective BMD capabilities. More specifically, an AN/TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-Band Radar”) system was deployed to the U.S. Shariki Communication Site¹⁶. Also in October 2006, U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 units (Patriot Advanced Capability) were deployed to Kadena Air Base and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area.

At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in February 2013, both sides agreed on the necessity of the additional deployment of TPY-2 radar in Japan, to further enhance BMD capabilities.

At the “2+2” Meeting held in October 2013, the Ministers confirmed their intention to designate the ASDF Kyogamisaki sub-base as the deployment site for a second AN/TPY-2 radar (X-band radar) system, and Japan provided the facilities and area necessary for the deployment to the United States in December 2013.

See ► Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-3 (Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks)

(5) Training Relocation

¹⁶ The radar was deployed to ASDF Shariki Sub Base (in Aomori Prefecture) in June 2006, but was thereafter transferred to the neighboring U.S. Shariki Communication Site.

As for training relocation¹⁷, the aircraft of three U.S. military facilities – Kadena, Misawa (in Aomori Prefecture), and MCAS Iwakuni – are set to be relocated to the following ASDF facilities for the time being: Chitose (in Hokkaido), Misawa, Hyakuri (in Ibaraki Prefecture), Komatsu (in Ishikawa Prefecture), Tsuiki (in Fukuoka Prefecture), and Nyutabaru (in Miyazaki Prefecture) in order to conduct joint exercises with ASDF. Based on this, since March 2007, the U.S. Forces in Japan have conducted training relocation from their Air Bases to those ASDF Bases. The MOD has been conducting site surveys at the ASDF bases to improve their infrastructure, when required, – so that they can better host training relocation at the SDF facilities.

MOD's local Defense Bureaus have been making every effort to ensure that training relocation goes smoothly by collaborating with the ASDF to support the U.S. Forces and that local people feel safe during training periods by setting up an on-site local headquarters as liaison between government agencies and local residents.

Furthermore, based on the “2+2” Joint Statement in May 2010, at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee held in January 2011, both governments agreed to include Guam as a training relocation site and expand the scale of training. They continued to have discussions and agreed on details such as sites where training is conducted, at the Joint Committee in October 2011. According to the agreement, relocation training was conducted in areas including Guam for the first time and since then, U.S. aircraft have been conducting training there.

Furthermore, in addition to existing fighter combat training, the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed to add air-to-ground firing/bombing training using the Misawa air-to-ground firing/bombing range as part of training relocation to be conducted at ASDF bases at Misawa or Chitose. This training contributes to enhancing interoperability between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, and also relocates some of the air-to-ground firing/bombing training previously conducted at the Torishima firing/bombing range, etc. with U.S. Forces aircraft flying to Kadena Air Base. Thus, this training relocation will help reduce noise around Kadena Air Base, thereby contributing to the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa.

5 Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

In order to smoothly implement the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan based on the Roadmap, the “Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of

¹⁷ USFJ aircraft conduct bilateral exercises at JASDF facilities in order to improve interoperability and reduce the impact of training activities on the areas surrounding USFJ air bases.

United States Forces in Japan (USFJ Realignment Special Measures Act)” was enacted in August 2007. Realignment grants, Special Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, etc. and other systems were established based on the law.

During a period of time before and after the implementation of realignment (10 years in principle), realignment grants¹⁸ will be awarded to help cover the expenses of projects¹⁹ which contribute to increasing the convenience of the lives of residents of local municipalities affected by the realignment²⁰, and to stimulate local industries. To this end, they will be awarded in accordance with progress made in the steps of U.S. Forces realignment, after the Defense Minister designates the specified defense facilities and neighboring municipalities affected by realignment. As of April 2014, 16 defense facilities in 41 municipalities are eligible to receive the grant.

In addition, under U.S. Forces realignment, some USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. Since this may affect the employment of USFJ local employees, the Government of Japan will take measures to maintain their employment, including education and skills training.

¹⁸ Approximately 10 billion yen in the FY2014 budget

¹⁹ Under the Realignment Special Measures Act, changes in the composition of units of those naval vessels that conduct operations integrally with US air wings subject to realignment (replacement of the aircraft carrier at Yokosuka Naval Base with a nuclear aircraft carrier) will be treated in the same way as the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan.

²⁰ The scope of specific projects includes 14 projects identified by Article 2 of the enforcement ordinance of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan, including education, sports, and cultural projects.

Chapter 3 Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

The international community today is facing an increasing number of challenges which are extremely difficult for one country to deal with on its own. Therefore, it is important to strengthen bilateral and multilateral security cooperation, as well as proactively engaging in international peace cooperation activities, from the perspective “proactive contribution to peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.

In light of this situation, the new National Defense Program Guidelines aims to continuously promote and enhance various initiatives related to support for capacity building, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in order to address global security issues, such as local conflicts, expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), while promoting cooperation with the allied countries and the related countries that share the security benefits in peacetime.

Section 1 Promoting Multilateral Security Cooperation and Dialogue in Areas Including the Asia-Pacific Region

1 Significance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogue and Defense Cooperation and Exchange

Recent years have seen dialogue and exchanges with various countries expand in terms of both quality and quantity. Specifically, 1) in addition to enhancing mutual understanding and confidence building, moves toward establishing and strengthening cooperation are accelerating, and 2) our focus in dialogue and exchange has broadened from neighboring countries to encompass partners across the globe. Moreover, 3) with some partners, our exchanges are developing and deepening, moving from simple interaction toward the stage of more concrete, practical cooperation. In addition, 4) initiatives in the security field in the Asia-Pacific region are also gradually shifting from dialogue focused on confidence building, to practical cooperation including building regional order and common norms and standards.

In light of these developments, it is necessary for the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to pursue security cooperation and dialogues as well as conducting defense cooperation and exchanges, while considering the characteristics of each country or region in a multi-layered manner, while effectively and efficiently making use of limited resources.

In the security field, it is necessary to nurture the habits of cooperation, and promote practical

and concrete cooperation for building regional order and establishing common norms and standards; and, in our neighboring countries and region, to eliminate the sense of confrontation and sense of caution, in order to foster a cooperative atmosphere with a future-oriented perspective, and actively promote cooperation in bilateral and multilateral arenas. To that end, the MOD and the SDF are promoting multi-layered security cooperation and dialogue, defense cooperation and exchange, and combined training and exercises.

See ▶ Fig. III-3-1-1 (High-Level Visits (January 2013-Early July 2014));

See ▶ Reference 47 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years)); Reference 44 (Exchange Student Acceptance Record (FY2013))

2 Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework and through Dialogue

1 Initiatives under the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Framework

The countries of ASEAN hold meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which serves as a security framework for the region, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), which is a ministerial level meeting between defense authorities in the ASEAN countries. In addition, at the 4th ADMM in May 2010, a decision was taken to establish the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), which added eight new non-ASEAN countries¹, including Japan to the members (those countries are called the "Plus countries"); the 1st ADMM-Plus was held in October that year, in Hanoi, Vietnam.

Until the establishment of the ADMM-Plus, there had been no official meeting for the region's defense ministers in the Asia Pacific region. The establishment of the ADMM-Plus is highly significant from the perspective of encouraging the development and deepening of security and defense cooperation in the region. Furthermore, the ADMM-Plus is a framework that tackles a broad and diverse range of security issues in the region; the MOD and the SDF are also of the view that the ADMM-Plus should be developed as a major pillar of security cooperation in the region, and are providing active support for its initiatives.

At the 1st ADMM-Plus, it was decided to create (1) ADSOM-Plus (ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting-Plus), (2) ADSOM-Plus Working Groups (ADSOM-Plus WG), and (3) Experts' Working Groups (EWG), and Japan and Singapore served as co-chairs of the EWG on Military Medicine until March 2014. In July 2012, the 2nd meeting of the EWG on Military Medicine was held in Tokyo, and the participants exchanged practical opinions on approaches to cooperation in each country and issues faced in this regard, in the field of military medicine at

¹ Japan, the U.S., Australia, the ROK, India, New Zealand, China, and Russia.

times of a major disaster. Furthermore, at meetings of the EWG on Maritime Security, Japan has been emphasizing the importance of establishing shared customary “manners” by which all countries abide, in order to avoid unintended collisions and the escalation of situations when government vessels, including warships, approach and encounter each other at sea, with a view to proactive confidence building among member countries in the field of maritime security.

In June 2013, Japan participated in the first ADMM-Plus field training exercise in Brunei Darussalam organized by the Experts Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief and the Experts Working Group on Military Medicine. It was carried out under the assumption that a large-scale disaster was caused by a severe hurricane, aiming to maintain and improve various types of operational abilities required for international disaster relief activities, and to deepen mutual understanding and strengthen cooperative relations between the participated countries. In September 2013, Japan also participated in tabletop exercises held in Indonesia, organized by the Experts Working Group on Counter Terrorism, as well as field training exercises held in Australia, organized by the Experts Working Group on Maritime Security.

In August 2013, Minister of Defense Onodera attended the 2nd ADMM-Plus meeting in Brunei Darussalam, and introduced Japan’s initiatives to promote stability in the Asia-Pacific region. He also advocated the importance of promoting initiatives to improve transparency of the military capabilities of each country, as a future agenda for the ADMM-Plus. Furthermore, since April 2014 Japan has been serving as a co-chair with Laos for the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief of the ADMM-Plus, and promoting initiatives to make contributions as a country with abundant experience in disaster relief operations.

See ▶ Fig. III-3-1-5 (Organizational Chart and Overview of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus))

2 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The ARF, a forum aimed to improve the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region through dialogue and cooperation on the political and security sectors, has been held since 1994. The ARF currently comprises 26 countries and one organization as member states², and holds various inter-governmental meetings on security that are attended by both foreign affairs

² A total of 26 countries, consisting of 10 ASEAN countries (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia [from 1995] and Myanmar [from 1996]), in addition of Japan, Australia, Canada, China, India (from 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the ROK, Russia, the United States, Mongolia (from 1998), North Korea (from 2000), Pakistan (from 2004), East Timor (from 2005), Bangladesh (from 2006), and Sri Lanka (2007), plus the European Union (EU).

officials and defense officials to exchange opinions on regional situations and security areas which should especially be focused on. In addition to opinion exchanges at various meetings, in recent years, specific initiatives³ in non-traditional security areas such as disaster relief, maritime security, and peacekeeping and peace building have been actively taken in coordination with various countries. For example, in the maritime security field, an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM-MS) has been held since 2009⁴. At the ISM-MS, an anthology of best practices concerning support for capacity building in the field of maritime security was formulated on the basis of a summary compiled by Japan. In addition, it is planned to hold a workshop in the future on trust-building through international and regional frameworks, arrangements, and cooperation as an ARF official event, which is one of the priority fields of the ISM-MS led by Japan and Malaysia.

Moreover, since 2009, in the field of disaster relief, the MOD and the SDF have dispatched troops and aircraft to participate in ARF Disaster Relief Exercises. In May 2013, the third ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREx2013), jointly hosted by Thailand and the Republic of Korea, was held in Thailand, with Japan sending around 50 personnel and one aircraft to participate.

3 Multilateral Security Dialogue Hosted by the MOD and the SDF

(1) Tokyo Defense Forum

As Japan's own initiatives regarding security in the Asia-Pacific region, the MOD has held since 1996 the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Tokyo Defense Forum) with the participation of officers in charge of defense policy (Directors General of defense ministries and General-class officers) from the countries of the region. At the forum, discussions are being held on defense policy issues and confidence-building measures in the region.

Twenty-one countries from the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the ASEAN Secretariat, the European Union (EU), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) took part in the 18th forum in October 2013. At this forum, discussions took place on the topics of (1) Preparedness in Peacetime for Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief; and (2) Regional Frameworks' Roles in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief.

³ In addition to Cabinet meetings at the Foreign Minister level, the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) is held each year, as well as meetings of the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBM/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC). Moreover, since the Cabinet level meeting in 2002, ARF Defense Officials' Dialogue (DOD) meetings and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) are held ahead of the main meeting.

⁴ In 2011, Japan co-hosted the 3rd Inter-Sessional Meeting in Tokyo, with Indonesia and New Zealand.

(2) Japan–ASEAN Defense Vice- Ministerial Forum

Since 2009, the MOD has annually held the Japan–ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum, with the purpose of creating a foundation for strengthening multilateral and bilateral relationships through establishing human networks between Japanese and ASEAN vice-ministerial-level officials. In conjunction with this, the Ministry holds bilateral talks at the vice-ministerial level. The 5th meeting was held in Okinawa Prefecture in February 2014, attended by officials at the vice-ministerial level from the countries of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat, who exchanged opinions concerning the topics of (1) Future Direction of Capacity Building Initiatives; and (2) Possible Equipment-technology Cooperation among Japan and ASEAN Member States to Respond to Non-traditional Security Issues. On the occasion of the forum Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense conducted bilateral talks at the vice-ministerial level with participants from Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Myanmar, etc.

Furthermore, around the time of this meeting, the Ministry holds the “Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges,” a public seminar to which security experts, including both academics and government officials, from Japan and other countries are invited, in order to discuss security challenges in the region and the roles of defense authorities in tackling them.

4 Other

(1) International Conferences held by Private Organizations

In the field of security, besides official intergovernmental conferences, various international conferences are also held by private organizations, attended by government officials, academics, and journalists, such conferences provide a forum for sharing and exchanging opinions on medium- to long-term security issues.

The leading international conferences are the IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)⁵ and the IISS Regional Security Conference (Manama Dialogue), both hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Set up for the purpose of establishing a regional security framework, the Shangri-La Dialogue is an international conference held each year in Singapore, which is attended by many participants,

⁵ This is a multilateral conference instituted at the initiative of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a private British think tank, in which defense ministers from various countries participate with the objective of discussing defense-related issues and regional defense cooperation. Since the 1st conference in 2002, it has been held in Singapore each year and is known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, from the name of the hotel at which it takes place.

including defense ministers from throughout the Asia-Pacific region, with discussions focusing on regional issues and defense cooperation. At the 13th conference held from May 30 to June 1, 2014, Prime Minister Abe delivered a keynote address, emphasizing the particular importance of the “rule of law” for ensuring the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region. He also advocated the three principles on maritime law: 1) making and clarifying claims based on international law; 2) not using force or coercion in trying to drive their claims; and 3) seeking to settle disputes by peaceful means. In addition, Minister of Defense Onodera delivered a speech at the second plenary session “Advancing Military-to-Military Cooperation,” and also held bilateral and trilateral talks with the participating countries to explain the security policies of Japan and to exchange opinions on the regional situations and defense cooperation.

The Manama Dialogue is an international conference at which exchanges of opinions on security are carried out primarily among parties concerned such as foreign and defense ministers from countries in the Middle East. The conference is convened in Manama, Bahrain. As the stability of the Middle East is extremely important for Japan, from the perspective of energy security, as well as the safety and security of sea lanes, the MOD has participated in this conference every time it has been held, since the 2nd conference in 2005.

See ▶ Reference 56 (Keynote Address by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the 13th IISS Asian Security Summit "Shangri-La Dialogue")

(2) Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD)

The CHOD is a meeting of the chiefs of defense, mostly from the Asia-Pacific region, aimed at nurturing trust among countries in the region and enhancing security relations through free exchanges of opinions on regional security and bilateral dialogues, among other activities. Japan has participated in each conference since the first one held in 1998. In 2004, Japan hosted the 7th conference together with the United States Pacific Command. Moreover, in November 2012, the 15th Conference, jointly hosted by the Australian Defence Force and the United States Pacific Command, convened in Sydney, Australia, and was attended by the Joint Chief of Staff.

(3) Inter-Service Branch Initiatives

a. The Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)

The PACC is jointly held by the U.S. Army and the armies of the Asia-Pacific countries every two years, for the purpose of improving inter-service branch relations between each country's army and promoting security cooperation. The GSDF has been participating since the first conference in 1999, and the Chief of Staff of the GSDF attended the last conference held in

New Zealand in September 2013.

b. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)

The WPNS has been held every two years since 1988. It is attended by the chiefs of staff of the navy of countries in the Western Pacific region, and holds discussions on various maritime security issues. The MSDF has been participating since the second symposium in 1990, and the Chief of Maritime Staff attended the last meeting held in Qingdao, hosted by China in April 2014.

c. The Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS)

The PACS, hosted by the United States, is held every two years. It aims to promote mutual understanding and enhance security relationships between the countries in the region through exchanges of views among the chiefs of staff of the air forces, etc. from those countries. The ASDF has been participating in PACS since the first symposium in 1989, except the 13th in 2013, and the Chief of Staff of the ASDF attended the last meeting held in Washington, D.C., in March 2014.

(4) Invitations to Opinion Leaders

Since 2001, the Ministry of Defense has invited key figures—primarily those involved in security policy—to Japan from countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with the objective of promoting an understanding of Japan's security and defense policies, and the current status of the SDF. In March 2014, experts were invited from the Republic of Korea.

3 Promoting Capacity Building Assistance and Other Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation

1 Proactive and Strategic Initiatives to Support Capacity Building

(1) Significance of the Implementation of Support for Capacity Building

In recent years, the role of and cooperation between defense authorities have been deepening and widening in security and defense fields, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, disposal of land mines and unexploded ordnance, military medicine, maritime security and PKO; in particular, there is an awareness of the importance of cooperation by the international community in providing support for capacity building aimed at improving the capabilities of stakeholder countries in such fields.

Support for capacity building is an initiative based on a new concept, which seeks to improve the ability of developing countries to deal with such situations themselves, through human

resource development and technical support in security and defense fields in peacetime, thereby actively creating stability within the region and improving the global security environment.

Providing support for capacity building has the following significance: (1) improving the capacity in the security and defense-related fields of the countries receiving such support and enabling them to contribute to improve the global security environment; (2) strengthening bilateral relationships by satisfying each country's requests for support; (3) strengthening relationships with other supporting countries such as the U.S. and Australia; and (4) promoting an awareness among the Japanese people and the countries receiving such support of Japan's stance of working proactively and independently to promote regional peace and stability, thereby increasing trust in the MOD and the SDF, as well as Japan as a whole.

In addition, these initiatives also facilitate improving the capabilities of the SDF itself.

For this reason, in FY2011, the Capacity Building Assistance Office was established in the Internal Bureau, and field surveys and initiatives were carried out to grasp and analyze specific needs, focusing on Southeast Asian countries. Since FY2012, capacity building assistance projects have been continuously implemented.

(2) Specific Activities

a. Full-scale Project

(a) Program Overview

The full-scale project involves dispatching a team composed of defense officials, SDF personnel, and staff from knowledgeable private sector groups such as NGOs (non-governmental organizations) for a comparatively long period in order to conduct large-scale, systematic human resource development, such as lectures and practical training. This program has so far been conducted in Timor-Leste and Cambodia.

(b) Activities in Timor-Leste

From December 2012 to March 2013, two GSDF personnel, one defense official, and four members of NGOs were dispatched to Camp Metinaro of the Timor-Leste Defence Force, where they carried out a program of human resource development (Phase I) relating to techniques for the maintenance and upkeep of equipment, to contribute to improving the army's abilities in the field of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In addition, from October 2013 to March 2014, the maximum of 15 personnel, including the maximum of eight GSDF personnel, were dispatched to carry out a program of human resource development (Phase II).

(c) Activities in Cambodia

From January to March 2013, four GSDF personnel, one defense official, and six members of an NGO were dispatched to the training institution of the National Centre for Peacekeeping Force, Mine and ERW Clearance (NPMEC), where they carried out a program of human resources development (Phase I) in engineering areas such as road building. In addition, from December 2013 to March 2014, the maximum of 23 personnel, including up to 16 GSDF personnel, were dispatched to carry out a human resource development program including practice education (Phase II).

b. Seminar-style Project

The seminar-style project involves dispatching knowledgeable SDF personnel for short periods of time to give lectures at seminars.

See ► *Fig. III-3-1-6 (Status of Activities of Short-Term Dispatch Program)*

To date, the MOD and the SDF have dispatched GSDF personnel to Mongolia and MSDF personnel to Indonesia, MSDF and ASDF personnel to Vietnam.

c. Invitation Program, etc.

The invitation program involves inviting practitioners from the counterpart country to Japan, in order to view facilities and undergo training. To date, the MOD and the SDF have invited military officials from Vietnam, Mongolia, and Indonesia.

In 2013, practitioners including generals were invited from the Ministry of Defence of Vietnam and the General Staff Office of the Mongolian Armed Forces, and received a briefing on the SDF's initiatives in the fields of PKO, underwater medicine and medical fields.

Furthermore, in November 2013, observers from the armed forces of Laos and Vietnam, which are the new and previous co-chair countries of the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief of the ADMM-Plus, were invited to see the earthquake response exercise carried out by the Northeastern Army of the GSDF.

In addition, practitioners were invited from the Indonesian Navy (February 2014), and Vietnam and Mongolia (March 2014) to introduce the SDF's initiatives in the field of oceanography, flight safety and civil engineering.

2 Pacific Partnership

The Pacific Partnership (PP), which started in 2007, is an initiative in which naval vessels, primarily those from the U.S. Navy, visit countries in the region to provide medical care, engage in cultural exchange, and seek to strengthen collaboration with participating countries and facilitate international disaster relief activities, through cooperation with the government, military, international organizations, and NGOs in each of those countries. Since 2007, Japan has dispatched SDF medical personnel or units, amongst others, as part of this initiative.

From June to July 2014, SDF medical personnel, facility repairing personnel from the GSDF, an MSDF vessel and an ASDF transport aircraft were dispatched to Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Philippines. They worked in partnership with NGOs to provide medical care and engage in cultural exchanges in Cambodia and the Philippines.

3 Multilateral Joint Training

(1) Significance of Multilateral Joint Training in the Asia-Pacific Region

Since 2000, in the Asia-Pacific region, in addition to conventional training conducted in preparation for combat situations, steps have also been taken to undertake multinational training in non-traditional security fields, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as non-combatant evacuation operation.

It is important to participate in and host such multinational training exercises so as not only to raise the skill level of the SDF, but to create a cooperative platform through various forms of coordination and exchanges of opinions with the countries involved. The MOD and the SDF continue to actively engage in such training.

See ▶ Reference 47 (Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years))

(2) Initiatives toward Multilateral Training

a. Participation in, and Hosting of, Multilateral Training

In April 2002, the MSDF hosted Pacific Reach 2002, the second Western Pacific submarine rescue exercise, for the first time. In October 2002, the MSDF also hosted multilateral search and rescue exercises. In March 2011, Japan and Indonesia co-hosted the second ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise 2011 (ARF-DiREx2011) within the framework of the ARF. Personnel from the MOD and the SDF participated in the ARF-DiREx2011. Furthermore, in September 2013, the MSDF hosted Pacific Reach 2013, the Western Pacific submarine rescue exercises.

Since 2005, the SDF has also been involved in the annual “Cobra Gold,” a multinational training event co-hosted by the U.S. and Thailand. In Cobra Gold 14 held in February 2014, the SDF participated in the command post exercises, the medical section of humanitarian and civic assistance activities, and conducted training in transporting Japanese nationals overseas. Furthermore, since 2010, the SDF has participated in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) Capstone Exercise, a multinational exercise for United Nations peacekeeping operations launched by the U.S. In March 2013, the SDF participated in staff exercises and field training as part of the Shanti Prayas-II exercise held in Nepal.

Moreover, as it did in 2013, the GSDF participated in the multilateral exercise, “KHAAN QUEST 14,” co-hosted by the United States and Mongolia in June 2014.

In September 2013, the MSDF participated in the multinational joint exercise “Triton Centenary 2013” in Australia. The MSDF also participated in the Western Pacific Mine Countermeasure and Diving Exercises (MCMEX/DIVEX) in February 2014 in New Zealand, as well as the multinational joint exercise “Komodo” organized by the ASEAN and the navies of the surrounding countries and hosted by Indonesia in March 2014. In February 2014, the ASDF participated in “Cope North Guam 2014” conducted in Guam. The Joint Staff Council participated in the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Exercise (AHEX), co-hosted by Thailand and Malaysia in April 2014.

In June-August 2014, the MSDF participated in the multilateral joint exercise organized by the U.S. Navy called the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), and conducted training on anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare and anti-mine operation. In addition, the GSDF also participated in this exercise for the first time, and conducted training including amphibious training. (* The training period is from late June to early August.)

b. Multinational Tabletop Exercise, etc.

Initiatives have also been made to invite observers from other foreign countries since September 2001, when observers from eight Asia-Pacific countries participated in the fourth Japan–Russia Search and Rescue training hosted by Japan.

In addition, the GSDF has hosted the Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP) every year since 2002 as part of its multilateral cooperative initiatives. For the MCAP, it invites officers from the respective countries involved. In August 2013, 25 countries and organizations including administrative agencies, the largest number in the past, participated in

the event and conducted a tabletop exercise based on a scenario relating to the theme of “For the further stability of the Asia-Pacific region - the cooperation of land forces for promoting effectiveness in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief activities.”

Section 2 Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In order to improve the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as across the globe, and ensure the safety and prosperity of Japan, it is important to utilize the Japan-U.S. Alliance as an axis, while developing networks that combine bilateral and multilateral dialogue, cooperation and exchanges frameworks in a complementary and multilayered manner. Accordingly, the MOD and the SDF are conducting strategic defense cooperation and exchanges based on the characteristics of each country and region in question.

1 Japan–Australia Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

1 Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia

Australia is an important partner for Japan in the Asia-Pacific region: Japan and Australia are allies of the United States and share not only universal values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and capitalist economies, but also strategic stakes and interests in the security field. In particular, the norm that different countries should work in concert to address global challenges has become widespread in the international community in recent years. Therefore, as responsible countries in the Asia Pacific region, Japan and Australia are strengthening mutual cooperation focused primarily on areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities.

In terms of Japan-Australia bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, the first such joint declaration in the realm of security with a country other than the United States, was announced at the Japan-Australia summit meeting in March 2007. It has been making steady progress since then and has now reached the stage of more concrete and practical cooperation.

In May 2010, the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)¹ and its Procedural Arrangement were signed at the third Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”), and entered into force in January 2013. The Japan-Australia ACSA enabled the reciprocal provision of supplies and services by the SDF and the Australian Defense Force (ADF) during peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief, and other activities.

Moreover, the Japan- Australia Information Security Agreement signed in May 2012 entered

¹ Official title: The Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning reciprocal provision of supplies and services between the SDF of Japan and the Australian Defense Force

into force in March 2013. The laying of foundations for sharing information between the two countries is expected to assist in strengthening bilateral cooperation.

Furthermore, at the fourth Japan-Australia “2+2” in September 2012, which was the first of these meetings to be held in Australia, both countries affirmed the importance of sharing a common vision and goals, and issued a joint statement entitled Common Vision and Objectives agreeing to further expand defense cooperation between Japan and Australia.

2 Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchange

From the policy perspective, it was agreed that at the Japan-Australia Defense Ministers Meeting in September 2012, personnel in charge from the Australian Department of Defence will be dispatched to the Ministry of Defense in Japan as part of human resources exchanges in the capacity building support area for three months from July 2013. The ministers also agreed to establish vice-ministerial and working level meetings as a framework for discussions on defense equipment and technology cooperation. Furthermore, the Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation Office was established at the Internal Bureau since FY2014, in order to further enhance defense cooperation between the two countries.

In April 2014, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott visited Japan, and attended the Four Ministers’ Meeting of the National Security Council as the first foreign leader to attend the meeting, and discussed the future direction of Japan-Australia security cooperation. In addition, the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting was held and the two leaders confirmed their intention to elevate the bilateral security and defense cooperation to a new level in the joint press release. In particular, in terms of the defense field, it was decided to enhance practical cooperation and commence negotiations towards a framework agreement in the field of defense equipment and technology cooperation, as well as confirming that interoperability between the defense units of the two countries will be improved, and further enhancing practical cooperation such as bilateral exercises.

In addition, in the same month, Minister of Defense Onodera held a meeting with Australian Minister for Defence David Johnston in Perth, and the two ministers confirmed that the two countries would promote joint research on marine hydrodynamics as an initial area of science and technology cooperation in the field of defense equipment and technology cooperation. Furthermore, in June 2014, the fifth Japan–Australia 2+2 Meeting was held in Tokyo, and the four ministers agreed to maintain strong opposition to the use of force or coercion to unilaterally alter the current status, as well as confirming the substantial conclusion of negotiations on an

agreement for cooperation in the field of defense equipment and technology. At the Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting held on the same day, the two ministers agreed on further enhancement of defense cooperation between Japan and Australia, as well as Japan and the United States, including an expansion of Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercises.

The ASDF Chief of Staff visited Australia in February 2013 and March 2014, holding informal discussions with the Australian Chief of Air Force, during which they exchanged opinions concerning such matters as the deepening of defense cooperation and exchanges between the ASDF and the Royal Australian Air Force.

As for the operational side, in 2012, in terms of support for UNMISS, the defense authorities of Japan and Australia agreed to enhance cooperation between SDF personnel and Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel in peacekeeping activities. Following this, two ADF personnel have been working at a Coordination Center of the SDF since August of the same year, providing support for communication and coordination with the related organizations including the United Nations. This effort continued to be carried out even after the Coordination Center was integrated into an engineer units as a coordination section. Moreover, through the international emergency relief activities for the typhoon disaster in the Philippines and the incident of missing Malaysian airplane, the strategic partnership between Japan and Australia has been facilitated and consolidated. It is anticipated that the cooperation between Japan and Australia facilitated and strengthened in this way will contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, while also being conducive to fostering intraregional order through cooperation and efforts to achieve international peace undertaken by the United Nations in particular, such as conducting peacekeeping operations. As for the field of training and exercises, MSDF naval vessels and aircraft participated in the Kakadu 12 multinational naval exercise organized by the Royal Australian Navy in August 2012, as well as conducting Japan-Australia bilateral exercises in Japanese waters in June and September 2013.

See ▶ Reference 48 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years))

3 Cooperative Relationship Between Japan, the United States, and Australia

Japan and Australia are both allied with the United States, and share universal values. They cooperate closely in order to resolve the various challenges the Asia-Pacific region and the international community are facing. In order to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of such cooperation, it is important to promote the trilateral cooperation with the U.S, whose presence is indispensable for regional peace and stability.

At the working level too, the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), which is a Director General-level meeting among the three countries, has been held five times since April 2007, with discussions taking place on such issues as coordinated promotion of trilateral defense cooperation.

It is important for the three countries to develop a shared understanding of the situation and coordinate policies through such discussions and cooperation to further develop and deepen the collaborative relationship among the three countries, via more proactive promotion of trilateral cooperation in such operational areas such as disaster relief and joint exercises.

As for inter-service branch initiatives, the first Australia-Japan-United States Trilateral Senior Level Seminar was held in July 2013, in which the GSDF, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps and the Australian Army participated. At this seminar, they shared recognition of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and the future direction of cooperation between Japan, the United States, and Australia towards the stability and security of the region.

In terms of training and exercises, the MSDF, the U.S. Navy, and the Royal Australian Navy held a joint exercise in waters around Guam in June 2013. In February 2014, the ASDF, the U.S. Air Force, and the Royal Australian Air Force conducted the joint exercises “Cope North Guam,” and in May 2014, the GSDF, the U.S. Army, and the Australian Army held the joint exercise “Southern Jackaroo.”

2 Japan–Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

1 The Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchange with the Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea (ROK) has historically maintained close relations with Japan in economic, cultural, and other areas, and is extremely vital to Japan in geopolitical terms. In addition, as well as sharing fundamental values, the two countries share many strategic interests as allies of the United States. Therefore, even if difficult issues occasionally arise, close collaboration between the two countries on the security front has enormous significance for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Both Japan and the ROK are confronted with wide-ranging and complex security challenges including not only the North Korean nuclear and missile issues, but also counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, large-scale natural disasters, anti-piracy measures, maritime security and so on. In order for the two countries to deal effectively with such challenges, it is important

to carry out more broad-ranging and concrete defense cooperation and exchanges.

With this in mind, at talks between the defense ministers of the two countries held in January 2011, it was agreed to further exchange views concerning ACSA to enable reciprocal provision of water, food, fuel, and so on in PKO activities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, etc. Furthermore, it was also agreed that the defense authorities of the two countries will exchange views on the content of information security agreement. Although the information security agreement was due to be signed in June 2012, it was postponed just before the signing ceremony at the request of the ROK side, due to domestic circumstances in the ROK.

2 Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchange

Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense visited the ROK in November 2013 to attend the international conference “Seoul Defense Dialogue” organized by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK, and had a Japan–ROK defense vice-ministerial meeting with Vice-Defense Minister Baek Seung-joo for the first time in two years. During the meeting, they discussed Japan–ROK defense cooperation and exchanges and the situation in North Korea, and Mr. Nishi introduced Japan’s initiatives for national security. Moreover, a Japan–ROK defense vice-ministerial meeting was held in Indonesia in March 2014, at which opinions were exchanged concerning Japan-ROK defense cooperation and exchanges and regional situations. Furthermore, the MSDF conducted a Japan-ROK search and rescue bilateral exercise in the waters west of Kyushu in December 2013, which further enhanced coordination with the ROK Navy.

See ▶ Reference 49 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK (Past Three Years))

3 Cooperative Relationship Between Japan, the U.S., and the ROK

As both Japan and the ROK are allied with the United States, which plays an indispensable role for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the ROK keeps on developing.

At the 12th Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2013, the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministers Meeting was held and a trilateral joint statement was issued. In the meeting, the three ministers expressed their common view of the regional security situations, including about North Korea, and strongly called for North Korea to abandon all nuclear development programs and affirmed that they will continue their collaboration against North Korea’s further provocative acts. In addition, they decided to expand joint efforts in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief cooperation, in Search and

Rescue Exercises, and in counter-proliferation efforts.

In March 2014, the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting was held in the Hague, Holland, and the three countries confirmed the importance of further enhancement of close coordination in relation to the security in East Asia surrounding the issues with North Korea. Following this, in April of the same year, Defense Trilateral Talks were held among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK, at which three countries reaffirmed that they do not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state and agreed to closely coordinate to deter North Korean provocations. They also reaffirmed the necessity for a coordinated response to international security posted by the North Korea's nuclear, ballistic missile, and proliferation programs.

In June 2014, the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Talks was held at the timing of the 13th Shangri-La Dialogue, and a joint statement was issued. At this meeting, the ministers discussed the regional situations including North Korea and the cooperation between Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea. The three countries shared the recognition that a series of provocative activities by North Korea is a serious threat to the security of the region and the world, and agreed to continue close coordination among them. In addition, they reaffirmed the importance of information sharing between the three countries, and shared understanding of the necessity of continuous discussions.

In July 2014, chief of Joint Staff Japan, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff held the first chief-of-staff-level meeting in Hawaii to discuss a broad range of issues, including the increasingly strained security situation, such as nuclear and missile threats from North Korea, and measures to enhance trilateral coordination among Japan, the United States and the ROK.

With regard to training and exercises, the MSDF participated in Japan-U.S.-ROK search and rescue trilateral exercises in the waters in west of Kyushu in May and October 2013, and also conducted counter-piracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden in December 2013, to strengthen the coordination and cooperation among the three countries. In addition, the GSDF has been promoting initiatives to enhance relationships, starting at the junior officer level who will become future leaders, for example, through exchanges between junior officers held in December 2013 and April 2014. It is important to further develop cooperative relations among Japan, the United States, and the ROK in this way, in order to contribute to the peace and stability of the region.

MSDF destroyers and other vessels conducting a Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise in the Gulf of Aden (from the front to back, MSDF destroyer Setogiri, ROK Navy vessel Choi Young, MSDF destroyer Ariake, and U.S. Navy destroyer Bulkeley).

3 Japan-India Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

1 Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India

India is located in the center of sea lanes which connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa, making it an extremely important country geopolitically for Japan, which relies on maritime transportation for most of its trade. Furthermore, Japan and India share fundamental values, as well as having a common interest in the peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia and the world, and have established a strategic global partnership. Therefore, Japan and India have been strengthening relations in the area of security in recent years.

In October 2008, the prime ministers of Japan and India signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India (Joint Declaration). India is the third country with which Japan has signed a joint declaration specializing in security, following those with the United States and Australia. The declaration serves as a guideline for future cooperation in the field of security between Japan and India, covering such areas as meetings and dialogues at various levels such as the ministerial, vice-ministerial, and staff level, as well as service to service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises.

Moreover, in December 2009, the prime ministers of Japan and India formulated the Action Plan to advance security cooperation between their two countries. The Action Plan includes measures to promote cooperation in maritime security such as cooperation in anti-piracy activities and the holding of joint exercises at sea.

2 Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Upon Prime Minister Singh's visit to Japan in May 2013, the prime ministers of Japan and India welcomed the expanding defense relations between the two countries based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India. Also they signed the joint statement in which they decided to conduct on a regular basis and with increased frequency bilateral exercises between the MSDF and the Indian Navy and to establish a Joint Working Group (JWG) regarding the US-2 rescue amphibian.

See ► Part. IV, Chapter 1 ,Section5 (Initiatives Aimed at Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases)

In January 2014, Minister of Defense Onodera visited India for the first time in about four years as a Japanese Defense Minister, and held a Japan–India Defense Ministerial Meeting. At the meeting, the two ministers shared views on the necessity to conduct regular high-level and working level exchanges, as well as to further promote exchanges between services and education/research exchanges, in order to continue enhancing mutual trust and understanding. In addition, they also shared views to strengthen Japan-India defense consultation and cooperation including those related to maritime security to further consolidate and strengthen the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India. Specifically, it was decided to conduct the following events: (1) the third Japan–India Vice-Ministerial (2+2) Dialogue and the fourth Vice-Ministerial Defense Policy Dialogue; (2) exchanges on U.N. peacekeeping operations between the International Peace Cooperation Japan Peace Keeping Training and Research Center of the Joint Staff College, the GSDF Central Readiness Force and the Centre for UN Peacekeeping of India; (3) expert exchanges between the GSDF and the Indian Army in the field of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counter terrorism; and (4) professional exchanges of test pilots, in flight safety , and of air transport squadrons of the ASDF and the Indian Air Force.

Furthermore, also in January 2014, Prime Minister Abe visited India to attend India's Republic Day Parade Celebration as the guest of honor. During his visit, the Japan-India Summit Meeting was held and the two leaders confirmed the realization of the visit of the Indian Defense Minister to Japan, continuous implementation of bilateral exercises between the MSDF and the Indian Navy, promotion of discussions in the field of security and defense at various levels, and further enhancement of bilateral defense cooperation, which was announced in the joint statement.

In terms of exercises and training, based on the agreement of the Japan-India Summit Meeting in May 2013, the MSDF and Indian Navy conducted their second bilateral exercise off the Chennai coast, India, in December 2013, which included anti-submarine and on-site inspection exercises. The Indian Navy is to visit Japan in 2014 to conduct a joint exercise in the Pacific Ocean with the U.S. Navy.

See ▶ Reference 50 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years))

4 Japan–China Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

1 Significance of Defense Exchange and Cooperation with China

China's economic development and the modernization of its military capabilities in recent years have raised its presence within the international community. Although there are pending issues

with China, such as the slow progress of Japan-China bilateral cooperation resource development in the East China Sea and the question of transparency in regard to military capabilities, comprehensive promotion by Japan and China of the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” and further deepening of friendly and cooperative relations are the common interests of both countries. In regard to this point, as well as improving the transparency of China’s defense policy and bolstering mutual understanding and trust between Japan and China, promoting and maintaining defense exchange is important from the perspective of avoiding and preventing unforeseen consequences, so Japan is cooperating with allied nations and becoming actively involved in ensuring that China acts responsibly in the international community. Such initiatives are essential to the stabilization of the bilateral relationship in general and, consequently, to the peace and stability the Asia-Pacific region.

2 Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchange

Japan and China have been striving to promote defense exchange at various levels, as well as seeking to increase mutual understanding and relationships of trust, based on the approach of comprehensively promoting a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests.” At the Japan-China Defense Ministerial Conference held in June, 2011, both Ministers agreed that promoting defense exchange between Japan and China in a stable manner through calm dialogues between the defense authorities of the two countries would develop the basis for the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” as well as lead to the strengthening of a friendly and cooperative relationship between the two nations, and the improvement of transparency in defense policies.

Japan and China are undertaking initiatives to avoid and prevent unforeseen consequences, perceiving this to be an important aspect of defense exchange. In particular, the construction of a maritime communication mechanism between the defense authorities of the two countries has become an urgent matter. Accordingly, at the third Joint Working Group meeting held in Beijing in June 2012, it was agreed that the maritime communication mechanism would be constructed, consisting of (1) annual meetings and experts meetings; (2) high-level hotlines between the defense authorities of Japan and China; and (3) direct communications between naval vessels and aircraft. The objective of this was to avoid unexpected collisions and prevent unforeseen consequences in waters and airspace from escalating into military clashes or political problems, as well as increasing mutual understanding and relationships of trust, and enhancing defense cooperation. However, defense exchanges – including this process - stalled in September last year and remain stagnant. In relation to this, Japan has continued to make approaches aimed at

continuing defense exchanges, but has had no success to date in achieving the active promotion of any of the proposed exchanges, such as bringing the maritime communication mechanism to fruition.

At present, due in part to the incident in January 2013 when a Chinese naval vessel locked its fire-control radar onto an MSDF destroyer, China's establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) based on its own claim in November 2013, and the incident when Chinese fighters flew abnormally close to the aircraft of SDF in May and June 2014, Japan is making approaches to China with the aim of commencing operation of this mechanism as soon as possible, in light of the increased necessity of such a maritime communication mechanism to avoid and prevent unforeseen consequences.

In regard to exchanges between troops, since 2007, the Chinese Navy destroyer Shenzhen and training vessel Zhenghe have visited Japan, while the MSDF destroyers Sazanami and, most recently (in December 2011), Kirisame have visited China. Moreover, in June 2010, the Commanding General of the Jinan Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army visited the GSDF Middle Army, while in March 2012, the Commanding General of the GSDF Middle Army visited the Jinan Military Region. In April 2014, the Chief of Staff of the MSDF visited Qingdao to attend the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).

At present Japan-China defense exchange is stagnated, including exchanges between troops; however, hereafter, as part of initiatives to construct a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests", it will be essential to strive to promote mutual trust and understanding between Japan and China through dialogue at various levels and in a range of areas, while also actively promoting concrete cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as anti-piracy measures.

See ▶ Reference 51 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years))

5 Japan–Russia Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

1 Significance of Defense Exchange and Cooperation with Russia

Russia has great influence on the security of Europe, Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region, and is a neighboring country of Japan. It is therefore very important for Japan to deepen defense exchanges and promote mutual trust and cooperation with Russia. As Japan–Russia relations have continuously been developing in a wide range of areas, the MOD and the SDF have been steadily promoting exchanges with Russia at various levels in accordance with the Memorandum on Japan–Russia Defense Exchanges drawn up in 1999 (revised in 2006).

Security consultations between foreign and defense authorities, and Military-Military Talks at the Director General-level and Councilor level, as well as annual meetings based on the Japan–Russia Agreement on Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas and bilateral search and rescue exercises are all held continuously.

2 Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchange

At the Japan-Russia summit meeting in April 2013, the two leaders affirmed the importance of expanding cooperation between Japan and Russia in the field of security and defense, amid the growing role of the Asia-Pacific region and major changes in the international security environment, and agreed to set up the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (the “2+2” Meeting).

At the first Japan–Russia 2+2 Meeting in November 2013, the two countries agreed to conduct Ground-to-Ground unit exchanges between land forces and mutual dispatch of exercise observers on a regular basis, and bilateral exercises between counter piracy units of the MSDF and Russian Navy in the Gulf of Aden, as well as regular hosting of the Japan–Russia Cyber Security Meeting.

In December 2013, the MSDF conducted the 14th search and rescue joint training with Russia. During this training, based on the agreement of the “2+2” Meeting, Japan and Russia conducted counter terrorism and counter piracy training for the first time.

In February 2014, the Chief of Staff of the GSDF visited Russia for the first time in eight years, becoming the first Chief of Staff to visit Khabarovsk (Eastern Military District). In March 2014, the unit exchange visits between the GSDF Northern Army and Russian Eastern Military District was held, following on from last year. The situation in Ukraine has become increasingly tense since March 2014. Under such circumstances, it is important for the Ministry of Defense to take appropriate actions in terms of defense exchanges with Russia, in line with the trend of the international community.

See ▶ Reference 52 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years))

6 Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries

Southeast Asian countries are located in an area strategically important for the maritime traffic that connects Japan with the Middle East and Europe, and have long been traditional partners for Japan, having close economic relations with Japan. Promoting trust and cooperative relations for issues in various security challenges with these countries is meaningful for both

Japan and Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, the countries of Southeast Asia are members of ADMM-Plus and ARF, so from the perspective of stabilizing the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, it is imperative to build relationships of trust and cooperation with each country, with a view to cooperation in multilateral frameworks.

In particular, as well as interaction with Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore and the Philippines, Japan is engaged in active exchanges of opinions with Thailand and Cambodia at various levels, concerning approaches to defense cooperation and exchange, and frameworks for regional security cooperation. In addition, Japan is proactively engaged in discussions with defense officials, unit exchanges, and the dispatch and hosting of international students. Furthermore, we are also striving to strengthen relationships with Myanmar, Laos, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam.

As 2013 marked the 40th year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, Prime Minister Abe announced the Five Principles of Japan's ASEAN Diplomacy² and visited all of the ten ASEAN countries. In addition, the Ministry of Defense has been conducting cooperation and exchange programs at various levels and fields, such as capacity building assistance, in order to further enhance and deepen relationship between Japan and ASEAN countries.

1 Indonesia

Indonesia accounts for about 40% of the land and population of Southeast Asia and is a major power in the region, as well as being the largest island country in the world, and has been promoting close defense cooperation and exchanges. Specifically, during the Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting in June 2011, it was agreed to host regular defense ministerial consultations in order to enhance the "strategic partnership." Following this, during the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2011 and June 2013, the Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministers meeting was held and it was agreed to continue the cooperation in the area of defense based on the concept of the strategic partnership. In November the same year, Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Takeda held a meeting with Deputy Minister of Defense Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin. Furthermore, during the Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting in December 2013, it was agreed to host the Japan-Indonesia

² (1) Protect and promote together with ASEAN member states universal values, such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights; (2) Ensure in cooperation with ASEAN member states that the free and open seas, which are the most vital common asset, are governed by laws and rules and not by force, and to welcome the United States' rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region; (3) Further promote trade and investment, including flows of goods, money, people and services, through various economic partnership networks, for Japan's economic revitalization and prosperity of both Japan and ASEAN member states; (4) Protect and nurture Asia's diverse cultural heritages and traditions; (5) Promote exchanges among the young generations to further foster mutual understanding.

Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting.

There have also been numerous developments at the working level, including the discussions involving the diplomatic and defense authorities that began in November 2011, discussions between the defense authorities, and the sharing of knowledge and experience through various education and research exchange initiatives.

Furthermore, Japan is working with Indonesia in an initiative to strengthen cooperation through capacity building, and in February and July 2013, the MSDF officials and other personnel were dispatched to the Indonesian Navy Hydro-Oceanographic Office, to conduct a short-term seminar on marine meteorology. Inspection and training were also held in Japan in February 2014.

See ▶ Fig. III-3-1-6 (Status of Activities of Short-Term Dispatch Program)

2 Vietnam

With a population of about 90 million people, Vietnam is a major power in Southeast Asia. In March 2014, President of Vietnam Truong Tan Sang, who was on a state visit to Japan, and Prime Minister Abe agreed to elevate the conventional “strategic partnership” to a higher level of cooperative relationship, calling it the “Extensive Strategic Partnership.” In addition, in recent years, Japan has been deepening cooperation with Vietnam, not only in economic fields, but also in the fields of security and defense. In October 2011, Vietnamese Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh became the first Vietnamese Defense Minister to visit Japan in 13 years, holding talks with Japan’s Minister of Defense, after which the two ministers signed a memorandum concerning Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchanges, and agreed to promote high-level exchanges, regular dialogue at the vice-ministerial level, and cooperation in such fields as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In September 2013, Minister of Defense Onodera visited Vietnam, and the two countries agreed to proactively promote Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchanges, including cooperation towards the Vietnam’s first dispatch for U.N. peacekeeping operations. Minister Onodera also visited Cam Ranh Bay, a military port located at a key strategic choke point of the South China Sea, for the first time as a Japanese defense minister. As for vice-ministerial consultations, the first consultation was held in November 2012, and the second in August 2013. During these consultations, two vice-ministers exchanged opinions regarding regional situations, as well as discussing cooperation in the field of support for capacity building. In addition, in August 2013 the Chief of Staff of the GSDF visited Vietnam, and shared recognition of the situation and exchanged opinions regarding the future direction of Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and

exchanges with high-ranking officials of the Vietnam People's Army.

With regard to capacity building programs, MSDF personnel and officials from the Internal Bureau had been dispatched to Vietnam in October 2012, May 2013 and March 2014, where they gave a short-term seminar to medical officers in the Vietnamese Navy concerning diving medicine, as well as inviting them to Japan to observe the training in September 2013. In addition, in February 2014, officers from the Vietnamese armed forces were invited to Japan to observe the Northeastern Army's disaster response training (tabletop exercise), as a short training course on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Furthermore, in September 2013, ASDF officers were dispatched to give a seminar regarding flight safety, and in March 2014, flight safety personnel of the Air Defence and Air Force of Vietnam were invited to Japan for short-term training on flight safety.

It will be vital to strengthen relationships in order to achieve more concrete, practical cooperation, with the memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange as the cornerstone of this.

See ▶ Fig. III-3-1-6 (Status of Activities of Short-Term Dispatch Program)

3 Singapore

In December 2009, Singapore became the first country in Southeast Asia with which Japan signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange, and a cooperative relationship is progressing steadily based on this memorandum. In particular, discussions between the defense authorities of Japan and Singapore have the longest history of any of Japan's defense discussions with the countries of Southeast Asia, with the 13th round of talks being held in Tokyo in July 2013. In terms of high-level exchange, Permanent Secretary of Singapore's Ministry of Defence Chiang Chie Foo visited Japan in July 2012 and held discussions with the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense. Moreover, in October that year, Minister for Defence Dr. Ng Eng Hen visited Japan and held a Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting.

During the 12th Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2013 and the 2nd ADMM-Plus meeting in August 2013, Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meetings were held. In December the same year, Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Takeda visited Singapore and held talks with Permanent Secretary of Singapore's Ministry of Defence Chiang Chie Foo, in which they exchanged opinions on the regional situations. In February 2014, for the purpose of promoting mutual understanding and building mutual trust, the Chief of Staff of the ASDF attended the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific and Singapore Airshow.

Furthermore, at the 13th Shangri-La Dialogue held in May 2014, Minister of Defense Onodera held talks with Singaporean Defense Minister Dr. Ng. Minister Onodera expressed his gratitude to the Singaporean Defense Ministry for its effort to host the Dialogue, and exchanged opinions on the regional situations.

4 The Philippines

To date, as well as high-level exchanges with the Philippines, involving visits by heads of defense from both countries, there have been frequent exchanges at the working level, including visits by naval vessels and discussions between the defense authorities of the two countries. In July 2012, at the ministerial talks held when Philippines Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin visited Japan, the two defense ministers signed a statement of intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and the Philippines, as well as exchanging opinions concerning the regional situation and defense cooperation and exchange between the two nations.

The Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and the Philippines included provisions concerning high-level interaction in the form of meetings between the defense ministers and vice-ministers, and reciprocal visits by chiefs of staff and commanding officers from each service of the military. In addition, in terms of working-level exchange, it included provisions regarding discussions and dialogue between defense authorities at the director general level, as well as staff talks between the MSDF and the Philippine Navy, and exchanges between units, students, and research institutes.

In June 2013, Minister of Defense Onodera visited the Philippines and held defense ministerial talks. After the meetings, Japan and the Philippines issued a joint press release, announcing further cooperation in maritime and air defense. In addition, in December of the same year, Minister of Defense Onodera visited the Philippines in the aftermath of the recent typhoon, when the SDF were conducting international emergency relief operations, and held Japan-Philippine Defense Ministerial Meetings. During the meetings, Minister of Defense Onodera expressed his condolences for the damage caused by the typhoon, and Philippines Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin expressed his gratitude for the international emergency relief operations by the SDF; thus the two countries confirmed further enhancement of their cooperation.

5 Thailand

With Thailand, the dispatching of Defense Attachés and consultations between defense

authorities were initiated at an early stage. Thailand is also the first country to send students to the National Defense Academy, and has sent the largest cumulative number of students. While maintaining the traditionally good relationship, the MOD and the SDF, since 2005, have been participating in the multilateral military exercises, Cobra Gold, hosted by the United States and Thailand. In January 2013, the Chief of Staff of the ASDF and the GSDF consecutively visited Thailand. In September 2013, Minister of Defense Onodera visited Thailand and held talks with then Prime Minister and Defense Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and other officials, confirming that both countries would further deepen the bilateral defense relationship. Furthermore, in February 2014, the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council visited Thailand to inspect the “Cobra Gold 2014” exercise.

6 Cambodia

Cambodia is the first country to which Japan dispatched the SDF for UN peacekeeping operations in 1992. Since then, defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries have been continuously improving: in 2008, the Defense Attaché to Vietnam was also appointed as Defense Attaché to Cambodia, and support for capacity building was started in 2013. At the Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting in December 2013, the bilateral relationship was upgraded to a “strategic partnership.” After the summit, Minister of Defense Onodera signed the “Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense, Japan and the Ministry of National Defence, the Kingdom of Cambodia,” with the attendance of the prime ministers of Japan and Cambodia.

7 Myanmar

Regarding Japan’s relations with Myanmar, Japan has been promoting exchanges since Myanmar’s transition from military rule to democratic government in March 2011, such as realizing the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense’s first visit to the country, and inviting Myanmar to multilateral conferences hosted by Japan. In particular, in September 2013, the Training Squadron of the MSDF made a call at Yangon Port for the first time. In November 2013, the first consultation between defense authorities was held in the capital city Naypyidaw, during which the two countries exchanged opinions regarding the regional situation, defense policies and the procedures for future exchanges between the two nations and agreed to further promote exchanges. Furthermore, in May 2014 the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff visited Myanmar for the first time, and paid a courtesy visit to President Thein Sein. During his visit, he also held talks with Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services and exchanged views on the development of defense exchanges at various levels.

In addition, Japan has continued to dispatch a Defense Attaché to Myanmar since 1971.

8 Laos

Regarding Japan's relations with Laos, defense cooperation and exchanges have been gradually developed since 2011, when the Defense Attaché to Vietnam was also appointed as Defense Attaché to Laos, as well as Defense Attaché to Cambodia. In April 2013, the National Defense Academy accepted students from Laos for the first time, and in August 2013, the first Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting was held during the 2nd ADMM-Plus meeting. During the Japan-Laos Summit Meeting in December 2013, it was agreed that both sides would coordinate toward early realization of security dialogue between the diplomatic and defense authorities, and the first security dialogue was held in April 2014.

In addition, in January 2014, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense visited Laos for the first time, and held meetings with Vice-Prime Minister and Defense Minister as well as Vice-Minister of Defense of Laos. During the meetings, as the co-chair countries of the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief of the ADMM-Plus, the two countries agreed to enhance cooperation in these fields.

9 Malaysia

Regarding Japan's relations with Malaysia, in April 2014, Minister of Defense Onodera visited Malaysia and paid a courtesy visit to Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, as well as holding talks with Malaysian Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein. During the talks the two ministers agreed to further promote Japan-Malaysia bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, such as enhancement of cooperation in maritime security and promotion of efforts for early realization of the signing of a memorandum on defense exchanges. As for service to service exchanges, in April 2014, vessels from the MSDF and the Royal Malaysian Navy conducted a goodwill exercise in waters west of Kyushu, and in June 2014 the Chief of Staff of the MSDF visited Malaysia. Thus, Japan has been promoting friendship and goodwill with the countries in Southeast Asia.

In addition, Japan has been dispatching Defense Attaché to Malaysia since 1975 to this date.

10 Brunei Darussalam

Regarding Japan's relations with Brunei Darussalam, during the 2nd ADMM Plus meeting held in Brunei Darussalam in August 2013, Minister of Defense Onodera held talks with Brunei's Minister of Energy Mohammad Yasmin Umar and exchanged views on the initiatives of the

ADMM Plus. As for service to service exchanges, in June 2013, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff visited Brunei Darussalam for the first time, and exchanged views on defense policies and the regional situations.

(5) Other Countries

In June 2013, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff visited Brunei Darussalam for the first time, and exchanged opinions regarding defense policies and regional situations. In April 2014, vessels from the MSDF and the Royal Malaysian Navy conducted a goodwill exercise in waters west of Kyushu, and in June 2014 the Chief of Staff of the MSDF visited Malaysia. Thus, Japan is promoting friendship and goodwill with the countries in Southeast Asia.

See ▶ Reference 53 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries (Past Three Years))

7 Japan-U.K. Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

The United Kingdom, being a major power that has influence not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world, has historically maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan shares the same strategic interests with the United Kingdom, as both countries are important allies of the United States. Given this relationship, it is extremely important for Japan to promote cooperation through such global issues as international peace cooperation activities and anti-terrorism and piracy, and through information exchange relating to the regional situation.

In April 2012, when British Prime Minister David Cameron visited Japan, a joint statement was issued by the prime ministers of both countries, entitled “A Leading Strategic Partnership for Global Prosperity and Security,” which stated that the two nations would begin negotiations concerning a government-to-government information security agreement, endorse the signing of the Defense Cooperation Memorandum, and promote the identification of appropriate defense equipment for joint development and production. In terms of interaction between the defense authorities of the two countries, in addition to the exchange of the memorandum on defense cooperation in June 2012, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense visited the United Kingdom in January 2013, paying a courtesy visit to Minister of State for the Armed Forces Andrew Robathan and Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for International Security Strategy Andrew Murrison, as well as holding talks with Permanent Under Secretary Jon Thompson. During these talks, the two vice-ministers agreed to continue to share intelligence, and to deepen defense cooperation between Japan and the United Kingdom at various levels. In July 2013, the two governments concluded inter-governmental framework agreement regarding joint development of defense equipment etc., and started joint research concerning chemical and

biological protection technology. Furthermore, Japan-UK Information Security Agreement signed in July 2013 entered into force in January 2014 leading to the development of a foundation for information-sharing between the two countries. In addition, at the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting which was held in May 2014 during Prime Minister Abe's visit to the United Kingdom, the prime ministers agreed to hold the first Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, to start a negotiation for the conclusion of ACSA, and to further promote joint trainings between the SDF and the British Armed Forces. In May 2014, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kihara visited the United Kingdom and held a meeting with Mr. Andrew Murrison, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and Minister for International Security Strategy, and Mr. Philip Dunne, Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology.

During the Shangri-La Dialogue held in the same month, Defense Minister Onodera held talks with U.K. Secretary of State for Defence Philip Hammond in which the two leaders exchanged their views concerning the progress of defense cooperation between Japan and the United Kingdom as well as the regional situation. Both parties agreed to promote further discussions between the two nations toward the conclusion of the ACSA and to establish a framework for working level dialogue in order to promote cooperation in equipment and technology.

2 Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In terms of interaction between the defense authorities of the two countries, in addition to the exchange of the memorandum on defense cooperation in June 2012, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense visited the United Kingdom in January 2013, paying a courtesy visit to Minister of State for the Armed Forces Andrew Robathan and Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for International Security Strategy Andrew Murrison, as well as holding talks with Permanent Under Secretary Jon Thompson. During these talks, the two vice-ministers agreed to continue to share intelligence, and to deepen defense cooperation between Japan and the United Kingdom at various levels. In addition, both governments concluded governmental initiatives on the joint development of defense equipment and started joint research on the evaluation methods of performance of chemical protective clothing. Furthermore, Japan-UK Information Security Agreement signed in July 2013 entered into force in January 2014 leading to the development of a foundation for information-sharing between the two countries. Moreover, in May 2014, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kihara visited the United Kingdom and held a meeting with Mr. Andrew Murrison, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and Minister for International Security Strategy and Mr. Philip Dunne, Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology.

As for service to service exchanges, the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval staff of the British Royal Navy visited Japan in December 2013, as well as the Chief of Staff of the British Army in March 2014. During their visits, they held discussions with the Chief of Staff of the GSDF, and the two countries agreed to develop specific plans for the cooperation related to peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

See ► Reference 54 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the United Kingdom (Past Three Years))

8 Japan-France Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

1 Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with France

France is a major power that has influence not only in Europe and Africa, but also in the world. Historically it has had a close relationship with Japan, and is positioned as a special partner in various international organizations.

The defense authorities of the two countries have held consultations annually since 1994 to exchange a wide range of opinions regarding regional situations and security issues. In addition, in October 2011, the Japan-France Information Security Agreement was signed to develop the infrastructure for sharing information.

In June 2013, French President Francois Hollande became the first French President to visit Japan in 17 years, and the two countries issued a joint statement regarding cooperation in the field of politics, security, economy and culture. In the same month, Minister of Defense Onodera held a meeting with French Minister of Defense, Jean-Yves Le Drian, during the Shangri-La Dialogue, and exchanged opinions regarding the present situation of defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and France, the regional situation. In addition, during the first Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Paris in January 2014, the two countries shared recognition on the importance of maintaining the freedom of the high seas and the freedom of flight in international airspace. Furthermore, the ministers issued a joint statement, which included an agreement to establish a framework for two dialogues in relation to export control measures and defense equipment cooperation. During the first meeting of the committee regarding defense equipment cooperation between Japan and France, which was held in April 2014 based on the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, the two countries confirmed that they share the common interest in some areas including unmanned systems.

In May 2014, Prime Minister Abe visited France and held talks with President Hollande. The two leaders agreed to start negotiations on an agreement of defense equipment and technology cooperation, as well as to launch dialogue on cyber security and strengthen bilateral cooperation

in maritime security. During the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2013, Minister of Defense Onodera held talks with French Defense Minister Le Drian, and exchanged views on the regional situations and Japan's security policy. In addition, Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Takeda visited France in June 2014 and exchanged views with Minister of Defense Le Drian and other Minister of Defense officials and also visited an exhibition of defense equipment, etc.

As for service to service exchanges, in August 2013, the Chief of Staff of the MSDF visited France, and in March 2014, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff visited the country for the first time in about 14 years, and exchanged opinions regarding the security situations in the regions of both countries' interest as well as defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and France.

9 Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries

1 European Countries

Europe shares fundamental values with Japan and plays a central role in working to address shared challenges to global security, focusing primarily on non-traditional security areas such as counter-terrorism and combating piracy, as well as international peace cooperation activities. Therefore, developing defense cooperation and exchange with the countries of Europe lays the foundations for Japan to become actively involved in dealing with challenges, and is important for both Japan and Europe.

In January 2013, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense visited Spain, where he exchanged opinions with Secretary General for Defence Policy Alvargonzález, as well as paying a courtesy visit to Minister of Defence Morenés. Furthermore, regarding Japan's relations with Sweden, the two countries signed a memorandum on defense exchanges on December 20, 2013.

In April 2013, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen visited Japan, and signed a Joint Political Declaration between Japan and NATO with Prime Minister Abe. Furthermore, in March 2014 the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff visited Belgium, Italy, EU and NATO headquarters, and exchanged opinions regarding the security situations of the regions of interest, the defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and the counterpart country. In May 2014, Minister of Defense Onodera visited Italy and held talks with Italian Minister of Defense Roberta Pinotti. During the talks, the two ministers agreed to continue promoting cooperation, such as cooperation towards the conclusion of information security agreement, in order to further enhance bilateral relations.

In April-May 2014, Prime Minister Abe made a round of visits to Germany, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, France and Belgium, holding talks with the top leaders of these countries as well as the EU and NATO. He had a meeting with NATO Secretary General Rasmussen at the NATO Headquarters and put his signature on an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP). Prime Minister Abe made an address before the North Atlantic Council³, drawing appreciation and support from European countries for Japan's security policy based on proactive contribution to peace. He also exchanged views with the permanent representatives of NATO's 28 member countries, developing the common recognition of the security environment between Japan and Europe. Furthermore, Prime Minister Abe reaffirmed the principle of the freedom of the seas, and also agreed on joint exercises with NATO and the EU relating to counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden and cooperation in the field of defense equipment and technology with the United Kingdom and France. Regarding information security agreements with European countries, Japan has concluded the agreement on the security of information with NATO (June 2010), France (October 2011), and the United Kingdom (January 2014), and the negotiation towards concluding an information security agreement with Italy is under way.

2 Other Countries

(1) Mongolia

Following the signing of a memorandum on Japan–Mongolia defense cooperation and exchanges in January 2012, the first Defense Vice-ministerial Level Meeting was held in November 2012, and the second meeting in November 2013, in which the two countries exchanged opinions regarding defense cooperation and exchanges including support for capacity building.

High-level exchanges are also promoted, including Mongolian Minister of Defense Dashdemberel Bat-Erdene visited Japan in April 2014. In terms of support for capacity building, Japan invited high-ranking military officers from Mongolia to provide trainings at the SDF Central Hospital regarding accepting a large number of injured persons in November 2013, and to provide educational training regarding engineering (road construction) at the GSDF engineer school in March 2014.

See ▶ Fig. III-3-1-6 (Status of Activities of Short-Term Dispatch Program)

³ The decision-making body comprised of the representatives of 28 NATO member countries (Chairperson: NATO Secretary General).

(2) Turkey

The Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense visited Turkey in July 2012, where he conducted talks with Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defence Ümit Dündar, as well as paying a courtesy visit to Minister of National Defence Ismet Yilmaz. During this visit, a Statement of Intent was signed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges between two countries. In March 2013, Minister of National Defence Yilmaz visited Japan and held a defense ministerial meeting with Minister of Defense Onodera. At this meeting, as well as exchanging opinions concerning the regional situation, the two ministers agreed to hold discussions between the defense authorities of the two countries (at the director general level) at the earliest possible date, and to push forward with various forms of defense exchange.

(3) Kazakhstan

The Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense visited Kazakhstan for the first time in July 2012, and as well as paying a courtesy visit to Minister of Defence Dzhaksybekov, he held talks with First Deputy Minister of Defence Zhasuzakov. They concurred regarding the necessity of developing exchange between the two countries in the field of defense, and agreed to commence high-level exchanges, starting at the vice-ministerial level, as well as working-level discussions, starting with consultations between the defense authorities of the two nations. They also agreed to promote cooperation in the areas of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance, as well as promoting cooperation through exchanges between educational and research institutes.

(4) Middle Eastern Countries

During his April 2013 visit to Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Abe held a summit meeting with Crown Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz, at which they agreed to promote security dialogue and defense exchanges, and to start dialogue between the National Security Council (NSC) of the two countries. In February 2014, Crown Prince Salman visited Japan, and the two countries confirmed that they will continue further promoting consultations and cooperation at various levels, including the implementation of the above dialogue and starting dialogue between the NSC of both countries, as well as enhancing the comprehensive bilateral partnership.

In addition to Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Abe visited the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar in May and August 2013, and shared recognition of the necessity of promoting cooperation in the security and defense field.

In January 2014, Prime Minister Abe held a meeting with His Majesty Qaboos bin Said, Sultan of Oman, at which they agreed to enhance cooperation in the field of maritime security,

including counter-piracy measures for ensuring the security and safety of maritime routes, as well as promoting defense exchanges. In addition, in February 2014, the Chief of Staff of the MSDF visited Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.

See ► Reference 63 (Three Principles on Transfer of defense Equipment and technology (April 1, 2014))

Section 3 Counter-piracy Operations

Piracy is a grave threat to public safety and order on the seas. In particular, for Japan, which depends on maritime transportation to import most of the resources and food necessary for its survival and prosperity as a maritime nation, it is an important issue that cannot be ignored. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea states that all nations shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy, so it is necessary for Japan to actively fulfill its international responsibilities for counter-piracy operations as stipulated in the New NDPG.

1 Basic Approach

The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), one of the law enforcement agencies in Japan, is primarily responsible for coping with piracy. However, in cases in which it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the JCG to cope with piracy by itself, the SDF is to take action as well.

2 Circumstances Surrounding Incidents of Piracy and Initiatives by the International Community

Incidents involving pirates armed with machine guns and rocket launchers who seek to take hostages for ransom have continued to occur in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden is a threat to the international community, including Japan, so it is an issue that should be dealt with via cooperation among the international community.

See ▶ Fig. III-3-3-1 (Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (Comparison with the number of incidents in Southeast Asia))

Successive United Nations Security Council resolutions¹, such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816, which was adopted in June 2008, have requested various that countries take actions to deter piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden; in particular, the dispatch of their warships and military aircraft.

To date, approximately 30 countries, including the United States, have dispatched their warships to the waters off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, in December that year, the European Union (EU) decided to commence a counter-piracy operation (Operation Atlanta),

¹ The other United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for cooperation in deterring piracy are Resolutions 1838, 1846, and 1851 (adopted in 2008), Resolution 1897 (adopted in 2009), Resolutions 1918 and 1950 (adopted in 2010), Resolutions 1976 and 2020 (adopted in 2011), Resolution 2077 (adopted in 2012), and Resolution 2125 (adopted in 2013).

escorting vessels transporting supplies for the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and patrolling the waters in the area; in addition, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been conducting its own counter-piracy operation (Operation Ocean Shield) since August 2009.

All countries continue to treat piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden as a matter of serious concern, even now.

3 Japanese Initiatives

1 Legislation Concerning Counter-piracy Operations

In March 2009, after receiving the approval of the Prime Minister based on a Cabinet decision under the provisions of Article 82 of the SDF Act, the Minister of Defense gave the order for Maritime Security Operations in order to protect Japan-affiliated vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Following this order, two Japanese destroyers departed from Japan and began escorting Japan-affiliated vessels in the same month. Moreover, to conduct more effective counter-piracy operations over an extensive marine area, an order was given in May to dispatch P-3C patrol aircraft, and these aircraft commenced warning and surveillance operations in the Gulf of Aden in June the same year.

In view of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Japan subsequently enacted the Act concerning the Punishment of Acts of Piracy and Measures to Deal with Acts of Piracy (the Anti-Piracy Measures Act) in July the same year in order to deal appropriately and effectively with acts of piracy. This act made it possible to protect the vessels of all nations from acts of piracy, regardless of their flag states; moreover, it became possible to use weapons to a reasonable extent, if no other means were available, in order to halt vessels engaging in acts of piracy, such as approaching civilian vessels.

Furthermore, the Act on Special Measures concerning the Security of Japanese Flagged Vessels in Areas that Are Highly Susceptible to Acts of Piracy came into force on November 30, 2013, which made it possible to have security guards on board a Japanese ship provided certain requirements are met, allowing them to carry small arms for the purpose of security operations.

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 22 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel)

2 Activities by the Self-Defense Forces

(1) Participation in CTF151

Although the number of acts of piracy occurring in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden declined substantially in recent years, the root causes of piracy such as poverty in Somalia have not been solved. In addition, considering the fact that Somalia's capability to crackdown piracy is still not sufficient, and that the criminal organizations responsible for piracy acts have not been totally destroyed, the situation in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden remains unpredictable. If the international community reduces its counter-piracy efforts, the situation could be easily reversed. Moreover, the Japanese Shipowners' Association and other entities are still requesting that the SDF continue their counter-piracy operations; in addition, international organizations such as NATO and the EU have decided to continue their operations. Therefore, there is no great change in the situation in which Japan must carry out its counter-piracy operations.

In addition, due to the fact that the scope of the area susceptible to acts of piracy is spreading to areas off the coast of Oman and the Arabian Sea in recent years, the area of activity of the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151)², which conducts warning and surveillance activities (zone defense), is increasingly spreading. Thus the number of deployed vessels of other countries in the Gulf of Aden decreases at certain times. Furthermore, the number of vessels that are directly escorted by the SDF surface force per escort operation was gradually reduced (a method in which the destroyers guard the front and rear of the convoy). In light of such a situation, in July of the same year, Japan decided to participate in the CTF 151 to commence zone defense in addition to escort missions as before, while coordinating closely with the units of other countries that are engaged in counter piracy operations, for the purpose of conducting more flexible and effective operations. Following this, the surface force started zone defense in December 2013.

In addition, the air force have been participating in the CTF 151 since February 2014. This participation enabled the force to acquire information that was previously not accessible, such as other countries' operation policies on flight squadrons and environment analysis that contributes to counter piracy measures. Moreover, it became possible to conduct more flexible warning and surveillance activities. For example, aircraft can be deployed as needed even to areas that are highly susceptible to acts of piracy, and as a result, coordination between other countries' counter piracy units was further enhanced.

Moreover, in July 2014, the SDF decided to dispatch a commander and command center staff to

² The Combined Maritime Force (CMF), whose headquarters are located in Bahrain, announced that CTF151 was set up as a multinational task force for counter-piracy operations in January 2009.

the CTF 151³. With SDF personnel serving as the CTF 151 commander and command center staff, it becomes possible to facilitate coordination among units of countries involved, including units participating in the CTF 151, and more broadly gather information on counter-piracy operations of other countries off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. This enables Japan to enhance the effectiveness of the SDF's counter-piracy operations through strengthened coordination with units of other countries engaged in counter-piracy operations.

(2) Achievements

At present, two destroyers have been dispatched, one of which is in principle escorting civilian vessels back and forth across the Gulf of Aden. The other destroyer is conducting zone defense in the designated marine area within the Gulf of Aden.

The direct escort method firstly places the destroyer and private vessels to be escorted at the assembly point, one each designated at the eastern and western ends of the Gulf. When the convoy sails across the Gulf of Aden, the destroyer guards the convoy; and helicopter carried on the destroyer also watches the surrounding area from the sky. In this way, the ships take around two days to sail the 900 km or so distance across the Gulf of Aden, all the while making absolutely certain that the convoy is safe and secure, day and night. Moreover, there are eight JCG officers aboard the destroyers⁴ and the SDF cooperates with the JCG to enable them to conduct judicial law enforcement activities, as required.

During the non-monsoon season (March - May, September - November), when the area within which acts of piracy become active because of the calmer seas, the escort route is extended by approximately 200 km to the east.

On the other hand, in zone defense, an operation area is allocated to each destroyer based on the coordination with the CTF 151 headquarters. The destroyer conducts warning and surveillance activities within the allocated area, and contributes to improve security for all countries' vessels, including those of Japan.

As of May 31, 2014, 3461 vessels have been escorted under the protection of the destroyers. Not a single vessel has come to any harm from pirates and they have all passed safely across the Gulf of Aden. In this body of water, which is a major artery for the economy not only of Japan, but also of the world economy, the escort activities undertaken by the SDF provide a

³ Going forward, time for dispatching, etc. is to be decided upon coordinating with Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)

⁴ If required, they conduct judicial police activities, such as arresting and questioning pirates.

tremendous sense of security.

See ► *Fig. III-3-3-2 (SDF's Counter-Piracy Operations)*

In addition, the maritime patrol aircraft (P-3C) based in the Republic of Djibouti make use of their excellent cruising capability in conducting surveillance operations in the vast Gulf of Aden. The flight zone is determined based on coordination with CTF151 headquarters. The P-3Cs taking off from Djibouti watch whether there are suspicious boats among the numerous ships navigating in the Gulf. At the same time, they provide information to the destroyers engaging in escort activities, the naval vessels of other countries and civilian vessels sailing through the area, responding by such means as confirming the safety of the surrounding area immediately, if requested. The SDF, which has dispatched two P-3Cs, conducts warning and surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, while cooperating with other countries who have also dispatched maritime patrol aircraft to the area. This activity accounts for 60% of warning and surveillance conducted by each country in the maritime area.

The information gathered by SDF P-3Cs is constantly shared with CTF151 or other related organizations, and contributes significantly to deterring acts of piracy and disarming vessels suspected of being pirate ships.

Since commencing duties in June 2009, the aircraft have flown 1,140 missions as of June 30, 2014, and their flying hours total 8,820 hours. Approximately 92,700 ships have been identified and information has been provided to vessels navigating the area and other countries engaging in counter-piracy operations on around 9,620 occasions.

Moreover, in order to improve the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the Deployment Airforce for Counter Piracy Enforcement, the Ministry of Defense and SDF has set up the base in the northwest district of the Djibouti International Airport, which started its operation in June 2011. Although this force is mainly composed of the MSDF personnel, P-3Cs and other equipment are guarded by the GSDF personnel at the base. In addition, the ASDF personnel to the headquarters are also involved in this force.

In addition, the Deployment Support Unit for Counter Piracy Enforcement, which is engaged in operations necessary for SDF personnel to carry out counter-piracy operations, is made up of MSDF and GSDF personnel, and GSDF personnel provide security for P-3C patrol aircraft and other equipment at operational bases in Djibouti, and also serve as the unit's command center staff. Furthermore, the ASDF has formed an airlift squadron to support these activities,

consisting of transport aircraft (C-130H) and aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-767), which is engaged in transport missions. Also, the local coordination center in Djibouti is in charge of communication and coordination with the government of Djibouti and other foreign units/organizations.

See ▶ Fig. III-3-3-3 (Structure of the Deployed Forces)

4 Praise for Japan's Endeavors

The counter-piracy operations by the Japan SDF have been highly praised by the international community, with national leaders and others expressing their gratitude. Moreover, the MSDF, which is engaging in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, has received many messages from the captains and shipowners of the vessels that its units have escorted, expressing their gratitude that the ships were able to cross the Gulf of Aden with peace of mind and asking them to continue escorting ships there. From the 1st to the 17th unit, a total of 2,700 messages have been received.

Section 4 Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF are proactively undertaking international peace cooperation activities, working in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, including the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving the fundamental causes of problems such as conflict and terrorism.

See ▶ *Fig. III-3-4-1 (Record of Activities in the International Community by the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces)*

1 Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities, etc.

1 Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities

The international peace cooperation activities undertaken by the MOD and the SDF to date are as follows: (1) international peace cooperation duties such as cooperation with peacekeeping operations (PKO); (2) international disaster relief operations to respond to large-scale disasters overseas; (3) activities based on the temporary Special Measures on Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq which is now abolished; and 4) activities based on the former Anti-terrorism Special Measures Act, and the temporary Replenishment Support Special Measures Act both of which are also abolished now.

See ▶ *Fig. III-3-4-2 (International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the SDF)*

See ▶ *Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 22 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel); Reference 59 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities); Reference 58 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities)*

2 Significance of Stipulating International Peace Cooperation Activities as One of the Primary Missions of the SDF

Amid the current security environment, the peace and security of the international community are considered to be closely linked to the peace and security of Japan. Based on this awareness, international peace cooperation activities, which used to be regarded as supplementary activities¹, were positioned in 2007 as one of the primary missions of the SDF², alongside the

¹ Activities prescribed in Article 8 of the SDF Act (a miscellaneous provision) or supplementary provisions

² Missions defined in Article 3 of the SDF Act. The primary mission is to defend Japan. The secondary missions are the preservation of public order, activities in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and international peace cooperation activities.

defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order.

3 Continuous Initiatives to Promptly and Accurately Carry Out International Peace Cooperation Activities

To be a proactive contribution to world peace, it is important for the SDF to always be fully prepared for all kinds of future operations. For this purpose, the Central Readiness Regiment, a unit that could be deployed swiftly to whatever needed and make the necessary preparations till the main unit arrives, was established under the Central Readiness Force in March 2008. Also, the GSDF has a stand-by unit based on a rotational system, in which members are chosen from a certain area force of the five area forces in Japan in each rotational period. However, in the future we are planning to abolish this rotational system and steadily choose members of the stand-by unit from the Northern Army. Since they were trained in an ideal training environment and through the numerous past SDF operations, have abundant experience of being the first unit to be deployed to the operational area.

In 2009, in order to participate more actively in U.N. peacekeeping operations, Japan registered for the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS)³. The objective of this system is to make the process faster and smoother for the United Nations to sound countries out on dispatch development when implementing peacekeeping operations. As of the end of March 2014, Japan has registered its preparedness to provide SDF personnel capable of providing logistic support for the following activities and operations: (1) medical care (including epidemic prevention measures); (2) transportation; (3) storage (including reserve); (4) communications; (5) construction; (6) SDF units capable of logistic support for installation, inspection, and repair of machines and apparatus; (7) military observers; and (8) HQ officers.

The SDF promotes capacity-building initiatives regarding information-gathering abilities and defensive abilities in dispatch destinations, which are required to complete missions while ensuring the security of personnel and units during international peace cooperation activities. In addition, in order to respond to a variety of environments and prolonged missions, the SDF promotes initiatives to improve the capabilities for transport and deployment and information communication, and to develop a structure of replenishment and medical support for conducting smooth and continuous operations. The GSDF promotes initiatives to enhance the conditions

³ This is a system adopted by the United Nations in 1994 in order to facilitate agile deployment for U.N. peacekeeping operations. The system involves member nations registering beforehand the scope of the contribution that they can make, the number of personnel available for dispatch, and the time required for dispatch. When the United Nations approaches member nations with a request for dispatch based on the registered information, it is up to each country to decide whether to actually dispatch personnel or not.

of the engineering unit, which is in high demand in dispatch destinations, as well as improving protection vehicles for transport that are used to protect people from mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). It also promotes improvement of the engines of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) and development of wheeled armored personnel carrier (modified), in order to ensure that activities can be carried out under diversified environments. The MSDF is promoting the portability and deployability of the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) to facilitate the effective operation of fixed-wing patrol aircraft overseas. The ASDF is upgrading its equipment through the acquisition of devices including aviation satellite phones, in order to maintain command communication between aircraft and ground controllers in a range of environments, as well as countermeasure dispensers for transport aircraft, and airborne collision avoidance systems.

The International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit at Camp Komakado (Shizuoka Prefecture) conducts education for GSDF personnel to be deployed to international peace cooperation activities, and also supports training related to international peace cooperation activities. In addition, the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) under the Joint Staff College launched a basic training course on international peace cooperation activities (the Basic Course on International Peace Cooperation) from October 2011. Furthermore, since FY2012, it has been providing education and research on international peace cooperation activities tailored to a variety of levels. For example, it provides specialized education (the Intermediate Course on International Peace Cooperation and the Advanced Course on International Peace Cooperation) to cultivate officers in charge of planning and policymaking associated with the management and implementation of international peace cooperation activities, and staff officers to be deployed at the headquarters of U.N. missions. Including the potential for further expanding the range of people to whom this education is made available, the SDF is exploring the possibility of further enhancing the Center as a hub for education and research focused on international peace cooperation activities.

4 Welfare and Mental Health Care of Dispatched SDF Units

SDF personnel are expected to fulfill their assigned duty under severe working conditions while being far away from their home country and their families. Therefore, it is extremely important to make necessary arrangements so that dispatched SDF personnel can effectively carry out their assigned duty while maintaining both their physical and mental health.

For this reason, the MOD and the SDF have implemented various measures to support families to reduce anxiety for the dispatched SDF personnel and their families.

See ▶ Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 1 (Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force)

The SDF provides mental health checkups several times before and after a dispatch to all the personnel to be sent. The SDF also offers mental health care services, such as a course on stress reduction methods for SDF personnel with a scheduled dispatch when engaging in overseas missions; and dispatched SDF personnel can consult with designated counselors who have completed specialized training. Such counselors provide dispatched personnel with sufficient mental care. As well as assigning medical officers to SDF units engaged in overseas missions, the MOD regularly sends mental healthcare support teams led by qualified psychiatrists from Japan and provides education on methods of dealing with stress on the spot, as well as important points to consider in communication with families or fellow SDF personnel after returning to Japan.

2 Initiatives to Support U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, etc.

As a means to promote peace and stability in the conflict regions of conflict around the world, the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) has expanded its missions in recent years to include such duties as providing assistance in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) into society of former soldiers, Security Sector Reform (SSR), elections, human rights, the rule of law, the promotion of political processes, the Protection of Civilians (POC), and other fields, in addition to such traditional missions as ceasefire monitoring. Today, 16 PKO and 12 political and peace building missions are being established (as of the end of April 2014).

International organizations, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) conduct relief and restoration activities for the victims of conflicts and large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective and from the viewpoint of stabilizing affected countries.

Japan has been promoting international peace cooperation operations in various regions including Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and South Sudan for more than 20 years, and the results of these activities have been highly praised by the domestic and international communities. From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of international cooperation, and in light of the appreciation and expectation from the international community, Japan will actively engage in international peace cooperation operations in multilayered way. In this regard, while developed nations place more priority on in “quality” and “cost-effectiveness” rather than on “quantity,” it is necessary to deliberate about how the SDF should contribute to the international community. Meanwhile, the SDF will

proactively continue taking part in peacekeeping activities utilizing their accumulated experiences and advanced skills in the field of such as engineering; as well as expanding the dispatch of SDF personnel to responsible positions, such as local mission headquarters and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the United Nations. As such, the SDF places more emphasis on taking more of a leading role, and the MOD will proactively participate in discussions in the whole government.

1 Outline of the International Peace Cooperation Act

The Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations, enacted in 1992, is designed to allow Japan to actively contribute to global initiatives led mainly by the United Nations to achieve peace and stability in the international community by establishing a structure for Japan to appropriately and swiftly cooperate in (1) U.N. peacekeeping operations⁴, (2) humanitarian international relief operations⁵, and (3) international election monitoring activities. The law also enables Japan to implement measures for providing assistance in the form of goods in response to each of the three activities listed above.

The law stipulates a set of basic guidelines (so-called five principles for participation) for Japan's participation in a U.N. peacekeeping force.

See ▶ *Fig.III-3-4-3 (Basic Policy on Japan's Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Forces (Five Principles))*

2 United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

(1) Background to the decision to dispatch personnel to UNMISS

In Sudan, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in January 2005.

From October 2008, Japan dispatched two GSDF officials to UNMIS headquarters as HQ officers (logistics staff and intelligence staff), but UNMIS ended its mission in July 2011, when South Sudan became independent.

⁴ Activities carried out under the jurisdiction of the United Nations based on a U.N. Resolution to maintain international peace and stability including ensuring the observance of agreements between combatants regarding the prevention of the recurrence of armed conflict, support for the establishment of governing bodies through democratic means carried out following the end of conflict, and others.

⁵ Activities being conducted by the United Nations, other international organizations, or countries based on a humanitarian spirit for the relief of victims of military conflicts, and reconstruction activities in connection with war-related damage. Such activities are initiated in accordance with a U.N. Security Council Resolution or requests from international organizations.

Meanwhile, in response to the independence of South Sudan, the United Nations Security Council adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1996, with the objective of consolidating peace and security and helping to establish necessary conditions for development of South Sudan, from the perspective of strengthening the capacity of the Government of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and to establish good relationships with neighboring countries; as a result, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established in July 2011.

In August 2011, during his visit to Japan, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asked then-Prime Minister Kan to cooperate with UNMISS, particularly through the dispatch of GSDF engineer units. The government conducted a number of field surveys. And based on the result of the survey, in November, the Cabinet approved the dispatch of two HQ officers (logistics staff and intelligence staff) to UNMISS, and in December, it decided to dispatch an SDF engineer unit, the then-Coordination Center, and an additional HQ officer (engineering staff).

The peace and stability of South Sudan is essential for the stability of Africa as a whole; moreover, it is a crucial issue that should be dealt with by the international community. Therefore, it is necessary for Japan to assist South Sudan in building up the nation. The MOD and the SDF have accumulated experience through the past peacekeeping operations, and we believe that it is possible for Japan to contribute to the nation building of South Sudan by providing personnel-based cooperation in infrastructure development, on which the United Nations places great expectations.

See ▶ Fig. III-3-4-2 (South Sudan and Its Surrounding Area)

See ▶ Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1, Item 2-5 (Sudan/South Sudan Situation)

(2) Activities by the SDF

In January 2012, for the purpose of smoothly carrying out the PKO activities in South Sudan, an organization mainly focusing on the coordination with other organizations was established in the South Sudan capital city Juba and in Uganda. This organization was called the “Coordination Center”, and this was the very first time for the SDF to set up this kind of organization in PKO activities.

The SDF constructed their encampment within the United Nations facility placed in Juba, and started their engineering activity within the UN facility in March 2012. Activities outside the United Nations facility began in April 2012. Moreover, the engineer unit began collaborative

work with international organizations in June that year, and also started “All Japan Project” by assisting ODA projects. On May 28, 2013, the Chief Cabinet Secretary announced it would expand the areas where operations would be carried out by the SDF, and on the same day, the Minister of Defense issued an order for expanding the areas in which the dispatched engineer unit could carry out its operations. Through this announcement and order, the action areas of the dispatched engineer unit widened from the areas in and around Juba to areas that also encompassed Central, Eastern, and Western Equatoria. This expansion was coordinated in response to a request from the U.N., and it will enable Japan to further contribute to South Sudan in nation-building⁶. Since December 2013, due to the worsened security situation in South Sudan, the dispatched engineering unit has been conducting site preparation activities for the protected refugee camps in the United Nations’ facility in Juba, as part of assistance for the local people who are taking refuge at the facility.

On December 23, 2013, at the request of the United Nations and other organizations, Japan provided 10,000 bullets to the United Nations in light of the urgent necessity and humanitarian aspect of the situation⁷.

See ▶ Fig.III-3-4-5 (Organization of UNMISS)

See ▶ Fig.III-3-4-6 (Overview of the Coordination Center and the Engineer Unit Deployed in South Sudan)

(3) Cooperation Between Japan and Australia in UNMISS

To date, the MOD and SDF have cooperated closely with the Australian military in the field, such as in activities to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq and United Nations peacekeeping operations. Both Japan and Australia are involved in UNMISS as well; on August 31, 2012, two Australian military personnel were dispatched to assist with liaison at Japan’s Coordination Team (the former-Coordination Center), where they are engaged in the coordination activities of UNMISS duties.

3 Dispatch of SDF Personnel to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Currently One SDF personnel is dispatched to the Force Generation Service, Office of Military Affairs of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations for a two-year period from September 2013 to engage in unit formation of the PKO mission personnel assignment or coordinating the negotiation of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with member nations.

⁶ Activities being conducted by the United Nations, other international organizations, or countries based on a humanitarian spirit for the relief of victims of military conflicts, and reconstruction activities in connection with war-related damage. Such activities are initiated in accordance with a U.N. Security Council Resolution or requests from international organizations.

⁷ In 2014, the bullets Japan provided were handed back.

See ▶ Reference 60 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations)

4 Dispatch of Instructors to the PKO Center in Africa

In order to assist in self-supporting endeavors by African countries to undertake peacekeeping operations, the MOD and SDF dispatch SDF personnel as instructors to African peacekeeping training centers, which educate and train peacekeeping personnel. Japan is contributing to peace and stability in Africa through strengthening the functions of these peacekeeping centers. Starting with the deployment to the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) in November 2008, a total of 15 SDF personnel (13 deployments and six countries in total), including one female SDF officer, were dispatched over the period until May 2014. The SDF personnel provided education in the experiences and lessons gained by the SDF through their activities overseas, such as lectures concerning the importance of building relationships with local residents in international peace cooperation activities, and the international disaster relief activities that the SDF has experienced. They also provided advice on education as international consultants, the first time to do so in the capacity other than instructors, at the Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Center (EIPKTC) in March-May 2014, and formulated curriculums on developing human resources of PKO mission. As a result, they were highly commended by local staff, as well as the audience.

See ▶ Fig. III-3-4-7 (PKO Centers in Africa)

5 Formulation of Engineer Unit Manual for Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations

In order to play more of a leading role in international peace cooperation activities, the MOD and SDF support the formulation of Engineer Unit manual for Peacekeeping Operations, which is initiated by the United Nations Headquarters, and Japan also serves as a chair country of the Engineer Unit Manual Working Group.

In March 2014, the Workshop of Engineer Unit Manual was held in Tokyo, and experts from the 14 participating countries and multiple international organizations held discussions about the basic concept for creating the engineer unit manual. With the second Workshop held in Indonesia in June 2014, Japan is playing a leading role in facilitating cooperation among countries concerned for the completion of the manual at the beginning of 2015.

3 International Disaster Relief Operations

In recent years, the role of advanced capabilities in military affairs has become more diverse, and opportunities for its use in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are growing. For the purpose of contributing to the advancement of international cooperation, the SDF has also

engaged in global disaster relief operations proactively from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the international security environment.

To this end, the SDF maintains their readiness to take any necessary action based on prepared disaster relief operation plans. The SDF has been proactively conducting international disaster relief operations which fully utilize their capabilities, while taking into consideration specific relief requests by the governments of affected countries and disaster situations in these countries, as well as based on the consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

See ▶ Reference 68 (Major Exercises Conducted in FY 2013)

1 Outline of the International Disaster Relief Law

Since the enactment of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams (International Disaster Relief Law) in 1987, Japan has engaged in international disaster relief activities in response to requests from the governments of affected countries and international organizations.

In 1992, the Japan Disaster Relief Team Dispatch Act was partially amended, enabling the SDF to participate in international disaster relief operations and to transport its personnel and equipment for this purpose.

See ▶ Reference 21 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces)

2 International Disaster Relief Operations by the SDF and SDF's Posture

The SDF's capabilities in international disaster relief operations encompass (1) medical services, such as first-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention; (2) transport of goods, patients, and disaster relief personnel by helicopter and other means; and (3) ensuring water supplies using water-purifying devices. Also, the SDF uses transport planes and ships to carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to the affected area. International disaster relief operations conducted by the SDF may take different forms according to factors such as the scale of the disaster, the degree of damage, and the requests of the governments of affected countries or international organizations.

The Central Readiness Force and regional units of the GSDF maintain their readiness to ensure that they can carry out international disaster relief operations in an independent manner anytime the need arises. The Self Defense Fleet of the MSDF and Air support command of the ASDF constantly maintain their readiness to transport units participating in international disaster relief operations and supplies to the units.

3 International Disaster Relief Operations in the Philippines

(1) Background of the Dispatch to the International Disaster Relief Operations

From November 8 to 9, 2013, a large-scale typhoon No. 30 directly hit the center of the Philippines. Following a request from the government of the Philippines, which was suffering catastrophic damage, to the government of Japan, and based on the consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense decided to conduct international disaster relief operations on November.

See ▶ *Fig. III-3-4-8 (The Philippines and the Surrounding Area)*

See ▶ *Fig. III-3-4-9 (Outline of Philippine International Disaster Relief Teams)*

(2) SDF Activities

On the same day, the MOD and SDF formed an international disaster relief team consisting of 50 personnel, including medical teams, and dispatched them to the Philippines one after another from that day on. After their, the medical team provided medical treatment in Tacloban and Cebu. Considering the fact that the government of the Philippines sent further requests on November 14 and the disaster situation on the ground, the MOD and SDF decided to expand their operation on November 15. Following this decision, the Joint Operations Coordination Center was established in Manila, and the first ever Joint Task Force in international disaster relief operations was formulated to conduct disaster relief activities with 1,100 personnel, the largest number in the past.

The Joint operations Center in the Philippines closely coordinated with the Embassy of Japan and JICA, That center also coordinated with the related Filipino organizations and other countries via a multilateral coordination center in Manila. In addition, liaison officers were exchanged between the MSDF destroyer Ise and the British aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious for maintaining close communication and coordination. Furthermore, based on the Japan-US and Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA), supplies and services were provided and received between these countries for the first time in international disaster relief operations. In particular, the U.S. Air Force provided liquid oxygen to the ASDF C-130H transport aircrafts, and the MSDF replenishment ship Towada conducted underway replenishment for an Australian vessel.

The Joint Task Force of the Philippines International Disaster Relief Team consisted of the following groups: 1) headquarters; 2) Medical Assistance and Air Support Unit consisting of the 6th Division, 1st Helicopter Brigade, Northeastern Army Aviation Group, Tohoku Logistics

Depot of the GSDF, and Sendai Hospital; 3) Maritime Dispatched Group consisting of the MSDF destroyer Ise and transport vessel Osumi; and 4) Airlift Unit consisting of the ASDF KC-767 tanker aircraft and C-130H transport aircraft. Under the integrated operation, a total of 2,624 people received medical care; a total of 11,924 people were vaccinated; epidemic control operation was conducted in an approx. 95,600 square meters area; approx. 630 tons of supply was transported by air; and a total of approx. 2,768 were afflicted people transported by aircraft.

On December 13, 2013, the Minister of Defense issued an order to terminate disaster relief activities, based on the talks with the Philippine government. The month-long activities were completed accordingly.

4 The International Disaster Relief Operations for the Missing Malaysian Airplane

(1) Background of Dispatch to the International Disaster Relief Operations

In the early hours of March 8, 2014, the air traffic control lost contact with Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 flying from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. With the request for assistance from the Malaysian government on March 10, and based on consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense decided to conduct international disaster relief operations on March 11.

See ▶ Fig. III-3-4-10 (The Malaysia and the Surrounding Area)

See ▶ Fig. III-3-4-11 (International Disaster Relief Teams for a Missing Malaysian Airplane)

(2) The SDF Activities

The MOD and SDF dispatched a maximum of 90 personnel as well as two P-3C patrol aircraft of MSDF and two C-130H Transport planes of ASDF to Malaysia to conduct search and rescue operations. After that, at the request of the governments of Malaysia and Australia, the two P-3C patrol aircraft moved to the western part of Australia to continue the search and rescue operations.

During this operation, MSDF P-3C patrol aircrafts were provided support including fuel and aircraft parts from Australia based on the ACSA.

On April 28, 2013, upon the announcement made by the Australian Prime Minister Abbott that Australia would proceed from the waterborne search to the ocean floor search, the Minister of Defense issued an order to terminate disaster relief activities, based on talks with the governments of Malaysia and Australia. The month-long activities were completed accordingly. During the operations, the SDF dispatched a total of six aircrafts such as the P-3C patrol aircraft,

and C-130H transport aircraft, and approximately 130 personnel; engaged in search activities for 400 hours on a total of 46 occasions.

Section 5 Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Causing anxiety not only to Japan and other East Asian nations, but also countries across the globe, especially the United States, North Korea's launch of a missile which it purported to be a satellite in December 2012 and its nuclear test in February 2013 demonstrate that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles which serve as their means of delivery still pose a pressing challenge to the peace and stability of the international community.

Moreover, many countries are working on the regulation of certain conventional weapons, while taking into account the need to maintain a balance between the humanitarian perspective and defensive requirements.

One of the initiatives to deal with these issues is the development of an international framework for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, and Japan is playing an active role in this effort.

See ▶ Fig. III-3-5-1 (Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.)

1 Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in Regard to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Japan actively participates in international initiatives including conventions and management systems relating to frameworks for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation in regard to weapons of mass destruction, in the form of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery and associated technologies and materials.

Japan has provided contributions in personnel in this field, offering its knowledge in the field of chemical protection from the time when negotiations over the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) were taking place, as well as dispatching GSDF personnel, experts on protection against chemical weapons, to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was established to implement the verification measures stipulated in the convention following its entry into force. Furthermore, small quantities of chemical substances subject to regulation under the convention are synthesized at the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), in order to conduct protection research. The school has undergone a total of eight inspections since its establishment, in accordance with the convention regulations.

Moreover, the whole of the government is working on projects aimed at disposing of abandoned chemical weapons in China, in accordance with the CWC, and the Ministry has seconded eight personnel, including GSDF personnel, to the Cabinet Office to work on this project. Since 2000, GSDF personnel with expertise in chemicals and ammunitions have been dispatched to conduct excavation and recovery projects on a total of 13 occasions. In 2013, from August to September, seven GSDF personnel participated in the project undertaken by the Cabinet Office in Hunchun, in China's Jilin Province. In addition, the Ministry of Defense has been cooperating in endeavors aimed at increasing the effectiveness of regulations and decisions, by dispatching officials to major meetings such as those of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), as well as international export control regimes in the form of the Australia Group (AG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Furthermore, from 2011 to 2012, one GSDF personnel was dispatched to the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the first time.

See ▶ Reference 60 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations)

2 Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms Control of Conventional Weapons

Taking into account both the humanitarian perspective and security needs, Japan has joined various conventions on the regulation of conventional weapons, including the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW).

In particular, with regard to the issue of the regulation of cluster munitions, it is important to formulate an effective protocol within the CCW framework, in which major producers and owners of such weapons participate, including the U.S., China, and Russia. Discussions within this framework have ended, for the time being, but in the event that a renegotiation is agreed in the future, Japan will continue to make an active contribution to the negotiations.

Furthermore, Japan has also acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention)¹, which was negotiated and adopted outside the framework of the CCW; with the entry of this Convention into force in August 2010, the use of all cluster munitions in the possession of the SDF immediately became prohibited. Moreover, the Convention stipulates that all cluster munitions held by signatories be destroyed within eight years of its entry into force, in principle, so such munitions will be safely and steadily disposed of.

¹ Countries such as the U.S., China and Russia, which are major producers and owners of cluster munitions, have not yet signed the Oslo Convention.

Furthermore, the MOD has actively cooperated in the initiatives of the international community, focused on the problem of anti-personnel mines, such as submitting annual reports that include data on Japan's exceptional stocks to the United Nations².

In addition, the MOD and the SDF participate in various systems introduced by the United Nations with the goal of increasing the transparency of military preparedness and military expenditure (the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures), and as well as providing the requisite reports, they dispatch personnel as needed to governmental expert meetings held in order to improve and strengthen these systems.

3 International Initiatives Aimed at Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

1 Proliferation Security Initiative

Harboring grave concerns about the development of weapons of mass destruction and missiles by countries of particular concern in regard to proliferation, such as North Korea and Iran, the U.S. announced its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)³ in May 2003, and sought the participation of other countries therein. Various initiatives are being undertaken based on PSI, such as holding meetings to consider issues related to policy and legislation; in addition, 40 PSI interdiction exercises have been held as of the end of March 2014, in order to improve the ability of participating countries to thwart the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related items.

Since the 3rd PSI Meeting in Paris (September 2003), the MOD and the SDF have collaborated with relevant organizations and countries, dispatching MOD officials and SDF personnel to various meetings, as well as engaging in ongoing participation in these exercises since 2004.

To date, Japan has twice hosted PSI maritime interdiction exercises, working in partnership with relevant organizations, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance and the Japan Coast Guard, and for the first time hosted the PSI air

² Between 1999 and December 2006, the MOD nominated retired Self-Defense Officials to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), to support antipersonnel mine removal activities in Cambodia; these retired SDF personnel were dispatched to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) as maintenance and transport advisors within JICA's long-term expert dispatch framework.

³ The Proliferation Security Initiative is an initiative that seeks the strengthening of relevant domestic laws of respective countries to the maximum possible extent, as well as considering the measures that participating countries can jointly take while complying with existing domestic and international laws, in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials.

interdiction exercise in July 2012. In addition, during the PSI maritime interdiction exercise, which was hosted by the ROK in September 2012, Japan sent participants including MOD and SDF personnel, and MSDF naval vessels and aircraft, as well as personnel from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japan Coast Guard. Based on the proliferation cases in the areas surrounding Japan, the MOD will continue its efforts to strengthen nonproliferation frameworks in peacetime, including PSI, as well as participating in and holding various meetings and exercises to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and improving the ability of the SDF.

See ▶ Fig. III-3-5-2 (Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since 2010))

2 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Regarding the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

In April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 regarding the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which lays the foundations for the international community to deal with the acquisition, development, use, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors.

Japan supports the adoption of this resolution and hopes that all United Nations member countries will comply with it.

Part IV Bases to Demonstrate Defense Capabilities

Chapter 1 Measures on Defense Equipment, such as the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

While the security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly harsh, our nation's fiscal circumstances remain difficult. Amid this situation, it is vital to maintain and strengthen Japan's defense production and technological bases, based on defense equipment related policies such as the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, in order to stably develop defense equipment, which is becoming increasingly high-performance and complex.

This chapter explains the Ministry's initiatives in this area.

Section 1 Defense Production and Technological Bases, and the Current Status of Defense Equipment Acquisition

1 Japan's Defense Production and Technological Bases

1 Attributes and Current Status of Japan's Defense Production and Technological Bases

The term "defense production and technological bases" refers to the human, physical and technological bases for development, production, operation, maintenance, remodeling, and refurbishment of defense equipment required for MOD and SDF activities. As Japan has no national arsenal (state-owned munitions factory), the whole of the production base and most of the technological base is in the hands of companies that manufacture defense equipment and associated items (the defense industry). Broad and numerous small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are involved in the production of defense equipment; for example, there are said to be approximately 1,100 companies involved with fighter aircraft, approximately 1,300 involved with tanks, and approximately 2,500 involved with destroyers. Moreover, the market for defense equipment is limited to the small amount of demand from the MOD, so manufacturing economies of scale cannot be expected. Furthermore, specialized, advanced technologies and skills are required in the development and manufacture of defense equipment, and it takes a great deal of effort to cultivate and maintain those technologies and skills.

Thus, the scale of Japan's defense industry is not large, and the value of production destined for the Ministry of Defense accounts for less than 1% of the overall value of production in Japan.

Moreover, the degree of reliance on defense sector demand (sales related to defense as a proportion of total sales by the company) among companies involved in the production of defense equipment and related items is around 5% on average, so for many companies, the defense business is not their main field of business. While some among the comparatively small-scale companies have a degree of reliance on defense sector demand in excess of 50%, fluctuations in procurement by the MOD have a major impact on such companies.

See ▶ Fig. IV-1-1-1 (Scale of the Defense Industry in Japan and its Degree of Reliance on Defense Demand)

2 Significance of Retaining Defense Production and Technological Bases Within Japan

Retaining such bases within Japan is significant in that it provides (1) bases to support the supply and use of the defense equipment required for the maintenance and improvement necessary so that defense equipment can be provided that are appropriate to the territorial and other characteristics of the country, and that Japan can wield its defense capabilities to the greatest extent possible, (2) a checking effect in terms of potential defense capabilities which can be autonomously strengthened, (3) a source of bargaining power (negotiating capability) so that the latest equipment and tools can be purchased at as low a price as possible when procuring supplies from other countries, and so that better terms can be drawn out during negotiations with other countries regarding international joint development and production, as well as (4) economic effects through the spinning off effect from defense equipment to industry overall, and to the creation of domestic employment opportunities.

2 Current Status of the Acquisition of Defense Equipment

1 Unit Prices and Quantities in Procurement

The situation surrounding defense-related expenditures in Japan continues to be difficult. Since FY2005, the cost of maintenance and upkeep has overtaken the costs associated with the purchase of major items of equipment and materials, creating an additional strain on the procurement of new major items of equipment and materials. Moreover, the increasingly high-performance and complex nature of equipment and materials has brought about a rise in development and manufacturing costs, inflating the unit price of equipment and materials. These circumstances have brought about a decline in the quantity procured, leading to problems such as difficulties in maintaining and cultivating highly-skilled factory workers, as well as the emergence of companies withdrawing from the defense business altogether, due to the opaque outlook for the future.

See ▶ Reference 61 (Change in Equipment Volumes Procured, by Procurement Method)

2 The Current Status of Research and Development

In terms of the technical strength of the defense industry, trends in the research and development budget have a considerable influence over the maintenance and improvement of skills among engineers in public and private sectors, because such skills are maintained and cultivated by working on research and development projects. Moreover, although factors such as the increasing performance of equipment have resulted in an increasing trend in research and development costs, in recent years, the ratio of defense-related expenditure accounted for by research and development has leveled off.

See ► Fig. IV-1-1-2 (Current Status of Research & Development Expenditure)

Section 2 Initiatives for Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement and Improving its Fairness and Transparency

In light of this situation, the Ministry is striving to ensure the effective, efficient acquisition of defense equipment, as well as the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases through initiatives aimed at increasing the efficiency of procurement and improving its fairness and transparency.

1 Basic Initiatives by the Ministry of Defense

1 Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement

Despite that the MOD has been endeavoring to increase the efficiency and rationalization of equipment procurement to date to achieve cost reductions to some extent, further efforts to increase the efficiency of procurement will be essential to the upgrading of defense capabilities, in light of the harsh situation surrounding the defense budget and equipment procurement at present.

Based on this awareness, since March 2013, there have been several meetings held by the “Project Team for Promoting Comprehensive Acquisition Reform” which is headed by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, and considerations are now proceeding for the advancement of acquisition reform in a robust manner through, amongst other things, reflecting acquisition efficiency policies that incorporate approximately 66 billion yen of economizing in the FY2014 budget.

2 Efforts to Increase Fairness and Transparency

The MOD aims to increase fairness and transparency in relation to the acquisition of equipment and materials, and has thus far implemented a variety of measures from the perspective of making contracts more appropriate, and strengthening checking functions respectively.

Recently, as a part of the effort to make public procurement more appropriate across the whole government, the MOD has been working on a number of measures, including the introduction and expansion of a comprehensive evaluation bidding system¹, the increase of multiple-year contracts, making bidding procedures more efficient, and reviews of single-tendering contracts.

¹ Unlike the automatic bid system, which focuses only on price, this is a system in which the successful bidder is determined on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation that includes both the price and other elements, which is used in cases in which it is appropriate to carry out such procedures as evaluating the technological elements.

Alongside these measures, a deputy chief in charge of auditing was assigned at the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office, and an auditing division was established in the Internal Bureau respectively, working toward strengthening checking functions.

However, because it emerged that in 2012 there was a violation of the Act on Elimination and Prevention of Involvement in Bid Rigging, etc. and Punishments for Acts by Employees that Harm Fairness of Bidding, etc. (commonly referred to as the “Bid Rigging Prevention Act”), in relation to a project to develop a new multi-purpose helicopter for the GSDF that had been contracted out to Kawasaki Heavy Industries, and that Mitsubishi Electric and four of its subsidiaries and affiliates, and Sumitomo Heavy Industries and a subsidiary² had engaged in overcharging, in December of the same year, the MOD announced measures to prevent recurrence, centering on the strengthening of system investigation, the revision of penalties, and the establishment of guidelines concerning bidding suspensions.

Furthermore, in June 2013, Sumitomo Heavy Industries reported to the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office that they had delivered “12.7 mm heavy machine guns” having falsified the results of product testing on them. The MOD is working to prevent recurrence, while implementing five months of bidding suspension measures against Sumitomo Heavy Industries.

2 Achieving Further Efficiency in the Acquisition of Equipment

1. Introduction of an PM/IPT System

Previous project management for equipment by the MOD has given jurisdiction for each stage of the life cycle, from conception and development, through mass production, to maintenance and upkeep, to the respective applicable bureau separately, making it difficult to respond to cost increases in a consistent and prompt manner. Therefore, a PM/IPT system is under development in which a cross-organizational Integrated Project Team (IPT) headed by a Project Manager (PM) is established for major projects, so that the project can be managed, in terms of cost, performance and schedule, in a unified way throughout the life cycle of the equipment product.

2 Promoting Standardization of Equipment and the Development of Product Families

The MOD and the SDF are endeavoring to promote the standardization of equipment and the development of product families, in order to achieve efficient procurement. As well as having endeavored to procure common equipment and supplies across the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, with a primary focus on small arms, vehicles, and chemical supplies (e.g. 5.56 mm machine

² Mitsubishi Electric, Mitsubishi Space Software, Mitsubishi Precision, Mitsubishi Electric TOKKI Systems, Taiyo Musen, Sumitomo Heavy Industries, and Sumiju Tokki Service.

guns, trucks, protective masks, etc.), the Ministry is striving to achieve reductions in the unit price of acquisition through curbing development expenses and achieving economies of scale, by such means as standardizing some components of short-range surface-to-air missiles used by the GSDF and ASDF, and the development of product families for anti-ship missiles used by all three branches of the SDF.

3 Efficiency by Intensive Procurement and Integrated Procurement

The MOD has endeavored to implement intensive procurement, which seeks greater efficiency by budgeting and entering into contracts for equipment, supplies and components based on the approach of consolidating the quantities required for several years into a single specific fiscal year. In addition, it has pursued integrated procurement, which involves the consolidated implementation of budgets for equipment used across multiple different organizations, or for components that are common to different types of equipment. For example, in the FY2014 budget, intensive purchasing of defense equipment such as the surface-to-ship missiles required to strengthen the defense structure of the southwestern region, saved approximately ¥33 billion on a contract base.

3 Effective and Efficient Maintenance and Replenishment

In order to deal with the increase in expenditure on the maintenance of defense equipment, initiatives focused on effective and efficient maintenance and replenishment are required. To date, the MOD has been endeavoring to achieve greater efficiency by extending the interval between periodic maintenance and to implement and expand the use of PBL (Performance Based Logistics), which is a new form of contract.

1 Greater Efficiency by Extending the Interval between Periodic Maintenance Checks

Having made adequate efforts to ensure that safety is not compromised, greater efficiency is being sought by extending the interval between periodic maintenance checks of defense equipment such as fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and Patriot missiles. For example, cost reductions have been achieved by extending the interval between overhauls for ten types of gas turbine engine on naval vessels from 8,000 hours, as it was prior, to 10,000 hours; and increasing the interval between progressive aircraft reworks of P-3C maritime patrol aircraft (P-3C) from 40 to 48 months.

2 Introduction of PBL

PBL, which involves paying compensation for achieving equipment performance in terms of availability ratio and safety, is a contract method that has achieved positive outcomes when

applied to the maintenance and servicing of equipment in Western countries. The MOD is getting down to its introduction of PBL from the perspective of maintaining and improving the equipment availability ratio and safety, while seeking long-term cost reductions. PBL contracts were concluded in FY2013 on some of the components of the ASDF initial training aircraft (T-7) and some of the engine components of a fighter (F-15). Survey and research will be conducted in FY2014 to contribute to the expansion and deepening of PBL method application.

4 Improving the Contract System

1 Background to the Review

In order to cope with the increasingly harsh environment surrounding the procurement of equipment and materials, the MOD is faced with the growing necessity to accept new ideas and promote the reform of acquisition in a more forceful way.

Against this background, the MOD has been holding meetings of the Contractual Systems Study Group of experts since 2010 to consider new measures.

In its deliberations concerning such matters as contracts relating to equipment procurement, the Contractual Systems Study Group has not only curtailed procurement costs from the government's point of view, but has taken a medium-to long-term perspective, keeping in mind efforts to improve the advantages of companies' participation in the defense business and build "win-win" relationships to reward those who have made efforts to improve efficiency.

2 Measures to Improve Systems Relating to Contracts for Defense Equipment

(1) Improvement of the Provision Requiring the Return of Excessive Profit

The provision requiring the return of excessive profit is a contract provision which stipulates that, in the event of any excessive profit remaining after the execution of a contract, companies must return this to the government. For the government, this provision is not only aimed at preventing the counterparty of the contract from generating excessive profits; it also has the advantage of enabling the collection of cost information through an audit after performance of the contract, as well as the advantage for the company that, because cost is allowed by the government, it forms the basis for the prices of similar contracts concluded in the future.

On the other hand, with contracts that include this provision, factors including cost reductions due to the companies' efforts have led to excessive profits generated which are subject to return, diminishing the effectiveness of cost reduction incentives for the company. Furthermore, careful evaluation is required concerning the appropriateness of imposing the excessive profit return

provision in regard to projects with multiple bidders, where substantial competitiveness is acknowledged to exist.

Accordingly, in March 2012, the MOD improved the regulations, as a result of which, this provision is not applied in the case of competitive contracts in which real competitiveness is ensured. At present, efforts are continuing to accelerate the pace of deliberations. The objective of this is to achieve a transition from cost audit contracts incorporating a provision requiring the return of excessive profit (contracts with a special provision stipulating that an audit of the actual costs incurred will be conducted and that the final amount paid will be established based on this) to an ordinary final and binding contract that establishes the contract sum from the time of concluding the contract, without any special provision concerning the amount to be paid and irrespective of any increase or decrease in the actual cost of manufacture.

(2) Improvement of the Contract System to Generate Cost Reduction Incentives

The MOD has undertaken a variety of initiatives in order to produce cost reduction incentives for companies to date, including the operation of an Incentive Contracts System³. Since being introduced in 1999, however, these incentive contracts have only been used for four projects. Furthermore, the rationalization of public procurement now requires that competitive procedures, such as an open tender, be conducted for each contract. However, in terms of the results, most cases are application by single entry, and these procedures have effectively lost all substance.

Accordingly, the Ministry of Defense made improvements to the System to Promote the Streamlining of Work Processes⁴ in April 2012, creating a system that, under certain conditions, accepts as an incentive fee an amount equivalent to 50% of the man-hours reduced, in the event that a company makes a commitment to reduce costs by achieving greater efficiency in its work by eliminating losses such as those arising from tasks in the manufacturing process. Furthermore, in April 2013, a system entered into force whereby contracts covered by this system (contracts concluded within a maximum of five fiscal years of the decision to apply the system) became single-tendering contracts, in the event that a company made a commitment to

³ A system aimed at motivating companies to reduce costs, whereby a certain proportion (rate) of the cost reduction effect is added as an incentive fee to the price calculated on the basis of the estimated price, in the event that the company proposes and employs cost reduction measures, such as technologies not envisioned at the time the contract was concluded.

⁴ A system jointly involving the public and private sectors to investigate whether there is room for streamlining work processes in which a fact-finding survey and analysis of work processes is performed by the MOD utilizing consulting companies, in order to raise the efficiency in the execution of contract counterparty duties.

use the system and achieve substantial cost reductions. At present, deliberations are underway with a view to the system attracting further initiatives for the cost reduction by reviews, such as diversifying the object to which incentives fees are to be given and reduction of rates⁵.

(3) Reducing Procurement Costs further through Multiple-year Contracts that Actively Utilize the PFI (Private Finance Initiative) Promotion Act⁶

In order to reduce costs, long-term contracts that are consolidated to a certain degree are essential. However, the upper limit for acts resulting in Treasury liability is five years, and it does not make business sense for companies to invest in such short-term contracts; thus, it appears that they refrain from investment that could lead to cost reductions and, furthermore, do not accept orders, in order to avoid risk.

Accordingly, by realizing the planned acquisition and execution of budgets using standardized investment amounts, it is anticipated that implementing long-term multiple-year contracts through the active utilization of the PFI Act and the Public Service Reform Act⁷ will give rise to such benefits as cutting equipment procurement costs by reducing risks for those accepting orders, and promoting the entrance of new suppliers. From this perspective, in regard to the project focused on the enhancement of the X-band communications satellite, which makes use of the PFI Act, the MOD concluded the contract for the project in January 2013.

3 Matters Relating to Measures to Prevent Recurrence of Overcharging

In order to unravel the motivation behind the series of cases of overcharging involving Mitsubishi Electric and other companies involved with defense, the MOD progressively began to conduct investigations and analysis of the motives of the companies in question, and compiled and published measures to prevent recurrences in December 2012.

Against the background of overcharging through the inflation of the number of man-hours involved in projects, the results of the investigation exposed the closed nature of defense-related divisions, which arises from the specific nature of the products (equipment and materials) that they handle. On the other hand, it emerged that the terms of trade unique to the procurement of equipment and materials – in terms of the fact that it is difficult to manage profit and loss, and to achieve sales in the same way that private sector companies usually expect to do – significantly influence their motivation.

⁵ The rate applied to the cost reduction effect as an incentive fee added to the calculated price is currently 50%.

⁶ Act on Promotion of Private Finance Initiative.

⁷ Act on Reform of Public Services by Introduction of Competitive Bidding.

Such background factors are not particular to Mitsubishi Electric and the other companies involved in these recent cases, but are considered to be a common challenge faced by the majority of companies involved in defense production. The measures to prevent recurrences seek to enhance and strengthen measures to alleviate the closed nature of those involved in defense production and increase transparency, as well as reviewing the measures toward the impartial evaluation of the costs and risks borne by companies. In March 2013, the Investigative Committee on Cases of Overcharging, chaired by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Sato, began deliberations concerning the specific implementation of these measures, with some of these measures entering into force the following month.

Section 3 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

1 Background

Japan has dealt with arms exports in a careful manner, in accordance with the Three Principles of Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines. On the other hand, in individual cases, such as the joint development of BMD by Japan and the U.S., it has taken separate measures by issuing Chief Cabinet Secretary's statements, where arms exports are dealt with outside the Three Principles.

Amidst this situation, the Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary On Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. was published in December 27, 2011. These Guidelines put in place exemptions from the Three Principles of Arms Exports based on the premise of strict control, in relation to the overseas transfer of defense equipment associated with cases related to peace contribution and international cooperation; and cases regarding international joint development and production of defense equipment, etc. that contributes to Japan's security. The strict control mentioned here refers to the duty imposed on recipient countries to gain prior consent of Japan with respect to extra-purpose use and third party transfer, within international arrangements concluded between Japan and the Governments of recipient countries.

See ▶ Reference 62 (The Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.)

2 Purpose of Establishment of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

Meanwhile, when Japan endeavored to arrange the participation of companies within Japan in the international logistics support systems for the manufacture of the F-35, in December 2013, and when 10 thousand rounds of ammunition owned by GSDF forces engaged in activities as a part of South Sudan PKO (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)) were provided to the U.N. based on a request by the U.N. since it was not possible to apply Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. for these cases, the measures were taken by issuing Chief Cabinet Secretary's statements not to rely on the Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.

In the "National Security Strategy" set out in December 2013, from the perspective of proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation, a more proactive involvement in peace contribution and international cooperation through the use of defense

equipment and other means, as well as participation in joint development and production of defense and other equipment is required. Based on this situation, clear principles were decided to be established which are suited to the new security environment in regard to the overseas transfer of defense equipment.

Based on the above, “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology”¹(was decided by the Cabinet Council, at the same time implementation guidelines for it were adopted by National Security Council. While maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation and giving due consideration to the roles that the existing policy guidelines have played so far, with consideration on the past accumulated exemption measures, new principles and guidelines have consolidated the policy guidelines comprehensively. New principles and guidelines also clarifies the concrete standards, procedures and limitation better than ever and state them clearly with transparency both internally and externally.

Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces, in addition to contributing even more to peace contribution and international cooperation, will also actively cooperate with Japan’s ally the United States and other countries in the area of defense equipment and technologies, and more proactively advance the measures required to maintain regional peace and stability and ensure Japan’s defense.

See ▶ Reference 63 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology)

3 Main Contents of the New Three Principles

1 Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited (the First Principle)

The cases in which transfer of defense equipment and technology shall be prohibited are clarified as when (1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded, (2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or (3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack).

¹ The term “defense equipment” is deemed appropriate for the title of “Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology”, since possible articles of overseas transfers help peace contribution and international cooperation as was seen in the example of the provision of bulldozers and other items belonging to the SDF to disaster-stricken countries. Similarly, due to the fact that there is provision of technology in addition to goods, the term “transfer” was adopted rather than “export.”

See ▶ *Fig IV-1-3-1 (Concrete examples of the First Principle “The cases where transfers are prohibited”)*

2 Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict examination and information disclosure (the Second Principle)

The cases where transfers may be permitted are limited to such cases as the transfer contributes (1) to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or (2) to Japan’s security. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. At the same time, standards of examinations and procedures will be clarified and made transparent, strict examinations systems of the Government as a whole including deliberations at the National Security Council are decided to be established.

See ▶ *Fig IV-1-3-2 (Concrete examples of the Second Principle “Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted”)*

3 Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties (the Third Principle)

Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, in cases where it is judged appropriate for the proactive advancement of peace contribution and international cooperation, cases involving participation in the international systems for sharing parts, and cases where parts are delivered to a licensor, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of the control system at the destination.

The Ministry of Defense has already advanced considerably in defense equipment and technology cooperation with other countries. Going forward, it will ensure further transparency under the new principles and increase the predictability of partner countries and defense industry. At the same time, it will control the transfer of defense equipment in a responsible manner in cooperation with the relevant Government agencies, while it will thoroughly secure defense technology that is important to the defense of Japan is protected. Thus, it will contribute even further to peace contribution and international cooperation.

See ▶ *Chapter II, Section 3*

See ▶ *Reference 76 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology)*

Section 4 Research and Development

1 Initiatives for Research and Development of Equipment and Materials

With limited financial and human resources, taking into account the latest trends in science and technology, changes in combat modality, the possibility of international joint research and development, the possibility of mutually effective integrated application of major equipment and so forth, a future vision for equipment will be established, which will set out the direction for medium-to-long-term research and development for each of major type of equipment, and human and financial resources will be invested effectively, so that new threats can be dealt with and technological predominance will be ensured in the sectors that are strategically important to security in order to enable the systemic implementation of advanced research from a medium-to-long-term perspective.

In recent years, the defense technologies and the civilian technologies have become dual use and borderless. In order to bring together the strengths of industry, academia and government, as these phenomena advance, and ensure that they are used effectively in the area of security, we will ascertain the trends in science and technology and promote the enhancement of collaboration with research institutions such as independent administrative agencies and universities, thereby both striving to make proactive use of applicable civilian technology in defense (spinning on), and trying to develop defense technology for the private sector (spinning off), and thus encouraging further advancement of technology based on a synergistic effect between defense and civilian technology. Because it has become mainstream idea to get involved in international joint development among advanced countries in order to deal with soaring costs while achieving higher performance, keeping in mind the idea of participation, Japan will advance cooperation with other countries in the field of equipment and technology based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. In promoting international equipment and technology cooperation and strengthening coordination between industry, academia and government, defense technology and the sensitivity and strategic character of dual use technology will be appropriately assessed, and the technology control function will be strengthened through efforts such as avoiding the risks in unintended diversion of weapons, from the perspective of Japanese security.

Moreover, in order to preferentially implement research and development that accords with the operational needs of the Self-Defense Forces under the current severe financial circumstances, the Ministry of Defense will continue to ensure consistency with the priority in the enhancement of

defense capabilities, based on cost-effectiveness when commencing research and development. From the perspective of optimizing the performance, scheduling, and cost throughout the lifecycle of equipment, analysis and comparison with multiple proposals, in terms of performance and cost and so forth will be thoroughly conducted at the concept, research and development stages, in addition to which, a system within which the Technical Research and Development Institute and Equipment Procurement and Construction Office will cooperate on cost estimates will be implemented from the development stage, as a part of the life cycle management, thereby avoiding a rise in the unit price for mass production of equipment.

2 TRDI Initiatives

The Technical Research and Development Institute makes highly promising technical proposals based on advanced research and technology seeds that correspond to the needs of the Self-Defense Forces while adopting advanced technology to develop, prototype, test and evaluate equipment such as maneuver combat vehicle, heavy weight torpedo (G-RX6) and new air-to-ship missile (XASM-3). An example that addresses the needs of the forces is a research on technology for building cyber training environments, which is one of the “operational verification research,”¹ development ongoing since 2002. It aims to verify the results of measures to deal with cyber-attack.

Moreover, from the perspective of joint operation, TRDI has been engaged in developing high-performance digital data link systems integrated on fighter aircrafts such as F-2 fighters to realize organized fighting by networking forces through tactical information sharing. It has also been engaged in researches (“operational verification research”) such as research on application of wireless secret communication function between the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces using software defined radio technology over already developed field communication network.

Furthermore, in order to improve air defense capability, TRDI has been promoting technological considerations on future surface-to-air missiles as well as strategic considerations (including demonstration research) on future fighters so that the fighter-related technology can be compiled and advanced within Japan and the development (including the possibility of international joint development) of fighters can be taken into account as an option before the retirement of F-2 fighters. Specifically, in order to ensure stealth, high-altitude and high-speed fighting capability,

¹ Research to design or prototype the equipment with new functions for each of the Self-Defense Forces, etc. The performance of the equipment etc. is decided while taking the opinions of users of the equipment into account. The research makes it possible to appropriately and timely adopt science and technology, which is dramatically developing, enabling swift fabrication.

research on fighter engines with high thrust has been conducted using cutting-edge materials technology. Research on the advanced technology demonstrator aircraft, a high-mobility stealth fighter, to which each of the advanced systems of the fuselage and engine are integrated² is also underway. In order to enhance warning and surveillance capability, development of radio wave information-gathering aircrafts, as well as research on sonar to which its detection capability is enhanced through the simultaneous use of multiple sonar, along with a new fixed warning and control radar are being conducted. Furthermore, research on unmanned equipment that can be used flexibly at times of various contingencies including large-scale disasters.

In addition to above, in order to detect ballistic missiles at their launching stage, TRDI has been conducting research on infrared sensors that can be integrated on patrol aircraft. The results of this research are now being utilized in the development of the systems-integration technology necessary to realize a ballistic missile warning and surveillance system which is integrated on unmanned patrol aircraft with downsized infrared sensors. Furthermore, in order to detect threats in the airspace such as stealth fighters, high-speed cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles at an early stage from distant place, research is ongoing on a radar-IR combined sensor which organically combines different sensors, namely radar and infrared sensors.

3 Technological Cooperation with Institutions Overseas and Within Japan

International joint development has become mainstream s within the international community to respond to soaring costs while achieving higher performance in defense equipment. Similarly, the Ministry of Defense is engaged in joint research and development with the U.S. Department of Defense, as well as making progress in its cooperation with other nations, such as the United Kingdom, in the field of equipment and technology. Moreover, as defense technology and civilian technology have become dual use and borderless, technological information exchange and research collaboration between TRDI and research institutions such as independent administrative agencies and universities, is being proactively implemented within Japan, in order to ensure that superior civilian technology is incorporated and efficient research and development is conducted.

In strengthening cooperation between industry, academia and the government, and driving international cooperation in equipment and technology, the sensitive and strategic aspects of defense and dual use technology are to be assessed appropriately, and the technologies that should be protected as a “strength” of Japan are to be protected At the same time, it is necessary to

² To build a system under which individual equipment components are combined, to ensure the maximum capability of equipment as a whole.

strengthen the technology control function, for example, in avoiding the risks of unintended diversion of weapons from the perspective of Japan's security. In ways ahead, collaboration with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry will be promoted, and efforts will be made to contribute to strict examinations and appropriate control, as per the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. In order to do so, a section was established in FY2014 to take responsibility for this.

See ▶ Fig. IV-1-4-1 (Cooperation with the U.S., other countries and domestic research institutions)

Section 5 Initiatives Aimed at Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases

1 Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases

Amid the present situation of rising competition from overseas companies caused primarily by the recent severe financial circumstances and reorganization of the global defense industry, the Ministry of Defense intends to maintain and strengthen the defense production and technological bases that are important and vital elements for the support of our defense capabilities. Hence, at the Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Committee on June 19, 2014, the Ministry of Defense decided on “Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases – For strengthening the bases to support defense forces and ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ –.”

1 Context of Formulation of Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases

(1) Context of formulation of strategy on defense production and technological bases and its place

As the war ended, the majority of Japan’s defense production and technological bases were lost. After the founding of the Self-Defense Forces and the subsequent period of reliance on America for supply and lending however, the Government and private sector collaborated, the basic guideline for production and development of defense equipment (so-called kokusanka-hoshin (guideline for indigenous development/production⁰)) of 1970¹, in efforts to achieve the domestication of production and licensed domestic production of the main defense equipment, and strived to strengthen Japan’s defense production and technological bases.

However, for the roughly 25-year period from the 1990s when the Cold War ended, factors such as the rise in unit costs, maintenance and upgrading expenses that came with the severe financial circumstances enveloping the country, and the increasing performance and complexity of equipment, as well as intensifying competition from foreign companies, contributed to a dramatic change in the defense equipment environment.

With all this in mind, it was determined in the National Security Strategy adopted in December 2013, “to strive for the effective and efficient acquisition of defense equipment, in order that Japan’s defense capability can be developed, maintained and used stably over the

¹ The basic guideline for production and development of defense equipment, the development guideline for defense industry, and the stimulation guideline for R&D (Directive July 16, 1970)

medium-to-long term by its limited resources, and to maintain and strengthen the defense production and technological bases of Japan, including raising its international competitive advantage.” Meanwhile, the new National Defense Program Guidelines stated that “to ensure the urgent maintenance and strengthening of Japan’s defense production and technological bases, a strategy will be established that indicates the future vision of Japan’s defense production and technological bases across the board.” As a result of this, the Ministry of Defense expressed a new direction for the future of maintaining and strengthening defense production and technological bases, in place of the “Guideline for Indigenous Development/Production” used previously, and adopted the new strategy in order to give new guidance to ensure the strengthening of the foundations that support Japan’s defense capability and proactive pacifism.

In order to concretize the strategy, it is necessary to take into account the fact that while the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases is a defense policy for ensuring the independence of Japan’s security status, it also combines an element of production policy, the effects of which will extend to the economic activity of private-sector companies, specifically defense production, and to work in collaboration with the relevant Government departments, rather than the Ministry of Defense alone. In addition, although in general the new strategy takes into account the next ten or so years, like the new National Defense Program Guidelines, it is based on the fact that change is expected to be very fast in areas such as the future security environment. It considers a change in the circumstances surrounding defense production and technological bases in the near future, and states that the necessary reports will be made at national security meetings, to be followed by reviews when needed.

(2) Change of security environment surrounding defense production and technological bases

As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes ever more severe, it will be necessary to efficiently overhaul our defense capability, to make it more comprehensive and effective, and to strengthen the systems involved so that various contingencies can be prevented or dealt with. Hence, it is essential to the protection of Japan’s national interests and fulfilment of Japan’s appropriate responsibilities in the international community, to respond assertively from a position of proactive pacifism based on the principle of international cooperation.

Japan’s defense production and technological bases, which make up one of the domestic foundations required to achieve these goals, face a challenge in that they are becoming fragile, which thus exposes them to changes in the international environment in the form of reorganization of European and American enterprises, and progress in international joint

development. Meanwhile, based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology adopted in April 2014, new changes are coming about in the regulatory environment, namely the overseas transfer of defense equipment.

See ▶ Part.IV ,Section1-1 (Defense Production and Technological Bases, and the Current Status of Defense Equipment Acquisition)

2 Goals and Significance of Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases

By maintaining and strengthening the defense production and technological bases on the basis of the strategy, we intend to (1) guarantee the independence of Japan's security, (2) potentially contribute to increased deterrence and maintain and improve bargaining power, and (3) contribute to the sophistication of domestic industry in Japan through cutting-edge technology. Taking into account these three objectives and their significance, efforts will be made to balance the defense production and technological bases Japan has cultivated to date with efforts to optimize and make more efficient, the acquisition of defense equipment, as well as its maintenance.

3 Basic Stance for Promoting Measures

In order to achieve the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases, it is necessary to promote the required policies based on the fundamental viewpoints of (1) developing a long-term partnership between the private and public sector, (2) strengthening international competitive strength, and (3) combining these with the streamlining and optimizing of defense equipment acquisition.

4 Methods of Defense Procurement

The acquisition of defense equipment is carried out at present by employing and introducing multiple acquisition methods, such as domestic development, international joint development and production, licensed domestic production and commercially produced articles. The format of these methods however, directly influences our defense production and technological bases. Going forward, in order to effectively and efficiently maintain and strengthen defense production and technological bases, it will be necessary to select the appropriate method on a case-by-case basis, to suit the characteristics of the defense equipment, including international joint development and production which will be possible to address in a more flexible and maneuverable manner with the newly adopted Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

5 Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases

In order to maintain and strengthen defense production and technological bases, acquisition methods that accord with the characteristics of each type of equipment will be combined efficiently, while policies are pursued to maintain and strengthen the foundations. In so doing however, firstly, across the entire technology sector in relation to defense equipment, the distinction between sectors in Japan which are comparatively superior and subordinate will be clarified specifically, and secondly, the functions and performance which should be provided by future defense equipment will be envisioned, taking trends in defense technology into consideration. This will allow us to ascertain the direction in which the required technology is evolving, based on which, it will be necessary to develop policies that emphasize variety and efficiency, considering the severe financial situation, in terms of for example, supporting research institutions such as companies and universities which have foundations suited to the task.

Based on such ideas, the following six efforts will be pursued. (1) Improvement of contract systems, etc., (2) policies relating to research and development, (3) defense equipment and technological cooperation, etc., (4) efforts relating to defense industry organizations, (5) strengthening of systems in the Ministry of Defense, and (6) promotion of policies in collaboration with other relevant ministries.

See ▶ Fig.IV-1-5-1 (Policies for the Maintaining and Strengthening of Defense Equipment Production and Technological Bases)

6 Course of Action for Each Area of Defense Equipment

Based on the ideas and policies previously stated regarding the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases in the main defense equipment sectors (ground equipment, supplies, etc., ships, aircraft, explosives, guided weapons, communications electronics and command control systems, unmanned equipment, cyber and space systems), as well as the matters emphasized for system improvement in the Self-Defense Forces as indicated in the new National Defense Program Guidelines, the future direction for the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases in each respective field, and the acquisition of defense equipment in each, will be presented and translated into a corresponding plan for the Ministry of Defense, and efforts made to increase predictability on the company side.

See ▶ Fig.IV-1-5-2 (Direction in the Various Defense Equipment Sectors)

2 Adapting Defense Equipment for Civilian Use

The Ministry of Defense is working in partnership with other ministries in considering not only maintaining and strengthening its defense production and technological foundations, but also civilian use of aircraft developed by the Ministry of Defense, which is expected to bring about a reduction in the procurement prices of SDF aircraft and other equipment.

In August 2010 a set of guidelines was compiled, stipulating the method in which companies will pay usage fees for aircraft to the Japanese government, and the disclosure and use of technical data possessed by the Ministry of Defense, for the implementation of a concrete system for converting aircraft to civilian use.

Later, in 2011, the Ministry of Defense developed the application procedure for private companies interested in civilian use. At present, technical data related to the civilian use of the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft and the C-2 transport aircraft are being disclosed in response to requests from the implementing companies. Also, given that India has been considering the procurement of amphibian search and rescue aircraft, the establishment of the Joint Working Group (JWG) to facilitate bilateral cooperation for the US-2 aircraft was decided during the Japan-India Summit Meeting held in May 2013. In December 2013, the first JWG meeting was held in Delhi, and in April 2014, the second JWG meeting was held in Tokyo, where the Japanese representatives provided information on the US-2, and both Japan and India sides agreed on continuous discussions regarding the mutual concerns on cooperation relating to the US-2 aircraft. In addition, on the day before the second JWG meeting, the JWG Indian delegation experienced a US-2 Flight and made a visit to the factory.

The possibility of civilian use of equipment other than aircraft will be considered based on the needs of foreign countries and the intentions of the defense industry.

3 Participation of Japanese Industry in the Production of the F-35A

In December 2011, Japan selected the F-35A as the next-generation fighter aircraft to succeed the F-4 fighter aircraft. At the same time, the government decided to procure 42 F-35A aircraft from FY2012 onwards and to have Japanese companies participate in its production, aside from several finished aircraft which shall be imported. In light of this decision, the Japanese government has been working to enable the involvement of Japanese companies in the manufacturing process in preparation for the F-35A acquisition from FY2013 onwards. Following discussions with related parties such as the U.S. government, the participation of Japanese companies in the Final Assembly and Check Out (FACO) for airframe and the

manufacture of certain engine and radar parts was decided in FY2013. In FY2014, the companies plan to start to further participate in the manufacturing process, in the engine FACO and the production of parts within the infrared detection device, the Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS)².

It is important for Japanese companies to participate in the manufacturing process and to come into contact with cutting edge fighter aircraft technology and knowledge in order to ensure safety and high operational availability, resulting in the safe and efficient management of ASDF F-35As.

Japan's industrial participation in manufacturing from FY2015 onwards shall be examined, considering various factors such as the significance of Japan's industrial participation, coordination with other parties such as the U.S. government, and also Japan's financial situation.

² Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS), comprising six cutting edge electro-optical sensors per aircraft for 360 degree spherical situational awareness, missile detection and tracking.

Chapter 2 Relationship between the Japanese People and the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

In order to exert their defense capabilities with the maximum effectiveness, it is vitally important that the Ministry of Defense and the SDF enhance and strengthen the human foundation that underlies these capabilities. The various activities of the MOD and the SDF are not possible without understanding and cooperation from every individual of the public, as well as local governments and others. We need to deepen mutual trust between local communities, the people, and the SDF.

Section 1 Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force

1 Recruitment and Employment of Personnel in the MOD and the SDF

The MOD and the SDF need highly qualified personnel in order to fulfill their missions. Uniformed SDF personnel and other personnel of the MOD and the SDF are recruited and employed under various systems.

See ▶ Reference 64 (The Breakdown of the Personnel of the Ministry of Defense)

1 Recruitment

In recent years, expectations and support from the public for the MOD and SDF have risen higher than ever. In Japan, however, due to the declining birthrate and increasing university enrollments the recruitable population has been decreasing in size, and the general recruitment climate for SDF personnel has been becoming increasingly severe. As a result, due to the nature of the SDF's mission of defending Japan, it is necessary to widely recruit personnel nationwide with superior abilities and a strong desire to enlist from among those with an interest in the SDF or who wish to become SDF personnel, after carefully explaining to them the role of defending the country, the duties and training, the particular lifestyle (life on base, etc.), and personnel management systems (early retirement fixed-term service, rank systems).

See ▶ Fig. IV-2-1-1 (Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF)

For this reason, the MOD and the SDF have enhanced their recruitment activities in response to the changing times, by holding recruiting meetings at schools and placing advertisements in job information magazines. Specifically, they maintain Provincial Cooperation Offices in 50 locations throughout Japan (four in Hokkaido, and one in each prefecture) to which SDF personnel with unit assignment experience in the GSDF, ASDF, and MSDF are deployed as PR

officers to respond in detail to the individual needs of applicants, with help in the form of understanding by educators and support from recruitment counselors.

Moreover, local governments are also required to carry out some of the administrative recruitment activities, such as announcing the recruitment period and promoting the SDF as a workplace, for which the MOD allocates them the requisite budget. In order to secure high-quality personnel, it is essential to further enhance recruitment activities with the cooperation of local governments through their close ties with the community.

2 Employment

(1) Uniformed SDF personnel

Based on a voluntary system (individuals join of their own free will), uniformed SDF personnel are recruited under various categories namely General Officer Candidates and General Enlisted Candidates (Upper)¹, Candidates for Enlisted (Lower)², students of the National Defense Academy and High Technical School³, etc.

See ▶ Fig. IV-2-1-2 (Overview of Appointment System for SDF Regular Personnel)

Due to its uniqueness as a career, personnel management of uniformed SDF personnel differs from that of other civilian government employees⁴. Among these differences, what greatly sets the SDF apart from other government organizations is that in order to ensure a powerful SDF, it has introduced an “Early Retirement System,” and “Fixed Term System.” Upon employment, uniformed SDF personnel who enlist in each SDF service complete their basic education and training in a training unit or at a school belonging to the respective service. Each individual is assigned a branch of service job appropriate to their choice or aptitude during education and training. After they have completed their course, they are appointed to units and positions all

¹ Until FY2006, the SDF had two “enlisted (upper)” recruitment systems for candidates between the ages of 18 and 27

² Fixed-term SDF personnel, prior to their formal employment as a private (GSDF), seaman apprentice (MSDF), or airman third class (ASDF), will be employed as candidates for uniformed SDF personnel and receive education and training to foster their sense of mission, responsibility, unity, discipline, and compliance. This system was adopted from July 2010.

³ System to recruit those who expected to graduate from junior high schools to become SDF personnel who can respond with confidence in international community, while using and operating systematized equipment with enhanced functions at the GSDF in the future.

Starting with those employed for FY2011, a recommendation test system was adopted in which, in addition to the general test, suitable applicants would be chosen to be technical high school students from among those who had received a recommendation from the principal of the lower secondary school.

⁴ SDF personnel must perform duties such as defense operations as specified in the Self-Defense Forces Law. They are, therefore, designated as special national government employees under Article 2 of the National Civil Service Law, and personnel management of SDF personnel is conducted independently from that of general civilian government employees.

around the country.

See ▶ Reference 65 (Authorized and Actual Strength of Self-Defense Personnel); Reference 66 (Status of Recruiting and Employing SDF Regular Personnel (FY2013))

See ▶ Fig. IV-2-1-3 (Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Regular Personnel)

(2) SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, SDF Reserve Personnel, and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel

The number of SDF uniformed personnel should be expanded promptly in the event of a crisis, to meet the needs of each contingency. To fulfill such needs promptly and systematically, the MOD maintains three systems: the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system, the SDF Reserve Personnel system, and the system for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel⁵.

See ▶ Fig. IV-2-1-4 (Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel)

a. SDF Reserve Personnel System

SDF Reserve Personnel become SDF personnel in cases such as the issue of muster orders for defense, and serve as personnel for logistical support and base guard duties.

SDF Reserve Personnel can be employed from retired SDF personnel based on their application, or can be employed after they complete all of the SDF Reserve Personnel Candidates' training. They remain engaged in their own jobs as civilians in peacetime and maintain preparedness by mustering for five days of training per year.

b. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel System

SDF Ready Reserve Personnel introduced into the GSDF become SDF personnel in cases such as the issue of muster orders for defense, and carry out their mission together with active-duty SDF personnel as part of pre-designated frontline units.

SDF Ready Reserve Personnel are selected from retired SDF personnel based on their application. They muster for a total of 30 days of training per year at the designated unit to maintain the necessary proficiency while working in their own jobs as civilians in peacetime.

c. SDF Reserve Personnel Candidate System

The SDF Reserve Personnel Candidate system was established to strengthen and expand the foundation of defense for those with no experience as SDF personnel to secure a stable source of SDF reserve personnel, and to make good use of competent technical specialists from the

⁵ Many countries other than Japan also have reserve personnel systems.

civilian sectors, with expertise in areas such as medicine and foreign languages. There are two employment categories in this system; general and technical. In the latter category, medical professionals and qualified personnel in such fields as foreign languages, information processing, legal affairs and radiation control are recruited. SDF Reserve Personnel candidates are assigned as SDF Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training to work as SDF personnel.

d. Measures for SDF Reserve Personnel

(a) Cooperation with Companies Employing Reserve Personnel

As SDF Reserve Personnel are involved in their own civilian jobs during peacetime, they need to participate in muster for exercises to maintain the required level of skills by either adjusting their work schedule or taking days off from work. In the event of a crisis, the SDF may have to engage in necessary activities for a long time, and accordingly, SDF Reserve Personnel are likely to be mustered for a long time or several times. Therefore, understanding and cooperation from the companies that employ these SDF Reserve Personnel are essential for the smooth operation of the program. In particular, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel are supposed to attend training for 30 days per year, so the necessary cooperation with respect to their employees, such as allowing Ready Reserve Personnel to take leaves of absence, is required.

To enable reserves to participate in training sessions without any constraint, the MOD has taken into consideration the burden on companies employing Ready Reserve Personnel, providing a special subsidy to companies which take the necessary steps to allow such employees to attend training sessions.

(b) Further application of SDF reserve personnel, etc.

The new National Defense Program Guidelines state that in order to support the continued operation of forces in diversifying and longer-term situations, SDF reserve personnel should be applied more widely over a range of fields, and measures should be implemented to increase the rate fulfillment of actual SDF personnel. For example, MOD will employ retired ASDF pilots currently working as pilots for private airlines as SDF reserve personnel. In FY2014, MOD will promote PR activities for the SDF Reserve Personnel system since the year marks the 60th anniversary of the founding of the system.

See ► Part II, Chapter 4, Section 3 (Details of the New National Defense Program Guidelines); Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1 (Reemployment of SDF Pilots)

(3) Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Other

Civilian Personnel

There are approximately 21,000 civilian personnel — administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others — in addition to uniformed SDF personnel in the MOD and the SDF. Civilian personnel are mainly employed from among those who have passed the Examination for National Public Officials for either career track or general staff run by the National Personnel Authority (NPA), and those who have passed the Examination for Defense Ministry Professional Civilian Officials run by the MOD. After participating in the common training course, civilian personnel recruited in this process undertake a wide range of work.

Administrative officials are engaged in policy planning in the Internal Bureau, and analysis and research at the Defense Intelligence Headquarters as well as a variety of administrative work (general affairs, personnel affairs, budget, public relations, military facilities-related activities, etc.) at the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country.

Technical and engineering officials are engaged in constructing various defense facilities (headquarters, runways, magazines, etc.), carrying out R&D and effective procurement, maintenance and improvement of a range of equipment, and providing mental health care for SDF personnel at the Internal Bureau, Technical Research and Development Institute, and Equipment Procurement and Construction Office, as well as at the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country.

Instructors conduct advanced research on defense-related issues and provide high-quality education to SDF personnel at the National Institute for Defense Studies, the National Defense Academy, the National Defense Medical College, and other organizations.

2 Daily Education and Training

Education and training are crucial for the SDF to strengthen its ability to accomplish its missions by developing its human resources. The SDF is making efforts despite various constraints to educate its personnel and train its units to develop them into powerful personnel and forces, while paying careful attention to safety, in areas such as accident prevention.

1 Education of Uniformed SDF Personnel

Enhancing the ability of the individual SDF uniformed personnel who comprise SDF units is essential to the execution of the units' duties. At its schools and training units, therefore, the SDF provides opportunities for systematic and phased education according to rank and duties,

in order to nurture the necessary qualities and instill knowledge and skills.

For instance, to train and educate pilots and air traffic controllers takes a long period of time, and this training and education also requires instructors with special skills, equipment and educational facilities. Thus, considerable investment in terms of personnel, time, and funding from the MOD and the SDF is necessary in order to provide this training. In the event that personnel need to further improve their professional knowledge and skills, or it is difficult for them to acquire them within the SDF, they may study at external educational institutions⁶, including those abroad, as well as domestic companies or research institutes.

See ▶ Reference 67 (Outline of the SDF Educational System)

In recent years in particular, in order to strengthen joint operation structure, the SDF has set up a joint educational program system, mainly at the Joint Staff College⁷, where SDF officers who will become senior unit commanders and senior staff can receive a joint education, thereby enriching the system of joint educational program at the respective educational facilities for the GSDF, MSFD and ASDF⁸, including the Joint Staff College itself.

2 SDF Training

(1) Training by Each SDF

Training conducted by units in each service can be broadly divided into training for individual SDF personnel to improve the necessary proficiency for their respective fields, and training for units to enhance their systematic capabilities. Training for individuals is conducted one-on-one in stages based on occupational classification and individual ability. Training for units is conducted by size of unit, from small to large; meanwhile, large-scale comprehensive training including coordination between units is also conducted.

See ▶ Reference 68 (Major Exercises Conducted in FY2013)

In addition to such training for national defense, enhanced training is given in response to the diversified roles required of the SDF in recent years, such as peacekeeping operations and large-scale disaster relief operations. Moreover, in order to strengthen joint operational capabilities and to better respond to various situations, efforts are being made to expand the

⁶ Such external educational institutions in FY2014 include the Tokyo Institute of Technology and Waseda University in Japan, and the National Defense University (United States) and Harvard University (United States) overseas; etc.

⁷ The Joint Staff College is attached to the Joint Staff Office, and educates SDF officers on joint operations.

⁸ Institutes of each SDF service where SDF officers of each service and others receive education on security, defense strategy, and other subjects.

scope of bilateral and multinational exercises engaged by the individual SDF services⁹.

(2) Training Environment

SDF training has been planned and conducted under conditions that are as close as possible to actual combat situations, yet many restrictions remain. To deal with these restrictions, each SDF branch makes maximum use of its limited domestic training areas. The new National Defense Program Guidelines and Mid-Term Defense Program state that units across the country will make further use of the prime training environment of Hokkaido. They also strive to carry out more practical combat training by conducting live-firing training and joint exercises in the United States and surrounding sea and airspace where they can secure training conditions not available in Japan.

See ▶ Reference 69 (Results of Fire Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States(FY2013))

3 Safety Management Initiatives

Because the primary mission of the SDF is to defend Japan, SDF training and activities are inevitably accompanied by risk. However, various accidents that cause injury to the public or damage to its property, or the loss of life of SDF personnel, must be avoided at all costs. Therefore, during routine training for warship and aircraft operation or target practice, for example, the MOD and SDF make a united effort to ensure the constant management of safety through the utmost mindfulness of ensuring safety.

The MOD and the SDF cooperated to the fullest extent in an investigation by the Japan Coast Guard into the cause of an incident which occurred on January 15, 2014 when an MSDF “Osumi” transport vessel and a small ship collided. In response to this incident, both the MOD and the SDF plan to dedicate themselves to ensuring that the causes of accidents are investigated and recurrence prevented in the future, based on the results of the Ministry of Defense Accident Countermeasures Committee and other considerations.

3 Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources

In order to provide an appropriate response to such recent challenges as the declining birth rate, the growing tendency for young people to enter higher education, and the diversification of the duties of the SDF, the MOD and the SDF are promoting various measures to make effective use

⁹ Training includes SDF Joint Exercises, Japan–U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercises, and Ballistic Missile Response training which are to prevent and repel direct threats to Japan. Other training is that such as International Peace Cooperation Exercises that assumes SDF’s international peace cooperation activities and Joint International Humanitarian Operation Training, in which the handling of prisoners is practiced.

of the human resources which form the foundations that enable Japan to demonstrate its defense capabilities.

1 Deliberation on Personnel Measures

With regard to the personnel structure of the SDF, while the total number of personnel has been decreasing since the enactment of the 1995 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), SDF units and other offices have been facing the need for further skilled and professional personnel in order to respond to the sophistication of equipment as well as the diversification and internationalization of SDF activities.

As a result of these circumstances, the new National Defense Program Guidelines call for appropriate assurance of the strength of the SDF, and the implementation of measures for personnel system reform, so that human resources can be utilized effectively under constrained financial circumstances. Accordingly, measures will be employed to ensure an appropriate composition of ranks and age distribution taking into account the various missions and characteristics of each branch of the SDF. Specifically, the new Mid-Term Defense Program states that the retirement age of 60 will be reviewed, that an early retirement system will be proactively employed, and that more suitable personnel management will be implemented for private/seaman/airman, as measures to make the age distribution more appropriate in the respective officer, warrant officer, sergeant/petty officer, and private/seaman/airman ranks. Measures will also be implemented to allow aircraft pilots to be re-employed in the private sector. Furthermore, the final promotion rates of officers, warrant officers and sergeant/petty officers will be reviewed, and in order to maintain the strength of the SDF, more appropriate personnel management will be employed that takes into account physical attributes.

See ► Part II, Chapter 5, Section1 (Column: Reemployment of SDF Pilots)

2 Enhancement of Pay and Conditions

The duties of the SDF make no distinction between night and day. The work assigned to uniformed SDF personnel can be extremely demanding, involving various operations onboard aircraft, long-term service on ocean ships or submarines, or parachuting. To instill SDF personnel with pride and allow them to concentrate on their duties without anxiety, the MOD and the SDF strive to provide salaries and allowances, medical care, welfare, and other benefits that reflect the special nature of their duties. Furthermore, the new National Defense Program Guidelines and new Mid-Term Defense Program state that measures relating to awards and honors will be pursued, beginning with the expansion of the system of Defense Meritorious Badges.

3 Initiatives for Further Utilization of Female SDF Personnel

The MOD and the SDF open their doors wide not only to men but to women to fulfill their duties. At the end of March 2014, the number of female personnel is about 13,000 (about 5.6% of total SDF personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March, 2004, at around 4.6% of total SDF personnel), this is a rise of 1.0, indicating that the ratio of female personnel has been on an increasing trend in recent years. While there are still limitations to certain assignments, due to the requirement for protecting motherhood and securing privacy (excluded from assignment to tanks, submarines, fighters, etc.), female SDF personnel engage in boarding escort vessels and piloting antisubmarine patrol aircraft and transport aircraft, and their roles are expanding even at the nucleus of the SDF, such as the staff offices and headquarters.

In order to continue the further expansion of recruitment and promotion of female SDF personnel, the MOD and the SDF drew up the “Basic Plan for Gender Equality in the MOD (FY2011-FY2015)”¹⁰ in March 2011. The plan calls for the consideration and implementation of numerous measures to allow female SDF personnel to lead a balanced life between work and family without having to quit their job, and to further expand the range of activities available to them. For example, ongoing initiatives include the active participation of female SDF personnel in core operations, in the SDF headquarters for example, further use of female SDF personnel in international peace cooperation activities, and the proactive operation of a program for replacement personnel for child care leave.

Similarly, the new National Defense Program Guidelines and new Mid-Term Defense Program state that female SDF personnel will be engaged further, in order to ensure more effective utilization of human resources, and note that the MOD will continue to make multilayered initiatives to utilize female SDF personnel in the near future.

4 Promotion of Measures to Support Child-Raising

Based on the “Action Plan to support a good work-family balance of the personnel of the MOD” (FY2010– FY2014) formulated in March 2010, the MOD presently implements measures aimed at actively encouraging male personnel to take child care leave and other special leave relating to child-raising, such as compiling a handbook for personnel in senior position and male personnel, and holding lectures to educate them about these leave systems.

¹⁰ The plan calls for expanded recruitment and promotion of female administrative officials in addition to female SDF personnel, as well as the consideration of measures for the involvement of male staff in child-raising and nursing.

Internal crèche facilities will be established to respond to the need for special working arrangements within in the SDF, in addition to which the required conditions are being enhanced on an ongoing basis, to facilitate the temporary care of children when personnel must suddenly attend to duties, such as when dispatched to a disaster area.

5 Initiatives to Support Families

Measures such as exchanges between units and personnel's families, as well as between family and family, will be pursued as routine initiatives. Furthermore, specific welfare services for SDF personnel deployed overseas for international peace cooperation or anti-piracy operations include facilitating direct communication between SDF personnel on deployment and their families in Japan by means such as e-mail and video conference systems, in order to enable them to maintain close bonds with their families. In addition, troops and their families exchange recorded video correspondence. Moreover, briefing sessions for families of the dispatched personnel are held to provide them with a variety of information, and family support centers and family counseling rooms have been established to respond to various questions raised by the families.

6 Discipline-related Initiatives

The MOD and the SDF make initiatives on a daily basis to increase compliance with laws and other regulations, as well as raising awareness of these. Also, in March 2012, the MOD and the SDF distributed the "discipline reference material," which explains the gist of instructing subordinates in order to develop well-disciplined personnel.

Moreover, campaigns such as the "Anti-Drug Abuse Month" and the "Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Week" have been established, with the objective of instilling in personnel an awareness of compliance with the law.

7 Initiatives to Prevent Suicide among SDF Personnel

The same is true for the SDF, and while a record was set in FY2004, with 94 SDF Regular Personnel suicides, subsequent figures have shown a decline, with 78 suicides in 2011, 79 suicides in 2012, and 76 suicides in 2013.

The suicide of a member of the SDF is truly a great tragedy for both the persons who committed suicide and their bereaved families, and it represents a great loss to the MOD and the SDF in terms of the loss of capable personnel. The MOD and the SDF are taking on-going measures to prevent suicide, including the following initiatives:

- Expansion of the counseling system (internal/external counselors, a 24-hour telephone counseling hotline, assignment of clinical psychotherapists at camps and bases, etc.)
- Promoting education among commanders and education aimed at raising enlightenment, such as mental health education for enlisted personnel
- Establishing a campaign period for enhancing mental health measures, ensuring thorough initiatives by commanders to closely monitor the mental condition of subordinates whose environment has been changed due to personnel transfers, etc. , and providing various reference materials

8 Commemorating Personnel Perished in the Line of Duty

Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in 1950 and through its evolution via the National Safety Force and the Coastal Safety Force into the SDF today, SDF personnel have been striving to accomplish the noble mission of protecting the peace and independence of Japan. They have accomplished this by devoting themselves unstintingly to training, day and night, to live up to the expectations and trust of the Japanese citizens, regardless of danger, and with a strong sense of responsibility. During this time, however, more than 1,800 personnel have lost their lives in the line of duty.

In the MOD and the SDF, funeral ceremonies are carried out by each SDF unit to which the personnel who perished in the line of duty belonged, in order to express condolences. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the achievements of the SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty, and to express deep honor and condolences, memorial ceremonies are carried out in various forms, such as the Memorial for SDF Members Killed in the Line of Duty conducted with the participation of the Prime Minister¹¹.

9 Dealing with Retirement and Outplacement of SDF Personnel

An early retirement system and a fixed-term service system is in place for SDF uniformed personnel, in order to maintain the strength of the forces. Therefore, unlike civilian government

¹¹ The Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962 in Ichigaya. In 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was completed by combining this monument with other monuments located in the same area. A memorial ceremony for SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty is held annually by the MOD. This ceremony is attended by surviving family members of the honored dead, and also attended by the Prime Minister and high-ranking officials of the MOD and the SDF including the Minister of Defense, former Directors-General of the Defense Agency, and others. At the Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel who perished in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the MOD, they make offerings of flowers, expressing their respect and condolences to personnel who perished in the line of duty. Memorial ceremonies are also held at individual SDF posts and bases.

employees, many SDF uniformed personnel retire by their mid-50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) or their 20s (most uniformed personnel serving under the fixed-term service system), and many of them need to find another job after retirement in order to secure their livelihoods.

It is the responsibility of the Japanese government (the MOD) as the employer to support this re-employment. This is of the utmost importance both for resolving any concerns that SDF uniformed personnel may have about their future so they can work diligently without any worries while in service, and for boosting morale and securing high-quality human resources; support measures such as training helpful to re-employment is provided for this reason. Measures to ensure the re-employment of retired SDF personnel is also important from the perspective of enabling them to serve society with their various skills, thereby reinforcing human resources infrastructure in society.

As the MOD is not authorized to work as an employment agency, the SDF Personnel Support Association has permission from the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to provide free job consultations to retired SDF personnel.

Each retired uniformed SDF personnel possesses excellent abilities in planning, leadership, faculty, cooperativeness and, responsibility gained through work performance and education and training across a wide range of duties and fields. Furthermore, they have various qualifications and licenses acquired through their work or occupational training. For these reasons, they are active in a broad range of sectors, including the manufacturing and service industries, in addition to the finance, insurance, real estate, and construction industries, where they are highly evaluated by their employers regardless of their duties or field during active service. These personnel are also employed by local governments as staff in charge of risk management and disaster prevention. Based on the new NDPG, the MOD is trying to improve the reemployment situation for retired SDF personnel by developing measures to increase incentives for private companies to hire them, and by further promoting their appointment to positions in the public sector.

Furthermore, with a view to creating an environment where SDF personnel can devote themselves to their duties without any worry, the MOD has a reappointment system that enables SDF personnel to be appointed for fixed terms of up to three years before the age of 60 (for SDF administration officials and others, up to one year).

See ► Fig. IV-2-1-5 (Main Measures for Reemployment Support); Fig. IV-2-1-6 (Overview of Reappointment System)

10 Regulations on Reemployment of Retired SDF Personnel

Meanwhile, reemployment of SDF personnel is regulated¹² in order to ensure public service impartiality. When SDF personnel get jobs at private companies within two years of retirement, and if that company had a contract with the MOD within five years before that SDF member's retirement, the approval of the Minister of Defense or other delegated authority must be sought in accordance with the regulation. In 2013, the MOD approved 98 cases (97 individuals) of reemployment of SDF personnel by private companies.

4 Enhancement of Medical Functions

1 Introduction of a Four-year Nursing Course at the National Defense Medical College

The MOD and the SDF have been facing an increasing need to train high-quality nurses equipped with the expertise and skills required to fully respond to the diversification and internationalization of duties, and the sophistication and complication of medical technology, and also equipped with well-rounded humanity and the ability to make accurate judgments. For this reason, a four-year "nursing program" was introduced for the training of public health/registered nurses at the National Defense Medical College, Faculty of Nursing, in April 2014.

The nursing program consists of two courses, one for education and training of nurses who will be SDF officers (1 year course, 75 attendees; hereinafter "SDF officers' course"), and the other for education and training of nurses who will be technical officers working at the affiliated hospitals (1 year course, 45 attendees; hereinafter "technical officials' course"). The SDF officers' course will also provide education and training as required for becoming senior SDF officers. Among graduates of the nurse training program, those who have completed the SDF officers' course will be assigned to work at SDF medical units and SDF hospitals after finishing the necessary training at the Officer Candidate Schools, while those who have completed the technical officers' course will be assigned to work at the National Defense Medical College Hospital, which deals with cases that require advanced medical technology.

2 Enhancement of Education of Medical Officers and Nurses

SDF medical personnel are required to have appropriate discernment and quality as SDF personnel according to the respective ranks and positions and display leadership in the medical field. Furthermore, they are also required to have the ability as a clinician in comprehensive

¹² "Seclusion from private companies" is stipulated in Article 62 of the SDF Act.

medicine. Furthermore, they are engaged at all times toward the objective of maintaining and increasing their abilities.

However, the fill rate of SDF medical personnel is currently at a low level, and in particular, it is considerably low for the middle level personnel who are supposed to play a central role in international peace cooperation activities. Such low sufficiency is caused by medical officers leaving the SDF, one of the major reasons of which is the lack of opportunity to engage in training and medical practice.

The MOD and the SDF will make efforts to prevent medical officers from leaving the SDF by providing them with more opportunities to engage in training and medical practice so that they can acquire, maintain, and improve specialist skills, while increasing motivation for their work and loyalty to their organization. At the same time, the MOD and SDF will take various measures as soon as possible to train medical officers who are capable of performing diverse duties properly.

Furthermore, based on the new Mid-Term Defense Program, the system of training for nurses and emergency medical personnel will be strengthened, and efforts made to ensure the availability of staff possessing more specialist and high-level skills.

3 SDF Hospitals as Hub Hospitals with Enhanced Functions

SDF hospitals are required to play the role of hospitals that are to admit SDF personnel injured while in service in response to various emergency events, and in normal circumstances, these hospitals are also required to play a role in providing medical treatment for SDF personnel and their families, etc. and educating medical staff to maintain and improve their skills.

For this reason, based on the new National Defense Program Guidelines and new Mid-Term Defense Program, SDF hospitals will be centralized, consolidated, and their performance levels increased; a network will be created between hospitals and medical offices; and an active contribution made to local medical care, in addition to which an efficient and high-quality medical care system will be established, including an improvement of the operation of the National Defense Medical College Hospital and other such institutions.

The required considerations will be made, including examination of the systems themselves for responding to contingencies, so that the aid capabilities are in place to provide the highest level of lifesaving for SDF personnel injured on the front line, while the arrangements for prompt

onward transfer of patients will be improved. In addition, the functioning of the National Defense Medical College will be strengthened to make it a center of training and research for defense medicine, with features one cannot find in general medical schools.

Section 2 Interaction between the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, and Local Communities and Japanese Citizens

The various activities of the MOD/SDF cannot all be carried out by themselves. They only become possible with the understanding and cooperation of individual citizens, municipal governments, and other organizations. The new National Defense Program, Guidelines states that the MOD and the SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations, including local governments, the police and the fire service, in order to enable the SDF to provide accurate to various situations. Moreover, the MOD/SDF have been conducting various cooperation activities to support the lives of nationals, as well as striving to minimize the impact of the establishment and operation of defense facilities¹ on the lives of surrounding citizens. Such activities are further deepening the mutual trust between the local community and the people, and the SDF, and greatly contributing to maintaining and revitalizing local communities.

1 Collaboration with Local Communities

1 Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society

The SDF conducts activities to support the lives of the citizens in a range of fields relating to the population, upon request from municipal governments and relevant organizations. Such activities are further deepening the mutual trust between the local community and the people, and the SDF, and providing SDF personnel with the pride and self-confidence that comes with their continual usefulness to the lives of citizens.

Even today, the GSDF still handles the disposal of unexploded ordnance found throughout Japan. In FY2013, there were 1,560 such cases, weighing about 57.1 tons in total. In particular, cases handled in Okinawa Prefecture accounted for about 40% of the total. Furthermore, the MSDF continues to clear and dispose of underwater mines and other dangerous explosives. In FY2013, there were approximately 333 explosives, totaling about 4.8 tons. In addition, most of the SDF camps and bases in Japan allow access to their facilities by municipal governments and neighboring residents upon request, unless the requests interfere with unit activities. Furthermore, SDF musical bands visit brass bands of local schools to give them instruction, thus striving to foster friendly interaction with local residents.

In addition to the above, the MOD/SDF is aiding the transport, communication and so forth at a

¹ The generic term for facilities used by the SDF and the facilities and areas used by the U.S. Forces in Japan based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. It refers to training areas, airfields, ports, communication stations, barracks, warehouses, ammunition depots, oil bunkers; and so on.

variety of athletic events, such as marathons and relay races, in response to requests from the relevant organizations. In addition to providing general medical care at the National Defense Medical College and some other SDF hospitals, it supports regional medical treatment efforts, by conducting the urgent transport of emergency patients from isolated islands that lack sufficient treatment facilities (the Nansei Islands, Goto Islands, Izu Oshima, Ogasawara Islands, etc.) by SDF rescue aircraft. Furthermore, based on the policy of contracts between the country and its small-and-medium enterprises, it ensures opportunities for these enterprises to receive orders, while taking efficiency into account.

See ▶ Reference 70 (Activities in Civic Life); Reference 71 (Activities Contributing to Society)

2 Cooperation from Municipal Governments and Other Related Organizations for the SDF

(1) Cooperation in Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Support for Outplacement

Amid the recent harsh recruitment and employment situation, the cooperation of local government and relevant organizations is vital to secure highly qualified personnel and to assist the outplacement of uniformed SDF personnel who retire in compliance with early retirement system of SDF.

(2) Support and Cooperation for SDF Activities

SDF camps and bases are located in all prefectures, and maintain close relations with the local communities. Various forms of cooperation and support from the local communities, such as close coordination with local government, are indispensable for the SDF to conduct diverse activities including training exercises and disaster dispatch. Moreover, units dispatched overseas for international peace cooperation and other duties, receive support and assistance from the relevant organizations for the procedures involved.

In addition to this kind of support and cooperation from local communities, many letters of encouragement are sent by the people to SDF personnel engaging in international peace cooperation activities, which raise the morale of SDF personnel and reinforce their awareness of serving the people of Japan.

3 Activities for Securing Understanding and Cooperation of Municipal Governments and Local Residents

Regional Defense Bureaus make efforts to build cooperative relationships with local communities through various activities, in collaboration with SDF units and Provincial Cooperation Offices.

In concrete terms, Regional Defense Bureaus hold seminars on defense issues for local residents and give briefings on the defense white papers to municipal governments, with an aim of gaining the understanding of defense policies from the general public. They also hold Japan–U.S. friendship programs, which have promoted exchanges between Japanese citizens living near the U.S. facilities and areas in Japan and U.S. Forces personnel and their families through sports and culture. On the occasion of the reorganization of U.S. Forces and of SDF units, deployment of equipment, and implementation of military training, Regional Defense Bureaus provide necessary explanations and coordination for the related municipal governments, so as to gain their understanding of these measures. Furthermore, in the event of a large-scale disaster, accident, or any other emergency situation, Regional Defense Bureaus conduct liaison and coordination with the related municipal governments as necessary. When North Korea launched missiles that they purported to be “satellites” in April and December 2012, the bureaus conducted liaison and coordination with the related local public entities for the deployment of the Patriot PAC-3 units in Okinawa Prefecture and the Metropolitan Tokyo area, through collaboration with the MOD and other SDF units.

4 Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

(1) Scale and Features of Defense Facilities

The uses of defense facilities are diverse, from maneuver areas and airfields to ports and barracks, and they often require large volumes of land. The land area of defense facilities as of January 1, 2014, is approximately 1,400 km² (the sum of the land area of SDF facilities, the land area of the facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and the land area of facilities other than SDF facilities which the U.S. Forces in Japan are jointly using under the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement), which accounts for approximately 0.37% of the country’s land. Of this, approximately 42% of the land area of SDF facilities is situated in Hokkaido. Divided by use, approximately 75% of this is maneuver areas. Meanwhile, around 24% of the land area of the facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the U.S. Forces in Japan is jointly used by the SDF under the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. Due to Japan’s geographical characteristics, there are some cities and industrial facilities that must coexist with defense facilities on narrow plains. In particular, problems related to restricted presence and operations of defense facilities have emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many defense facilities as a result of economic development. Also, noise related to frequent takeoffs and landings by aircraft, firing, bombing, gunshots from artillery, tank operations, and so on raises concern in local residential communities over its effect on the living environment.

See ▶ *Fig. IV-2-2-1 (Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots)); Fig. IV-2-2-2 (Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities))*

(2) Initiatives to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

Defense facilities, as bases which support the defense capabilities of Japan and the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, are indispensable to the country’s security. The MOD has been securing harmony between the defense facilities and surrounding areas in order to fully maintain those capabilities, and working to obtain the understanding and cooperation of the local residents, as it is necessary to constantly maintain conditions for stable utilization. For that purpose, the MOD has taken Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas since 1974, based on the Act Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Act).

See ▶ Fig.IV-2-2-3 (Measures for Harmony Between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas)

See ▶ Reference 72 (Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities)

a. Measures of the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities

Based on the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities, the MOD has been undertaking various measures to prevent, alleviate, mitigate impediment such as aircraft noise caused in the surrounding areas by the SDF or U.S. Forces activities, or by establishing and operating defense facilities including airfields.

In regard to measures based on the Act, given that demand received from relevant municipal governments is strong, in 2011, the MOD partially revised the Living Environment Improvement Act and conducted a review to make it possible for the specified defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants to be applied to so-called soft projects, such as aid for medical expenses, as well as their conventional purpose focused on the improvement of public facilities, and to make the measures more effective and more convenient for the related municipal organizations. In addition, the MOD added defense facilities which can be designated as specified defense facilities intended for delivery of grants. Focused work is also underway to provide residential sound insulation, as a part of further progress in construction efforts.

In consideration of opinions summarized at the Administrative Project Review which was held in November, 2013 regarding the specified defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants, that “the Ministry of Defense should advance efforts to ensure thorough application of

the PDCA cycle², by ascertaining the situation regarding use by target facilities and the implementation of funding, making grant eligibility stricter, with respect for instance to providing extra for basic administrative services, establishing specific rules regarding the PDCA cycle, and so forth. In addition, efforts should be made to ensure the thorough implementation of activities to enhance notification to local residents about the grants,” the Ministry of Defense aims to implement the efforts required to fully engage in these areas, and increase the effects of the grants.

See ▶ Reference 73 (Partial revision of the Act Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities)

b. Considerations for Future Harmonization of Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

The MOD is fully considering ways to more effectively and efficiently develop measures to harmonize defense facilities and surrounding areas, in light of the severe fiscal situation, based on requests by related municipal governments.

See ▶ Fig. IV-2-2-4 (FY2014 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas Near Bases (Based on Expenditures))

2 Initiatives to Mitigate the Local Impact of the Stationing of USFJ

1 Initiatives for the Use of Lands Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces

For the return of lands in Okinawa provided for use by the USFJ (hereinafter, “USFJ Land”), the “Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces” stipulates various measures concerning the USFJ Land agreed to be returned. Mainly, the MOD: (1) conducts mediation in relation to access for surveys, etc. to be implemented by prefectural governments and local municipalities on the USFJ Land which are agreed to be returned; (2) conducts measures applying to all the returned lands to remove impediments for use such as soil contamination and unexploded ordnance, not only those caused by the activities of the stationed forces, before handing over the land to the owners of former USFJ Land; and (3) provides financial benefits to alleviate the impact on the owners of the returned lands and to promote use of the land.

The MOD will continue its initiatives to promote the effective and appropriate use of returned lands by coordinating and cooperating with related ministries, prefectural government and local municipalities.

² A method of managing the work process. By repeating the four stages of actions, plan→do→check→act, the process is subjected to continual improvement.

2 Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ Facilities and Areas

(1) Initiatives to Conserve the Environments Around USFJ Facilities and Areas

At the “2+2” meeting in September 2000, based on the recognition that environmental conservation is important, the governments of both nations agreed to make it a common objective to ensure the health and safety of residents in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas, U.S. Forces personnel, their families and other such parties, and made the “Joint Statement of Environmental Principles³.” To follow up on this announcement, Japan-U.S. consultation was enhanced. Specifically, relevant ministries are collaborating in initiatives on enhancing cooperation in regular review of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEKS)⁴, information exchanges on the environment, and responses against environmental pollution.

Additionally, at the “2+2” meeting in May 2010, from the perspective of shared responsibility for environmental conservation, Japan and the United States instructed their staffs to discuss the possibility of taking a “Green Alliance” approach for the U.S. Forces facilities and areas in Japan, and the adoption of renewable energy for U.S. bases under development in Japan as one of the elements of the Host Nation Support (HNS) was reviewed, along with other issues. The result was reflected in the comprehensive review of HNS.

On December 25, 2013, the governments of both Japan and the U.S. announced the “Joint Announcement on a Framework Regarding Environmental Stewardship at U.S. Armed Forces Facilities and Areas in Japan.” The governments commenced discussions aimed at the creation of a framework for increased initiatives in managing the environment associated with USFJ facilities and areas, and are considering, amongst other things, the establishment of an agreement to supplement the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement.

As for the implementation of the Futenma Replacement Facility project, it was determined to take maximum environmental conservation measures in order to avoid or reduce impacts on the environment as much as possible. Such measures include consideration and implementation of measures to improve environmental conditions to make them suitable for sea turtles to come onto land and lay eggs, the transplanting of corals and seaweeds, periodic aircraft-based

³ Consisting of four items; (1) environmental governing standards, (2) information sharing and access, (3) response to environmental contamination, and (4) environmental consultation.

⁴ JEKS is an environmental standard compiled by USFJ in order to ensure that USFJ activities and installations protect the natural environment of people and health, and stipulates the handling of environmental pollutants and storage methods within the facilities and areas.

checking for the habitat of dugongs, and the use of rubble⁵ for land-fill material, which is produced regardless of the project; it was also determined to engage in other enhanced initiatives such as follow-up surveys. In order to implement these measures, an environmental monitoring committee was established to ask for advice and guidance by specialists and experts, as was considered when approval was given by the governor of Okinawa Prefecture for the reclamation. In addition, where necessary, environmental conservation measures will be improved and the range of surveys will be expanded to make sure all possible measures will be taken.

(2) Other Measures

Japan is engaged in steps for the improvement of the living environment in regions surrounding USFJ facilities and areas. It also provides municipalities with base grants⁶ which have alternate features in terms of municipal tax on real estate.

See ▶ Section 1-4 (Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas)

Moreover, in the vicinities of USFJ facilities and areas, incidents and accidents caused by U.S. Forces personnel and others have affected local areas and their residents, so the Government of Japan has requested USFJ to take effective measures for the prevention of recurrence, such as educating military personnel and others, and enforcing strict discipline among them. The Government of Japan is cooperating with USFJ in these preventive measures; at the same time it has taken measures for prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the incidents and accidents.

Responding to the gang rape resulting in bodily injury case caused by two U.S. Navy service members in Okinawa in October, 2012, the United States reviewed its guidelines for off-duty action (liberty policy) and introduced a new liberty policy in February 2013. Because ceaseless initiatives by the people involved is important for the prevention of incidents and accidents involving U.S. Forces personnel, the MOD will continue efforts to prevent incidents and accidents involving U.S. Forces personnel based on feedback from the communities and institutions involved.

3 Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities

1 Various Public Relations Activities

⁵ Byproduct created in producing broken stones at the quarry.

⁶ Furnished by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

The activities of the MOD/SDF to protect the peace and security of Japan cannot be carried out without the understanding and support of the Japanese people. For this reason, it is important to be proactive in undertaking easily comprehensible public relations activities and to gain the trust and cooperation of the public.

The public expectations and evaluations towards the SDF have been increasing as the scope of MOD/SDF activities has expanded both domestically and internationally, including international peace cooperation activities in the Republic of South Sudan, antipiracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and domestic disaster relief activities for the Great East Japan Earthquake.

With regard to this point, in a “Public Opinion Survey” conducted by the Cabinet Office in January 2012, 91.7% of nationals – the highest rate since the survey began – replied that they “have a positive impression⁷” of the SDF. In addition, 97.7% responded that they “appreciate⁸” the SDF’s disaster relief activities for the Great East Japan Earthquake, while 87.4% responded that they “appreciate⁹” the SDF’s activities overseas.

In light of this vitalization of MOD/SDF activities, and the high level of expectations and support for the SDF among the public, the MOD/SDF will continue to conduct a variety of PR activities, thereby striving to ensure better understanding of the current status of the SDF.

See ▶ Reference 74 (“Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt))

(1) Website and Brochures

The MOD/SDF conducts PR activities using a wide variety of media, including providing information, gathering public opinions, distributing PR videos via the Internet, and broadcasting commercial films for each SDF service. As for the recent activities, the MOD/SDF has enhanced its function to communicate information via social media such as Facebook and Twitter. The MOD also provides some of its website content in an optimized form for smartphones.

The MOD has been making great efforts to provide accurate information on the SDF and national defense to all levels of nationals in a more extensive and timely fashion, in forms such

⁷ The figure for “Have a positive impression” is the total of the responses “Have a positive impression” and “Tend to have a positive impression.”

⁸ The figure for “appreciate” is the total of the responses “highly appreciate” and “appreciate to a certain degree”.

⁹ The figure for “appreciate” is the total of the responses “highly appreciate” and “appreciate to a certain degree”.

as production and distribution of brochures and PR videos which explain MOD policies and the activities of the SDF, manga edition of the defense white paper which targets younger readers, cooperation on media coverage, and assistance in editing the PR magazine MAMOR.

Furthermore, as SDF activities overseas have been expanding, the international community is increasingly interested in the MOD/SDF. In light of such circumstances, the MOD has been engaged in initiatives to transmit information to the international community through activities such as publishing the monthly English magazine, “Japan Defense Focus,” which is distributed to foreign embassies in Japan as well as to Japanese embassies abroad, thereby helping people in foreign countries understand more about the MOD/SDF initiatives. It is proactively transmitting information to the international community through efforts such as providing foreign media with opportunities to cover stories, through participation in regular press conferences, enhancement of the English section of the MOD website, publishing an English version of the defense white paper, and producing various policy brochures and PR videos in English.

(2) Events and PR Facilities

The MOD/SDF conducts activities to inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. These activities include the annual GSDF Fuji Fire Power Exercise conducted at the foot of Mt. Fuji, cruises to experience MSDF vessels throughout Japan, and demonstration flights and boarding experiences on aircraft at open base festivals at ASDF bases. In addition, at camps and bases throughout the country, events including equipment exhibitions, unit tours, and SDF band concerts are held on occasions such as the anniversary of a unit’s foundation. In some instances, they also hold parades throughout the cities both in vehicles and on foot, with cooperation from the local communities. Furthermore, in commemoration of the anniversary of the SDF, the SDF Marching Festival is held at Nippon Budokan arena every year. The festival attracted approximately 35,000 visitors in total last year.

Concerning annual reviews by the SDF, a troop review, a fleet review, and an air review are hosted in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF respectively, at which SDF equipment and achievements in daily training are exhibited to the public. In 2013, a fleet review was hosted by the GSDF at the Asaka training site. Around 33,000 people attended the review and the rehearsal. In 2014, a ceremony was held in May to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the ASDF. In addition, an air review commemorating the 60th anniversary of the MOD/SDF is planned to be held for late October at Hyakuri Base.

The MOD/ SDF also actively opens PR facilities to the public. For instance, the PR facilities in the MOD at Ichigaya are open to visitors on two guided tours each weekday, one in the morning and afternoon. The number of visitors reached 340,000 as of the end of June 2014.

In addition, the MOD/SDF provides cooperation for shooting films (“Sukuitai! Doctor's Wish”, “Blue Impulse” and “THE NEXT GENERATION-PATLABOR-” and “Kokunan 3.11 the Great East Japan Earthquake.”

Furthermore, each SDF service has a large-scale PR facility. The SDF camps and bases throughout Japan have also made PR facilities and archives open to the public.

In recent years, students from junior high schools and high schools in areas struck by disasters such as the Great East Japan Earthquake have visited the MOD to express their gratitude for disaster relief operations. The Ministry of Defense is taking advantage of opportunities such as this to encourage understanding of defense issues among young people, by showing them around JGSDF Camp Ichigaya, and other such efforts.

(3) Trial Enlistment Programs

The MOD/SDF offers SDF Life Experience Tours¹⁰ and Enlistment Experience Programs¹¹ at the request of private companies, etc. These programs are intended to deepen their understanding of the SDF by offering the opportunity to experience the daily life and training of the SDF, as well as to have direct contact with SDF members, by staying at an SDF camp or base for two to three days. In FY2014, approx. 170 persons participated in SDF Life Experience Tours. From private sectors, the SDF received approx. 1,300 requests for Enlistment Experience Programs, and approx. 27,000 employees experienced SDF life.

2 Initiatives for Information Disclosure

(1) Appropriate Operation of the Information Disclosure System and Personal Data Protection System

In accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs in 2001, the MOD discloses its administrative documents properly. In the light of respecting individual rights in line with the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs, the MOD takes measures to ensure the security of the personal information under its

¹⁰ Information on the Summer Tour/Spring Tour for College Students, Ms. Parsley Tour (trial tour for women in their 20s); and One-Day Visit to SDF for Women etc. is available on the MOD website.

¹¹ Tours to experience the daily life of the Ground, Maritime, or Air SDF. To participate in an Enlistment Experience Program, please contact local Provincial Cooperation Offices.

jurisdiction, and discloses such information upon due request.

See ▶ Reference 75(Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2013))

(2) Appropriate Operation of the Whistleblower Protection System

The MOD set up a system to handle public interest-related information disclosures by its officials and employees and outside workers, establishing an internal contact desk for dealing with information disclosure that is in the public interest and whistleblower protection.

(3) Engagement in Policy Evaluation

The MOD has been conducting the evaluation of various policies based on its policy evaluation system, and in FY2013, it assessed 24 such policies, beginning with the “Strengthening of Systems relating to Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Cooperation.”

Section 3 Reform of the Ministry of Defense

1 Background of the Reform

The purpose of the reform of the Ministry of Defense (the MOD reform) is to secure public trust, and shape the MOD as an organization that is capable of adequately performing the missions assigned to it. The MOD has made every effort to implement the MOD reform, including the reorganization of the central organization from the standpoint of preventing scandals; and ensuring that the SDF operates more actively and efficiently through the effective use of human resources.

In response to the frequent incidence of scandals within the MOD and the SDF, the “Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense” was established in the Prime Minister’s Office in 2007, and a report compiled in 2008. In accordance with the basic directions stipulated in this report, the MOD made various initiatives aimed at the MOD reform, including thorough adherence to rules and regulations, and the establishment of operational management that prioritizes the execution of duties, with the aim of total optimization; as well as the establishment in law of the Defense Council, the Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense, and the abolition of the post of the Director of Defense in 2009, in order to strengthen support for the Minister of Defense and ensure more thorough civilian control. Furthermore, incorporated in the FY2010 budget request made in August 2009 was an organizational reform proposal which detailed, amongst other things, unification into the Internal Bureau of defense capabilities build-up departments in the MOD central organization, and unification into the Joint Staff of the operational departments. However, the request was passed over in the FY2010 budget request in October 2009 due to the change in administration to the Democratic Party of Japan in September 2009, which resulted in a review of the MOD reform reviewed from the DPJ’s perspective.

The subsequent change in administration to the Liberal Democratic Party and New Komeito in December 2012 promulgated the release of the “Direction by the Minister of Defense on the MOD Reform” and the establishment of the “Committee for the Deliberations on the MOD Reform (referred to as “Committee” hereinafter),” whose chairperson was the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense in February 2013, in order to accelerate the deliberations on the MOD reform. The Committee is conducting the necessary considerations together with a review of approaches to defense capabilities and putting its efforts to realize required measures, from the perspectives not only of preventing scandals but of making the SDF operate more actively and efficiently through the effective use of human resources, and accomplishing the civilian control

over the SDF under the severe security environment facing Japan.

With regard to the business operation and structure of the central organization, the Committee is giving necessary consideration, taking into account the lessons learned from handling recent incidents such as the Great East Japan Earthquake and the launch of missiles by North Korea, and in tandem with the discussion to strengthen the commanding function of the Prime Minister's Office concerning national security such as the establishment of the Japanese National Security Council.

2 Direction of the MOD Reform

1 Course of Considerations

Based on discussions and considerations conducted at Committee and various other levels, the "Direction of the MOD Reform" was arranged at the 7th Committee Meeting on August 29, 2013, and reported to the Defense Council and made public on the 30th of the same month.

See ▶ Reference 76 (Direction of MOD Reform)

2 Basic Concept and Direction of Reform

The fact that the security environment surrounding Japan is increasingly severe has been recognized, as have a number of lessons relating to the use of units in like the Great East Japan Earthquake. Changes have also arisen in the policy environment, including the establishment of the National Security Council and comprehensive exceptional measures relating to the Three Principles on Arms Exports (as it was then).

The "Direction of the MOD Reform" determined that full-fledged reform would be undertaken, taking due account of the matters specified in previous considerations, on the basis of situational changes such as those above. The course of action for this full-fledged reform including reorganization, which is also stipulated in the Mid-Term Defense Program (JFY2014-2018), is as follows.

(1) Removal of Barriers between civilian official and Uniformed Personnel

In order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, permanent posts for uniformed personnel will be established in the Internal Bureau, while permanent posts for civilian officials will be established in each of the Staff Offices and major commands.

(2) From partial to total optimization (defense capabilities build-up)

In order to eliminate defense capabilities build-up based on individual, vertically-divided

optimization for the ground, maritime and air forces, and ensure that build-up is instead conducted based on total optimization, a procedure will be established for defense capabilities build-up based on joint operation. In combination with this, equipment acquisition will be streamlined and optimized by means of management of equipment throughout its lifecycle, and sections involved in equipment acquisition will be reorganized in order to contribute to the overall optimization of defense capabilities.

(3) Make accurate decisions more swiftly (Joint Operation)

In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operation of the SDF and make the process swifter, a review of the organization will be conducted so that affairs concerning actual operations will be unified into the Joint Staff office.

(4) Enhancement of Policy-planning and Public Relations Capability

Policy-planning functions will be enhanced in response to the rapid increase in international affairs-related work and the establishment of the National Security Council. In addition, public relations capability will also be strengthened.

In order to make the reforms in the “Direction of the MOD Reform” truly effective, a change in the mentality of both civil officials and SDF personnel is vital, and it is necessary for reforms to be advanced smoothly so as not to invite disruption and stagnation in operations in response to contingencies. For this reason, it is important to establish a series of reforms through steady and phased implementation while Internal Bureau and Staff offices equally support the Minister of Defense.

3 Specific Reform Initiatives

Based on the direction of the reform detailed above, specific areas were arranged for the MOD.

See ▶ Fig. IV-2-3-1 (Specific Initiatives in the MOD Reform)

Based on the foregoing, the initiatives below are being implemented during FY2014.

First, the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense will be revised, and a total of 40 permanent posts for uniformed officials will be established in the Internal Bureau; while permanent posts for civil officials will be established in the Joint Staff, the each Army Headquarters of the GSDF, the Yokosuka and Sasebo Headquarters of the the MSDF, the Air Defense Command Headquarter and Air Defense Support Command Headquarter of the ASDF.¹

¹ Reflecting these changes, the “Act for Partial Revision of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Act”

In response to the diversifying security challenges and rapidly increasing volume of international affairs, in order to ensure support system for political appointees including Minister of Defense, a Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs will be newly established to collectively coordinate important policies such as international affairs.¹

Furthermore, a cross-functional Integrated Project Team (IPT) headed by a Project Manager (PM) will be established, and so that projects can be managed in a unified way throughout the life cycle of the equipment, a PM will be assigned to be exclusively responsible for the management of each project.

In addition to these initiatives, considerations will be pursued over the medium term toward organizational restructuring, including the integration of departments associated with equipment acquisition (with a view to the establishment of a Defense Equipment Agency (provisional name), and the revision or abolition of the Bureau of Operational Policy, due to the unification of work relating to actual operations into the Joint Staff office.

See ▶ *Fig. IV-2-3-2 (Deliberation Framework on the MOD Reform)*